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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
Between 1940 and 1945, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) carried out sabotage 
and organised resistance across occupied Europe.  There have, however, only been a 
small number of scholarly studies of SOE’s activities, and no specific examination of 
its involvement in occupied Norway.  This thesis, therefore, is the first multi-archival, 
international, and academic analysis of its policy and operations in this country and 
the influences that shaped them.  The proposition is that it was the changing 
contribution of both SOE and Norway within the wider strategic context in Europe 
that was the predominant factor behind its plans for this theatre, and other factors, 
although material, were of secondary importance.  These included SOE’s relationship 
with the Norwegian government-in-exile and the resistant movements that emerged in 
response to the occupation, especially Milorg, which set out to form an underground 
army within the country.  As well as collaboration with the other clandestine 
organisations and regular armed forces that had a military involvement in Norway.    
 Through an examination of these contextual influences this work argues that 
between 1940 and 1945, in step with its original strategic role, SOE’s policy for 
Norway consisted of a short-term objective, which through activities such as sabotage 
was to help undermine German fighting strength, and a long-term objective of 
forming a secret army.  These aims could not, however, be achieved or implemented 
without the co-operation of the Norwegian military authorities and Milorg, who 
provided most of the manpower, and the assistance of the other military agencies that 
often operated alongside SOE.  From the beginning, therefore, SOE deliberately set 
out to work with all these parties, but always on the basis that any joint activity was 
undertaken in accordance with British and Allied interests. 
 This meant that SOE’s operations in Norway were ultimately the result of a 
blend of influences.  It was, however, this country’s subordinate and peripheral 
position in relation to the main thrust of Allied strategy in Europe that was the crucial 
factor.  The constructive relationship that the organisation eventually had with the 
Norwegian authorities and Milorg was also important because it meant that SOE both 
received the support it required and managed to ensure Allied control over special 
operations in this theatre.  It was, therefore, a relationship that was beneficial and 
rather than undermining SOE’s plans, it underpinned them and guaranteed they 
remained in step with strategic and military requirements.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the early hours of 9 April 1940 German forces occupied a number of 
strategically important towns along the Norwegian coast from Narvik in the north to 
Oslo in the south.  Allied forces began arriving in Norway from the middle of April, 
but what turned out to be a disastrous campaign was over when the last Allied troops 
left Narvik on 8 June and the Norwegian units that remained in the country 
capitulated two days later.  This left Norway occupied for the next five years by 
enemy forces that at the time of the German surrender in May 1945 totalled over 
350,000 military and civilian personnel.
1
  The Norwegian government arrived in 
Britain on 10 June 1940 to continue the fight „to regain Norway‟s independence‟, 2 
and as Norway‟s constitutional and legitimate authority the government-in-exile spent 
the next five years endeavouring to mobilise all possible resources, including those of 
its allies, to win back the freedom of its country.
3
  On 7 June 1945 King Haakon VII, 
Norway‟s first monarch after its separation from Sweden in 1905, arrived back home 
five years after departing into exile with the Norwegian government. 
 Although the brief Allied sojourn in Norway in the spring of 1940 was a 
failure it did not result in Britain turning its back on the country, either strategically or 
militarily.  Between 1940 and 1945 the Royal Navy (RN), Royal Air Force (RAF), 
Combined Operations, and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), were all active in this 
theatre.  Moreover, soon after its conception in July 1940, a new organisation also 
began to take an interest in the country; this was the Special Operations Executive 
(henceforward SOE).  SOE was set up, according to its founding charter, „to co-
ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas‟, 
and therefore over the coming months it gradually subsumed those organisations, such 
as Section D and MI (R), which had previously been responsible for such activities.
4
  
                                                          
1
 At the time of the German surrender there were eleven divisions in Norway (192,500 men), with 
137,520 of this total in the north.  The other services, civilians, semi-military, such as the Todt 
organisation that was responsible for the construction of large military and civilian projects and those 
employed by the Wehrmacht totalled 165,200.  Public Record Office (henceforth PRO): „Report on the 
visit to Allied land forces by MO 3 colonel, 14-18 June 1945‟ in WO 216/568. 
2
 Proclamation by Johan Nygaardsvold, the Norwegian Prime Minister, which was broadcast over 
Tromsø radio on 9 June 1940, cited in A. Moland, Over Grensen? (Oslo: Orion Forlag, 1999), pp. 24-
25. 
3
 Olav Riste, London regjeringa: Norge i krigsalliansen, vol. I, prøvetid 1940-1942, (Oslo, Det Norske 
Samlaget, 2
nd
 edition, 1995), p. 20.    
4
 The War Cabinet approved the Charter on 22 July 1940.  It states that Section D, M.I.(R), and Electra 
House (EH), a propaganda department under the Foreign Office, would all be placed under SOE‟s  
 2 
With responsibility to the Minister for Economic Warfare, over the next five years 
SOE sent over 500 agents into Norway to carry out a range of operations that included 
coup de main attacks, sabotage, assassination, and attempts to organise an 
underground guerrilla army.
5
 
This thesis is an examination of SOE‟s policy and operations in Norway 
between 1940 and 1945 within the context of the major strategic and political 
influences that shaped them.  It uses archival material from both Britain and Norway, 
including SOE files at the Public Records Office (PRO) in Kew, West London, which 
from 1993 have been gradually opened up to researchers.  Unlike with France or the 
Low Countries
6
 a specific scholarly history of SOE in Norway has not been 
published.  There are several British publications that contain chapters or sections on 
Norway, but these have not made use of the extensive SOE material in Oslo.  They 
consist of either a short narrative of aspects of SOE activity, such as its use of the 
Shetlands Base, or an outline of some of its many operations, and therefore are not 
detailed and wide-ranging analyses.
7
  Studies of the Norwegian government in exile 
and the Home Front
8
 have examined the impact of SOE‟s involvement in Norway 
upon Anglo-Norwegian relations and the development of resistance, but again are 
founded on the use of single archival material or were unable to use the recently 
released SOE files at Kew.
9
  There are also many anecdotal accounts, memoirs or 
recollections written by ex-Norwegian SOE operatives that afford an insight into the 
human element of working underground in an occupied country and provide 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
wing.  See: PRO: WP (40) 27, SOE Charter, 19 July 1940, in CAB 66/10.   
5
 The SOE‟s Norwegian section history has a total of 542 agents whilst a recently released SOE 
Headquarters file has a total of 592 officers and men.  Only three British recruits and no women went 
into Norway on behalf of SOE.  Both are gross totals.  PRO: HS2/175, Norwegian Section History – 
Appendices, Appendix B, „A Short History of the Linge Company‟ and file HS8/280, „British Military 
Aid to the Occupied Territories‟.  
6
 M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France, (London: HMSO, 1966) and M. R. D. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries 
(London: St. Ermin‟s Press, 2001). 
7
 Charles Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, (Oxford: OUP, 1986).  W. J. M. Mackenzie, The Secret 
History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1945, (London: St. Ermin‟s Press, 2000).  M. 
R. D. Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946, (London: Pimlico, 1999).   
8
 The expression Home Front was the collective term used during the occupation for all resistance 
against the German occupation and Nasjonal Samling (NS), the Norwegian Nazi party.  The word was 
also used to describe all patriotic Norwegians in occupied Norway.  See: H. F. Dahl [et al], Norsk 
krigsleksikon 1940-1945, (Oslo: J.W. Cappelen, 1995), p. 175. 
9
 Sverre Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene: hovedtrekk av den militære motstanden under okkupasjonen, 
(Oslo: Aschehoug, 1959) and Olav Riste, London regjeringa: Norge i krigsalliansen, vol. I, prøvetid 
1940-1942: vol. II, vegen heim 1942-1945, (Oslo, Det Norsk Samlaget, 2
nd
 edition, 1995).   
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important background on some of SOE‟s actions.  They do not, however, impart much 
information on the wider influences behind the operations.
10
  
Consequently, there is a gap in the literature for an international, academic, 
and multi-archival history of SOE in Norway, which rather than being a 
straightforward narrative will be an analysis of the many influences behind the 
organisation‟s policy and operations.  This thesis also for the first time brings together 
and examines the many divers issues surrounding SOE interest in this theatre.  It will, 
therefore, unlike previous publications, present a single and overarching 
interpretation, and through using the most recently released material and a 
combination of British and Norwegian archives, re-appraise and offer new 
explanations of many aspects of this organisation‟s involvement in occupied Norway.        
There were several factors that determined SOE policy, defined here as its 
plan of action and statement of aims and ideals, and ultimately the nature, mix, and 
extent of its operations.  The major significance of this work, however, is the 
contention that it was SOE‟s and especially Norway‟s role and significance within the 
wider strategic context in the war against Germany in Europe, that was the principal 
influence behind its activity in this theatre between 1940 and 1945.
11
  Political factors, 
defined in this case as relations with the Norwegian government-in-exile and the 
„official‟ military resistance, militær organisasjonen (henceforth Milorg),12 as well as 
the nature of the occupation of Norway, along with collaborative factors, SOE‟s 
relationship with the other armed forces and organisations operating in this theatre, 
also had an impact.  But in the case of Norway, although important, they remained 
secondary to strategic factors. 
                                                          
 
10
 An example is three publications written by men involved in the attacks against heavy water 
production in Norway.  Knut Haukelid, Skis Against the Atom, (London: William Kimber, 1954); 
Jomar Brun, Brennpunkt Vemork 1940-1945, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985); Jens Poulsson, Aksjon 
Vemork: vinterkrig på Hardangervidda, (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2
nd
 edition, 1993).   
11
 Strategy is „the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy‟, whilst the 
„role of grand strategy… is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, 
towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy‟.  
See: Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 17, and Basil H. 
Liddell-Hart, „Strategy: The Indirect Approach‟, (London: 1967), pp. 335-336, cited in Gray, Modern 
Strategy, p. 18.   
12
 From the autumn of 1940 a clandestine organisation (Milorg) began to develop in Norway with the 
aim of organising an underground army that could contribute to the eventual liberation of the country 
through supporting a landing by Allied forces.  In November 1941, Milorg was recognised by the 
Norwegian authorities in London and became not only part of its armed forces but the „official‟ 
military resistance in Norway.  By May 1945, it constituted a force of around 40,000.   
 4 
SOE was conceived in the summer of 1940 when Britain was militarily 
isolated and weak after the rapid collapse of France.  Within this context it became 
part of a British forward strategy that was built on the conviction that before major 
land operations against the German army in northwest Europe could recommence, its 
fighting strength had to be significantly reduced.  The British believed this even after 
the entry of the United States of America (USA) into the war.  SOE‟s contribution 
would be to carry out sabotage and subversion, which would undermine German 
fighting capacity and morale and help tie down its forces in peripheral theatres away 
from the main battlefronts.  It was, therefore, part of an attritional strategy that set out 
to wear down Axis power.  In addition, but over the longer-term, through the supply 
of arms, organisation and training it would harness the potential for resistance in the 
occupied countries and create secret armies that would support Allied landings as part 
of an eventual liberation of Europe.  SOE‟s military contribution varied, however, 
across the various theatres of operations.  Its role in Greece in 1943, which was close 
to the Allied campaigns in North Africa and Italy, was in many ways different from 
Norway, which at the time was marginal to the main course of events.  Moreover its 
significance changed as the war progressed.  After the USA entered the conflict in 
December 1941, with its vast resources, the contribution of secret armies was finally 
demoted to a strategically and militarily far more subordinate and supportive role.
13
 
By the end of 1940, SOE‟s policy for Norway reflected the military 
responsibilities that had been assigned to this new organisation.  In the short-term it 
would undertake coup de main operations, sabotage, assist raids and strategic 
bombing, and carry out covert, „black‟ propaganda.  Over the longer-term it would 
prepare a secret underground army based on local resistance groups that would be 
organised and preserved in readiness to support a landing by regular forces at a time 
determined by Britain and its allies.  At a local level these two objectives would be 
kept separate, although within the wider context they were inseparable.  The aim of 
SOE‟s short-term activities in Norway and across Europe was to help create the 
                                                          
 
 
13
 See: David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special 
Operations Executive, with Documents, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); B. P. Farrell, 
The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy 1940-1943, books I & II, (Lampeter: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1998-1999); J. R. M. Butler (ed.), „Grand Strategy‟ vols. I-VI, in History of the Second 
World War, (London: HMSO, 1956-1976); M. Matloff, „Allied Strategy in Europe 1939-1945‟, in P. 
Paret, (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Oxford: OUP, 1986), 
pp. 677-690.  
 5 
conditions that would allow Allied forces supplemented by local secret armies to 
undertake a final and decisive land offensive against Germany. 
This combination of short and long-term aims remained in place and was the 
template for SOE operations in Norway for the rest of the war.  The military 
significance of these objectives altered, however, as SOE and Norway‟s position and 
role within the wider European context changed.  The organisation of a secret army, 
for example, was closely linked to British plans for a landing in Norway.  These, 
however, never came to fruition and it was not until the final stages of the war, after 
the launch of Operation Overlord, the invasion of northwest Europe that preparations 
for Norway‟s liberation really got underway.  Only then, after years of shortages, 
were significant resources made available to enable the establishment of an armed and 
trained underground army.       
Political factors also influenced SOE‟s plans.  By operating within the 
occupied countries across Europe, SOE inevitably became involved in internal issues 
and came into contact with their political representatives, primarily the governments 
in exile or other groups that were often based in London.  In June 1942, in recognition 
of SOE‟s close links with the exile governments, the British Chiefs of Staff 
Committee appointed it as the official co-ordinating authority through which these 
governments were instructed to work on matters of sabotage and subversion.
14
    
Furthermore, for SOE to operate effectively in Norway it had to work with 
members of the Norwegian government in exile and the indigenous military resistance 
organisations, especially Milorg, which meant that it was regularly subject to external 
political pressure.  Only Norwegian recruits had the required language skills and 
could cope effectively with the extreme climatic and topographic conditions found in 
Norway.  To secure access to these potential operatives, it was necessary to make 
contact with the relevant figures within the Norwegian government and its military 
authorities in London.  To form a secret army that remained subservient to British 
requirements SOE also had to get in direct touch with and bring under its influence 
the local resistance organisations in Norway, including Milorg.  
SOE was not, however, faced with a fragmented and unstable political 
background in Norway, something that distorted and complicated its efforts in other 
occupied countries.  The nature of the German occupation ultimately gave rise to a 
                                                          
14
 PRO: copy of memorandum addressed to General Sikorski entitled, „Subversive Activity in the 
Occupied Territories‟, by A. F. Brooke, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 2 June 1942, in HS7/2. 
 6 
largely organised and co-ordinated resistance movements that had close links with 
their government in London.  The Norwegian government in exile also had the 
authority, both domestically and internationally, to defend and pursue its country‟s 
national interests, which it eventually decided could best be done through 
collaboration with its allies.
15
  
Finally, modern war has increasingly become a „joint‟ effort‟, 16 and British 
and Allied strategy as it affected Norway was a combined military endeavour 
involving several organisations such as the RN, RAF, Combined Operations, SIS, and 
the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  Therefore, SOE did not act alone 
and its policy reflected an understanding that the organisation would have to co-
operate with these other agencies as part of a broad military front that set out to attack 
economic and military targets within the country.  Consequently, its ability to 
collaborate was a further important factor in determining the nature, extent and 
success of its activities in this theatre.  
Although SOE‟s policy and ultimately its operations in Norway were shaped 
by important strategic, political, and collaborative influences, the eventual outcome of 
its activities was often decided by another set of more straightforward factors.  These 
included the extreme weather conditions that regularly occurred in the North Sea, 
especially during the winter months, and the topography and demography of Norway, 
which meant that with the exception of the area around Oslo the arrival of a stranger 
in the small, isolated communities was obvious to both the local population and 
eventually the local police.  These elements all imposed a significant constraint on 
what SOE was ultimately able to achieve in this theatre.  Having a set of aims and 
objectives was one thing, being able to carry them out in a heavily occupied country 
proved far more difficult. 
Through using a combination of British and Norwegian archives, some only 
recently opened, this thesis will offer a new perspective on SOE operations in 
Norway.  It will also challenge previous interpretations of the relationship between 
this organisation and both the Norwegian authorities and Milorg.  Moreover, new 
historical detail will be revealed and some aspects of SOE‟s best known operations, 
such as the actions against the Norsk Hydro heavy water plant in southern Norway, 
will be re-evaluated.  It will not, however, be possible to examine all of the many 
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SOE operations.  Therefore, as an important addendum to the main text of this work, a 
series of appendices have been produced that for the first time attempt to synthesise 
all the available archival material on SOE into detailed chronologies and lists of not 
only its operations but also of the staff and military units that were behind them.  This 
will provide an important database for future historians.       
  
 
Historiography 
This thesis examines the impact of strategic, political, and collaborative factors on 
SOE activity in Norway.  The effect of all these factors together has never before been 
extensively examined within one publication.  Moreover, many of the works that 
include some consideration of SOE in Norway were produced several years ago and a 
large amount of new material, both primary and secondary has since become available 
to historians.  In order to provide a wide and up to date analyse of the many issues 
surrounding these contextual influences this thesis therefore uses a huge range of both 
British and Norwegian publications that cover a wide gamut of topics, not just SOE.  
Consequently, for the sake of clarity the historiography will be divided into a series of 
categories dealing with the predominant debates within each.  It will begin with 
strategic issues, move on to SOE, and conclude with a broad category that 
encompasses the Norwegian political context, which includes the government in exile, 
the occupation, and Milorg and its relationship with SOE.  There will naturally be a 
small number of books that cut across the categories, and therefore some works will 
be referred to on more than one occasion. 
The contribution made by SOE in Norway during the Second World War was 
influenced by the development of British and then Allied strategy in Western Europe, 
which was in turn shaped by British and American doctrine and ultimately the 
relationship between the two.  British strategy has variously been defined as 
„peripheral‟, „indirect‟, „Mediterranean‟, and „opportunistic‟.17  Michael Howard and 
Brian Bond, in their work on British defence policy between the wars, put forward the 
political and imperialistic reasons for Britain‟s interest in an indirect strategy.  Bond 
argues that the relegation of the British army to an imperial policing role between the 
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wars, led to the series of defeats between 1939 and 1942.  Both claim that a British 
continental commitment emerged only in the spring of 1939, but as Howard points out 
this required a continental strategy and that owing to British unpreparedness and the 
defeats of 1940 this was by necessity an indirect strategy.  Howard describes the 
British approach as „gallant‟ but ultimately dependent on support from the USA, 
which provided the resources for the final offensive.
18
  David Stafford and other 
historians follow a similar line arguing that Britain‟s initial strategy, which emerged 
at the end of the 1930s, was to rely on the larger French army to take the main 
military burden whilst it would apply economic pressure through indirect means to 
weaken Germany from within, causing it eventually to crumble .
19
       
  From June 1941, however, Britain fought the European war in the company of 
great power allies, the Soviet Union and a few months later the USA.  The nature and 
development of Allied grand strategy from December 1941, the conflict between the 
different strategic doctrines of Britain and the USA, has been the source of an 
ongoing debate amongst historians for several decades.  At issue has been the 
relationship between a British „indirect approach‟ and an „American theory of war of 
mass and concentration‟.20  It is impossible, within the limited confines of this work, 
to go into the detail of this debate, but as strategic developments were so important in 
shaping the nature of special operations in Norway it is important to outline some of 
the major milestones.
21
   
The argument over the relationship between British and American approaches 
began as early as the 1940s, although it was the early 1950s before the first major 
works began to appear.  In his publication entitled, The Struggle for Europe published 
in 1952, Chester Wilmot contrasts British and American strategy in terms of a missed 
political opportunity, arguing that the abandonment of a British Mediterranean 
strategy in favour of the American direct strategy resulted in the Red Army having a 
free road in southeast Europe.
22
  Winston Churchill describes the British approach, 
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founded on the country‟s military weakness and isolation from the summer of 1940, 
as a process of weakening the enemy through a combination of indirect methods, such 
as economic blockade, strategic bombing, and tightening the ring through tactical 
offensives on the periphery, concluded by a final offensive on the continent of 
Europe.
23
  This debate intensified when the British and American „official‟ histories 
appeared. The British view, expounded in the series entitled Grand Strategy, and 
which largely follows Churchill is that this British three pronged strategy of attrition 
emerged after the fall of France and was followed consistently until 1943 when it 
gradually became subservient to the dominant American view of decisive 
concentration.
24
  The American „official‟ histories, which have been described as 
offering a more „sophisticated description‟25 of the development of Allied grand 
strategy maintain that after a period when British ideas prevailed by the end of 1943 
coalition policy had shifted back toward the American view.
26
  R. M. Leighton argues 
that the two strategies were eventually blended into „a pragmatic compromise‟, and 
that Operation Overlord, the invasion of northwest Europe, was a „logical 
consummation‟ of „closing and tightening the ring about Hitler‟s Europe‟.27  Michael 
Howard in his book on the Mediterranean strategy makes a similar assertion.  He 
dismisses Wilmot‟s case for operations in the Mediterranean, arguing British strategy 
was primarily driven by a desire to weaken Germany before undertaking operations in 
northwest Europe and that Britain never opposed the concept of a concentration of 
force.
28
   
Maurice Matloff argues that Britain‟s „peripheral‟ and „indirect‟ strategy was 
forced upon the country after the defeat of France, and because of sensitivity to huge 
manpower losses in the First World War.  It was a process of softening up Germany, 
which would be completed by a final campaign resulting in the destruction of German 
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forces in northwest Europe.  This compared with the American view that Germany‟s 
defeat could only be registered by a campaign in northwest Europe.  In other words 
was it „to be a “power drive” or “mop-up”?‟  Ultimately, the „final strategy against 
Germany was a compromise between American and British views‟.29   
Another view is that the Americans saw a cross-Channel effort as „essential‟ to 
the defeat of Germany, whilst the British believed it should only occur once the defeat 
of Germany was „assured‟.30  T. Ben-Moshe also argues that the British, particularly 
Churchill, in fear of defeat in France, wished to see a German collapse, not just a 
weakening, before a major landing in Normandy.
31
  More recently, a detailed analysis 
re-defines British grand strategy as a process of „wear down‟, eroding „German power 
by a combination of bombing, blockade, raids, subversion and sabotage, peripheral 
campaigns, and a coup de grâce assault‟.  It was a strategy that, although borrowed 
from the old concept of economic pressure, was modified after the defeat of France in 
1940.  From this point it was „what must not be done: the Allies must not seek 
decisive battle against the main enemy force until he was no longer able to mount a 
formidable campaign‟, that prevailed.  In the meantime this strategy would provide a 
framework in which Britain could move forward whilst building a stronger coalition.  
The author argues that the „wear down‟ concept remained intact, although modified 
by changing circumstances, through to the end of 1943.  By this time, however, 
American strength began to dominate the partnership and the „Americans felt strong 
enough to confront the Germans, and the British themselves agreed the sooner the war 
was won the better‟.32 
Although the historiography on Allied grand strategy in Europe is significant, 
this is not the case for Norway and its contribution in the war against Germany.  
Norway receives little attention in the „official‟ histories, which is perhaps a reflection 
of its perceived value.  Mention is made of two proposed landings in the country, 
Operations Ajax and Jupiter, largely in the context of pressure from Churchill to force 
them through against the wishes of the Chiefs of Staff (COS).
33
  The most important 
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exception to this is Olav Riste‟s two-volume work: London regjeringa (the London 
Government).  The primary aim of this work is to give a „joint political-historical 
overview of Norway‟s place and role in the war alliance‟ through a history of the 
Norwegian government-in-exile.  By implication this includes a consideration of 
British interest in Norway within the broader wartime context.  Riste describes 
Norway as strategically located somewhere between the periphery and a dead end, by 
which he seemingly means that operations this far north would have little military 
value, especially as the ultimate defeat of Germany was never going to be through 
Norway.  Nevertheless, Riste points to a considerable British interest in this theatre, 
which he argues up until 1942 was part of a larger strategic effort aimed at initially 
holding out, followed by a period of consolidation and building up of resources.  
Raids along the Norwegian seaboard, resistance and sabotage within Norway, were 
parts of this defensive strategy, which set out to raise British morale but was short-
term as circumstances would not allow a long-term offensive strategy with eventual 
victory as the aim.  From 1942, however, with the survival of the Soviet Union and 
the entry of the USA into the war, Norway‟s strategic value was shaped by a shared 
aim, which was the eventual liberation of the whole of Europe.  Operations in this 
theatre were from then on determined by their contribution to the long-term battle 
plan and their place within the final phase of the war.
34
 
H. P. Willmott, whilst writing on Operation Jupiter, the proposed landing in 
northern Norway in support of the Soviet Union, also argues that Norway was 
marginal to the outcome of the war and that an operation against it was in nobody‟s 
interest.  Like Riste, however, he does concede that it had some importance as a cover 
for the Normandy landings.
35
  A recent and detailed narrative of British strategy and 
policy toward Norway presents a different conclusion, claiming that because of its 
position in relation to the United Kingdom‟s maritime supply routes the country was 
strategically significant.  In line with some previous historians it argues that the 
deployment of the major part of the German surface fleet in Norwegian waters from 
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1942 represented a threat to these routes and therefore tied down important British 
naval resources in the Atlantic at the expense of the Mediterranean and Far East.
36
   
The number of publications on SOE is significant, estimated in the 1980s at 
almost 200 and more recently at over 400 publications on just its operations. 
37
  Prior 
to the 1990s, however, SOE archives in Britain remained firmly closed to most 
researchers and therefore a significant proportion of these works consist of the 
memoirs of ex-SOE employees, rather than scholarly studies, and have famously and 
aptly been characterised as „good thrillers but bad history‟.  It has also been asserted 
that SOE activities are often presented in „terms more suited to the detective novel 
than to serious historical analysis‟.38  More recently the literature on special 
operations has been described as „deeply unsatisfactory‟ and tending to „offer 
adventurous narratives, or anecdotes, of daring deeds, and colourful regimental 
histories‟. 39  Nevertheless, there has been an academic debate, which has centred on 
the contribution, worth and efficiency of SOE within the wider military context.  
SOE, like other aspects of World War Two, has its own „official histories‟.  
The first, an „in-house‟ history written soon after the end of the war by the Oxford 
don William Mackenzie, was commissioned by the organisation.  It has only recently 
been published and is largely a chronicle of SOE between 1940 and 1946, its origins, 
organisational development, and its activities in several occupied countries including 
Norway.  Nevertheless, it makes some interesting points, arguing that SOE was 
militarily profitable and that after Dunkirk subversion was perceived as so important 
that it was unified under one organisation, although this interest soon declined and 
from as early as the autumn of 1940 the organisation was never again „to secure 
overriding priority‟.  Mackenzie also asserts that for five years SOE was „the main 
instrument of British action in the internal politics of Europe‟.40   
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The first „official‟ history to be published was Michael Foot‟s controversial 
history of SOE in France, which marked the beginning of his huge body of work on 
SOE and resistance in occupied Europe.  Foot makes a number of important points.  
The first, perhaps axiomatic point is that it is absurd to claim that SOE could have 
won the war itself, or even that it had a „major battle-winning influence‟.  
Nevertheless, he claims that SOE did help the citizens of the occupied countries re-
gain their self-respect.  He also places importance on the cost-effectiveness of SOE, 
describing it as an „exceptionally economic means of attaining strategic ends‟, and in 
comparing it to Bomber Command emphasises what he describes as „the possible 
economies that might be effected by the use of clandestine agents‟.41  This point was 
pursued by Foot in his response to A. S. Milward‟s claim that a resistance strategy 
was rarely the correct strategy if assessed on economic grounds, as in almost every 
case the resources could have been better used elsewhere, although he concedes that 
the social and psychological value of resistance occasionally made it of value.  Foot, 
however, argues that the resistance did make some significant contributions, such as 
providing intelligence and aiding the escape of aircrew.
42
  
An early and brief consideration of SOE is contained within the British 
„official‟ histories of the Second World War.  In the series Grand Strategy there are 
several small, scattered references to SOE that collectively claim that the strategic 
contribution envisaged for this organisation changed as the war progressed.  The 
initial dependence on the employment of patriot armies organised through the efforts 
of SOE to support eventual British landings ended after the entry of the USA into the 
war.  From this point these forces were no longer central but „secondary‟ and 
subordinate to any final strategic plan.
43
 
SOE‟s strategic and political contribution was more fully developed in the 
1980s with David Stafford‟s influential analysis of British and European resistance. 
He asserts that SOE was born out of Britain‟s desperate situation in 1940, and a belief 
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in a German susceptibility to indirect methods such as economic pressure and 
subversion.  Alongside this, and within the context of Britain‟s military weakness and 
isolation, there emerged what Stafford describes as the „Detonator Concept‟ the use of 
underground armies across Europe to explode into action in support of eventual 
British landings.  SOE was therefore initially seen as central to British strategy.  But a 
realisation that supplying these armies would seriously degrade the efforts of Bomber 
Command and then the entry of the USA into the war eventually relegated the use of 
resistance movements to a supportive role for major operations such as Overlord and 
as forces for the maintenance of order after the liberation.  Stafford also emphasises 
the important political impact of SOE, initially as a conservative influence against the 
Communist movements that wished to pursue more active resistance.  As the Allies 
moved onto the offensive in the later stages of the war, however, SOE activities 
became a source of conflict between strategic and political post-war interests.
44
 
Detail on SOE in Norway can be found across a range of works.  The first are 
SOE‟s own unpublished internal reports.  During the final months of the war and the 
immediate post-war period SOE produced an account of its activities through the „war 
diaries‟ and the „sectional histories‟.  The Scandinavia diaries, which include Norway, 
are based largely on telegrams sent to and received from agents in the field.  They 
provide a detailed narrative of many of the operations undertaken during the period 
between July 1942 and February 1944, but were never completed and offer no 
contextual background or interpretation.
45
  During the summer and early autumn of 
1945, SOE‟s Norwegian section also produced its own internal history.  Written by 
Colonel J. S. Wilson, variously responsible for Norway and Scandinavian, it provides 
useful background.  But although Wilson is not excessively self-congratulatory, often 
admitting failure or criticising relations with other agencies, especially SIS, the work 
is again predominately a chronicle of SOE‟s activities in Norway.  These works are 
significant, however, because they were an important source for early historians, such 
                                                          
44
 B. P. Farrell uses the term „Igniter‟ missions as a substitute for Stafford‟s „Detonator‟ concept 
suggesting a significant influence from Stafford.  See: Stafford, Britain and European Resistance and 
Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, book one, pp. 11 & 81.  
45
 Many of the telegrams used in the war diaries no longer exist in the PRO, although many are 
available in SOE archives in Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum (NHM), the Resistance Museum in Oslo.  
References to the telegrams are footnoted in the diaries.  See: PRO: HS7/279-282, the Scandinavian 
War Diaries. 
 15 
as Mackenzie who in the case of Norway rather than plough through the original 
documents tended to use the in-house summaries.
46
 
There has been no specific published British or Norwegian history of SOE in 
Norway.  The closest is Charles Cruickshank‟s „official‟ history of SOE in 
Scandinavia, which includes Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.  It is based almost 
entirely on the use of British archives and with the exception of a chapter on the 
development of secret armies, is largely a narrative of some of the organisation‟s 
operations in Norway.  Reflecting his reliance on British sources the author does not 
examine the emergence and development of resistance in Norway within the wider 
context of the occupation.  According to Cruickshank, Milorg would have made a 
„more effective contribution to the Allied effort‟ if it had thrown all its resources into 
sabotage.  He also claims that SOE‟s attempt to build a secret army gave way to 
Milorg‟s proposals for an underground force directed from Oslo.  The author, 
however, does make the important point that constant sabotage undermined enemy 
morale and helped keep large enemy forces in Scandinavia.
47
  There are also a 
number of sections or paragraphs devoted to Norway within some general SOE 
histories.  These, when footnotes or endnotes are available, appear to rely on either 
SOE‟s internal sectional histories or on published memoirs rather than an analysis of 
contemporaneous documents.  They also tend to focus on operations, particularly 
„Gunnerside‟, SOE‟s attack against the Norsk Hydro heavy water plant at Vemork in 
southern Norway in February 1943, an event that has attracted considerable historical 
and cinematic attention.
48
    
Two major publications have dominated the arguments on SOE amongst 
Norwegian historians.  Although neither is specifically about special operations they 
include sections on SOE and provide important interpretations of its activities and 
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relationship with the Norwegian government-in-exile and Milorg.    The first, and the 
most important of these is Hjemmestyrkene (the Home Forces), by Sverre Kjelstadli, 
which sets out to show the main features of the military resistance in Norway.  It was 
published over forty years ago but never completed and therefore does not cover the 
final months of Norway‟s occupation and the country‟s liberation.  Nevertheless, it 
has influenced several European historians and is still influencing Norwegian 
historians today.  Kjelstadli argues that British scepticism regarding the Norwegian 
suitability for resistance activities originated in the disastrous campaign of the spring 
of 1940.  This resulted in SOE attempting to carry out subversive activities in 
Norway, including the building up of an underground army, independent of the 
Norwegian authorities and Milorg.  Contact was made with only those individuals 
who could be trusted, and they were kept „largely in the dark‟.  It was only after the 
setting up of the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee (ANCC) in February 
1942 that relations improved, collaboration began, and by 1943 most of the 
„childhood ills‟ had past. 49  
The second work is Olav Riste‟s London regjeringa.  Riste argues that initially 
SOE attempted to control the development of military resistance in Norway and 
before 1942 did not give proper consideration to Norwegian views.  Liability for this, 
however, also lay with the Norwegian government as it initially had no „responsible‟ 
approach to irregular operations, and therefore SOE was given a free run.  He 
describes SOE‟s policy as a consisting of two strands: short-term action and long-term 
preparation.  Initially these were combined in one organisation under British 
direction, although at the beginning the priority was action through sabotage in order 
that SOE as a new organisation could „justify its existence‟.  From July 1941, 
however, Milorg was given the longer-term preparatory role of assembling a secret 
army whilst SOE teams from the UK or its own local organisation within Norway 
would undertake sabotage.  By autumn 1942, however, confidence in Milorg had 
                                                          
49
 Owing to Kjelstadli‟s untimely death in 1961 he never completed volume two.  Arnfinn Moland‟s 
interpretation of aspects of the relationship between SOE and Milorg can be traced back to Kjelstadli. 
David Stafford also relies heavily on Kjelstadli‟s essay in English, from a conference on European 
resistance movements held in Milan in 1961.  See: Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, pp. 20, 90-91, 191. A. 
Moland, „Milorg and SOE‟ in Salmon (ed.), Britain and Norway in the Second World War, pp. 141-141 
and A. Moland, „Norway‟, in B. Moore (ed.), Resistance in Western Europe, (Oxford: Berg, 2000), pp. 
236-237. See also: Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, pp. 40, 83-84.  European Resistance 
Movements 1939-1945: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the History of the 
Resistance Movements held at Milan 26-29 March 1961, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964), pp. 324-
339.  F. Kersaudy, Vi stoler på England 1939-1949, (translated from French by Sidsel Mellbye), (Oslo: 
Cappelen, 1991), p. 66.            
 17 
grown, and therefore it was agreed that where possible it would co-ordinate its 
activities closely with SOE groups.  Nevertheless, the functional division remained 
and the military resistance in Norway continued to concentrate solely on preparing a 
secret army that could eventually assist operations to liberate the country.  It was only 
from spring 1944 that Milorg became active.  Both Riste and Kjelstadli also claim that 
SOE, particularly in the period from 1940 to 1942 was particularly preoccupied with 
northern Norway as it was seen as the most promising location for an Allied 
landing.
50
 
 The Norwegian political context, the inter-relationship between the 
Norwegian government in exile, its allies and the Home Front, had an important 
influence on SOE policy and operations in Norway and therefore also merits some 
consideration.  The pre-eminent work in this field is again Olav Riste‟s history of the 
Norwegian government in exile.  Riste argues that the Norwegians chose an 
„offensive‟ but pragmatic alliance policy, and thereby had „considerable influence‟ in 
areas such as the main direction of resistance and warfare behind enemy lines.  In its 
relationship with the Home Front, he claims that the government‟s primary aim was to 
retain its constitutional authority, and thereby represent the whole nation.  
Nevertheless, on certain matters it was prepared to compromise in order to maintain a 
satisfactory relationship with the resistance organisations in Norway.
51
 
The number of published works on the occupation of Norway and the 
emergence of resistance is enormous and therefore can only be dealt with in broad 
terms.  In recent years Norwegian historians have conducted a debate, largely in the 
newspapers, over the nature of these works.  Some have claimed that they have been 
dominated by the so-called „Skodvin-School‟ after the historian Magne Skodvin, 
which has concentrated on the resistance struggle to the detriment of other subjects.  
Histories of the occupation have also been described as consisting of certain phases of 
writing, beginning in the 1940s and 1950s with a pioneer generation of historians who 
were directly linked to the occupation and the government fact finding commissions 
that were set up at the end of the war.  Other historians, however, reject both these 
descriptions and claim that research in Norway has always continued within a 
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framework of consensus that emerged during the occupation around the view that 
opposition to the Nazi state was the right thing to do, and which precluded any 
generational shifts.
52
  Publications that conform to this „consensus‟ characterisation 
are the multi-volume „official‟ histories of Norway during the occupation,53 which 
more recently have been described  „as the basis for the creation of a particular 
national identity‟ and „a common understanding of the history of the war‟.54 
In the post-war period Norwegian historians began to produce a number of 
„scholarly theses‟. These „pioneer‟ works laid the foundations for future research on 
issues such as the emergence of resistance in Norway, and resistance policy.
 55
  The 
first was Striden om okkupasjonsstyret i Norge ( The Conflict over Occupational 
Government in Norway) by Magne Skodvin, which analyses the period from 9 April 
to 25 September 1940.  For Skodvin it was the negotiations with the German 
authorities during the summer of 1940 over the form of Norway‟s future government, 
the „Riksrådforhandlinger’, and the „Nyordning’  („New Order‟) of 25 September, 
after which all political parties except for Nasjonal Samling, the Norwegian Nazi 
party under Vidkun Quisling (NS), were banned, which created a hardening and 
togetherness amongst the Norwegian population against the occupation.  This was the 
stimulus that eventually resulted in a unified, national resistance movement centred 
upon Oslo.
56
 
The second work, „Nyordning og motstand‟ (The New Order and Resistance) 
by Thomas Wyller, explores the period from 25 September 1940 to 25 September 
1942.  Wyller looks at the various and widespread associations that represented the 
professional groups in Norway, from farmers through to doctors.  He argues that after 
25 September 1940 these organisations effectively became the people‟s 
representatives in Norway, and fought a political struggle for democratic values 
against attempts to impose a one party and single ideology state.  This civil resistance 
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struggle, described as the „Holdningskamp‟, was therefore the opposition to NS whose 
ideology was unwanted by the majority of the population.  Wyller also claims that it 
was these organisations that were the basis of civilian or political resistance in 
Norway, and to co-ordinate and lead this network of groups a Koordinasjonskomite, 
Co-ordination Committee (KK), was eventually formed in the autumn of 1941.  This 
became an important voice in the leadership of the civilian resistance movement in 
Norway.
57
     
Toward the end of the 1950s Kjelstadli‟s book, Hjemmestyrkene, was also 
published and showed that Milorg‟s policy until the final year of the occupation was 
to „lie low, go slow‟.  The objective was gradually and carefully to build an 
underground army that would be able to contribute to the eventual re-occupation of 
Norway.  Resistance leaders have argued that this was the only viable policy, a view 
subsequently supported by „most historians‟ in the country.58 
This fascination with the emergence and development of resistance in Norway 
during the Second World War has continued amongst Norwegian historians and many 
have been influenced by these early works and built on them.
59
  Nevertheless, from as 
early as 1945 there has also been a „counter-current‟ to the so-called general 
consensus.  This includes what has been described as „NS-revisionism‟, which is 
made up of the views of old NS members and others who are critical of the decisions 
made against alleged war criminals and traitors in the Norwegian courts after the war.  
Their argument centres around the claim that a state of war no longer existed in 
Norway after the capitulation of Norwegian forces on 10 June 1940, an argument 
firmly rejected by several mainstream historians.
60
  During the 1970s an opposition 
also emerged to what has been characterised as „traditional research‟.  This set out to 
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question some of what have been described as the „myths‟ of the occupation, such as 
the togetherness of the people.
61
  There are also more recent publications that deal 
with some of the more difficult and contentious subjects surrounding the occupation, 
such as the deportation of the Norwegian Jews, which has often been ignored or only 
touched upon in earlier works, either because archives were closed or because of the 
sensitivity of the topic.  Most of these are not relevant to this thesis, but with one 
important exception.  In 1996 a journalist Egil Ulateig published a book on 
assassinations in Norway during the occupation, which caused a significant storm at 
the time, particularly amongst war veterans and some historians.  As a consequence of 
what he considered to be the unreliability of Ulateig‟s work, Arnfinn Moland 
produced his detailed analysis of the assasinations carried out by resistance groups 
and SOE, a subject that owing to the impact it had on all those involved had been 
largely avoided by professional historians.  He examines this contentious issue within 
a legal and constitutional context, and argues it was a justified and necessary part of 
defending the resistance movement in Norway against the constant threat from the 
German and Norwegian security police.
62
  
This historiography has considered a large number of publications covering a 
wide range of issues.  None of them, however, is a dedicated history of SOE in 
Norway, which re-emphasises the point that there is a gap in the literature.  Moreover, 
as this thesis is not a straightforward narrative of events but an analysis of SOE 
actions in this theatre within the wider strategic and political contexts it is important 
to take account of the wealth of literature, both British and Norwegian and much of it 
fresh and new, which is particularly relevant to these broad influences.     
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                           Methodology and Sources 
This is an empirical, multi-archival, international history of SOE in Norway.  
Therefore, although it uses a large collection of secondary literature it is 
predominately based on the use of primary sources from archives in both Britain and 
Norway.  When researching SOE the historian has once again to confront the problem 
of the availability and accessibility of contemporary documents.  When dealing with a 
secret organisation, however, and the obsessive concealment that often surrounds it, 
either through closed archives, „weeded‟ files, or a reluctance to record events, the 
problem is intensified.  Consequently, in an attempt to minimise this difficulty this 
thesis is built on the use of a wide-range of documents from not only SOE but also 
other files in London and Oslo.  
SOE files in Britain were not opened to the general public until 1993.  The 
Scandinavian files were accessible from 1994, which post-dates most of the literature 
on Norway, and the final batch of SOE documents were only de-classified in 2003.  
Consequently, there is a lot of new and fresh material now available for historians to 
work on.  It has, however, been estimated that owing to a fire at Baker Street and 
various culls and weeding, eighty-five percent of SOE files in Britain have been lost, 
and even those that are now in the Public Records Office in Kew, West London have 
gaps where papers have been retained or paragraphs, sentences, and names blocked 
out.
63
  
  Fortunately a large archive of SOE material has been preserved at Norges 
Hjemmefrontmuseum (NHM), the Norwegian Resistance Museum, in Oslo.  This 
material, taken back to Norway in 1945 by Forsvarets Overkommando (FO), the 
Norwegian Defence High Command and a result of the close collaboration between 
SOE and the Norwegian authorities during the war, has been available to researchers 
for several decades.  It fills in some of the gaps within the British archives, 
particularly detail on operations, and therefore is of immense value.
64
  The NHM 
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archives in Oslo also contain the files of FO IV, the department of the Norwegian 
High Command that worked closely with SOE from December 1942.  These files are 
significant because they not only contain information that is not in SOE archives, but 
also because they provide an insight, through internal correspondence, to attitudes 
within the Norwegian military authorities. 
Immediately after the war the Norwegian government also set up a series of 
investigations into issues such as its relations with the Swedish authorities and the 
Home Front during the occupation, the results of which were eventually published.
65
  
The most important of these for this thesis is: Stortinget og hjemmefronten under 
krigen: aktstykker utgitt av stortinget, (The Government and Homefront during the 
War: Documents published by Parliament), which contains original correspondence 
between the government in London and the Home Front and therefore is a valuable 
source of information on the relationship that developed between these parties.
66
 
It is also profitable to look beyond SOE material in Britain.  The British 
Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) memos and minutes in the Cabinet files contain 
important detail on the strategic direction of the war and the contribution of SOE and 
Norway.  The Foreign Office files include useful information on the interaction 
between the British and Norwegian governments and the involvement of the British 
Foreign Office in the development of the relationship between SOE and the 
Norwegian authorities.  The Admiralty and Air Force files are also an additional 
source of material on SOE, its relationship with these organisations, and on the many 
operations that SOE contributed to in Norway. 
Finally, other secret organisations operated in Norway either with or alongside 
SOE.  The first of these was SIS, which was responsible through using agents 
working on the ground for gathering military intelligence from the occupied countries 
of Europe.  The files of this secret organisation are still closed in Britain, but 
fortunately considerable original material on SIS activities in Norway during the 
Second World War is available in the NHM archives in Oslo, and has been used by 
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several Norwegian historians.
67
  Their works, and some SIS material that can be 
found within SOE files, will be used in this thesis to analyse the impact of SIS activity 
and interests on SOE‟s policy and operations in Norway.  Another clandestine 
organisation that worked alongside SOE in Norway was OSS, the forerunner of the 
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  There is a large amount of material on 
OSS activity and interest in Scandinavia in SOE files at Kew, and some important 
snippets in the FO IV archives in Oslo. 
In addition to the wide range of primary source material now available in the 
British and Norwegian archives, there is also a large collection of memoirs and 
recollections written by the Norwegians that worked on behalf of SOE.  Whilst 
accepting that many of these accounts may be sensational and exaggerated, they 
nevertheless help fill in some of the many gaps in the documents and provide an 
additional source of information on important events or relationships.   
 
 
Chapter Review 
 This thesis consists of a series of narratives that examine the various 
influences behind SOE policy.  All are inter-related and lead up to and explain the 
nature, extent, and mix of SOE operations in this theatre.  Consequently, the 
arrangement of chapters is a reflection of the fact that this work is an examination of 
SOE‟s intentions and actions in Norway and not simply a chronicle of events. 
There are eight chapters.  Chapter one examines the context within which SOE 
and its Norwegian Section were conceived and how this new organisation changed as 
the war progressed.  It will show that strategic factors were the formative influence 
behind both the origins of the organisation and its interest in and approach toward 
Norway.  The chapter, by using SOE archives in Britain and Norway, including 
recently released material, COS papers, and Foreign Office files, will also challenge 
previous accounts and interpretations on the formation of SOE‟s Scandinavian and 
Norwegian sections and its military units, such as the Shetlands Base.  
Through the appraisal of a series of policy documents the second chapter will 
move on to examine how SOE‟s overall plan for Norway developed after 1940.  The 
fundamentals of its policy, the combination of short and long-term objectives, 
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originated from a British strategy that was devised within the difficult conditions of 
the autumn of 1940.  As will be shown through use of SOE files, Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) documents, and COS papers it 
was, however, a policy that changed in response to Norway‟s contribution to British 
and later Allied strategy in Europe as it unfolded after 1940.   
 Using primarily SOE and Foreign Office files (FO), chapters three and four 
will examine what influence political factors had on SOE‟s policy for Norway.  The 
close relationship that developed between SOE, Norwegian authorities, and 
eventually Milorg, something that served the interests of all sides, tempered some 
aspects of SOE‟s plans for this theatre, but because it was a largely beneficial 
association it did not fundamentally alter them.   
The fifth and sixth chapter will look at SOE‟s relations with the other military 
agencies and regular forces that operated in Norway.  From 1940, SOE recognised 
that it would be required to collaborate on activities such as raids and air attacks.  
These chapters will show, through using a wide range of primary sources from the 
PRO, including Admiralty (ADM), Combined Operations (DEFE2), and Royal Air 
Force (AIR) files, as well as SOE material, that despite difficulties at a higher level 
SOE worked closely at an organisational and local level with these other parties.  
Collaboration, therefore, had a productive impact on SOE‟s plans for Norway, 
allowing it to widen and intensify its activities.   
The realisation of SOE‟s overall plan for Norway was its operations.  The final 
two chapters, representing the culmination of this work, will through extensive use of 
SOE archives, particularly those from Norway, show how policy, determined by 
strategic factors but moulded by political and collaborative influences, translated into 
activity on the ground.  Chapter seven will examine operations in the period from the 
autumn of 1940 to the spring of 1944, whilst chapter eight will show how SOE 
activity in the final months of the war closely reflected Norway‟s position on the 
strategic and geographical periphery of Europe. 
Finally, it has only been possible to include a part of the huge amount of detail 
on SOE‟s activities in Norway within the body of this work.  The number of 
operations it was involved in, or attempted to carry out between 1940 and 1945 was 
enormous.  Consequently, attached to this thesis as an addendum consisting of a series 
of appendices that for the first time using both British and Norwegian archives detail 
these operations.  These will both add to historical knowledge and provide an 
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important reference point for future historians.  There are also appendices on the 
histories of the Shetlands Base and SOE‟s Scandinavian and Norwegian sections, as 
well as one that puts names to the many cryptonyms, the series of symbols that SOE 
employees used in internal correspondence to cover their real identity.  SOE produced 
several organisational charts during its brief existence but as they only provide the 
researcher with a brief snapshot in time they are quickly out of date and therefore 
unsatisfactory.  The appendix of SOE cryptonyms is a first attempt to track the careers 
of those staff that who a particular or special responsibility for SOE‟s policy and 
operations in Norway, which will again help future researchers. 
In July 1940, under the authority of the British War Cabinet, the go ahead was 
given for the creation of a new organisation called SOE.  The first chapter of this 
thesis will examine the conditions within which it was conceived and how and why it 
quickly became active in Norway.  This is crucial in explaining and understanding its 
future policy in this theatre.            
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE FORMATION OF SOE AND ITS SCANDINAVIAN SECTION: A NEW 
STRATEGIC TOOL AND A NORDIC OPPORTUNITY 
 
 
Introduction 
To explain SOE‟s policy toward Norway it is important to comprehend the origins of 
this new organisation within the strategic and military background of the summer of 
1940, as they are inextricably linked.  This chapter will therefore examine the 
formation and development of SOE, its Scandinavian section, and the military units, 
such as the Shetlands Base, which were crucial to the implementation of its objectives 
in this theatre.  This is not only to provide important historical knowledge and thereby 
aid understanding in later chapters, but to demonstrate that they all shared one 
common factor: all of them were ultimately a result of Britain‟s military 
circumstances after the fall of France and the forward strategy that this situation gave 
rise to. 
SOE was created for strategic and military purposes at a time when Britain 
was weak, isolated and therefore inferior in both position and resources.  It was a 
small but significant element of a strategy that at the time was seen as providing a 
means by which the nation could move toward the achievement of the ultimate 
objective of the war, victory over Germany.  Because it has been covered so 
extensively
1
 the first section of this chapter will, however, only briefly examine the 
origins of SOE.  Nonetheless, this will show that it was created within a climate and 
context that fostered both a belief in and a call for a co-ordinated use of clandestine 
and subversive operations.  Moreover its strategic origins were fundamental in the 
development of its future policy toward the occupied countries. 
Norway was also a country where Britain could quickly take the offensive and 
target Axis power and resources.  Factors such as its accessibility across the North 
Sea, long coastline, peripheral position, the specialist war materials it exported to 
Germany, and its occupation by substantial enemy forces, made it militarily attractive.  
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Consequently, SOE quickly formed a Scandinavian section that included Norway, 
which from the summer of 1940 was responsible for the implementation of its policy 
and operations in this theatre.  From the beginning, as the second part of this chapter 
will show, it was staffed by personnel who had a background in the implementation of 
indirect methods, particularly the application of economic pressure and the use of 
clandestine operations against the enemy.  Therefore, they shared the growing belief 
in and enthusiasm for the potential of subversive operations, something that would 
have a crucial influence on the development of SOE‟s plans for Norway. 
 Lastly, this chapter will examine the formation, nature, and effectiveness of 
the Norwegian Independent Company No I (henceforward NIC I), the unit of the 
Royal Norwegian Army formed to undertake special operations on behalf of SOE and 
the Norwegian authorities, the Shetlands Naval Base, and the RAF „Special Duty‟ Air 
Squadrons that dropped SOE agents and equipment into Norway.  All of these 
military units were crucial to the implementation of clandestine operations and will 
appear regularly in the body of this thesis, which means it is important to provide 
some detail on their background.  Furthermore, they embody the key elements that 
shaped SOE plans for this theatre.  Firstly, the importance of the strategic background, 
which although it led to an urgent and co-ordinated effort to create these facilities, 
also meant that there was a shortage of key resources for operations in Norway, 
particularly aircraft.  Secondly, an early and clear understanding within SOE that it 
would not be able to operate effectively in Norway without both Norwegian co-
operation and support from the regular armed forces, and that therefore these 
relationships were crucial to its future effectiveness.     
 
 
I 
The Origins of SOE: the Birth of a New Weapon 
SOE began its short five and half year life on July 22 1940 when its Charter, which 
set out its future role, was approved by the War Cabinet.
2
  Two factors were central in 
the creation of this new organisation that was instructed „to co-ordinate all action, by 
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way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas‟.3  The first was a small 
but growing belief within political circles and especially within sections of SIS and 
War Office of the military value of this type of activity.  The second and more 
important was Britain‟s military isolation and weakness after the fall of France, which 
led to the creation of a new forward strategy in the war against Germany. 
 By July 1940 a commitment to the potential of sabotage, subversion, and 
guerrilla warfare had taken hold amongst many important political figures in Britain.  
The most significant of these was Winston Churchill, who when he became Prime 
Minister in May 1940, as a result of his previous experience as a soldier, journalist, 
amateur spy and politician, already had a strong faith in the potential of irregular and 
clandestine warfare.  This meant that he placed his considerable weight behind the 
COS proposal of May 1940 for the creation of a new organisation to co-ordinate 
sabotage and subversion in the occupied countries, and his support for SOE although 
not unquestioning was at times critical to its long-term survival.
4
  
 A belief in the potential of subversive warfare not only resided with the Prime 
Minister but also more widely.  A fear of fifth columnists that developed in the 
country around the time of the defeat of France in May/June 1940 helped to foster 
this,
5
 and it led to pressure for Britain to create its own fifth column.  An early result 
of this was the establishment in the of summer 1940 of the so-called „Auxiliary 
Units‟, perhaps better known as „stay behind units‟, which would be used to operate 
behind enemy lines in the event of a German invasion.
6
  In June 1940 a „Guerrilla 
Committee‟ under Commander Stephen King-Hall, MP was also formed.  In July it 
forwarded a memo to Sir Maurice Hankey, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
who the Prime Minister had given the task of co-ordinating the re-organisation of 
subversive warfare.  The memo describes winning the war „by combining a 
disintegration of the Nazi regime from within and bombing and blockade from 
without‟, and points to the use of „total guerrilla warfare‟, including raids by military 
forces, subversive action, and sabotage and propaganda.  It was eventually sent to 
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many of the figures who were involved in the discussions with Hankey that led to the 
formation of SOE and is an indication of the considerable support that existed within 
the British political and military establishment for the use of irregular and subversive 
measures in the war against Germany.
7
  Furthermore, there was a belief, which had 
emerged before the outbreak of war, in Nazi economic and political vulnerability.
8
  
These factors, a mixture of fears, preconceptions about German susceptibility, and 
growing interest in the potential of subversive warfare, all of which were nourished by 
Britain‟s increasingly desperate military situation in spring 1940, created the fertile 
conditions that led to the germination of SOE. 
Alongside this, two small departments were actively investigating the potential 
of subversive and clandestine warfare.  The history of the creation of Military 
Intelligence (Research), (MI [R]), a small section within the War Office under 
Lieutenant Colonel J. F. C. Holland that analysed the use of special or irregular 
forces, and Section D, a new section established within SIS under Major Lawrence 
Grand to examine attacking the enemy by means other than operations by military 
forces, has been well documented elsewhere and therefore will not be repeated here.
 9
  
Nevertheless, these developments were important as they indicate that even before the 
creation of SOE significant consideration had already been given within the military 
establishment to both the potential of clandestine warfare and importantly the 
employment of fifth column or resistance groups within occupied Europe.  Many of 
the personnel that were later employed by SOE came from within Section D and MI 
(R), and they provided not only the organisational but also more significantly the 
conceptual foundations upon which SOE was built.  These departments were active 
before and after the outbreak of war in 1939 and were importantly „seen as playing a 
part‟ within economic warfare.10  They also took an early strategic and military 
interest in Norway.  Section D was active in Scandinavia from as early as the summer 
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of 1938,
11
 and many of the recruits and ideas that SOE would use in Norway were 
taken from these two organisations. 
Although there was a developing interest in irregular and subversive activities 
and a few small operations were undertaken within occupied Europe prior to spring 
1940, they were largely uncoordinated and sporadic.  With the rapid collapse of 
France in May and June, however, the context changed.  Prior to this British strategy 
envisaged a three-staged process: warding off an attempted German knockout blow, 
followed by consolidation and a building of resources whilst German strength was 
undermined by economic pressure and propaganda and a final general offensive.  It 
was a strategy based on a belief that „the French army could hold out and the German 
economy was vulnerable‟.12  Rapid German success in France in May 1940, however, 
required the COS to re-assess Britain‟s position, and on 19 May 1940 they met to 
consider a paper entitled „British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality‟, the certain 
eventuality being the new conditions resulting from the collapse of France and the 
loss of a substantial part of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and its equipment.  
This document both marked a shift in strategy and led directly to the formation of 
SOE.  It re-affirmed the British emphasis on economic pressure and air attack, but 
more importantly placed them at the fulcrum of future strategy.  An additional strand 
was, however, also added to the strategic mix, „the stimulation of the seeds of revolt 
within the conquered territories‟.  The potential of widespread resistance to German 
occupation across Europe was seen as a valuable additional weapon, which could be 
used after conditions in these countries had begun to deteriorate due to economic 
pressure.  As this activity was considered of the highest importance it was decided 
that a „special organisation‟ was required.  On 27 May 1940 the War Cabinet accepted 
the recommendations of this paper and instigated the process that led to the War 
Cabinet‟s approval of SOE‟s Charter on 22 July 1940.13  It was therefore Britain‟s 
military situation in the summer of 1940 and the search for a new way forward in the 
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war against Germany that ultimately led to the birth of this new organisation.  SOE 
had strategic origins and its link to wider strategic developments would be a crucial 
factor in its future development and military contribution.                    
        The political activity and the negotiations leading up to the formation of SOE in 
July 1940 have also been fully narrated elsewhere and therefore will not be repeated 
here.
14
  Since June 1939 it had been recognised that there was a need to harmonise 
„paramilitary‟ activities, but after the collapse of France sabotage and subversion were 
considered „of such importance‟ it was decided that they had to be unified „under one 
strong hand‟.15  Consequently, on 16 July 1940, Hugh Dalton, the Minister of 
Economic Warfare, was invited by the Prime Minister to take charge of SOE.  The 
new organisation therefore had its own minister and subversive activities were 
removed from their previous Foreign and War Office control.  SOE was also, rather 
appropriately, placed under the minister whose remit included economic warfare 
against the enemy.
16
  Dalton‟s grandiose view of what SOE could achieve, a Europe 
in a state of „permanent revolution‟, and his call for subversion to be an independent 
service, a „Fourth Arm‟, were, however, ultimately rejected.17  Therefore, although 
SOE represented a new element of Britain‟s forward strategy, it was very much a 
junior player. 
 The creation of a Charter was an attempt to define SOE‟s function and its 
relationship with other organisations and government departments, such as SIS, MI5, 
the Foreign Office and the COS.  And although the Charter is vague in how these 
relationships would work, it does establish some important points of principle.  Co-
operation with the intelligence services and consultation with the Foreign Office are 
emphasised, as is the conviction „that the general plan for irregular warfare offensive 
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operations should be in step with the general strategical conduct of the war‟.18  
Consequently over the next four years SOE was guided by a series of directives that 
were approved by the COS.  These set out in detail how subversive operations in the 
occupied countries of Europe including Norway would contribute to or support 
military operations.  They also specified priorities and the role of SOE in the various 
theatres of war.
19
  Significantly, therefore, SOE not only had strategic origins, its 
future role was also inextricably and formally linked to strategic and operational 
requirements. 
Consequently, in the autumn of 1943, by which time the planning and 
preparation of Operation Overlord had become the Allies‟ strategic priority in the 
west, responsibility for SOE in Norway was placed under the operational command of 
the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Designate (COSSAC).
20
  In line 
with this SOE‟s London office was merged with the offices of its American 
counterpart, the Special Operations (SO) branch of OSS to form SOE/SO HQ.  In 
January 1944, command of Allied operations in northwest Europe and Scandinavia 
was placed under the control of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF), and in May SOE/SO HQ was renamed Special Forces HQ (SFHQ).
21
  
Therefore, from early 1944 through to the end of the war it was directives issued by 
SHAEF that determined SOE‟s policy in Norway. 
 The organisational re-alignment of special operations began during the 
summer and autumn of 1940 when Section D and MI (R) were merged into SOE.  
This new organisation, which moved into its wartime residence in Baker Street in 
London at this time, was initially divided into three departments: SO1, which took 
over covert propaganda, SO2, which subsumed Section D and was responsible for 
operations, and SO3, which was responsible for intelligence and planning.  In August 
                                                          
18
 PRO: WP (40) 271, 19 July 1940, in CAB 66/10.   
19
 Four SOE directives were issued by the British COS between November 1940 and November 1944 
and all are available in the PRO.  COS (40) 27 (0), „Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy‟, 25 
November 1940 in CAB 80/56.  COS (42) 133 (0), „SOE Collaboration in Operations on the 
Continent‟, 12 May 1942, in CAB 80/62.  COS (43) 142 (0), „Special Operations Executive Directive 
for 1943‟, 20 March 1943, in CAB 80/68.  COS (44) 957 (0), „Directive to Special Operations 
Executive‟, 9 November 1944, in CAB 80/89.   
20
 PRO: COSSAC (43) 58 (final), from F. E. Morgan to Secretary, COS Committee, 2 October 1943, in 
WO 219/40B.  This states that at the COS meeting, COS (43) 217
th
 (0), on 16 September 1943 
COSSAC would discuss with SOE proposals for the control of SOE activities in northwest Europe.   
See also: SHAEF/17240/13/Ops (A), 23 March 1943, „Operational Directive to SFHQ,‟ in 
WO219/4967, which states that at the COS meeting, COS (43) 237
th
 meeting (0) on 15 October 1943, 
SOE activities were finally placed under COSSAC.     
21
 Stafford, British and European resistance, p. 153. 
 33 
1941, however, after a year of inter-departmental wrangles, SO1 was abolished and its 
responsibilities taken over by the Political Warfare Executive (PWE).  SO3 had 
already been wound up leaving only SO2, which took on the title of the Special 
Operations Executive.
22
  From this point the organisation grew significantly in size 
and employed a total of almost 12,000 personnel by the spring of 1944,
23
 which 
reflected the increasing range and scale of its activities across occupied Europe.  The 
organisation remained responsible to the Minister for Economic Warfare, which from 
February 1942 was the Tory minister Lord Selborne.  It was, however, its Executive 
Director (CD) that provided the „leadership and strategic control‟24 of what was a 
hierarchical organisation.  The CD initially kept in touch with his senior officers 
through a series of senior committees, beginning with the „D-Board‟ in August 1940, 
which became the „SO2 Executive Committee‟ in December, was renamed the „Board 
of Directors‟ in November 1941, and finally became SOE Council in February 1942.  
The Council was the executive body that „prepared most of SOE‟s main policies and 
had a perceptible influence on resistance strategy‟.25  Under the Council came the 
country sections, often in regional groupings such as Scandinavia and which 
contained the staff officers responsible for operations in the occupied countries, 
followed by the technical departments such as finance, signals and operations. 
 This section has shown that SOE originated as a new strategic tool within a 
climate receptive to the use of subversive operations.  It was born at a time when 
sabotage, subversion, and the encouragement of the „seeds‟ of resistance were seen as 
some of the few offensive military measures that Britain could use in the war against 
Germany.  Furthermore, occupied Norway was identified as a country where Britain 
could quickly employ clandestine operations, and where nascent resistance groups 
were beginning to develop.   
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II 
SOE’s Scandinavian and Norwegian Sections: The Continuation of a Strategic 
and Military Tradition in Norway 
 It was the occupied countries that proved to be fruitful for SOE.  After the withdrawal 
of Allied troops and the capitulation of Norwegian forces in June 1940, German 
control over Norway was confirmed and therefore the country became a potential 
sphere of operations for a range of clandestine and underground activities.  It was also 
decided that it was „essential‟ that SOE was formed on a „territorial‟ basis and as a 
result country and regional sections were created, including a Scandinavian section,
26
 
which contained the staff that would be responsible for administering and 
implementing SOE activity in this theatre.  It has been asserted that the attitude of the 
staff within this section, particularly toward the Norwegian authorities, was shaped by 
British experiences during the disastrous campaign in Norway in the spring of 1940.
27
  
The Scandinavian section, however, included personnel with a range of backgrounds 
often from much earlier.  From the outbreak of the war in Europe, key figures in the 
eventual development and discharge of SOE policy in this theatre had contributed to 
efforts to implement economic pressure against Germany through Norway.  Many of 
the Scandinavian section‟s staff also had experience of working within those 
organisations, Section D and MI (R), which were merged into SOE.  They therefore 
brought with them many of the ideas and practices that these organisations had either 
conceived or advocated, such as the potential of sabotage and guerrilla warfare.  Some 
of the staff also had direct involvement in irregular and subversive activities in 
Norway, both before, during and after the campaign of 1940, and therefore had 
developed an enthusiasm for the military potential of such actions. 
 A detailed chronicle of the history of the SOE‟s Scandinavian and Norwegian 
sections can be found and referred to in Appendix B.
28
  This shows that for most of 
the war Norway, along with Sweden and Denmark, had its own sub-section under the 
umbrella of a Scandinavian section, although for periods, such as in 1942, it was 
given its own independence.  Two figures were central in the early formulation of 
policy toward Norway and the setting up of the Scandinavian section.  Both moved 
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onto senior positions within SOE, but continued to have a major influence over its 
activities in Norway and its relations with the Norwegian authorities.  These were Sir 
Charles Hambro and Harry Sporborg.   
Charles Hambro had been head of the Scandinavian section in the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare (MEW), but in August 1940, after a recommendation from Hugh 
Gaitskell, he was recruited by Hugh Dalton to set up and run SOE‟s Scandinavian 
section.
29
  He occupied this position until December 1940 when he took over 
responsibility for Europe, parts of Africa, and propaganda in SO2 and began his rapid 
rise to CD in 1942.
30
  Harry Sporborg, who was Hambro‟s deputy at the MEW, also 
joined SOE and continued to work under Hambro with responsibility for Norway until 
December 1940 when he took over the Scandinavian section, a position he retained 
until October 1941, when George Wiskeman replaced him.  He nevertheless 
maintained a close involvement with Norway through 1942 despite his continued rise 
within SOE, eventually becoming its Vice-Chief in September 1943.
31
   
Hambro had family connections with Norway,
32
 which would have helped him 
to understand the nature of the country and its political institutions.  Prior to joining 
SOE he had also, along with Sporborg, made contact with members of the Norwegian 
government,
 33
 something that would help in the development of fruitful relations 
between SOE and the Norwegian authorities.  Moreover, the MEW was created in 
1939 „to advise the armed services on the measures that they should adopt in order to 
undermine the enemy‟s economy‟. 34  Both Hambro and Sporborg‟s early war 
experience, therefore, came from their contribution to the application of economic 
pressure against Germany through attempting to deny it supplies of important 
materials from Scandinavia, particularly Norway.  Between September 1939 and 
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March 1941, Hambro was involved in negotiations with the Norwegian government 
on a War-Trade agreement, which set out to reduce the export to Germany of certain 
Norwegian products such as fish, fish products, non-ferrous metals, and ferro-alloys.  
During a visit to Norway in February 1940 he also had discussions with directors of 
the Orkla Mining Company at Løkken south of Trondheim on how their exports of 
pyrite ore, an important source of sulphur and copper for the German munitions 
industry, could be reduced.  This site was eventually attacked at least on four 
occasions by SOE teams between 1942 and 1944, more than any other industrial 
target in Norway.
35
  Both Hambro‟s and Sporborg‟s background of working within 
the MEW was therefore an important influence on the future development of SOE‟s 
plans for Norway.  For example in August 1940, soon after his move to SOE Hambro 
began to examine ways of interrupting supplies of fish oil to Germany, something the 
Scandinavian section continued to pursue until the end of 1941.
36
  Sporborg also 
advised Section D on an operation called the „Norwegian Expedition‟, which it 
carried out in June 1940 against targets in the Bergen area, including the power plant 
for a A/S Bjølvefossen at Åvik in Hardanger, which produced ferro-chromium.
37
  The 
production of specialist metals and mining of ores became the most important targets 
for SOE in Norway over the following years.
38
  Strategic interest in Norway as a 
source of materials for the German war economy began well before SOE was formed, 
but significantly through the influence of Hambro and Sporborg it was continued.  
The many coup de main operations that were carried out by SOE against industrial 
and economic targets in Norway after 1940 were therefore, through using military 
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means, a perpetuation and attempted expansion of the policy of applying pressure 
against Germany that had begun in the autumn of 1939 with the work of the MEW.       
SOE‟s small Norwegian section, which was formed during the summer and 
early autumn of 1940, also included personnel that had previous experience of 
subversive or irregular activities in Norway.  It was British strategic interest in the 
export of Swedish iron-ore through Narvik to Germany that led to Section D‟s 
involvement in Norway from the summer of 1938.
39
  In 1939 it also established a 
Scandinavian section, followed later in the year by a small Norwegian sub-section 
staffed by J. L. Chaworth-Musters.  Musters, who had personal experience of 
Norway, worked under the cover of temporary vice-consul in Bergen between January 
and May 1940, before escaping to Britain to work with the Norwegians recruited by 
Section D for the „Norwegian Expedition‟.40  When Musters moved to SOE in the 
summer of 1940 to help set-up its Norwegian section he therefore brought with him 
this experience as well as an understanding of the country, especially its language.  
This background made him ideally suited for the recruitment and preparation of 
Norwegian volunteers, and whilst carrying out this role he had an important influence 
on the development of early relations with the Norwegian authorities in London.   
After Sporborg took over responsibility for the Scandinavian section, the 
Norwegian sub-section was, from January 1941, placed under Lt. Commander Frank 
Stagg RN, who had been Sporborg‟s principal adviser.  Stagg had worked for SIS and 
also had considerable experience of Scandinavia and its languages.  It was, however, 
his naval experience and particular interest in northern Norway, 
41
 combined with 
Sporborg‟s background in economic warfare, that appears to have been another 
important contributory factor in the development of SOE‟s early plans for this theatre.  
In December 1940, Stagg produced a series of proposals that recommended 
operations in the north of the country in order to interrupt the supplies of war 
materials to Germany.
42
  This led to his instigation of or direct involvement in the 
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planning of the series of amphibious operations that were undertaken against targets 
along the Norwegian seaboard during 1941.
43
 
Lastly, MI (R) had a direct involvement in Norway during the British 
campaign in the spring of 1940 through special units such as the „Independent 
Companies‟ and the „No. 13 Military Mission‟, which attempted harassing operations 
against the enemy‟s flanks and lines of communication in support of regular forces.44  
Its ideas and experience were exported to SOE when it was subsumed into the 
organisation at the end of October 1940.  MI (R) influence percolated through to the 
Norwegian section primarily through Brigadier, later Major General, Colin McVean 
(McV.) Gubbins who joined the organisation in November 1940 and was made 
responsible for the supervision of training and the conduct of operations and raiding 
parties.
45
  Gubbins had undertaken extensive research into guerrilla warfare behind 
enemy lines, had personal experience of Norway and rose quickly within SOE 
becoming its Executive Director in September 1943.  He eventually had an important 
and direct influence over SOE‟s policy and activities in this theatre both whilst in 
charge of operations in the occupied countries and later as Deputy Executive Director 
with responsibility for Western Europe and higher „operational policy‟.46 
Gubbins had also been a mentor to John Skinner Wilson, who in January 1942 
became head of an independent Norwegian section and in September 1943 Regional 
Head of the Directorate of Scandinavian and Baltic States.  Prior to joining the 
Norwegian section, Wilson had been an instructor in counter-espionage, anti-fifth 
column and offensive fifth column work, and had worked closely with Gubbins in the 
Training Section of SOE.  His background was also steeped in the concept and 
potential of using irregular operations behind enemy lines.
47
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The senior staff of SOE and its Scandinavian section, who were responsible 
for developing policy and implementing operations in this theatre, contained several 
key individuals who had a background in the development and use of clandestine or 
indirect forms of warfare, particularly with regard to Norway.  They were ideally 
suited for implementing this element of Britain‟s forward strategy and enthusiastic 
exponents of the military opportunities that this occupied country appeared to offer.  
As with SOE there is, therefore, a explicit link between the creation of its 
Scandinavian section and the strategic potential that special operations appeared to 
offer in the situation that Britain found itself in the summer of 1940.   
The long frontier that separated Norway and neutral Sweden also made 
Stockholm an important location for the implementation of SOE operations in this 
theatre.  For example it was a major route for refugees, and SOE and SIS agents who 
wished to move between the two countries.  SOE involvement in Norway from its 
Stockholm Mission at the British Legation began with Malcolm Munthe.  Munthe was 
another MI (R) officer who had been active in Scandinavia and Norway from 
December 1939, often working from the Legation.  In April 1940 he was in Norway 
preparing to act as a liaison officer with the Norwegian army and to receive the 
British forces that were expected to land in response to a German invasion.  Munthe‟s 
escape to Stockholm during the German occupation, his employment as Assistant 
Military Attaché (AMA) at the Legation, his recruitment to SOE by Charles Hambro, 
and his setting up of the „Red Horse‟ organisation to subsequently cover his courier 
operations, re-establishment of contacts, and instigation of sabotage in Norway on 
behalf of SOE in 1940 and 1941 has been well documented.
48
   What is most 
significant is that Munthe is another example of the MI (R) influence that filtered into 
SOE from the autumn of 1940.
49
  His enthusiasm should be seen within the context of 
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his military background, which was that he belonged to an organisation whose raison 
d’être was to develop methods to harass the enemy.  He was also part of the small 
effort that began in autumn 1940 to use clandestine and subversive operations against 
the enemy in order to ensure that its occupation of Norway quickly became an 
increasing military burden.  His sponsoring of subversive activity, however, soon 
brought him to the attention of the Norwegian Legation in Stockholm and the 
Swedish government, which was keen to avoid any threat to its neutrality through the 
displeasure that Munthe‟s actions might cause Germany.  The Swedish authorities 
originally called for his expulsion in January 1941,
50
 but were persuaded to back 
down by the British Minister in Stockholm, Sir Victor Mallet.  Recently released 
material appears to indicate that Munthe‟s activities had the support of not only SOE, 
but also initially and more surprisingly, the British Foreign Office.  At a time when 
the fear of a German invasion of Britain from Europe, including Norway, was still 
prevalent, Munthe‟s contact with groups in the country that could be organised to 
operate behind German lines, was considered valuable.  His relationship with Mallet, 
however, who grew to object to SOE using the Legation, undermined efforts to keep 
him in place and in the late spring of 1941 after the Swedish authorities again 
objected to his presence, SOE was forced to recall him to London.
51
  This was 
therefore an early example of how SOE had to balance its eagerness to become active 
in Norway with the local relationships that were ultimately crucial to its effectiveness.   
Second Lieutenant Hugh Marks, who had fought in the Norwegian campaign 
before escaping to Stockholm, initially continued Munthe‟ work.  His earlier 
association with Munthe‟s activities, however, also incurred the displeasure of both 
Victor Mallet and the Swedish government and he returned to Britain in early October 
1941.  The role of AMA was taken over by Andrew Croft; a former colleague of 
Munthe‟s in MI (R), who had also been in Norway when it was occupied.  Whilst 
Croft undertook more general work for SOE it was Edgar Nielsen who assumed 
responsibility for Norway at the British Legation, a role in which he continued until 
the end of the war.  Nielsen, with Danish ancestry, had a diplomatic and an 
intelligence background in Norway and was working as assistant vice-consul at Skien 
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when the country was occupied.  He was put forward by the Foreign Office and 
accepted by SOE as he was „on the spot‟ and it meant agreement could then be 
reached over Marks‟ replacement.  He was not, therefore, SOE‟s immediate choice 
and unlike many of his colleagues in London he did not have a background and 
therefore a particular understanding of the nature and requirements of special 
operations, which may have contributed to his difficult relationship with SOE‟s HQ in 
London.
52
     
The early creation of SOE‟s Scandinavian section under men such as Hambro 
reflected the commitment to the co-ordination and intensification of subversive 
operations in this theatre that emerged in the strategic conditions of the summer of 
1940.  SOE‟s interest in Norway and enthusiastic pursuit of clandestine activities was 
therefore directly linked to the dire military situation that Britain found itself in at this 
time, and the search for ways to take the offensive against Germany. The whole 
process was furthered by the employment of staff who had a background in 
organisations such as the MEW, Section D, and MI (R), and who had direct military 
experience of Norway through earlier involvement in special operations, coupled with 
a knowledge of the country and its language.  This alone was, however, not enough. 
 
 
III 
SOE Military Units for Norway: From the Shetlands to Aviemore 
For SOE to be able to implement its plans it required both suitable recruits to 
undertake operations on its behalf in the difficult conditions of occupied Norway and 
the transportation to get them there.  Having a policy and a series of military aims and 
objectives would be fruitless without the means to achieve them, and in the autumn of 
1940 SOE was a new organisation with very few resources.  Consequently, it began 
urgent attempts to recruit Norwegian volunteers.  SOE also took part in a 
collaborative project to establish a small naval base on the Shetland Islands from 
where a handful of Norwegian fishing vessels and crew would eventually be used to 
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provide an important link with Norway.  With a severe limitation on the availability 
of aircraft for Special Duty operations, particularly for Norway, which did not receive 
its first airdrop until early 1942, the North Sea route was critical.  
An understanding of the formation and development of the unit of the Royal 
Norwegian army, NIC (I), which carried out operations in Norway on behalf of SOE 
and the Norwegian High Command, the Shetlands Base, and the Special Duty flights 
that dropped SOE teams and supplies into Norway is important because of what they 
represented.  The origins of NIC (1) and the Shetlands Base were the result of a 
resolve in the summer of 1940 to intensify and accelerate the implementation of 
clandestine and subversive operations in this theatre.  Both were built on the 
experiences of SOE‟s predecessor organisations, Section D and MI (R).  They also, 
however, reflect the joint nature of SOE activity in Norway, the collaboration that 
developed with both the Norwegian authorities and the other Allied agencies that took 
a similar military interest in this country.  
SOE operations required Norwegian recruits because they had the language 
skills and experience of local conditions that enabled them to work successfully in 
occupied Norway.  Therefore, from the summer of 1940, building on a practice 
instigated by Section D, SOE began attempts to enlist and train Norwegians to 
undertake actions on its behalf.  It started as an improvised small-scale effort, but 
during the summer and early autumn of 1940, under the auspices of the Scandinavian 
section, attempts were made through liaison with leading figures within the 
Norwegian government and military authorities, to formalise and accelerate the 
process.  There was an early realisation that this process could not happen and would 
probably be jeopardised without Norwegian co-operation, although it would have to 
be on terms acceptable to SOE.  This ultimately led to the establishment of what from 
March 1942 was officially known and jointly recognised as NIC (1), more 
colloquially called Kompani Linge, the „Linge Company‟. 
It was from the trickle of refugees that began to arrive in Britain after the 
occupation of Norway that in August 1940 SOE recruited its first Norwegian 
volunteers.  Two figures were central to this effort: Martin Linge, who had been a 
Norwegian liaison officer with the British forces at Åndalsnes in April 1940 and from 
whom the name of the unit came, and J. L. Chaworth-Musters.
53
  It appears that 
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Chaworth-Musters had meetings with Halvdan Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister 
at the time, and Colonel Birger Ljungberg, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, and 
from early August it was agreed, certainly on the British side, that Linge should act as 
the „liaison officer‟ between the British and the Norwegian government.  His role 
would be to deal with the recruitment of Norwegians from the Norwegian Armed 
Forces, to contact Norwegians who had recently arrived in Great Britain, and to look 
after Norwegian agents in London.
54
  He symbolises SOE‟s acceptance of the fact that 
it was dependent on Norwegian support and that it was necessary to have a systematic 
and ordered approach to recruitment.  
Nevertheless, despite early contact with members of the Norwegian 
government and General Fleischer, the head of Hærens Overkommando, the 
Norwegian Army High Command (HOK) in Britain, along with the efforts of Linge, 
no more than six Norwegians were recruited by SOE during 1940, far less than the 
between twenty to thirty it was hoped would be employed.
55
  From January 1941, 
however, despite some initial difficulties, a orderly process of recruiting Norwegian 
volunteers from the Norwegian army reception camp at Dumfries in Britain began.  In 
early February the first batch of recruits entered SOE‟s training network, which was 
based on the series of specialist training schools (STSs) that were being set up across 
the country.
56
  In March 1941, this process was placed on a more formal footing when 
an agreement, re-affirmed in June, was reached with General Fleischer that around 
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twenty-five Norwegians could be recruited from the Norwegian army each month 
until this special unit reached a ceiling of 250 members, which it did in May 1943.  
Up to this point regular cohorts of Norwegian recruits entered SOE‟s training pipeline 
and those that were deemed suitable ended up at a Holding School, initially at 
Grendon Hall in Buckinghamshire but from mid-June 1941 at Fawley Court near 
Henley on Thames, where they awaited assignment to an operation.
57
  By the end of 
October 1941 a total of 143 Norwegian recruits were spread across SOE‟s training 
schools, including sixty-four at Fawley Court.
58
  However, because of the need to 
prepare for Scandinavian conditions the Norwegian section was in November 
provided with its own Special Training School (STS 26) near Aviemore in Scotland.  
It was made up of three sites: STS 26a, Drumintoul Lodge, STS26b, Glenmore 
Lodge, and STS26c Forest Lodge.  In May 1943 these were taken away from SOE‟s 
Training Section and placed under the direct responsibility of Lt. Col. Wilson, where 
they remained until they were disbanded in July 1945.  Altogether 654 Norwegians 
were trained by SOE during its lifetime.
59
  From the beginning, therefore, SOE 
attempted to instigate an organised and most importantly a joint effort to employ, 
train, and prepare Norwegians to carry out operations on its behalf.  It was ultimately 
very successful.   
The recruitment and training of Norwegian volunteers were initially slow to 
get underway, although owing to certain important factors both eventually began to 
accelerate.  Firstly, the increase in the number of refugees that began to arrive in 
Britain during the early part of 1941.  Almost 2000 Norwegians crossed the North Sea 
and arrived in the Shetlands during the year, including 164 in March alone.  Over 
5000 were also brought to Britain during the war as a result of Allied operations on 
Norwegian territory, beginning with the 285 that were brought back in spring 1941 
                                                          
57
 Recruitment continued through February and March and by April 1941 groups of at least twenty 
were being regularly sent at this time initially to Stodham Park in Hampshire, and ending up at a 
Holding School at Grendon Hall northeast of Oxford.  Kjelstadli claims that „systematic‟ recruiting 
only began in April, but this appears to be incorrect.  See: NHM: „Consolidated Progress reports of S 
Section‟ during the months of January to April in SOE archive, Boks 3a, mappe 10/3/8b.  PRO: 
HS7/174, „History of the Norwegian Section‟.  FA, hylle 20, mappe „4-B-2, P.M. av 12.5.1942, cited in 
Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 63 and Riste, London Regjeringa, vol. 1, p. 119. 
58
 There were also six Norwegians at the paramilitary school at Swordlands who were probably being 
trained for work at the Shetlands Base.  PRO: SOE Executive Committee Weekly Progress reports, 
report for week ending 29 October 1941, in HS8/218.   
59
 Not all of those trained went on to work for SOE.  PRO: HS7/175, „Norwegian Section-History 
Appendices‟, Appendix B -„A Short History of the Linge Company‟.  HS7/51-„ History of SOE‟s 
Training Section‟.   
 45 
after Operation Claymore.
60
  Secondly, the nature of the relationship between SOE 
and Norwegian authorities.  The establishment in January 1941 of the 
Forsvarsdepartementets etteretningskontor, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence 
Intelligence Office (FD-E) under captain Finn Nagell helped to improve the working 
relationship between SOE and the Norwegian military authorities in the matter of 
recruitment.
61
  Linked to this was the involvement of both SOE and FD-E in the 
British amphibious raids that were carried out against economic targets in Norway 
during 1941.   Through co-operation between SOE and FD-E groups of Norwegians 
were enlisted and trained to take part in these operations, which helped to improve 
contact, liaison and accelerated the whole process of recruitment.
62
 
The employment of Norwegian volunteers by SOE, however, despite the close 
contact with FD-E, ran into difficulties at the end of 1941.  Notwithstanding the 
involvement of a large number of its citizens, the Norwegian government was not 
advised beforehand of Operations Anklet and Archery, the British amphibious raids 
against targets on its territory in December.  Disquiet also broke out amongst the 
Norwegian contingent on „Anklet‟ after the naval and military forces were withdrawn 
prematurely.  Consequently, the Norwegian authorities began intensive efforts to 
assert greater control over the use of their citizens on special operations.  This led in 
March 1942 to the official recognition of NIC (1) and ultimately resulted in a more 
collaborative and integrated approach to the employment, organisation and 
preparation of Norwegian recruits on behalf of SOE.  The British accepted that NIC 
(1) was a special unit of the Norwegian armed forces that was under the joint control 
of SOE and Forsvarets Overkommando (FO), the recently created Norwegian 
Defence High Command.  It was made up of Norwegian personnel seconded from the 
regular army who were subject to Norwegian discipline administered by a Norwegian 
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officer under the authority of the Norwegian Commander in Chief.  The men were 
trained at STS 26 under the auspices of SOE but were sent to Norway on operations 
under the joint authority of both SOE and FO.
63
  Subversive operations in Norway 
were therefore carried out on a partnership basis and symbolised not simply British 
and Allied military interest in this theatre but also the level of co-operation and 
support that SOE received from the Norwegian authorities.  The events that led to the 
creation of NIC (1) also illustrated how important the nature of the relationship 
between SOE and Norwegian authorities was to the development and implementation 
of clandestine operations in this theatre.    
From spring 1942, when SOE activity in Norway began to take off, it was NIC 
(1) that provided the teams that were sent in to destroy key economic and industrial 
targets in the country, the organisers and radio operators that prepared and worked 
with local resistance organisations, and the groups that co-operated with Milorg in 
preparation for the eventual liberation.  Between August 1940 and May 1945, 530 
Norwegians were recruited to serve on behalf of SOE, although during the same 
period 160 never reached the required standard and were returned to the Norwegian 
army.  At the end of hostilities in early May 1945, the unit‟s „effective strength‟ was 
245 men, close to its original target.
64
  Altogether the company lost fifty-seven men, 
fifty-one on active service.  It, therefore, had a survival rate of ninety percent, which 
compares very favourably with a rate for SOE recruits across occupied Europe of 
between sixty and seventy per cent.
65
  This indicates that, despite the difficult 
conditions found in occupied Norway, the use of Norwegian recruits by SOE, 
prepared, trained, and sent to Norway in collaboration with the Norwegian military 
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authorities, was an effective and comparatively successfully  means of undertaking its 
operations.    
SOE also had to find ways to transport its agents to Norway.  Therefore, in the 
autumn of 1940 a small naval base was established on the Shetland Islands from 
where Norwegian fishing boats and later American submarine chasers were used to 
transport SOE teams, arms and equipment to the Norwegian coastline and to pick-up 
agents or refugees who wished to return to Britain.  There are a number of anecdotal 
and human-interest accounts of what has become known as the „Shetlands Bus‟ 
service, but few scholarly accounts based on original sources. A detailed chronicle of 
its history, based on sources from British and Norwegian archives, can be found and 
referred to in Appendix C.
66
 
The base was extremely important for SOE.  The concept of using Norwegian 
fishing boats to transport men and equipment to Norway was not new, but the 
organisation and establishment of a permanent base was.  This is a further indication 
of the value that from the summer of 1940 was placed on Norway as a potential 
theatre for subversive operations, and of the growing urgency to accelerate such 
activities.  Between late 1940 and mid 1944, the North Sea was the primary route for 
transporting SOE teams to Norway.  As Special Duty flights were severely limited 
owing to both a lack of available aircraft and because Norway was both 
geographically and strategically peripheral, and therefore not a priority, it was the use 
of the fishing boats and later the submarine chasers out of the Shetlands Base that 
effectively allowed SOE to continue to operate in this theatre.  Its long coastline and 
the relatively short 180-mile trip from the Shetlands also provided a large and 
important gateway in and out of occupied Norway.  Moreover, the coastal waters off 
the Norwegian seaboard, which contained many small, uninhabited offshore islands 
(skerries), were an important locus for operations against enemy forces and shipping, 
often using vessels from the Shetlands Base.
67
  The base was also another example of 
the positive working relationship that developed between SOE and the Norwegian 
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authorities, who provided the fishing boats and crews, and an early indication of the 
collaboration that would develop between SOE and the RN in this theatre.  
According to the Shetlands Base log a total of 202 trips to the Norwegian 
coast and back were attempted between November 1940 and May 1945 by Norwegian 
fishing vessels and the submarine chasers.  Of these 170 involved SOE and thirty-two 
were on behalf of SIS.  Altogether 191 SOE agents and almost 300 tons of stores were 
delivered to the Norwegian coast and over sixty agents and 330 refugees picked up.
68
  
Norwegian representatives were initially located at both Lerwick and Aberdeen to 
take part along with the British in the examination of these new arrivals to the 
country, although from the summer of 1941 this process was transferred to the Royal 
Patriotic School in London.
69
  SOE also opened a second base at Burghead in 
Scotland from where five additional trips to Norway were attempted between 
November 1942 and January 1943, whilst SIS opened its own base at Peterhead from 
where it made twenty seven trips to Norway between July 1941 and November 
1943.
70
   
The total number of trips across the North Sea was, however, restricted by 
certain factors.  The vessels could not sail between the end of May and late August 
because of the long daylight hours found in this northerly region during these months, 
which made operating off the Norwegian coast too dangerous.  The number of fishing 
boats available at any one time was also extremely small.  In the three seasons 
between 1940 and 1943, there were usually only about six Norwegian fishing boats 
that were in a suitable condition to go to sea.  These small wooden vessels were also 
not only vulnerable to the extreme conditions found in the North Sea but also to 
attacks from German aircraft.  The worst single disaster was in November 1941 when 
the fishing boat, „Blia‟ disappeared with seven crew and thirty-six refugees on board.  
Altogether at least eight fishing boats and forty-four crewmen were eventually lost.  It 
was for this reason that in autumn 1943 the three faster and better protected American 
submarine chasers were acquired and manned by Norwegian crews until the end of 
the war, fortunately without further losses.
71
  Nevertheless, the casualty rate of the 
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men working on the fishing vessels was higher than for the NIC (1) teams that were 
sent to Norway.
72
   
This collection of facts and figures is significant because it indicates how 
valuable the Shetlands Base and the route across the North sea was for SOE.  Between 
November 1940 and May 1943 there were only twenty Special Duty air sorties to 
Norway compared with eighty-five trips from the Shetlands Base.
73
   Therefore, 
without the service that these fishing vessels provided, SOE activity in Norway would 
have been significantly curtailed.  In August 1941, the British Joint Planning Staff 
(JPS) recognised that although Norway was only likely to be an area of „subsidiary‟ 
operations, the process of organising a secret army should continue as it was possible 
„to introduce a large proportion of the arms and equipment by sea‟.74   
Nevertheless, the idea of using Norwegian fishing vessels manned by 
Norwegian crews was not new.  It can be traced back at least to September 1939 when 
Section D, through its Scandinavian section began exploring the possibilities of using 
trawlers or drifters for smuggling „devices‟ into Norway. 75  This project never got off 
the ground but in the spring of 1940 Section D again considered linking England and 
Norway „by means of Norwegian and Danish fishing boats, a number of which are in 
the hands of the Admiralty‟.76  Consequently, from May Section D and soon 
afterwards SIS began using fishing vessels to transport men and equipment to 
Norway,
77
 and through the summer of 1940, a small „ferry service‟ continued across 
the North Sea, in order to deliver agents, establish arms dumps, and contact resistance 
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groups.
78
  When Section D was finally subsumed into SO2 in October 1940 the 
practice of using fishing vessels as a means of transport was therefore already 
established and consequently SOE did not start with a completely blank sheet in 
Norway.
79
  
Prior to the autumn of 1940, however, the use of fishing boats was ad hoc and 
improvised.  The formation of SOE led to a co-ordinated effort to set up a permanent 
base on the Shetlands from where contact with Norway could be maintained, a fleet of 
fishing boats harboured, with residence for the Norwegian crews and SOE agents, and 
arms and equipment stored.  A realisation of the military potential of such a site also 
meant that there were joint discussions over its establishment involving SOE, SIS, 
Admiralty, MI 5, and indirectly the Norwegian government.  The Norwegian fishing 
boats had been taken over by the Norwegian Department of Trade, which then hired 
them to the British, although it appears that the Norwegian government was not 
initially aware of what these vessels were being used for.  They were then 
incorporated into the Admiralty‟s Small Vessels Pool from where they were allocated 
to NID (C), part of the Directorate of Naval Intelligence, for use by SOE and SIS.
80
  
Supplying the base and boats with stores and equipment was the responsibility of an 
army unit called Military Establishment No. 7 (M.E. 7), which was up and running by 
the end of 1940.
81
 
  The use of these fishing vessels, whilst remaining under local control and 
enjoying a high measure of independence, was therefore very much a collaborative 
project.
 82
  The flotilla of Norwegian fishing vessels was operated under the local 
supervision of the Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands (ACOS).
83
  The 
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base was used jointly for most of the war by both SIS and SOE, and its first 
commander L.H. Mitchell was a SIS officer, even though the first trip on behalf of 
SIS was not until September 1941.
84
  SOE operations from the base were under the 
control of the Norwegian section, although the crews of the fishing vessels whilst 
trained by SOE eventually became the responsibility of the Norwegian authorities.  
From spring 1942, as with NIC (1) and as part of an effort to impose tighter control 
over the use of Norwegian volunteers for operations in Norway, the crews were 
placed under Norwegian discipline with a Norwegian officer stationed at the base.  By 
the summer the crews constituted what was officially called the Norwegian Naval 
Independent Unit (NNIU), which was in the summer of 1944 placed under Norwegian 
naval command.
85
  Close liaison with the Admiralty was maintained through the local 
naval officer on the Shetlands and the care and maintenance of the flotilla eventually 
became a naval commitment.
86
  The submarine chasers were provided by the 
American navy.
87
   
The North Sea was not, however, the only route for delivering SOE agents to 
Norway.  Many crossed the border from Sweden by train, vehicle, or on foot, having 
been recruited in Sweden or transported to Stockholm using the small number of 
aircraft that provided an intermittent link between the Swedish capital and Scotland 
during the war.
88
  Agents and equipment were also dropped into Norway by the 
Special Duty Squadrons from Bomber Command that operated on behalf of SOE and 
SIS.  The first flight to the country was in February 1941 when a SIS agent was 
parachuted into southern Norway.  SOE‟s first airdrop was not until January 1942, 
after which a further 1,310 sorties were attempted of which 747 were completed 
successfully.  These dropped a total of 199 agents, similar to the total transported 
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from the Shetlands Base, and a huge number of containers and packages, although 
seventy percent of this material was not delivered until the final nine months of the 
war.
 89
  There were two squadrons, 138 and 161, which Bomber Command allocated 
for special duty operations, but even by the spring of 1944 there was still only a 
minimum of thirty six aircraft available for such operations in the whole of northwest 
Europe.
90
  The prioritisation of strategic bombing severely restricted SOE‟s 
capability,
91
 and the low priority accorded to Norway, especially as the planning and 
preparations for Operation Overlord gained momentum, meant that special duty 
sorties on behalf of SOE to this theatre up until the final months of the war were 
extremely limited.  In 1943 a total of over 600 sorties were flown to France as the 
build up to Overlord began, whilst only twenty-four where flown to Norway.
92
   
The long flights to Norway across the North Sea during the dark winter 
months, when there was a high risk of bad weather, cloud, snow, and icing, were also 
undoubtedly extremely hazardous.  This did not, however, restrict the number of 
sorties flown during the final months of the war, by which time it had been accepted 
that the resistance would be required to play a significant role in the country‟s 
liberation.  Local groups were in desperate need of training, arms and equipment and 
consequently after the assault phase of Overlord was complete and therefore more 
aircraft were available, there was a huge increase in special duty flights to Norway on 
behalf of SOE.  From the beginning of November 1944 until early May 1945, close to 
600 successful sorties were flown to this theatre compared to just eleven in 1942.
93
  
This massive but late increase is perhaps best highlighted by the night of 30-31 
December 1944 when there were fifty-two aircraft in the air over eastern Norway and 
Nordmarka, the wooded area to the north of Oslo.
94
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There were also the Catalina flying boats from the Royal Norwegian 333 
Squadron based at Woodhaven in Scotland that flew sorties to northern Norway, but 
these were primarily on behalf of SIS.  Only three missions were flown for SOE and 
these were to coastal areas that were too distant for the Shetlands fishing boats to 
reach safely.
95
  The priority accorded SIS also did not significantly affect Special 
Duty flights for SOE.  A total of only fifty-two sorties were flown to Norway on 
behalf of SIS during the war, and in every year between 1942 and 1945 considerably 
more airdrops were made on behalf of SOE than SIS, even if the delivery of arms and 
equipment is excluded.
96
  It was the country‟s strategically peripheral position that 
ultimately determined the number and distribution of Special Duty flights to this 
theatre.       
The growth in airdrops to Norway during the final months of the occupation 
was made possible by an increase in the availability of the number of air squadrons, 
beginning with a special squadron of six B-24 Liberators loaned from the US 8
th
 Air 
Force and led by the Norwegian born American Air Force pilot Bernt Balchen.  This 
flew a total of sixty-four sorties to the country during the summer of 1944.  After the 
liberation of France further squadrons were freed up, including in the New Year two 
from the 492
nd
 Bombardment Group from the United States of America Air Force 
(USAAF).
97
  Nevertheless, in the three years from the autumn of 1940 until the end of 
1943 an average of less than one sortie per month was flown on behalf of SOE to 
Norway.  Consequently, prior to 1944 SOE‟s activities, coup de main attacks or the 
organising and equipping of resistance groups, were very dependent on what could be 
transported using the Norwegian fishing boats based at the Shetlands Base.  These 
were largely unprotected, slow and often-unreliable vessels that could only operate for 
eight months of the year and when conditions in the North Sea permitted.  This alone 
illustrates the huge difficulties that SOE faced in operating in this theatre.  
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Conclusion 
SOE was formed in the summer of 1940 within a climate that was supportive 
to the potential of irregular and subversive operations and as a response to Britain‟s 
worsening military and strategic position.  At a time when, after the collapse of 
France, Britain was weak and isolated in Europe, the creation of a new agency that 
could kindle the seeds of revolt within the occupied countries of Europe was seen as a 
valuable additional weapon.  Sabotage, particularly through the efforts of Section D, 
had been used as a means to apply economic pressure to Germany, but the formation 
of SOE gave sabotage and subversion a more prominent and significant position.  The 
birth of this new organisation was therefore directly linked to the strategic conditions 
of the time.     
Soon after its formation SOE also continued the interest in Norway that had 
been pioneered by Section D and MI (R).  The creation of a Scandinavian section with 
staff employed largely from organisations that were previously involved in the 
implementation of economic pressure against Germany through Norway or carrying 
out clandestine and subversive operations in the country also ensured a continued 
enthusiasm for the use of these activities in this theatre.   
The increased strategic and military significance that was placed on 
clandestine operations at this time also meant that SOE urgently began to look for the 
means that would allow it to commence its work.  It was this, and the opportunities 
that it was believed Norway would offer, that led to the establishment of the Shetlands 
Base and early attempts to recruit and train Norwegians.  Both these small endeavours 
are important, however, not only because they show, at a time of limited resources, 
the methods that SOE employed, but because they also symbolise the importance of 
co-operation and collaboration: it was clear that this new organisation could not 
operate in this theatre without support.  The next step for SOE was to articulate its 
aims and intentions for Norway, to put in place a policy that would provide direction. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
SOE POLICY IN NORWAY 1940-1945: THE COMBINATION OF SHORT 
AND LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES  
 
 
Introduction 
SOE‟s origins were strategic and following on from this the creation of its 
Scandinavian Section, the Shetlands Base, and the attempts to recruit Norwegians 
were the result of a determination to increase clandestine operations in Norway, a 
country that was deemed ideally suited for such activities.  These operations could 
not, however, proceed without some direction and therefore through a series of 
directives, SOE also set out its policy for Norway.  This chapter will analyse the 
evolution of this policy, which has often been criticised by Norwegian historians and 
largely ignored by British historians, and show how its development was closely and 
principally linked to wider strategic developments.
1
 
 SOE‟s military contribution was in broad terms mapped out within the first 
few months of its existence although its role and value to Allied operations changed 
as the war progressed.  This was also the case with its policy for Norway.  From 
December 1940, in line with the proposed contribution of sabotage, subversion, and 
organised resistance in the occupied countries to Britain‟s forward strategy, it took on 
the essential structure that it would retain for the rest of the war.  From this point 
onwards policy consisted of a combination of short and long-term objectives.  In the 
short-term the aim was, through sabotage, propaganda, support for amphibious and air 
raids in Norway, to assist in the debilitation of German military strength.  These 
activities would also help to tie down Axis forces in this peripheral theatre and 
thereby impose a further, unwelcome strain on enemy resources.  In the longer-term 
the aim was to organise small guerrilla units, based on local resistance groups, that 
would be trained, armed and equipped by SOE.  These would together constitute a 
secret army that would be preserved to enable it, through carrying out operations 
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behind enemy lines, to support an eventual landing by regular forces in Norway; one 
of a series of landings across the Continent.  
 As the conflict in Europe progressed, however, and particularly after the entry 
into the war of the Soviet Union and the USA as allies with their vast resources in 
men and material, the strategic contribution of SOE and particularly Norway changed.  
This had a knock-on influence on policy.  Although the combination of short and 
long-term objectives remained, the significance of these aims within the wider context 
altered, which ultimately had a direct effect on local operations. 
This chapter will begin with an analysis of SOE‟s policy in the period from the 
autumn of 1940 to the end of 1941.  It will show that by the end of 1940 it had taken 
on its fundamental shape, the combination of short and long-term objectives.  During 
this period, however, there were two additional factors that influenced SOE‟s plans 
for Norway.  The first of these were concerns over a possible German invasion of 
Britain from northwest Europe, including Norway.  The second was Winston 
Churchill‟s „obsession‟ with the country,2 which began in 1939, was resurrected in the 
late summer of 1940, and was given added momentum during 1941 by Soviet and 
British calls for a Second Front.  Both factors temporarily gave additional impetus to 
the long-term aim of organising a secret army.  But as will be shown this fixation with 
Norway also led to difficulties for SOE as it meant that its aim of attacking economic 
and military targets was opposed by the Prime Minister, who believed it would stir up 
the country and thereby jeopardise any prospect of a British landing.   
During the summer of 1941, however, the British planning staff scaled-back 
the role of secret armies within their strategic plans and decided that an eventual 
landing by Allied forces on the Continent as part of a final and decisive military 
offensive would be concentrated in northwest France and the Low Countries.  
Therefore, by the end of 1941, notwithstanding continued pressure from the Prime 
Minister, the remote possibility of a British landing in Norway to liberate part or all of 
the country had effectively been sidelined, where it would remain until May 1945.  
Consequently, SOE would temporarily downgrade the importance of its plans to 
organise and prepare a secret army.    
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 The second section of this chapter will analyse the development of SOE‟s 
policy in the period between early 1942 and the end of 1943.  This will show that with 
the entry of the USA into the war and with the strategic and operational focal point 
moving to the Mediterranean and in the long-term toward an invasion of northwest 
Europe, Norway increasingly became a subsidiary theatre of war.  This meant that the 
effort to organise a secret army, although ongoing, was of secondary importance.  At 
the same time the short-term objective of attacking economic and military targets in 
the country and tying down enemy forces within this peripheral theatre became 
increasingly valuable as every effort was made to weaken Germany and help create 
the conditions that would allow the implementation of Overlord.  Moreover, the 
arrival of a large part of the German surface fleet in Norway in early 1942 and its 
threat to the Arctic convoys, not only increased the significance of Norwegian coastal 
waters but also SOE‟s attacks against military targets, particularly the German 
battleship the Tirpitz.   
 By 1944, Norway was firmly under the dominant influence of Overlord.  
Consequently, the liberation of the country had to await the successful realisation of 
the Allied campaign in northwest Europe, which meant that the forces required to 
enforce a re-occupation might not be available until well after military operations on 
the Continent were complete.  At the same time post-war considerations, particularly 
the protection of Norwegian industries and infrastructure from German destruction 
became increasingly significant.  It was within this context, as the last section of this 
chapter will show, that SOE‟s policy toward Norway changed yet again.  The long-
term objective, the preparation of an indigenous clandestine army, became the priority 
and short-term policy was modified.  Sabotage became tactical and rather than 
helping prepare the way for Overlord it was linked to Allied operations on the 
Continent.  Through to the liberation in May 1945, therefore, the fundamental 
structure of SOE policy in this theatre was directly and intrinsically shaped by 
Norway‟s relationship to the unfolding of Allied strategy and operations across 
Europe.   
 
 
 58 
I 
SOE Policy in Norway 1940-1941: from Rebellion to a Secret Army 
After the fall of France the British Prime Minister and the COS began to build a 
strategic framework that reflected not only the desperate situation the nation found 
itself in, but also within which it could move forward.
3
  In the spring of 1940, even as 
France collapsed, the COS had begun to review Britain‟s future strategy in the war 
against Germany.  The assumption that Britain and France together would eventually 
be stronger than the Germans was self-evidently no longer applicable,
4
  and by mid-
June, with no major allies and facing a nation with a huge superiority in resources and 
position, Britain could no longer undertake large-scale land operations in Europe.  
Any forward strategy therefore had to overcome this imbalance and eventually create 
the conditions that would allow a final offensive on the Continent leading to the 
ultimate objective, victory over Germany.
5
  It was within this context that the concept 
of creating „widespread revolt in the conquered territories‟ was seen as an important 
additional „indirect method‟, along with economic pressure and strategic bombing, 
that could be used to undermine German military strength.
6
  The British Planning staff 
and MI (R) both produced several documents during the late spring and early summer 
of 1940 that examined the possibility of organised rebellions.  These papers reflected 
a belief that there was extensive anti-German feeling across Europe that if equipped 
and supported could be used to facilitate operations by British forces.  The corollary 
of this was that subversive activities within the occupied countries should be 
undertaken with the eventually aim of promoting open armed resistance that would 
„either be a forerunner to, or an auxiliary of direct military action‟.7 
In line with this between June and November 1940 a series of policy 
documents were produced initially within Section D and then SOE‟s Scandinavian 
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section outlining the case for an uprising in Norway in early 1941.
8
  The aim was to 
encourage local groups led by Norwegians trained in Britain, supplied with arms and 
ammunition from the Shetlands, to break into open revolt, attacking communications, 
small local garrisons, and stores of arms and equipment.  Britain would provide 
assistance and encouragement through raids, but not a full-scale landing, and 
eventually the demoralised German forces in Norway would be overwhelmed.  By 
November 1940, however, this ambitious concept had been reined back owing to a 
realisation that the country was not yet ready for a general rising, and in response to 
changes in British strategy during that autumn.  Consequently, in December 1940, 
SOE‟s policy toward Norway took a new direction and the concept of rebellion was 
dropped.   
 At the heart of British military doctrine was this conviction that it was 
necessary to wear down and weaken Germany before Britain and her allies could once 
again undertake major land operations on the Continent.  At the time this could only 
be done through a combination of indirect methods such as economic pressure, air 
action, propaganda, „amphibious operations against the enemy‟s coastline‟, and small 
peripheral campaigns.  Irregular and subversive activities would contribute in two 
ways.  Firstly, as part of a policy of attrition, the undermining of the enemy‟s fighting 
capability through sabotage and containing and extending his forces, and secondly, 
uprisings by secret armies that would coincide with and augment eventual land 
operations across Europe. The earlier concept of „sowing the seeds of revolt‟ was 
therefore abandoned and subversive activity would be supplementary to „regular 
operations‟ as part of a „general policy‟.9   
 It was within this context that on 25 November 1940 SOE‟s first directive was 
issued.  A product of liaison between SOE, the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) and the 
COS its objective was to provide guidance „as to the direction in which subversive 
activities can best assist‟ strategy.  In the short-term the priority was, alongside the 
elimination of Italy, to continue to „wear down‟ Germany by „amphibious and other 
operations within the limits of our resources‟, including the use of subversive 
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operations, such as creating economic disorganisation, to undermine enemy strength 
and morale.  Over the longer-term SOE would prepare organisations in the occupied 
countries, Holland, Belgium, France and southern Norway, which could undertake co-
ordinated revolts in co-operation with the eventual landing of British forces.  These 
„secret armies‟ would be preserved until the moment when their actions could 
augment „decisive‟ operations against Germany.10  It was an ambitious document but 
one that was in step with British policy at this time and the role it was believed that 
sabotage and subversion could ultimately play in the war against Germany.
11
 
 From an early stage Britain had recognised the economic importance of 
Norway to Germany in any future military conflict.  And well before the outbreak of 
war strategic targets in the country, such as the transportation of Swedish iron-ore and 
the production of whale and fish oil, had already been identified.
12
  During the spring 
of 1940, as the momentum to apply economic pressure against Germany gathered 
pace, the MEW and the Inter-Services Project Board (ISPB), a predecessor of SOE, 
highlighted the value of the specialist metals produced in Norway,
13
 which directly 
led in the late spring of 1940 to the Section D operation against the production of 
ferro-chrome at A/S Bjølvefossen near Ålvik.
14
  There was also a growing belief, 
probably nourished by reports that Section D had received through its contacts in 
Norway, that the country was increasingly dissatisfied with German rule and therefore 
there was the potential for organised resistance.
15
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 It was within this background that in December 1940 SOE‟s Scandinavian 
section produced a paper entitled, „Norwegian Policy‟.  This is a defining document 
because it lays down the core of SOE‟s policy, the combination of short and long-
term aims that would be the blueprint for its operations in Norway for the rest of the 
war.   It has been criticised as unsuitable for Norwegian conditions, but at the time it 
was in step with the role envisaged for subversive operations within Britain‟s forward 
strategy, as expressed in SOE‟s first directive, and the possibilities that Norway 
appeared to offer for clandestine operations.  The longer-term objective was to 
prepare and preserve the indigenous resistance, primarily across southern Norway, 
„for simultaneous uprisings to assist either a landing by a British or Allied 
Expeditionary Force, or, an incipient German collapse‟.  The short-term aim was to 
carry out sabotage, both active and passive, and assist amphibious raids and air raids.  
Small-scale and unobtrusive sabotage would be undertaken by groups within Norway, 
whilst teams from the UK would attack „special targets‟.  In both cases these 
operations would not be allowed to threaten the longer-term process of preparing local 
resistance groups.  The Norwegian authorities had no involvement in the development 
of this policy and therefore no influence over its make-up.
16
  Its origins were firmly 
rooted in a British strategy that would be applied across occupied Europe.  
At this time there was, however, another factor that also influenced SOE‟s 
plans for Norway.  Whilst a German invasion remained a possibility, the strategic 
importance of defending the UK remained a priority.
17
  Therefore, SOE‟s December 
paper emphasises preparing resistance groups not only to assist a landing in Norway 
but also to „impede any German attempt to invade Great Britain‟.18  Norway was seen 
as a place where a „workable machine‟ was being implemented that could hinder the 
activities of any German forces that took part in an invasion of Britain.  The military 
importance placed on the development of local resistance groups that could operate 
behind enemy lines is reflected in SOE‟s defence and the Foreign Office‟s acceptance 
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of Malcolm Munthe‟s work out of the British legation in Stockholm during the spring 
of 1941, notwithstanding the diplomatic risks.
19
  
At the end of April 1941, SOE reaffirmed its short-term aim of carrying out 
sabotage whilst over the longer-term making preparations for simultaneous rising 
across Norway that would support a landing by an „Allied expeditionary force‟.  
Moreover, and for the first time, it also stated that if the short-term policy resulted in 
the „locking up‟ of German divisions in Norway, this would be „desirable‟ from a 
„strategic point of view‟.  In other words there was a clear understanding that attacks 
against economic and military targets could have an important additional benefit.  
Tying down large numbers of enemy forces in this theatre was, therefore, not simply a 
consequence but from a very early stage an important and deliberate element of its 
policy, although it does not appear that SOE was ever aware of the possible 
implication of this.  Even though actions that forced the enemy to retain sizeable 
troops numbers in Norway were valuable, this also meant that a landing in a country 
ideally suited for defensive operations was made considerably more difficult and 
thereby less likely.  Over the next three years, therefore, there remained a conflict at 
the heart of SOE‟s policy between its short and long-term objectives, although this 
does not seem to have had any influence on its development.  It was wider strategic 
factors that would shape future plans, not internal inconsistencies.
20
     
In the spring of 1941, British military fortunes reached a low point with the 
disasters in Greece, Crete, and North Africa, which reinforced the belief that British 
land forces were still not ready to take on the bulk of the German army.
 21
  A further 
complicating factor was the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.  It 
was within this difficult and shifting context that during the spring and summer of 
1941 SOE began to examine its future programme including an assessment of its 
requirements, in aircraft and equipment, for arming secret armies and sabotage groups 
across occupied Europe.
22
   This was done in consultation with the British planning 
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staff, who also reviewed the contribution of subversive and irregular operations to 
strategy.
23
  This led to important changes.
24
  The defence of the UK remained the 
immediate priority, and there was no change in the conviction that German military 
strength had to be undermined through indirect means before Britain could again 
undertake a major land offensive on the Continent.  The priority was, however, to use 
Bomber Command to „break the back of the Germans‟, although this would be 
supported by acts of sabotage.
25
  Significantly for SOE, this meant that in the 
immediate future it was recommended by the British planning staff that sabotage and 
subversive activities should be given preference over the longer-term aim of preparing 
and organising secret armies, which by mid August had been scaled back.  There was 
a realisation that arming resistance groups across Europe would require huge 
resources from Bomber Command, thereby threatening its contribution.  This and the 
entry of the Soviet Union into the war, which meant that eastern Europe became a 
Soviet sphere of influence, also led to a decision to concentrate SOE‟s long term 
effort in northwest Europe, specifically Holland, Belgium, and France, from where a 
final land offensive against Germany would probably commence.  The first step for 
SOE would be to send organisers with wireless transmitters to these countries to 
establish „patriot forces‟ prior to supplying arms and equipment.   
Norway was not, however, immediately sidelined for three important reasons.  
It was seen as an area for possible future „subsidiary‟ operations, considerable 
progress had been made in organising a secret army and this should not be wasted, 
and finally, because of the Shetlands Base it was believed that this clandestine army 
could be supplied by sea and was not dependent on airdrops.
26
  Consequently, the 
long-term objective of organising a secret army in Norway could continue despite the 
country‟s geographical and strategically marginal position.  The reference to the 
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suitability of Norway for „subsidiary‟ operations was probably the result of the 
considerable attention that was paid to this theatre at the time within both military and 
political circles.  During the spring of 1941, certain senior SOE staff officers began to 
take a special interest in Norway and saw it as a possible location for operations by 
regular forces, which could be supported by local resistance groups.
27
  Around this 
time, even before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the British planning staff 
also began to examine the possibilities of landings in both the south and north of the 
country.
28
  One important influence behind this was probably the Prime Minister‟s 
preoccupation with Norway that had returned in September 1940, only four months 
after the failed Norwegian campaign, when he commissioned a report on climatic 
conditions south of Bergen.
29
  From the summer of 1941 there were also calls for a 
Second Front to support the Soviet Union, which Churchill used to sustain interest in 
the country.  This all culminated in October 1941 in Operation Ajax, a plan to 
establish a bridgehead in Norway through a landing at Trondheim.  There was 
considerable high-level SOE involvement in several of these studies, especially 
„Ajax‟ where it was at one stage proposed that resistance groups should be used to 
support operations by regular forces.  The organisation was therefore fully aware of 
the considerable and widespread attention that was being given to this theatre.
30
  
Nevertheless, despite pressure from the Prime Minister, a landing in Norway was 
eventually resisted by the COS for both strong operational and strategic reasons.  His 
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trumpeting of action in the north was therefore silenced, at least temporarily, and the 
ambitious plans for the country were significantly scaled-back leaving only a series of 
large combined operations against industrial and military targets close to the 
Norwegian coastline during December 1941.  These were more in step with the 
British strategic aim of wearing down German fighting strength and little more than a 
sop to calls for a Second Front.
31
  They are, however, symbolically important because 
they represent the absolute limit of what the COS were militarily prepared to 
undertake in Norway.  From early 1942 and prior to its liberation in 1945 only small-
scale amphibious raids, coup de main attacks, and subversive operations were carried 
out in this theatre.  Plans for a landing in the country by a British or Allied 
Expeditionary Force had therefore effectively been abandoned. 
The attention paid to Norway was the result of the polemic within the British 
war management machinery,
32
 between Churchill on one side, anxious to take the 
offensive at any opportunity, and the COS‟s more cautious step by step, measured, 
and long-term  approach to strategy, which won out in the end.
33
  Importantly, 
however, this influenced SOE policy in Norway in two ways during 1941.  It created 
a temporary expectation that there could be a landing in the country before and 
independently of any final offensive across Europe.  In April, in a document entitled 
„Scandinavian Policy‟, the long-term objective was simply to prepare for a rising to 
support „a landing by an Allied expeditionary force‟.34  But by July, it was envisaged 
that large-scale military operations could occur in Norway prior to and independent of 
a landing that was part of the „opening of a British offensive on the Continent‟.35  By 
November 1941, however, after the rejection of Operation Ajax, and the concept of 
„secret armies‟ exploding into action across Europe had been scaled back, the 
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available SOE documents make no mention of a landing in Norway, either as part of a 
Europe-wide offensive or independently.  The long-term policy was to prepare the 
indigenous resistance to support Allied military operations to re-conquer Norway.  In 
other words to re-assert legitimate control over the country and return it to lawful 
government: an exclusively political role.  It was also not to be used prematurely to 
support „insignificant‟ operations.36  Therefore, by the beginning of 1942, SOE‟s 
long-term aim in this theatre had changed.  It was no longer to create a secret army 
that would support a landing by regular forces, one of a series of such landings across 
Europe that were part of a final and decisive military offensive against Germany.  
Even before the entry of the USA into the war the role of Norway within British 
strategy had altered.  The country had been marginalised and SOE policy quickly 
reflected this. 
Prime Ministerial interest in Norway during 1941 also had another immediate 
and disruptive impact on SOE policy.  From late 1940 and during the first half of 
1941, contrary to previous assertions,
37
 Churchill attempted to block small raids and 
subversive actions in the country because he believed they threatened his wish for a 
landing by British forces.
38
  This effectively undermined SOE, caused uncertainty, 
and thereby made future planning problematic.  In response and in order to make its 
case to be allowed to carry out its objectives unhindered, SOE began to make 
exaggerated claims about what it could achieve.  For example, it asserted that both the 
Norwegian people and government were actively urging an intensification of 
operations against the Germans in their country.  SOE‟s seemingly hyperbolic 
statements, which have been seized on by earlier historians, where not a result of over 
enthusiasm after the success of operations such as „Claymore‟, which Churchill had 
grudgingly agreed to, but part of a internal campaign to be allowed to follow its remit, 
which the Prime Minister appeared to be stiflying.
39
  By July, however, these 
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difficulties had passed.  Fortunately for SOE, the Prime Minister‟s opposition was 
only temporary, and in searching for ways to support the Soviet Union after the 
German invasion, his resistance to amphibious raids was abandoned .
40
  Therefore, by 
the autumn of 1941, SOE was able to pursue its aim of attacking industrial and 
military targets in Norway without interference.
41
  Nevertheless, Churchill‟s interest 
in the country had not only been an ongoing concern for the COS but also had been a 
distracting and complicating factor for SOE in the development of its plans for this 
theatre during 1941.    
 From the summer of 1940 until the end of 1941, the development of SOE‟s 
policy for Norway closely mirrored the contribution that it was expected clandestine 
activities and the Norwegian theatre would make to British strategy.   By the end of 
1941, however, a landing by British forces in Norway, as part of a series of similar 
landings across Europe, had been abandoned, and despite pressure from the Prime 
Minister to create a Second Front there was little possibility of any future large-scale 
operations in this theatre.   SOE‟s policy would quickly reflect these changes.  By 
early 1942, the long-term aim was to prepare a clandestine army in readiness to 
support operations to liberate the country, something that became increasingly distant 
as the strategic and operational focal point moved to the Mediterranean and ultimately 
an invasion of northwest Europe.  From this point Norway and SOE‟s plans for this 
theatre became progressively subsidiary to Allied strategy as it was played out across 
Europe and North Africa.  
   
 
II 
SOE Policy in Norway 1942-1943: Subordinate to ‘Torch’ and ‘Overlord’  
The US entry into the war in December 1941 changed the strategic picture in Europe, 
with grand strategy no longer the sole responsibility of Britain, but defined by the 
British and American coalition.  Future American policy was based on the concepts of 
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mass and decisive concentration and built on national optimism and a belief in its 
industrial might.  Consequently, the Americans wanted to „concentrate Allied forces 
as rapidly as possible and seek a decisive clash in the field‟.42  In contrast the British 
wished to continue with the policy of reducing Axis military capability before 
undertaking a final offensive that would complete the defeat of Germany.  It was the 
relationship between these two approaches that shaped the development of Allied 
strategy during 1942 and 1943.  In the short-term it was the British view that 
prevailed and American calls for a cross-channel operation in 1942 were rejected.  
After agreeing to a „Germany first‟ strategy, however,43 it was politically 
unacceptable for American forces to remain idle in Europe and therefore Operation 
Torch, the landings in northwest Africa, was eventually agreed.   
  Allied strategy was hammered out during 1942 and 1943 at a series of 
conferences involving the British and American general staffs, political leadership, 
and later Soviet representatives, at locations in North America, North Africa, and the 
Soviet Union.
44
  The first of these, the „Arcadia‟ conference, was held in Washington 
from late December 1941.  Although on the way to the USA Churchill resurrected the 
concept of scattered landings across Europe supported by resistance forces,
45
 at 
Washington this notion was finally discarded.  With the entry of the USA into the war 
it was no longer necessary to depend on secret armies; they could „contribute to the 
execution of a plan but they were henceforward quite secondary to the making of it‟.46          
Although „Arcadia‟ largely re-affirmed Britain‟s indirect, attritional approach, 
the Americans did not see it as definitive.  Therefore, through the spring and early 
summer of 1942 they began to press for a landing in France.  A series of protracted 
and complex negotiations followed that eventually led to the decision to go ahead 
with Operation Torch in November 1942, and to prepare for Operation Roundup, an 
invasion of northwest Europe in 1943.  The British had rejected an early 
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„concentration of force‟ until German strength was visibly weakened.  More 
significantly, the consequent decision to land in North Africa, although with 
American agreement, deflected Allied operations toward the Mediterranean during 
1943, away from northwest Europe and Scandinavia.
47
 
Nevertheless, in the search for an alternative to a cross-channel operation and 
owing to the threat to the Arctic convoys posed by the German surface fleet stationed 
in Norway from early 1942, Churchill‟s interest in Scandinavia re-surfaced.  In May 
1942, this resulted in a plan for a landing in northern Norway, Operation Jupiter.  
This, however, despite further requests from the Soviet Union for a Second Front and 
notwithstanding its long life, was consistently opposed by the COS and ultimately 
rejected.  Although protection of the Arctic convoys placed additional demands on the 
British Home Fleet, the requirements of home defence and the call for resources in the 
Mediterranean meant that a landing in Norway, even if it could be justified, remained 
unrealistic.
 48
  
Norway‟s significance was evinced in the series of strategic deception 
operations that commenced with Operation Hardboiled in early 1942, a notional 
attack aimed at the coast south of Trondheim.  The objective was to alarm the enemy, 
force him to divert his forces to this theatre away from the main battlefronts, and 
deceive him as to Allied intentions.
49
  It was followed soon afterwards by Operation 
Solo, which was authorised in July 1942 and included „Solo I‟, which by simulating 
operations against Norway was designed to cover preparations in the UK for 
Operation Torch.
50
    
It was within this context that in May 1942, the COS issued their second 
directive to SOE, a document that was shaped by Allied proposals for a landing in 
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Western Europe in 1943.  Paramilitary organisations in the areas of projected 
operations would be built up and equipped in readiness to provide support during the 
initial assault.  The only mention of Norway is as a potential theatre for raiding 
operations during the summer of 1942,
51
 which is another indication that by this stage 
Norway was, despite Churchill‟s „mad plans‟,52 ancillary to the main strategic and 
operational momentum in Europe.    
These contextual developments are important because of the impact they had 
on SOE‟s policy for Norway during 1942.  It meant that the balance between and the 
importance of the long and short-term objectives, began to change.  As Norway 
became increasingly peripheral to the development of Allied strategy, the timing of 
operations to secure its eventual re-occupation became unpredictable.  Consequently, 
the long-term objective became wrapped in uncertainty, especially as there was an 
„absence of information concerning high policy‟.53  Internal SOE documents 
consistently refer only to an expected „re-conquest‟ of Norway,54 and by June there is 
frustration and impatience within the Norwegian section over when if ever an 
invasion of Norway would happen, which made  preparation very difficult.
55
  The 
arming, equipping and organising of a „secret army‟ would continue so that it could 
be used at „some future time‟ to be indicated by the „Chiefs of Staff ‟.56   Previous 
historians have suggested that Churchill‟s interest in and pressure to mount „Jupiter‟ 
created an expectation within SOE and the teams it sent into Norway at this time that 
an invasion was coming, which then spilled over into the local population.
57
  But the 
available SOE policy documents only appear to emphasise doubt over what might 
happen, and make no specific mention of any plans to support an imminent landing by 
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Allied forces.
58
  Moreover, during the first half of 1942, the majority of its operations 
along with arms and equipment went into southern Norway with the objective of 
organising and preparing guerrilla groups to attack appropriate targets, but only in the 
„event of an Allied landing‟ or an invasion somewhere.59  It is understandable, 
however, that the arrival of these teams, whose job was to prepare local groups to 
assist operations by regular forces, should have raised hopes that an invasion was 
impending.  The long-term objective remained as it had from the previous November, 
to organise and prepare a secret army that could assist an Allied landing that would 
lead to the „re-conquest of Norway‟ and the „re-establishment of the Government of 
H.M. King Haakon VII‟.60  In Norway, therefore, part of SOE‟s role would be purely 
political, although how and when it would be able to carry out this political task 
would increasingly depend on strategic and operational developments elsewhere in 
Europe.    
In the meantime the short-term objective would be pressed on with.  In August 
1942, Brigadier Gubbins, recently appointed as the Deputy Executive Director of 
SOE with responsibility for operations, approved a document outlining SOE‟s policy 
in Norway for the next six months.  It called for coup de main operations to be 
undertaken as often as possible and an increase in „incendiarism‟ and sabotage that 
„could not be traced back‟.61  By December it was Gubbins belief that SOE would be 
given a part in a future strategy, „which will call for much greater sabotage activity in 
practically all territories‟, and therefore SOE „may be directed to ease up‟ on „efforts 
to organise secret armies‟.62  Consequently, in the second half of 1942 there were 
indications from the senior hierarchy of SOE that the priority accorded to short-term 
objectives such as sabotage in northwest Europe would not only continue but also 
intensify, particularly in the case of Norway.  
During 1943, the Allies focused on the Mediterranean, with operations moving 
from North Africa through Sicily and into Italy.  According to Alan Brooke, the 
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chairman of the COS, the intention was to wear out „German forces, both land and 
air‟ and withdraw strength from Russia.  Strategic bombing, economic pressure, and 
subversive activities would also continue with the aim of „softening up‟ Germany in 
preparation for a final campaign in northwest Europe.
 63
  In the meantime, important 
preparatory steps were taken toward the implementation of the „decisive concentration 
of force‟ that would complete the defeat of Germany with the „nature, timing, and 
priority of the cross-Channel attack‟, the landings in Normandy, eventually agreed.64   
During 1943, Churchill also rather predictably returned his attention to 
Norway as a possible alternative to Overlord.
65
  His views were again rejected, both 
by the COS and by Lt. General Frederick Morgan, who in the spring of 1943 was 
appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) (COSSAC) in 
preparation for Operation Overlord.  Although Morgan was directed to consider a 
landing in southern Norway, eventually given the title Operation Atlantis, he opposed 
the exercise for strategic, operational, and administrative reasons and it never reached 
fruition.
66
  Norway‟s value continued to be its contribution to the development of 
Allied operations elsewhere in Europe.  The country was again selected as suitable for 
a strategic deception operation this time called „Tindall‟, part of a larger plan to 
mislead the enemy as to Allied intentions during 1943 and pin down German forces in 
this theatre by once more creating the expectation of a landing in southern Norway.
 67
  
Moreover, the damage inflicted on the Tirpitz by midget submarines in September, 
and the sinking of the Scharnhorst in December 1943, meant that from early 1944 the 
Allies were able to take the initiative in Arctic waters, bring the „German forces based 
in Norway to battle‟ and sink U-boats, which would also help to exploit „German 
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fears‟ that the country would be invaded.68  In March 1943, the COS issued their third 
SOE directive.  Followed by a fourth in November 1944 that was largely a repeat of 
the previous directive, although it was stressed that the Supreme Commander Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) would in future guide special operations in Norway.   
The emphasis for northwest Europe was on short-term sabotage operations and 
guerrilla warfare.  In Norway efforts would be concentrated on attacks against the 
transportation of materials through Norwegian waters and important industrial targets, 
whilst the value of increasing German security commitments in the country, a 
euphemism for tying down enemy forces, through local guerrilla activities, was also 
accentuated.  No mention was made of preparing a clandestine army.
69
  At this time 
there was even uncertainty within SOE‟s Norwegian section as to whether the 
building of „secret army units in Norway was either advisable or necessary‟.  The 
decision was made, however, to carry on but without „doing too much in the way of 
fresh organisation‟.  When Lt. Colonel J. S. Wilson read SOE‟s March directive it 
confirmed to him that no military operations were contemplated for Norway.  This, he 
believed, would continue to handicap the long-term objective of organising resistance 
groups, as it prolonged uncertainty over the future.  Nevertheless, he largely 
supported an increase in sabotage although he thought that it should only be planned 
and executed from „the UK‟.  He considered that the use of local guerrilla activities 
against the Norwegian railway network would, however, be more harmful to the local 
population than to the enemy and therefore unwelcome.  And as the instruction was 
that such actions „should be studiously avoided before the moment of strike has 
come‟, he felt that they should be held in abeyance until the time of an invasion.70  
Railway sabotage in Norway would, therefore, only be carried out in direct support of 
military operations either on the Continent or possibly within the country.  
It was within this background that in May 1943 SOE produced, for the first 
time, a separate „Sabotage Directive‟ for Norway.  This document, in step with SOE‟s 
March directive, places the main emphasis on attacks against coastal shipping and 
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mines that supply raw materials to the enemy.  Furthermore, it states that the 
„organisations‟ that SOE had established, especially in the „more populated‟ areas 
such as around Oslo, should begin to engage in sabotage activities, provided that this 
did not prejudice their ability to contribute to an eventual liberation.  Therefore, in 
accordance with the strategic priority conferred on sabotage and in order to widen its 
impact, SOE‟s senior staff began to press for local involvement in attacks against 
enemy targets.  The balance within SOE policy had by the spring of 1943 completed 
its shift in favour of short-term activities.
71
  
Through 1943 it was the preparations for the final stages of the war in Europe 
and Norway‟s contribution to these preparations that dominated the evolution of SOE 
policy.  The priority given to sabotage operations in this theatre was directly linked to 
the process of intensifying the strain on Germany and thereby creating the conditions 
that would allow a final and decisive Allied offensive in the West.  From the middle 
of the year, however, the impact that this military offensive might eventually have on 
conditions within Norway also began to affect SOE‟s plans.  For example, German 
units could be withdrawn from the country in order to bolster defensive operations 
elsewhere in Europe.  Consequently, it was decided that a clandestine army should be 
prepared so that it could be used to support not only a landing in Norway, but also to 
delay the withdrawal of enemy forces to „meet any Continental Allied landing‟ if 
required, or carry out counter-scorch activities as these forces withdrew.
72
  By June 
1943, therefore, SOE‟s Norwegian section were cognisant of and beginning to plan 
for the impact that Norway‟s marginal position in relation to Allied operations in 
Europe might have on the nature of the country‟s future liberation.    
  
 
III 
SOE Policy in Norway 1944-1945: The Ascendancy of Overlord 
During 1943 and early 1944 the approaching invasion of northwest Europe 
increasingly dominated SOE‟s plans for Norway.  Sabotage and subversive activities 
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remained part of the process of adding to the burden on the German war machine, 
whilst the preparation of a secret army was widened so that it would be ready to 
contribute to what might ultimately happen in Norway as a result of Overlord.  After 
the completion of Operation Neptune, the assault phase of Overlord in June 1944, 
however, SOE policy changed and became directly linked to the progress of Allied 
operations on both the western and eastern fronts.  Therefore, although as SHAEF 
recognised the liberation of Norway was a purely political issue,
73
 it remained 
dependent  on strategic and operational developments outside Scandinavia.   
  When the Allies, including the Soviet Union, met at the Tehran conference in 
November 1943 the date for the launch of Overlord was pinned down for 1 June 
1944.
74
  In the autumn, COSSAC took over operational command of SOE in 
northwest Europe, including Norway,
75
 and from January 1944, in the final run up to 
„Overlord‟ this control passed to SHAEF, which took over the final preparations for 
the landings in Normandy.
76
  Therefore, in March 1944 it was SHAEF that issued an 
„Operational Directive‟ to SFHQ, which under the command of SCAEF would be „the 
co-ordinating authority‟ on „all matters in connection with sabotage and the 
organisation of resistance groups‟ in this theatre.  According to the directive a „full-
scale invasion of the Continent‟ was the supreme operation for 1944.  Undermining 
German fighting capability through sabotage and subversion in the short-term, to 
bring „the conditions in Europe considered essential to the success of invasion 
operations‟ remained the immediate priority, although it should not to be allowed to 
put at risk the long-term aim of „supporting‟ the invasion of Western Europe when it 
came.  Preparations for activities that would be undertaken „in conjunction with the 
allied forces under conditions of invasion or re-occupation‟ could therefore 
continue.
77
   
Norway, however, remained marginal and subservient to the main course of 
Allied strategy and this continued to determine its particular contribution in the war 
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against Germany.  In the run up to the landings in Normandy it was again allocated a 
role in „inducing the enemy to make faulty strategic dispositions‟, as highlighted by 
the two strategic deception operations targeted at Scandinavia, „Fortitude North‟ and 
„Graffham‟.  Both of these were part of Operation Bodyguard, a plan to induce 
Germany to disperse its forces across Italy, the Balkans, and Scandinavia, and to get 
the enemy to underestimate the Allied ability to undertake a cross-channel landing 
until late summer.
78
  The nature and timing of a re-occupation of Norway, therefore, 
continued to be secondary to and dependent upon the success and progress of Allied 
operations on the European mainland.  Norway, however, could not be militarily or 
politically ignored, especially whilst some eleven to twelve enemy divisions remained 
in the country.  Consequently, from the summer of 1943, proposals for an eventual re-
occupation based on the Rankin plans, had begun to take shape.  In addition to 
Overlord, COSSAC had also been instructed to prepare a plan for „a return to the 
Continent in the event of German disintegration‟.  Out of this came the Rankin plans, 
which were submitted to the COS in August 1943.  They consisted of Rankin A, a 
plan for an early invasion of Europe if the enemy became over stretched and 
significantly weakened, Rankin B, a plan to reoccupy a part of Europe from where the 
enemy had withdrawn, and Rankin C, a plan to deal with a complete collapse or 
surrender of Germany.
79
   
It is outside the framework of this work to go into the tortuous and complex 
details of the run up to the liberation, especially as it has been extensively covered 
before.
80
  It was predominately Rankin C and to a lesser degree B that became the 
templates for plans to re-occupy all or part of Norway; Rankin A was deemed 
extremely unlikely and quickly dropped,
81
 which meant that the possibility of a 
landing in Norway, something that SOE had long prepared for, was initially viewed 
within COSSAC as extremely unlikely.  Nonetheless, fears grew within the 
Norwegian government and eventually the Allies that German forces might attempt a 
last stand and create a Festung Norwegen, a fortress Norway.  By early 1945, 
                                                          
 
78
 PRO: „SOE/SO Directive Fortitude – Deception Plan, extracts from plan “Fortitude”‟, (SHAEF 
[44]), 23 February 1944 in HS2/1.  Mann, British Policy, pp. 234-248. M. Howard, „Strategic 
Deception in the Second World War‟, vol. V, in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), British Intelligence in the Second 
World War, (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 105 –117.  
79
 F. E. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1950), pp. 115-116. 
80
 Riste, London regjeringa, vol. II, pp. 113-274.  Mann, British Policy, pp. 280-312. 
81
 F. E. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, pp. 89, 112-129.  Riste, London regjeringa, vol. II, pp. 150-156, 
181-188, 237-247.  Mann, British Policy, pp. 281-366.  
 77 
therefore, preparations had begun to deal with „post-capitulation resistance‟ by an 
overland advance through Denmark and Sweden, although as the German forces in 
Norway capitulated unconditionally on 8 May 1945 it was fortunately never 
required.
82
  Nevertheless, what this complicated background shows is that because of 
Norway‟s peripheral position, its eventual liberation remained shrouded in doubt and 
as a result plagued by a number of difficulties right up until the German surrender, 
which ultimately had an important impact on SOE‟s policy for this theatre. 
In August 1943, planning and preparation for the liberation was placed under 
Scottish Command (Scotco), commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew 
Thorne.
83
  Although plans were made for a Rankin B scenario, a German withdrawal 
from all or part of Norway, it was the Rankin C plan, which „dealt with the possibility 
of a complete collapse of Nazi power on the lines of the swift surrender of November 
1918‟,84 that became the basis for Operations Apostle and Doomsday, the final 
proposals for the re-occupation of the country.
85
  These plans were, however, beset by 
two major problems from their inception until their implementation in the early days 
of May 1945.  Firstly, there was a lack of available forces and secondly an 
expectation that even after a German capitulation there would be a significant time 
delay before any Allied troops could arrive in Norway.
86
   
Toward the end of 1943 there were intimations of a change in SOE‟s policy 
for Norway.  There were signs of a growing reluctance to allow any intensification or 
widening of activities, particularly sabotage or coup de main attacks.  In October 
although SOE received a directive to „plan for the future interruption of railway 
communications‟ to slow down a German withdrawal, it was told not to take „overt 
action‟ unless instructed.87  SOE involvement in the strategic deception scheme 
„Fortitude North‟ was also confined to incidental activities that would not result in a 
reaction from the occupying regime against the local population or resistance forces.  
Therefore, unlike Denmark, it was decided that sabotage should not be escalated.
88
  
The reluctance to permit an increase in open activity is significant because it indicates 
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that SOE was not prepared to risk any damage to the resistance groups in Norway, 
particularly as the final stages of the war in Europe approached.  There was a growing 
belief that they would probably be required to undertake an important role in the 
country‟s liberation, especially if regular forces were not available.   
It was, however, only after the successful completion of the landings in 
Normandy and the assault phase of Overlord that there was a fundamental and 
irrevocable shift in SOE policy.  Firstly, short-term objectives were modified to meet 
the needs of ongoing operations on the Continent.  From late June 1944 the emphasis 
on sabotage in Norway moved to toward discarding all targets, „the products from 
which are not of immediate value to the enemy‟,89 and by July the general policy was 
to concentrate efforts on those industries that were of „present value to the enemy‟.90  
By the summer of 1944, therefore, SOE‟s short-term focus in Norway had shifted 
from strategic to tactical operations that were directly supportive of the Allied 
campaign in Europe.
91
  
  After the successful landings in Normandy, coup de main and sabotage 
operations also no longer had precedence in Norway.  From September 1944, until the 
liberation the following May, the first concern was the long-term objective of 
preparing and organising a clandestine army.  With a shortage of regular forces 
SHAEF formally accepted that local resistance groups would be needed to play a 
significant part in the country‟s eventual liberation, and therefore their preservation, 
training, arming, and equipment became a priority.  In early August when the British 
52
nd
 Division, the proposed core of a future re-occupation force, was transferred to the 
Continent, SOE saw this as confirmation that the possibility of military support for 
Norway‟s liberation was extremely remote, and therefore „as a corollary‟ its 
responsibilities increased.
92
  Moreover there was a growing fear of the potential threat 
posed by the large number of German troops that remained in the country.  And SOE 
and Scotco were agreed that the Norwegian resistance should be prepared to act as 
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both a protective force and a force for law and order in the period immediately after 
an eventual German surrender or collapse and that this situation required a „new 
directive‟.93   Post-war considerations therefore became an increasingly important 
factor in determining policy.   
At a crucial meeting of the Anglo Norwegian Collaboration Committee 
(ANCC) on 17 August that included leading figures from SFHQ and the Norwegian 
High Command, and which was attended by Jens Chr. Hauge, head of Milorg, the 
issue of the military contribution of clandestine forces in Norway to a future liberation 
was discussed.  It was decided that an up-to-date set of instructions for the resistance 
were urgently required and therefore toward the end of the month a draft proposal was 
submitted to SHAEF.
94
  This was eventually approved and at the beginning of 
September 1944 a new directive for the „Employment and Development of Resistance 
in Norway‟ was issued under the authority of SFHQ.   
This document set out SOE‟s policy for Norway for the remainder of the war.  
It confirmed that „no military offensive operations‟ were planned for the country, and 
that therefore there should be no „overt‟ action that would require outside support.  It 
was felt that the liberation would probably result from a German surrender, collapse 
or evacuation, and in these circumstances the primary role of the resistance would be 
to act as a protective force, preventing the execution of a German scorched earth 
policy, or as a force for law and order after a German collapse and „pending the 
arrival of an Allied relieving force‟.  Current sabotage should continue and limited 
action to prevent or hinder an evacuation would also be permitted but only by 
„specialist‟ groups.  Consequently, the emphasis during the final months of Norway‟s 
occupation as expressed through this document was on preparing the resistance for the 
liberation, especially for the uncertain and potentially chaotic period immediately 
after the German authorities and troops in Norway had surrendered or withdrawn 
from the country, and prior to the eventual arrival of Allied forces.  It was a document 
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that reflected Norway‟s position in relation to the strategic priority afforded to the 
campaign in northwest Europe and the growing importance of post-war factors.  It 
also meant that with the full authority of the Allied High Command behind it, for the 
first time the objective of organising, arming, and training a clandestine army in 
Norway could really get underway.
95
  It would, however, no longer be used to support 
operations by regular forces as part of an opposed landing.  As a result of the very 
different conditions within which it had originated four years earlier, the contribution 
of a secret guerrilla army had dramatically changed.   
The directive also permitted limited action, such as railway sabotage, to 
prevent or hinder a German evacuation.  Although only SOE teams sent into the 
country would undertake such activities in order that the resistance movement as a 
whole was not endangered.  This element of policy did not, however, remain intact for 
long.  By early October SHAEF had decided to allow German forces to return to the 
Continent, because the „smaller number of Germans left in Norway‟ when they 
surrender, „the less will be the commitment‟ that the Allies will have „to free the 
country‟.96  Operations on the Continent were, therefore, seen as the best way of 
reducing the difficulties of liberating a country that was occupied by several enemy 
divisions.  Pressure from the Admiralty, however, which wished to intensify attacks 
against enemy shipping, and SFHQ, which argued that it would be difficult to sustain 
„resistance groups in Norway in a state of discipline‟ if they could not contribute to 
the offensive against Germany, meant that on 26 October SHAEF partially backed 
down and agreed that „a limited number of attacks‟ could be carried out by 
„independent sabotage groups‟ against suitable targets on the main Norwegian railway 
routes‟.97   
Despite this amendment to policy, however, the Admiralty, Scotco, and SFHQ 
kept up the pressure on SHAEF to permit unlimited attacks on the rail network to 
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hinder German troop withdrawals.  They initially met with opposition, not only 
because it was feared that any action could result in harsh German counter-measures 
that would threaten the resistance‟s eventual ability to undertake its primary role of 
protection, but also because SHAEF was concerned that if the Norwegian railways 
were brought to a standstill it might result in widespread famine in Norway, as it had 
in Holland.
98
  This would require assistance from the Allies that in light of the 
commitment to Overlord would be extremely difficult if not impossible to meet. 
What changed matters was Operation Nordlicht, the retreat of the German 20th 
Mountain Army from Finland into northern Norway in October 1944, which 
eventually included an order to transfer six of its divisions out of the country.  It was 
the withdrawal of these experienced and battle hardened forces and their potential 
threat to Allied operations on the Continent that resulted in a change in policy.
99
  In 
early December 1944, in response to an internal intelligence report that set out this 
threat, SHAEF agreed to allow unlimited attacks against the Norwegian rail network 
in order to impose „the maximum delay and casualties‟ on the German divisions that 
were withdrawing through Norway and to force them to use sea routes where they 
were vulnerable to British air and naval forces.  In line with this it was believed that 
the destruction of the Tirpitz in November 1944 would allow the navy to „adopt a 
bolder policy‟.100 
Although it was realised that this change in policy could put Milorg at risk, it 
was decided that success must be ensured on the Continent „even at the expense of 
Norway‟.101  The priority accorded to operations in northwest Europe therefore 
predominated and continued to cast a shadow over SOE‟s plans for Norway until well 
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into 1945.  Unlimited attacks on the Norwegian railway network were persisted with 
until 16 April 1945 when SHAEF decided that the arrival of enemy divisions from 
Norway could no longer influence the main battle, and therefore were no longer a 
danger.  The priority for the Norwegian resistance from that point was to build up „in 
order that it may play an active part in the final liberation of Norway‟.102  All 
uncertainty ended when the German forces in Norway surrendered unconditionally on 
8 May. 
 
 
Conclusion 
SOE‟s policy, its plan of action and statement of aims for Norway, was articulated 
through a series of documents and directives produced between 1940 and 1945.  The 
combination of short and long-term objectives, which from the late autumn of 1940 
was at the core of this policy, originated from the contribution that it was envisaged 
sabotage and subversive operations would make to the new forward strategy that 
Britain put in place in the months after the fall of France.  This policy, however, 
evolved after 1940 and was adapted to meet the changing conditions that occurred as 
the war against Germany gathered momentum.  From the end of 1941 the principal 
factor in this evolution was Norway‟s growing subordination to the development and 
implementation of Allied strategy in Western Europe.  It meant that the country was 
seen as an ideal location for operations that set out to disrupt and slow down the 
supply of war materials to the enemy.  Therefore, from 1942 through to the end of 
1943, SOE‟s priority in Norway would be to carry out coup de main attacks against 
important industrial and military targets.  This also created ongoing security problems 
and fed fears over Allied intentions toward Norway, which together encouraged 
Germany to retain an unnecessarily high military presence in this peripheral theatre, 
thereby adding to the strain on its war effort.  This meant, however, that there was 
little likelihood of an Allied landing to liberate part or the whole of the country and 
therefore SOE‟s long-term aim of organising a secret army became less significant, 
although it had to continue in the expectation that one day the country would be 
liberated.  Even after the launch of Operation Overlord, Norway remained subordinate 
to strategic and operational developments elsewhere, although by this stage the impact 
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on SOE‟s policy was different.  Sabotage became tactical and part of the offensive 
against the German forces in Europe.  And whilst all of the available regular forces 
were deployed on operations on the Continent, for the first time the Allied High 
Command made it a priority to arm, equip, and prepare local resistance forces, and 
thereby create a viable secret army in Norway.           
There were, however, other factors that also contributed to the development of 
SOE‟s policy in this theatre.  The first of these, which will be considered in the next 
chapter, was the nature of its relationship with the Norwegian government in exile.  
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      CHAPTER THREE 
 
SOE AND THE NORWEGIAN GOVERMENT AND MILITARY 
AUTHORITIES 1940-1945: CONTROL THROUGH COLLABORATION 
 
 
Introduction 
 Through operating in the occupied countries of Europe, SOE inevitably made 
contact with or worked alongside various political representatives or groupings, 
such as the governments in exile based in Britain, or became drawn into the 
internal conflicts that broke out within some of these countries after 1940.  
Political factors therefore became an additional factor „governing operations‟.1 
Norwegian interests were represented in London from June 1940 by the 
Norwegian government in exile.  Its relationship with SOE and the impact of this 
association on SOE policy toward Norway will be examined in this chapter.  This 
will show that although this relationship was crucial to SOE‟s success and 
tempered some aspects of policy it did not alter its essential structure or break its 
link to wider strategic developments.  The Norwegian government in exile was 
recognised as the constitutional representative of the Norwegian people, both at 
home and internationally, and although initially it had to face some unpopularity 
its legitimacy was never seriously challenged.
2
  From the autumn of 1940, through 
its new Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, Norway pursued a policy of developing a 
close and positive affiliation with Britain and became a supportive and active ally.  
At the same time SOE also set out to establish a working relationship with the 
Norwegian authorities, which from the of spring 1942 became a formal and 
structured collaboration through which both parties were able to work together on 
sabotage and subversive activities in Norway.  Most significantly through co-
operation SOE was able to secure Allied control over special operations in 
Norway and ensure that they remained in step with strategic requirements as laid 
down by the COS, and later SHAEF. 
 As the first section of this chapter will show from the beginning SOE set 
out to work with the Norwegian government and its military authorities in London 
                                                          
1
 „Factors Governing SOE operations‟, 21 April 1943, COS (43) 212 (0), in CAB80/69, cited in 
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in order to effect its recruitment of the Norwegian volunteers that were required 
for operations in Norway.  It was, however, at this stage a relationship built on 
individual contacts, subject to the prerequisites of security, and based on a 
determination that all subversive activities should remain under SOE‟s control.  It 
was not a relationship that was built on a unique scepticism or mistrust toward the 
Norwegian authorities: it was co-operation on SOE‟s terms.  This rather one-sided 
association did not last.   
In the autumn of 1941, as will be shown in the second section of this 
chapter, Milorg was placed under the direct authority of the Norwegian Army 
High Command.  From this point SOE realised that if it wished to retain a 
measure of control over the organisation and development of a secret army in 
Norway, it had to take a more collaborative approach in its relations with the 
Norwegian authorities in London.  At the same time the Norwegian government, 
through its Ministry of Defence, began attempts to improve its contact and 
therefore influence with the British military authorities and SOE.  It also accepted 
that the realisation of its primary aim, the liberation of Norway, could only be 
achieved with the support of its allies.  Toward the end of 1941, in order to help it 
accomplish these objectives it therefore instigated a series of internal reforms to 
its military and defence set up.  This resulted in the re-establishment of Forsvarets 
Overkommando (FO), the Norwegian Defence High Command, which for the rest 
of the war was responsible for co-ordinating both military co-operation with the 
British and preparations for the eventual liberation.   
These developments led to a more structured and balanced relationship 
between SOE and the Norwegian military authorities, especially after the 
establishment of the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee (ANCC) in 
February 1942, which was made responsible for overseeing sabotage, subversion 
and the organisation of a secret army in Norway for the rest of the war.  It was a 
mechanism that served the interests of both parties.  It allowed SOE to retain 
direction over these activities and thereby ensure that they stayed in line with 
policy and ultimately and most significantly, Allied strategy.  It also gave the 
Norwegian High Command authority over the use of its manpower and resources 
and some influence over clandestine and subversive operations in Norway, which 
meant that SOE had to accept some changes to its policy for this theatre, 
especially its approach to sabotage.       
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From 1942, as the final section of this chapter will show, relations between 
SOE and FO developed into a close association.  The clearest manifestation of this 
was the amalgamation in the summer of 1944 of the staffs of SOE‟s Norwegian 
section and FO IV, a new department set up within FO the previous December.  
By this stage the Norwegian military authorities were working in co-operation 
with SOE and fully accepted that the ultimate authority on special operations lay 
with the Allied High Command.  In addition there was little disagreement over 
objectives, especially the long-term aim of organising a clandestine army in 
Norway, which meant that they were able to work together effectively and in 
harmony. 
 
 
I 
SOE and Norwegian Government in Exile, August 1940-August 1941: The 
Attempt at Control 
 A scepticism within SOE toward Norwegians, which remained in place until well 
into the war, has been cited by previous historians as the reason why the 
organisation took an initially selective approach in its relations with the 
Norwegian authorities in London.
3
  This was not the case.  From the summer of 
1940 there was a view within SOE that if it failed to communicate with the 
Norwegian government in exile it might put at risk any future intentions it had for 
Norway.  At the same time, however, according to its Charter it was obliged to 
keep its activities in step with strategic developments and therefore it needed to 
retain control over its policy toward and activities within the occupied countries.  
SOE was also a secret service, not answerable to Parliament, paid out of the 
„secret vote‟, and part of a ministry where many of its employees did not even 
know of its existence.  It was for these reasons that SOE initially confined its 
contacts with the Norwegian government to those individuals or departments that 
were expedient.
4
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Section D had already begun to enlist Norwegian volunteers before their 
government arrived in Britain.
5
  But after the cruiser Devonshire reached Scotland 
on 10 June 1940, carrying with it the King, Crown Prince and most of the 
members of the Norwegian government, there was a recognised „constitutional 
authority‟ in Britain to represent the interests of the Norwegian people.6   This was 
confirmed at meetings on 27 June and 1 July between Lord Halifax, the British 
Foreign Minister, and Halvdan Koht the Norwegian Foreign Minister.
7
  From this 
point it became very difficult for initially Section D and later SOE , when 
recruiting Norwegians, to ignore the concerns of their government. 
There were also practical reasons why SOE had to work with the 
Norwegian authorities.  As early as June 1940, Section D had recognised that the 
Norwegian government‟s help was required to obtain „enough Norwegians‟ for its 
„work‟ in Norway.8  By late July, therefore, contact had been made with Halvdan 
Koht both privately and through the War Office, which eventually led in August 
to the selection of Martin Linge to work as the liaison officer between the newly 
established SOE and the Norwegian authorities in London.
9
  This was followed by 
contact with Birger Ljungberg, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Major 
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General Fleischer, the head of Hærens Overkommando (HOK), and Colonel 
Stenersen at the Norwegian army reception camp at Dumfries in Scotland where 
the Norwegian forces in Britain where based.
10
  SOE considered that these were 
the key members of the Norwegian government and military authorities, and 
initiating these contacts, along with the appointment of Linge, was all part of a 
process that SOE hoped would help facilitate and secure the use of Norwegians 
for special operations in Norway.
11
   
During the autumn of 1940, there were calls from within SOE for a more 
intimate relationship with the Norwegian government, as it was believed that it 
could „wreck‟ everything if co-operation was withheld.  Nonetheless, Norwegian 
ministers were not kept fully informed of SOE activities and at this stage had no 
involvement in the development of policy.
12
  This was not, however, down to any 
unique or particular British mistrust of Norwegians that emerged during the 
campaign in Norway the previous spring.  Both Charles Hambro and Harry 
Sporborg, the dominant figures in the early development of SOE‟s Scandinavian 
section had no involvement in the fighting in Norway and were quick to make 
contact with members of the Norwegian government.  It was also only days after 
the inception of SOE that contact was made with Halvdan Koht, who had been 
responsible for Norway‟s pre-war policy of neutrality, a position that was unlikely 
to endear him to the British military authorities.
13
  From the beginning, therefore, 
SOE‟s approach to the Norwegian government was not based on prejudice, but 
rather on pragmatism.        
Secrecy was also a major issue for SOE.  It was the War Cabinet that 
decided that the activities of this new organisation should not be disclosed in 
parliament, that it was an „official secret‟, and its „affairs could not be debated‟.  It 
is rather ironic, therefore, that details of some of its operations were eventually 
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withheld from the War Cabinet.
14
  In these circumstances it is perfectly consistent, 
particularly in the early stages, that this new organisation restricted its contacts 
and limited the disclosure of information to those governments it worked with.  It 
also seems harsh to describe SOE as „playing on the requirement for security‟, 
especially when at the same time Halvdan Koht was withholding the details of his 
involvement with the British secret services from his own ministerial colleagues.
15
    
Furthermore, SOE‟s disparaging view of Norwegians as defeatist, „ill-
disciplined‟ and „great talkers‟, an attitude that remained even after British-
Norwegian collaboration had significantly improved,
16
 was not uniquely applied 
to Scandinavians, and therefore is not a satisfactory explanation for SOE‟s 
selective contact with the Norwegian government.  It was typical of a „certain 
condescension in foreigners‟ that was rife amongst British officers at the time.  
Within SOE there was also a „presumed insecurity and indiscretion‟ amongst 
other nationalities, an attitude that was both „universal‟ and persistent.17 
SOE confined its contacts to those ministers who were most valuable and 
appeared most supportive, not only because of security considerations but because 
it wanted to maintain a close and tight control over its activities in Norway.  It had 
to ensure that when the time came to use any „movement‟ within the country it 
could „lay it on and lay it off‟ at its „will‟ and not „anybody else‟s‟.18  Sabotage 
and the organisation of resistance groups had to be co-ordinated with broader 
strategic and operational requirements, and therefore kept tightly under its wing.  
Nevertheless, by the early months of 1941, SOE felt that it had a close 
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Indirect Strategy‟ in D. Reynolds, W. F. Kimball, A. O. Chubarian, (eds.), Allies at War, p. 5.  
Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, p. 43. 
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relationship with the Norwegian government although one forged on British 
terms.
19
 
This one-sided relationship also developed because at the time the 
Norwegian government, distracted by events at home, lacked coherence and 
direction, and had no clear policy on clandestine operations in Norway.  It also 
had no executive body to effectively represent its interests with its allies on 
military matters.
 20
  Although, the Norwegian government was in a strong 
economic position when it arrived in Britain due to its gold reserves
21
 and its 
ownership of the fourth largest merchant fleet in the world, which was an 
important source of income during the war,
22
 it faced many difficulties.  Only 
twenty to thirty civil servants accompanied it,
23
 and it did not have the armed 
forces to allow it to make any more than a token contribution to the Allied war 
effort.
24
  The government‟s position with the population at home was also weak, 
especially in light of the failure of its pre-war position of neutrality and a defence 
policy that meant that it was unprepared for the German invasion.
25
  The 
negotiations in the summer of 1940 between the Presidential Board of the 
Norwegian Storting (parliament) and the German Reichskommissar over the 
establishment of a State Council to take over the running of the country - the 
Riksrådforhandlinge -  which resulted in the call from Oslo for King Haakon to 
abdicate and the government to stand down, indicate both the weakness of the 
government‟s positon and the serious concerns it had to deal with back home.26  It 
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therefore became a priority to make contact, gain a foothold with, and establish 
some influence over developments on the Home Front so that the government 
could ultimately be seen to „represent one nation in the fight to regain its 
freedom‟. This meant, however, that at this stage it was not a priority, even if 
suitable staff and institutions had been in place, to indulge in developing policy on 
such matters as subversive or clandestine operations.
27
   
During the first six months of 1941, the relationship between SOE and the 
Norwegian government continued much as before, based on individual contacts 
and led by SOE.  The interests or concerns of the Norwegian authorities therefore 
had little influence over the development or implementation of SOE policy.  
Nevertheless, a significant change in the Norwegian government led to closer 
political relations with Britain.  This was the appointment of Trygve Lie as 
Foreign Minister in place of Halvdan Koht in November 1940,
28
 which 
represented a major step toward an unequivocal pro-Allied Norwegian foreign 
policy.  In May 1941, military co-operation was also formalised and placed on a 
more practical level when an agreement was signed with the British over the use 
of the Norwegian forces in Britain.  In future they would only be deployed either 
in the defence of the UK or the re-conquest of Norway and were placed under 
British operational control.
29
  Significantly, the view of Trygve Lie within SOE‟s 
Scandinavian section was that he was supportive of any activity that harmed the 
Germans or their war effort.
30
  The new Norwegian Foreign Minister also 
maintained his contact with both Charles Hambro and Harry Sporborg,
31
 and his 
appointment was not only well received within the British Foreign Office, but also 
by Hugh Dalton.
32
  The establishment of FD-E also provided a more institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                
Norway, 27 June 1940, and the King‟s answer dated 3 July 1940, ref. N 5926/213/30 in 
FO371/24828. 
27
 Riste, London regjeringa, vol. I, pp. 95 & 154, and Koht, For fred og fridom i krigstid 1939-
1940, p. 263.  
28
 On 19 November 1940, after he became isolated within the government, Halvdan Koht was 
granted three months leave.  Lie took over in London and on 27 January 1941, Koht handed in his 
formal letter of resignation.  On 19 February Lie became Norway‟s Foreign Minister. See: Krosby, 
Host to Exiles, p. 74.   
29
 Riste, London regjeringa, vol. I, Bilag (enclosure) II, pp. 249-258. 
30
 PRO: enclosure no. 9, „note from Mr. C. Hambro‟, 6 January 1941 in HS8/306. 
31
 Lie, Med England i ildlinjen 1940-1942, p. 61.  PRO: note from L. Collier 17 December 1940, 
ref. N7471/213/30 in FO371/24828. 
32
 PRO: note from Cecil Dormer, (British Ambassador to the Norwegian government) 20 
November 1940, ref. N7293/213/30, and letter from Cecil Dormer to the Foreign Office 16 
December 1940, ref. N7471/213/30 in FO371/24828.  Letter from Hugh Dalton to Winston 
Churchill, 8 January 1941, in HS8/306.  Lie, Med England i ildlinjen 1940-1942, p. 114  
 92 
avenue of contact between SOE and the Norwegian authorities.  This small office, 
under Captain Finn Nagell, was directly subordinate to the Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence and responsible, amongst other things, for forming closer links between 
the Norwegian Foreign and Defence ministries and SOE.
33
  SOE had already  
made contact with Nagell after interviewing him the previous November and 
thereafter it saw him and his staff as an important source of intelligence on 
conditions in Norway and more importantly as an additional help, along with 
Martin Linge, in recruiting a greater number of Norwegian volunteers for 
operations in Norway.
34
  The involvement of FD-E, members of the Norwegian 
naval staff, and Trygve Lie in the preparation of British amphibious raids against 
herring and cod oil plants in northern Norway during March and April 1941, also 
helped to cement the view within SOE that it was working closely with the 
Norwegian government.  With their help the British were able to enlist 
Norwegians, obtain the use of a Royal Norwegian destroyer, gather intelligence, 
and provide food and clothing for local inhabitants.
35
   
At this early stage, therefore, relations with the Norwegian authorities 
helped rather than hindered SOE plans for Norway.  The relationship was, 
however, led by SOE and based on selected contacts, although it is difficult to see 
how it could have been otherwise.  The Norwegian government still did not have a 
co-ordinated or clear policy on special operations or the institutions in place to 
represent its interests with its allies.  A remarkable illustration of this is Operation 
Hemisphere, one of the actions against herring oil production in northern Norway 
in spring 1941, which alongside SOE and the British Admiralty also included a 
                                                          
 
33
 Den norske regjerings virksomhet under krigen fra 9 april til 22 juni, vol. IV, 
forsvarsdepartementet, p. 102.   
34
 FD-E was originally located in „Norway House‟ close to Trafalgar Square, where Linge had an 
office above Nagell.  In March 1941, it consisted of three Norwegians and an office lady.  FD-E 
registered Norwegians that had arrived in Britain.  Any person deemed suitable for SOE work had 
a small „n‟ written on their form, which was then passed up to Linge.  PRO: „Interview with 
Captain Nagell, 21 November 1940, in HS2/238.  NHM: „Consolidated Progress reports of S 
Section‟, weeks ending 21 December 1940, 21 January and 18 February 1941 in boks 3a, mappe 
10/3/8b.  Riste, London regjeringa, vol. I, p. 111.   Haavardsholm, Martin Linge-min morfar, pp. 
175, 186, 204-205.  
35
 It is worthwhile pointing out that Lie later denied any involvement in „Claymore‟, although the 
documentation in SOE and the COHQ files appears to undermine this.  PRO: files DEFE2/141, 
Operation Claymore and HS/224, Operation Claymore. NHM, „Consolidated Progress report of S 
Section‟, weeks ending 21 January, 11 & 18 February 1941 in SOE archive, boks 3a, mappe 
10/3/8b.  „Øksfjord operation‟ in SOE archive, boks 44, mappe 40/3/4.  For details of these 
operations see: Appendix E, „Sea borne Operations Instigated by or Involving SOE along the 
Norwegian coastline, 1940-1945‟, pp. 328-333.  Lie, Med England i ildlinjen, 1940-1942, p. 140.   
 93 
contribution from the Royal Norwegian Navy both in its planning and 
implementation through the provision of the destroyer „Mansfield‟ with crew, 
along with ten Norwegian marines and one officer.  According to Hugh Dalton the 
operation had the complete agreement of the Norwegian government, but despite 
the participation of Norwegian forces it was apparently carried out without the 
knowledge of the Norwegian Defence Minister, Birger Ljungberg.
36
   
It was with the seeming support of key members of the Norwegian 
government and its armed services that SOE developed and implemented its plans 
for Norway during the spring and summer of 1941.  It was therefore able to 
pursue its objectives without undue political interference.  A further important 
illustration of this is provided by the arrival in London on 17 February 1941 of 
John Rognes, a leading member of Milorg.  He was called over from Norway by 
the Norwegian Minister of Defence to deal with matters concerning Milorg and to 
work under the authority of FD-E. 
37
  It appears, however, that Rognes was 
quickly commandeered by SOE.  It interviewed him a few days after his arrival in 
the country and the Norwegian authorities eventually gave permission for him to 
be used as a link, initially based on the Shetlands, between SOE and the 
headquarters of Milorg in Oslo.  For SOE he was seen as a means to bring Milorg 
under British „control‟.38  It was this determination to control matters that was at 
the heart of SOE‟s relations with the Norwegian authorities, although this does 
not mean that it completely excluded members of the government from important 
decisions.  In June 1941 the military council of Milorg (Rådet) sent a report to 
Britain addressed to the Norwegian King.  This report, outlining its views on 
issues concerning its role in occupied Norway, did not, however, go directly to the 
Norwegian government but instead via John Rognes was handed to SOE, which 
through Harry Sporborg quickly drafted a reply.  This alone represents the degree 
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of influence that SOE exercised over clandestine activities in Norway at this time.  
Nevertheless, SOE‟s reply, which it rather suitably called a „Directive‟ was, 
before being sent, placed before both Trygve Lie and General Fleischer.  Lie, 
comforted by the presence of Rognes and Nagell at his meeting with SOE when 
the document was discussed, and under the apparent impression it would be 
placed before the Norwegian Prime Minister if that had not already been done, did 
not object to it being his government‟s answer.  Fleischer‟ view was that the 
document gave „precise and clear instructions‟.39  Consequently, SOE‟s 
„Directive‟ to Milorg in July 1941, which was an important statement of its 
policy, was placed before important figures within the Norwegian government and 
military authorities, although not the government as a whole.  Their uncoordinated 
and rather haphazard response was, however, perhaps indicative of the inability of 
the Norwegian authorities to effectively handle the issue of subversive activities 
and the development and use of the military resistance in Norway at this stage.  
The whole episode was also symbolic of the relationship that the Norwegian 
government had with SOE during most of 1941and its lack of influence over the 
development and implementation of British policy on special operations in 
Norway.  This situation, however, soon began to alter. 
 
 
II 
SOE and Norwegian Authorities 1941-1942: From Control to Collaboration 
From the autumn of 1941 the relationship between SOE and the Norwegian 
government in London progressively changed and ultimately resulted in the 
government, through its newly appointed military authorities, having a greater 
involvement in the development, shaping, nature, and implementation of SOE‟s 
policy for Norway.  SOE also abandoned its previous ascendant position and 
accepted that collaboration, working together toward a common aim, was the best 
way to protect Allied interests.  This, however, came at a price.  Norwegian views 
and concerns would have to be considered, which led to the tempering of some 
aspects of policy, although not altering its principal objectives.  The relationship 
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that developed from early 1942 was positive and constructive, serving the 
interests of both sides, and most importantly it ensured that SOE policy toward 
Norway remained in step with strategic and operational developments elsewhere 
in Europe.   
The emergence and organisation of military resistance in Norway and the 
creation of an underground army, represented by Milorg, will be examined in 
more detail in the next chapter.
40
  Relations between Milorg and its government, 
however, were crucial to the development of the relationship between SOE and 
the Norwegian authorities.  By the summer of 1941, Milorg had set up an 
administrative hierarchy centred on Oslo, based on a Sentralledelsen, Central 
Leadership (SL), responsible for its day to day running, which was under the Råd, 
the central council (R), responsible for formulating policy.
41
  In June 1941, Milorg 
in its communication to the King in London expressed concerns over SOE 
activities in Norway and began to look to the Norwegian government for authority 
and direction.
42
  The arrival of Jacob Schive and Professor Johan Holst in London 
in October, two members of its central council, helped accelerate this process.  
Most significantly by turning to its government for legitimacy, Milorg was 
rejecting SOE‟s attempts to control it. 
 On 28 October 1941, Schive and Holst met Charles Hambro and Malcolm 
Munthe, and on 12 November Schive wrote to Lt. Col. Harry Sporborg with his 
summary of the meeting.  He called for a „co-ordinating element‟ to bring together 
the British and Norwegian governments along with Milorg, which he declared 
was responsible to the Norwegian government and would only consult with the 
British through them.
43
  Just over a week later on 20 November, Milorg was 
officially recognised by its government and placed under the control of HOK in 
London.  That same day Charles Hambro met Trygve Lie and was told of the 
change, which according to Lie he fully supported.
44
  Consequently, if SOE was 
to retain any future influence over the „official‟ military resistance, the potential 
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core of a clandestine army in Norway, it would be have to be through the 
Norwegian authorities not independently. 
 From this point, therefore, SOE changed its approach toward the 
Norwegian government and suggested a more equitable and structured 
relationship.  On 25 November 1941, Charles Hambro sent a proposal, written by 
Sporborg, to the newly appointed Norwegian Minister of Defence, Oscar Torp, 
suggesting ways to ensure greater Anglo-Norwegian collaboration.  This 
document was a watershed in SOE-Norwegian relations.  In light of the „official‟ 
incorporation of Milorg, Hambro realised that it was time to define more precisely 
the basis for subversive operations in Norway.  Whilst accepting the wishes of 
Milorg to be guided by its own government, the paper stresses that any 
mechanism put in place to enable collaboration must guarantee that the work in 
Norway is kept in step with „general policy‟ as applied across occupied Europe.  
Behind Hambro‟s apparent magnanimity, therefore, was a British determination 
that all sabotage and subversive activity should ultimately remain under Allied 
direction.  The mechanism put forward, an Anglo-Norwegian Committee, 
borrowed from Jacob Schive, to oversee special operations in Norway was 
accordingly a pragmatic means that aimed to ensure this objective.  Collaboration 
with the Norwegian authorities would allow SOE to retain influence over both the 
use of Milorg and the employment of Norwegian recruits.  In return the 
Norwegian authorities would have a say in the implementation of SOE policy in 
Norway, whilst retaining their authority over Milorg and regaining control over 
the employment of Norwegian recruits on operations on behalf of the British.  It 
was a proposal that suited both parties, and reflected a realisation by SOE that the 
British could „not get on without the work of Norwegians in Norway‟.45   
 At the same time, through the relationship that developed between Charles 
Hambro and Oscar Torp, the Norwegian government began a determined effort to 
ensure greater involvement in and influence over Allied plans for Norway, 
especially those concerning an eventual re-conquest of the country.
46
  It was no 
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 PRO: letter from D/CD (Charles Hambro) to Oscar Torp, ref. CH/88, 25 November 1941, 
including paper entitled „Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration regarding the Military Organisation in 
Norway‟, in HS2/127. 
46
 Between late November 1941 and the end of January 1942, there was ongoing correspondence 
between Oscar Torp, Charles Hambro, Major General Sir H. L. Ismay, Secretary to the COS, and 
Anthony Eden regarding the setting up of a Anglo-Norwegian Planning Committee to co-operate 
on preparations for a future re-conquest of Norway.  This committee was eventually approved by 
 97 
longer prepared to stay outside the planning and decision making processes when 
it concerned operations on Norwegian territory.  This coincided with growing 
fears within SOE that it might loose the co-operation of the Norwegian authorities 
„in facilitating the use of Norwegian specialists‟, something that was considered a 
„very serious matter‟.47  Events at the end of 1941 threatened to lead to this 
scenario. 
Despite the wishes of the British Foreign Office, the Norwegian 
government was not advised beforehand of the two British amphibious raids, 
Operations Anklet and Archery, which included large SOE-Norwegian 
contingents and in the case of „Anklet‟ the assistance of the Norwegian navy.48   
These operations also went against an agreement reached between Trygve Lie and 
Charles Hambro in October 1941, resulted in severe reprisals against the 
Norwegian civilian population, and led to sharp recriminations between the 
British and Norwegian contingents on the raids, all of which the Norwegian 
government could not ignore.
49
  In light of this on 14 January 1942, at a meeting 
involving Harry Sporborg, Charles Hambro, Trygve Lie and Oscar Torp, SOE 
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was made aware of Norwegian resentment.  It realised it had little choice but to 
accept that its activities in Norway and the use of Norwegian recruits would have 
to have the approval of a joint committee, which would include Norwegian 
representatives who were responsible to the Norwegian Minister of Defence.  
Consequently, on the same day Hambro wrote to Torp confirming the setting up 
of the ANCC, and agreed that SOE would not „initiate any expeditions to or 
against Norway without the knowledge or consent of the Norwegian members of 
this Committee‟.  Within SOE there was an acceptance that failure to implement 
this new mechanism quickly could mean that „the Norwegians would simply 
refuse to participate in future operations‟.50  In order to continue to exercise 
control and retain influence over future clandestine and subversive activities in 
Norway, SOE therefore felt that it had little alternative but to institute closer 
collaboration with the Norwegian authorities.  Another pragmatic decision.    
Alongside this there were also further changes within the Norwegian 
government, particularly the Ministry of Defence, which led to significant 
structural and policy developments.   Although with the arrival of Trygve Lie as 
Foreign Secretary Norway‟s pre-war neutrality policy was replaced by an alliance 
policy built on co-operation with Britain and America,
51
 under the stewardship of 
Birger Ljungberg, defence policy drifted and lacked clarity.
52
  This changed when 
in November 1941 Oscar Torp replaced Ljungberg.
53
  From this point onwards 
Torp initiated a series of reviews to examine the organisation of the Norwegian 
armed forces, the making of policy, and the primary issue of Norway‟s 
liberation.
54
   
 Out of this emerged important changes that would assist in the advent of 
closer relations with SOE.  The first was the re-establishment of Forsvarets 
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Overkommando, (FO), on 6 February 1942 under Major-General Wilhelm 
Hansteen, the newly appointed Norwegian Defence-Chief, who became 
responsible to the Minister of Defence for all three Norwegian fighting services.  
FO was charged with co-ordinating and organising „everything on the Norwegian 
side as best possible for the liberation of Norway‟, including Milorg, and through 
preparation ensuring „the greatest consideration of Norwegian interests and the 
best possible utilisation of the Norwegian contribution to the process of 
liberation‟.55  Secondly, the policy reviews that were undertaken concluded that 
Norway‟s greatest direct military contribution to its liberation would be through 
the potential manpower reserves within Milorg.
56
  Importantly, this was a view 
that fitted in well with SOE‟s aim of using a clandestine army to assist and 
support an eventual Allied landing in the country.  There was, therefore, a basis 
for agreement over long-term objectives, which ultimately assisted both parties in 
their efforts to work together. 
The first meeting of the ANCC was held on 16 February 1942 and 
included representatives from both SOE and FO.  Hambro, Sporborg, and later 
Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins, all senior staff within SOE, were members of the 
committee at various times, which illustrates the importance that the British 
attached to this collaborative mechanism.
57
  The ANCC has been described as the 
basis for trustful co-operation at the highest level,
58
 and an important forum for 
the co-ordination of Norwegian and British policy on resistance, which ultimately 
bore rich fruit.
59
  These are both correct and the regular meetings of the 
committee, initially once every two weeks, later once a month, through to the end 
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Wilson, and Frank Stagg in attendance.  From the Norwegian High Command there was Leif 
Tronstad and Thore Boye.  Captain John Rognes and Lt. Commander Marstrander joined the 
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February 1942 to 26 April 1945‟ in HS2/138. 
58
 Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 174. 
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 Riste, London regjeringa, vol. I,  p. 216. 
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of the war indicate the significance placed on this new machinery as a means to 
ensuring joint control of subversive operations in Norway. 
It was through the forum of the ANCC that FO affirmed its responsibility 
for the Norwegian volunteers that were sent to Norway on behalf of SOE.  From 
the spring of 1942, therefore, all the recruits in NIC (1) and NNIU were subject to 
Norwegian military discipline instigated under the authority of the Norwegian 
Commander-in-Chief.  It was also decided that the military bases, such as STS26, 
although under British „operational command‟ would be run with the co-operation 
of the Norwegian authorities.
60
  It was the ANCC that became the collaborative 
mechanism that oversaw the administration of these military units and bases.  
Most significantly, it was also the body that over the next three years supervised 
sabotage and clandestine activities in Norway, including the organisation of a 
secret army, with responsibility „on the one hand to the Norwegian High 
Command and on the other to the COS‟. 61  From the spring of 1942, therefore, 
largely through the ANCC and the positive relationship that resulted from it, the 
development of SOE policy and the implementation of subversive operations in 
Norway became a joint responsibility.  SOE was no longer able to pursue its aims 
in Norway on the basis of the support of one or two key figures within the 
Norwegian government or military authorities.  
 Closer co-operation between SOE and the Norwegian authorities was not, 
however, only administratively based, but also founded on a parity in policy, 
especially when it concerned long-term aims.  Toward the end of 1941, the 
Norwegian government set up two committees to examine the issues surrounding 
a future „re-conquest‟ of Norway.62  In January 1942, the second committee 
produced its report, which was an analysis of the role that the Home Front and the 
Norwegian forces in Britain might play in an eventual re-conquest.
63
  An extract 
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 NHM: reply by J.S. Wilson to a paper by Major Hampton and Major Helle at STS 26, 13 April 
1942 in FO IV archive, boks 31, mappe 4-b-1.  PRO: minutes from the first to the fifth meetings of 
the ANCC, 16 February to 24 April 1942, in HS2/138.   
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 PRO: „Minutes of ANCC Meetings from 16 February 1942 to 26 April 1945‟ in HS2/138..  
NHM: paper entitled „Principles of Service in Nor.I.C. (I)‟, (undated) in FOIV archive, mappe 4-A-
2.  
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 The first committee examined Norway‟s economic and strategic significance in the ongoing war, 
whilst the second examined the Home Front and the Norwegian military forces in Britain.  See: 
Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 175 & 407 (footnote 7).    
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 PRO: „Re-conquest of Norway: The Norwegian “Home Front” and the Norwegian Army in UK‟, 
26 March 1942, extract from a survey made by a Committee under the Royal Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence, 19 January 1942, in HS2/218.  
 101 
from this paper and other documents produced soon afterwards, which examined 
similar issues, were sent to Charles Hambro at the end of March.
64
  They 
concluded that the co-operation of Milorg would be „of such great importance for 
the re-conquest of Norway that every effort should be made to make its 
contribution as effective and extensive as possible‟.  Nevertheless, it was to take 
up arms „only in conjunction with an invasion aiming at a permanent re-conquest 
of the whole country or a major part of it‟.65  This was remarkably close to SOE‟s 
view that the future role of a clandestine army would be: „to assist Allied military 
operations designed to lead to the re-conquest of Norway from the Germans‟ 
although it „must on no account be called out prematurely or for any insignificant 
military operation‟.66  In April, in a ten page reply to the Norwegian surveys, SOE 
declared that part of its role in preparing for the re-conquest of Norway would be 
assistance in long-term planning where it concerned „the Military organisation in 
Norway‟.67  Therefore, although there were still issues to be resolved over the 
future contribution and role of Milorg, especially in the period prior to a 
liberation, SOE and the Norwegian military authorities in London had very 
similar long-term aims.   
 The Norwegian position on short-term activity in Norway, coup de main 
attacks and local sabotage was not, however, as compatible.  Nevertheless, with 
the formation of FO and through the ANCC, the Norwegian military authorities 
became directly involved with SOE operations carried out by teams sent from the 
UK against sites that were of agreed economic or military value to the enemy.
68
  
From May 1942, when the first SOE coup de main attack against a major 
industrial target in Norway was undertaken, such operations were overseen by the 
ANCC, prepared jointly by SOE and FO, used NIC (1) teams consisting of 
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 PRO: letter from Charles Hambro to General Hansteen, ref. CH/1436, 3 April 1942 in HS2/127. 
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„Introduction‟, 17 February 1942 in HS2/218. 
65
 PRO: „Re-conquest of Norway: The Norwegian “Home Front” and the Norwegian Army in UK‟, 
26 March 1942, in HS2/218. 
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 PRO: memo from AD/S (Lt. Col. H.N. Sporborg) to M (Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins), 28 
November 1941, in HS8/237. 
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 PRO: paper entitled, „The Re-conquest of Norway: SOE‟s Role‟, 6 April 1942, in HS2/218. 
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 Minutes from the ANCC meetings show Norwegian involvement in the preparation for SOE‟s 
first coup de main operation in Norway - Operation Redshank - an attack against the transportation 
of pyrites from the Orkla pyrite mine near Trondheim.  It was jointly sanctioned on 8 April.   See: 
PRO: minutes of the first, third, and fourth meetings of ANCC, 16 February, 20 March, and 8 April 
1942 respectively, in HS2/138   
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recruits from the Norwegian army transported from the UK primarily on 
Norwegian fishing boats, and had the authority of the Norwegian Commander-in-
Chief behind them.
69
  FO also made available Norwegian expertise through staff 
such as Professor Leif Tronstad and Lt. Jan Reimers, who had important technical 
and local knowledge.  SOE chose many of its objectives in Norway from an 
industrial target list that was created with the help of FO and the MEW.
70
  If it 
was believed, however, that these operations were more damaging to Norwegian 
interests than the German war effort the Norwegian authorities would not hesitate 
to object,
71
 and as a result some of them were scaled back.
72
  Nonetheless, over 
the following two and half years through its military authorities the Norwegian 
government actively assisted and thereby indirectly gave approval to coup de 
main operations in Norway.  This is not to say that all ministers were aware 
beforehand of each operation, for security reasons alone that would have been 
unacceptable and unnecessary.  The government had specifically created FO to 
represent Norwegian interests with its allies on military matters, including 
subversive activities, and this it did both effectively and within a climate of co-
operation.  
 There was, however, a twin-track approach to the implementation of 
sabotage in Norway.  Although specialist teams from outside would undertake 
planned coup de main attacks against the most important economic targets, it was 
also intended that there would be an ongoing campaign of small-scale 
„unobtrusive‟ sabotage undertaken by groups or individuals within Norway.73  
One of SOE‟s objective was to set up within the occupied countries „a system for 
the development of active sabotage‟, organised from and in touch with Britain, but 
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 According to Harry Sporborg all operational orders were submitted to the Norwegians for 
counter-signature and according to Lt. Col. Wilson, General Hansteen approved all suggestions put 
to him for coup de main operations.  See: PRO: letter from Lt. Col. H. N. Sporborg to E. O. Coote, 
(Foreign Office), ref. F/5357/130/17, 23 September 1942 in FO898/241.  Memo from D/S (Lt. Col. 
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 The list contains forty-one targets in Norway, headed by the Knaben molybdenum mine in 
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list of industrial targets for Norway in HS2/129.   
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 PRO: letter from MEW to A.H.B. Schofield at the British Foreign Office, 8 January 1942, in 
FO371/32827.  Riste, London regjeringa, vol. II, pp. 47-48.  
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 For example see details on Operation Clairvoyant in Appendix D, „SOE Coup de Main 
Operations in Norway 1940-1944‟, p. 323. 
73
 PRO: paper entitled „Norwegian Policy‟, 11 December 1940, in HS2/128. 
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using the local population to carry out attacks against identified targets.
74
  
Nevertheless, in autumn 1941, when relations with the Norwegian authorities 
were at a critical stage, and in recognition of the „mixed feelings‟ and 
„misgivings‟ within the Norwegian government owing to its concerns over 
reprisals against the local population and potential damage to Milorg, SOE 
decided to sideline „immediate‟ and local sabotage.  For the time being, only 
prepared and trained teams sent in from outside, under the authority of a joint 
committee, would undertake planned attacks against important strategic targets in 
Norway.
75
  It is important to emphasise, therefore, that in contrast to previous 
assertions,
76
 SOE put to one side its plans to organise a separate sabotage 
organisation inside the country.  Collaboration came at a cost and as a 
consequence policy was modified.  But this was a relatively small price to pay in 
order to obtain the support and co-operation that was critical for the successful 
implementation of its plans for Norway.  
 
 
III 
SOE and Norwegian Authorities 1943-1945: From Collaboration to 
Partnership 
This concluding section will examine the relationship between SOE and 
Norwegian authorities during the final two and half years of the war and show that 
the collaboration that developed during 1942 deepened until both parties were by 
the autumn of 1944 working in a close organisational and administrative 
partnership.  Between 1942 and 1945, FO also became an increasingly 
multifaceted organisation, which led to both advances in its policy on subversive 
activities, and in its relationship to SOE.  Moreover, its positive approach to 
collaboration helped to facilitate the significant increase in sabotage and 
subversive in Norway during the final year of its occupation and was critical in 
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 PRO: memo from M (Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins) to A/DZ,  ref. M/OR258, accompanied by 
paper entitled, „Notes on the Organisation of a Sabotage System‟, 11 April 1941 in HS8/272. 
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organising the important role that was delegated to Milorg during the liberation.  
Ultimately, therefore, SOE‟s plans for Norway benefited from its partnership with 
the Norwegian authorities.   
Before examining relations between SOE and Norwegian authorities in 
London during the final years of the war, it is important to consider briefly the 
relationship that developed between them in Stockholm, from where a 
considerable proportion of special operations in Norway were instigated.  This 
will show that owing to the remoteness from London, which made control more 
difficult, and lacking a mechanism through which collaboration could be formally 
conducted, contact only operated at a personal level.  It was therefore regularly 
subject to local difficulties between certain individuals.  Nevertheless, whilst SOE 
and FO worked together closely and made joint decisions on subversive activities 
in Norway, the problematic relationship in Stockholm had little if any impact on 
the development of policy or the implementation of operations. 
The SOE Mission that was set up at the British Legation in Stockholm in 
the autumn of 1940 was important.  It was only a train or car journey from the 
border, which made contact and communication with Norway easier.  It therefore 
became an additional route through which SOE attempted to exercise direct 
control over resistance organisations in the country.  Operations were often 
instigated or concluded in Stockholm, and it was a point from which couriers 
could be sent across the frontier to deliver materials and retrieve intelligence.  The 
Norwegian authorities also opened a Military Office in the Norwegian Legation 
under their Military Attaché.  It also used couriers to communicate with groups in 
Norway, made contact with Milorg, and collected intelligence.  It remained in situ 
until the spring of 1943 when it was reformed along the lines of FO in London.  
From then on communication with Milorg and co-operation with SOE became the 
responsibility of a new department, Militærkontoret IV (MI IV).
77
  Through the 
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 The first Military Attaché was Oscar Strugstad, followed in March 1941 by A. R. Roscher-Lund 
and in the autumn of 1941 by Ingvald Smith-Kielland.  From spring 1941, Paal Frisvold became 
the contact with Milorg, whilst Ornulf Dahl concentrated on intelligence.  In the summer of 1942, 
Lasse Heyerdahl-Larsen replaced Frisvold.  In the spring of 1943 Colonel Ole Berg became 
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Heyerdahl-Larsen, and MI II under Ornulf Dahl.  At the end of 1943 Axel Baumann replaced 
Heyerdahl-Larsen, until the spring of 1945 when Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold Rørholt replaced him.  
See: T. A. Barstad, „Norsk motstand fra Svensk grunn‟, in S. Ekman & O. K. Grimnes, (eds.), 
Brøderfolk i ufredstid – Norsk forbindelser under annen verdenskrig, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1991), p. 228-261.  Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, note 16, p. 425.    
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war, therefore, SOE and Norwegian authorities both had offices in Stockholm that  
undertook similar activities.  
The relationship between the SOE Mission and the Military Office at the 
Norwegian Legation never replicated the formal and organised collaboration that 
developed in London.  During the period from the autumn of 1940 to the summer 
of 1941, Malcolm Munthe ran his own show and was extremely sceptical of the 
staff at the Norwegian Legation.
78
  The Norwegian representatives also expressed 
their disquiet with the extent and nature of the subversive activities that were 
being carried out in Norway.
79
  There appears to be no evidence of an effort or 
even an inclination from either SOE or Norwegian authorities to co-operate or co-
ordinate their work at this time.  Furthermore, from the late spring of 1941, 
exactly as in London and using individual contacts, SOE set out to assert direct 
influence over resistance groups in Norway.  When it was recommended to the 
Norwegian government that Paal Frisvold, the Milorg pioneer who fled to 
Stockholm in late March 1941, should be appointed to liase with Milorg‟s 
leadership in Oslo, SOE attempted to bring him under its wing, very much as it 
had with John Rognes in London.
80
     
Therefore, and despite co-operation between Frisvold and Hugh Marks 
being described as „splendid‟, 81 by December 1941 it was felt that the relationship 
in Stockholm should be placed on a structured footing.  Consequently, Daniel 
Ring, yet another Milorg veteran, was sent to Sweden to liaise between the 
Norwegian Legation and SOE Mission in the recruitment of agents, establishment 
of contacts in Norway, choice of routes for agents, provision of equipment, 
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4301 (Munthe), 1 May 1941, letters from Daniel Ring in Stockholm to Colonel Ljungberg and 
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Note from AD/S (Lt. Col. H. N. Sporborg) to SS (John Rognes), 8 August 1941 in HS2/231.         
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 PRO: letter from Frisvold to Rognes, 8 September 1941 in HS2/228. 
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necessary papers, and money.
82
  Although this was an attempt to improve 
relations it was still based on individual contacts and appears to have had limited 
success.  Consequently, despite the formation of the ANCC leading to formalised 
collaboration in London, relations in Stockholm remained difficult.
 83
  Edgar 
Nielsen, visited SOE HQ in the autumn of 1942 and returned to Stockholm 
apparently with a determination to achieve the same unity „of purpose‟ as in 
London.
84
  Attempts were also made to impose a more structured relationship 
when in November 1942 General Hansteen issued an instruction that agents 
arriving in Stockholm were the responsibility of SOE, should report to the British 
Legation before the Norwegian Legation, and that there should be „the best 
possible co-operation with the British‟.85  Nevertheless, by early March 1943, FO 
felt that there was an urgent need for a joint British-Norwegian organisation, a 
branch of the ANCC, to oversee SOE and FO activities out of Stockholm, 
although unfortunately it appears nothing came of this suggestion.
86
   
Despite the setting up of MI IV under Lasse Heyerdahl-Larsen, which was 
made responsible for working with SOE Mission, and a joint SOE and Norwegian 
decision to replace Daniel Ring with Sverre Ellingsen, who would liase between 
the two parties in Stockholm, relations remained troubled.
87
  During 1943 and into 
1944, Edgar Nielsen continued to complain about the nature of co-operation in 
Stockholm.  Perhaps more significantly, because it indicated a personal prejudice, 
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he also expressed a distrust of Norwegians who he felt were not pulling their 
weight.  This was a view that had long disappeared in London.  Negative feelings 
were, however, not unique to the British.  Jens Christian Hauge later described 
Nielsen „as never really co-operative‟.  These comments go to the core of the 
problem in Stockholm: a mistrust between individuals that was never completely 
negated, despite the development of close relationship between SOE and the 
Norwegian military authorities in London.
88
  
Although relations in Stockholm remained problematic, this does not 
appear to have had a direct impact at a policy level.  Operations from Sweden into 
Norway either to carry out sabotage or organise local resistance groups continued 
and grew in number as the war progressed.
89
  Sverre Ellingsen, based at the 
Norwegian Legation, and Edgar Nielsen, often worked together in order to 
instigating some of these operations.
90
  Both SOE and FO also recognised that 
there were difficulties and regularly attempted to find ways to overcome them, but 
whilst there was collaboration in London, where policy was formulated, the 
problems in Stockholm remained no more than a local complication.  
Nevertheless, this was not an ideal background for a co-ordinated implementation 
of clandestine activities into Norway from Sweden, especially during the final 
year of the war when the intensity and number of these operations increased 
significantly.  Consequently, and perhaps reflecting a lack of confidence in 
conditions in Stockholm, SOE and FO staff officers were sent out from London in 
an attempt to ensure co-ordination and organisation of effort.
91
  In effect the 
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commitment to collaboration between SOE and FO in London was eventually 
exported to Stockholm.    
 Meanwhile in the UK co-operation between SOE and the Norwegian 
military authorities strengthened and between 1943 and 1945 it developed into 
what is probably best described as a partnership.  This was symbolised by the 
growing synergy between the administrative infrastructures of both SOE‟s 
Norwegian section and FO.  By September 1944 the administrative and 
organisational relationship between SOE and its Norwegian colleagues had 
become so close that the two were able to amalgamate their staff into one office in 
London.  In step with this between autumn 1942 and spring 1945, FO also 
continued its direct involvement in clandestine and subversive activities in 
Norway, in order to protect both Norwegian interests and to ensure a co-
ordination of effort with its allies.    
In March 1942, soon after the establishment of FO, a small office entitled 
O II was set up to take care of issues concerning the Homefront.  It consisted of 
three officers: Jacob Schive, responsible for charting Milorg; Leif Tronstad, with 
responsibility for the Linge personnel and the Shetlands Base; and John Rognes, 
who was responsible for obtaining equipment and instructors for Milorg.
 92
  The 
creation of this office reflected the resolve of the Norwegian authorities both to 
build up Milorg and to assert control over the Norwegian volunteers that were 
assigned to undertake clandestine activities on behalf of the British.  It was also 
this department that initially worked with SOE.  By the summer of 1942, 
however, SOE felt that with the number of issues that were being handled it 
would be valuable to have a Norwegian officer to work in its Norwegian section.  
This request was, nevertheless, turned down within SOE owing to the precedent it 
was feared it would set with other countries, where relations were not necessarily 
as close.  Nonetheless, it was agreed that a liaison officer could be appointed to 
approve co-ordination between the two parties.  Whether this happened on an 
„official‟ basis is unclear, but the event is a further indication of how closely SOE 
was prepared to work with the Norwegian authorities.
93
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 O II was situated in the department FO III, which was responsible for land and air operations.  
See: FO arkiv boks 45, mappe XXXX, „Foreløbig arbeidsprogram for III kontor‟, utarbeidet av 
Bjarne Øen 19.3 og approbert 31.3.42, cited in Riste, London regjeringa, vol. I, pp. 189-190.  
93
 PRO: paper entitled „Liaison between Norwegian High Command and SOE‟, by Lt. Col. J.S. 
Wilson, ref. JSW/826, to General Hansteen and Colonel Christophersen, 1 July 1942. 
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In December 1942, however, there was a major re-organisation within FO.  
Department, FO IV, which had originally been responsible for naval operations, 
absorbed O II and under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Bjarne Øen, took on 
responsibility for operations of a purely military nature and also of a „special‟ 
nature in Norway in the period prior to the liberation.  Øen also became a member 
of the ANCC and over the next two and half years established a close working 
relationship with SOE‟s Lt. Colonel Wilson.94  FO IV gradually expanded and by 
the summer of 1944 the office was divided into three sections that were 
responsible for administration, assistance with military plans especially those 
concerning Milorg and SOE, and work on coup-de-main operations and 
preparations for the protection of Norwegian industry.  Six district specialists 
were also employed to cover the various regions of Norway.
 95
  These 
administrative and organisational developments are a further reflection of the 
committed and collaborative approach taken by the Norwegian military authorities 
to both the preparation of Milorg and its involvement in attacks against or the 
protection of economic sites in Norway. 
In June 1944, on the recommendation of SOE, a process began which led 
to the amalgamation of its Norwegian section staff with that of FO IV in offices at 
17 Oxford Square in London.  By this time, with the involvement of the American 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), it was believed that the time was right to 
establish a „joint Anglo-American-Norwegian staff‟.  As FO IV had been 
associated „more and more in the intelligence, planning and carrying out‟ of joint 
activities in Norway, and with the level of understanding achieved it was believed 
best to form a joint organisation „to control resistance in Norway on behalf of 
SHAEF‟.96  Over the next two months therefore, with the full support of the 
Norwegian authorities, plans were put together and approval sought for the 
creation of a single office.  This was eventually given in principle on 28 August 
1944.
 97
  By the final twelve months of the war, therefore, the relationship 
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between SOE and the Norwegian military authorities at an administrative level 
had clearly evolved into a partnership.  This was to be particularly valuable during 
1944 and 1945 when as a result of the changes in policy there was a huge increase 
in both the number and complexity of sabotage and protective operations in 
Norway as well as a major effort to prepare Milorg in time for the liberation.   
  Relations between SOE and the Norwegian military authorities also 
flourished because they agreed over the nature of their relationship and continued 
to share the same broad objectives.  This meant that SOE could pursue its aims in 
Norway mostly with Norwegian backing.    Both parties persisted with their long-
term goal of preparing a secret army that could assist with the liberation and the 
restoration of a free and independent Norway.  SOE accepted that this would be 
done in the „name of‟ the Norwegian C-in-C‟.98 even though „the war against the 
enemy‟ had to be „continued on the basis of the strategic considerations laid down 
by the Chiefs of Staff‟.  It was also still fully aware that it „could not carry out any 
work against the enemy in Norway without the services of Norwegian army and 
navy personnel‟.99  Moreover, within FO IV it was acknowledged that the Allies 
had „the supreme leadership of the war‟, the means to conduct the war, and that to 
protect Norwegian interests it must „co-operate as openly as possible‟.  It also 
agreed that SOE was responsible to the COS and that it would carry out 
operations in Norway on their instruction.
100
 
The potential manpower reserves within Milorg were also crucial to any 
plans to create a clandestine army in occupied Norway.  During most of 1942 
communication and relations with its leadership in Oslo remained problematic, 
and the view of SOE was that „the stage had not yet been reached‟ when it was 
„under the direction and control of the Norwegian High Command in London‟.101  
From the autumn of 1942, however, communication and contact began to improve 
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and in May 1943, after a meeting in Sweden with members of FO IV, Milorg 
accepted its subservience to the military authorities in London when it was agreed 
that only FO could decide if and to what degree it would go into action.
102
  In 
these circumstances it was imperative for SOE to continue its close association 
with FO.  The Norwegian military authorities also recognised that Milorg lacked 
weapons, equipment, and officers, and that there was an urgent need for 
instructors from outside.
103
  To achieve this British support through SOE was 
vital.  Moreover, by the summer of 1942, SOE had come to accept that it should 
„meet the requests of the Norwegian High Command and SNM [Milorg] for 
assistance in the provision of trained personnel, arms and transportation‟.104  
There was also a shared commitment to the role that it was believed this force 
would eventually undertake.  At a further conference in Sweden in March 1944, 
between representatives of Milorg and FO IV, it was agreed that the organisation 
[Milorg] would be of most service by „making preparations for a military state of 
readiness, which can be utilised as a link in larger plans, when the liberation 
draws near‟.105  In September 1944, in its directive to the resistance in Norway, 
SFHQ echoed this view when it prioritised the preparation of resistance groups in 
readiness to act as a protective force during the potentially chaotic period in the 
early hours or days after a final German surrender or collapse.
106
 
Unlike the aim of organising a clandestine army, however, the Norwegian 
government continued to face difficulties over sabotage.  Strong opposition to 
such activities from the Norwegian Home Front, including Milorg, until well into 
1943 meant that the government had to remain cautious in its approach to this 
issue.  It was caught between its obligation to ensure that it was in touch with and 
represented the immediate interests of the Norwegian people, and its obligation to 
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contribute as best possible to the Allied defeat of Germany and thereby the 
liberation of Norway.  In the case of sabotage it was difficult to satisfy both these 
requirements.  This was illustrated during the summer of 1942 when owing to the 
action of a Communist group in Oslo, important resistance figures in Norway 
wrote to their government protesting strongly against acts that had severe 
consequences for the civilian population.  In response the Norwegian government 
set out its position on sabotage to the resistance leadership, the people back home, 
and its British ally.
107
  In August, Trygve Lie had a meeting with Laurence 
Collier, the British Ambassador to Norway, during which he declared that 
Norway‟s policy was to support „warlike action from outside‟, but not to 
encourage patriots in Norway „to commit isolated acts of sabotage‟.108  This was 
confirmed soon after in a letter to the Soviet Ambassador, in which Lie protested 
against radio broadcasts from Moscow that apparently encouraged random acts of 
violence.  The letter, however, also confirmed that Norway, „was prepared to 
undertake certain acts of sabotage in so far that these would be of real military 
significance‟.109  In a BBC radio broadcast by the Norwegian Prime Minister in 
early September he also emphasised his government‟s opposition to „individual 
actions that did not serve any useful purpose‟.110   Soon after a concerned British 
Foreign Office asked SOE to clarify its position on sabotage in Norway.  In a terse 
reply SOE confirmed that only teams from outside undertook such acts, and these 
would leave signs to indicate that it was personnel sent into the country that were 
behind the activities.  Everything was done with the approval of the ANCC and 
General Hansteen.  Significantly, the civilian population was not encouraged „to 
indulge in acts of sabotage‟.111 
Nevertheless, despite stating their apparent opposition to individual and 
random sabotage actions within Norway, difficulties between the Norwegian 
government and the Home Front continued.  These were sparked by SOE and FO 
operations that for example in October 1942 led the German authorities to declare 
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a state of emergency in the county of Trøndelag, around Trondheim, and 
eventually execute thirty-four Norwegians.
112
  In early 1943, members of staff 
from within FO were called to a government meeting and criticised for their 
involvement in such operations and soon after the Norwegian Prime Minister 
described both SOE and FO as „irresponsible‟.  Trygve Lie also wrote to the 
resistance leadership denying that the Prime Minister and himself had any 
knowledge of these actions beforehand and were therefore not responsible for 
them, even though FO had sanctioned them under the authority of the Minister of 
Defence.  He also claimed that they shared the Home Front‟s view and agreed that 
people‟s lives should not be put in danger „unnecessarily‟ 113  In conversations 
with the British government, however, a different impression was presented.  Lie, 
in a meeting with the British Ambassador in October 1942, described the British 
raid, Operation Musketoon, which along with SOE activity led to the tragedy in 
Trøndelag, as „a very satisfactory achievement‟, and that executions „were what 
might be expected from the Germans‟.114 
This seeming disparity is explained partly by the existence of different 
views on this issue within the government but more significantly by a requirement 
by the Norwegian authorities to take a different approach in its relations with the 
Home Front from those with its allies.  In line with the wishes of the resistance 
leadership the government supported non-violent resistance in Norway.  This, 
however, did not mean it opposed all sabotage.  Provided attacks were undertaken 
against legitimate military targets by teams sent in from outside, they were 
acceptable.  This was the line that SOE followed, and which allowed it to continue 
to work closely with the Norwegian military authorities.  In April 1943, it 
confirmed that it was „SOE and Norwegian policy‟, not to encourage „active 
internal resistance‟, but to „carry out certain specific acts of sabotage from 
outside‟.115  By May 1943, even Milorg had accepted that „in certain specific 
instances FO will operate actively during the time of waiting‟, in other words 
prior to the liberation.
116
  In the summer of 1943 a copy of the „Directive for 
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Future Sabotage Policy for Norway‟ was sent by Lt. Colonel Wilson to Bjarne 
Øen with a note stating that he was „glad to discuss it‟, exemplifying the 
commitment to ensuring that both parties worked together on this issue.  In 
January 1944, Lt. Colonel Wilson also stoutly defended the Norwegian 
government‟s approach to sabotage, arguing it had never restricted SOE 
activity.
117
  Although this is an exaggeration, it nevertheless reflects the 
determination to present a shared view on this difficult matter and a strong desire 
within SOE to defend its Norwegian partner. 
On the issue of sabotage SOE reached an accommodation with the 
Norwegian authorities.  In the interests of collaboration it temporarily sidelined its 
aim of setting up a sabotage organisation in Norway and using the local 
population to help it attack a range of targets within the country.  Policy was, 
therefore, up until spring 1944, slightly compromised in the interests of 
accommodating Norwegian concerns.  During 1944, however, sabotage policy 
changed due to a transformation in the attitude of the resistance leadership.  This 
will be examined in the next chapter, which deals with the impact of conditions 
and the development of resistance in occupied Norway on SOE policy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The effect of the concerns of the Norwegian authorities on the development and 
evolution of SOE‟s plans for Norway was relatively small.  The central pillars of 
its policy, the combination of short and long-term objectives, were not 
fundamentally altered.  The approach of SOE toward the government in exile was 
based on two factors: fear and a need to retain control over subversive and 
underground activities in Norway.  From the summer of 1940 there was a fear that 
if relations between the two parties broke down, SOE would be deprived of the 
use of the Norwegian recruits that were vital to its operations in this theatre.  At 
the same time, however, SOE received its instructions from the COS, who were 
determined to make sure that subversive activities across Europe remained in 
accordance with overall strategy.  To ensure this SOE had to maintain a measure 
of control or at least influence over not only the use of Norwegian volunteers but 
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also resistance groups in Norway, especially Milorg.  This could only be achieved 
through initially contact with selected members of the Norwegian government, 
and eventually by collaboration and a partnership with the institutions that the 
government set up to represent its interests in the military sector.  The positive 
approach to co-operation taken by the Norwegian authorities also meant that SOE 
did not have the difficult task of working with a troublesome ally.  It eventually 
had a partner that took the view that the best way to protect Norwegian interests 
was by making an active and positive contribution to the war effort.  This 
ultimately enabled the British to secure the use of Norwegian volunteers, expertise 
and intelligence, whilst at the same time make sure that special operations in 
Norway were kept under Allied direction.  In order to cement this relationship, 
however, SOE had to take note of Norwegian concerns, especially regarding 
sabotage activities and the choice of some of the military or industrial targets in 
Norway, but this was a relatively small price to pay to ensure that its broad 
objectives remained intact.  SOE‟s relationship with the Norwegian authorities 
was therefore ultimately advantageous to its plans for Norway.  Relations with 
Milorg were, however, far more problematic and difficult.       
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SOE AND THE MILITARY RESISTANCE IN NORWAY 1940-1945: 
DIRECTION, SEPARATION AND FINALLY PARTNERSHIP 
 
 
Introduction 
It was not only SOE‟s relationship with the Norwegian government in exile that 
influenced the development of its policy for Norway, but also its interaction with the 
resistance movements that emerged in response to the country‟s occupation, 
particularly Milorg.  SOE, Norwegian government, and Milorg all shared the same 
long-term objective, which was to create a clandestine army that would eventually 
support British or Allied forces in the liberation of the country.  Milorg‟s view on the 
nature and role of this underground army in the period prior to an expected Allied 
landing or German collapse was, however, at least until late 1943, in several ways at 
odds with SOE.  Consequently, early relations were difficult, which ultimately had a 
significant impact on the evolution of SOE‟s plans for this theatre of operations. 
Milorg was a centralised organisation, covering a large part of southern 
Norway, with a leadership in Oslo.  By the late spring of 1941 its central council, 
Rådet, had made contact with the Norwegian authorities in London.  From this point it 
had a voice, which it used to articulate its views on its future role, and a leadership 
that began to resist attempts by SOE to control it.  Its recognition by the Norwegian 
government in the autumn of 1941 as the „official‟ military resistance gave its 
opinions additional weight in the unfolding discussions with the Home Front over the 
use and development of a secret army within occupied Norway both prior to and after 
an Allied landing.  Initially, the resistance movements within the country, with the 
exception of the Communist groups, were opposed to armed and violent action that 
could lead to severe reprisals from the occupying regime.  The view within Milorg 
was that a clandestine army should remain underground, unarmed, and not become 
involved in overt actions before the arrival of Allied forces.  It believed that any 
participation in sabotage would threaten both its long-term integrity, and as a result of 
violent reprisals, undermine its support amongst the local population.  This quickly 
put it at variance with SOE, and ultimately contributed to the British decision to 
restrict sabotage to coup de main operations carried out by teams sent in from the UK.  
Only in the final year of the war when the resistance leadership, owing to powerful 
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internal pressures, changed policy did Milorg work with SOE in the implementation 
of sabotage. 
 As the first section of this chapter will show, from late 1940 SOE set out to 
prepare its own secret decentralised guerrilla army in Norway using any indigenous 
resistance group that could be armed, organised and trained.  It therefore did not in the 
beginning attempt to avoid or work outside the leadership of Milorg,
1
 it tried to bring 
it under its direct authority and control.  To secure the co-ordinated use of secret 
armies across Europe it was of central importance that the development and 
preparation of all military resistance groups in Norway, including Milorg, conformed 
to Allied direction.   
The second section of the chapter will show, however, that after Milorg 
became a part of the Norwegian armed forces it had to be treated as a separate 
movement controlled jointly with FO.  This proved to be a slow and difficult process 
as the centralisation of Milorg, with its council in Oslo, was not only seen as a 
security risk by SOE, but also as a barrier to ensuring that decisions over its role and 
use were made in London, not Norway.  From the autumn of 1941, therefore, owing 
to concerns over this centralisation, SOE decided to organise a secret army made up 
from two „distinct‟, although not completely separate organisations.  One was based 
on local independent groups prepared by SOE, the other on the Milorg districts. 
The third and fourth sections of this chapter will move on to show how after 
difficulties in the field this policy was quickly reversed and from the autumn of 1942 
SOE teams and local resistance groups were instructed, where possible, to work 
closely with Milorg.  Consequently, over the following two and half years, and 
despite some continuing reservations about its centralisation, SOE was, through 
collaboration with FO, eventually able to ensure that Milorg and its leadership 
became part of their partnership.  It was thereby able to achieve its long-term aim of 
developing a decentralised secret army that could be utilised in accordance with 
strategic and military requirements and which was eventually able to make a 
significant contribution to the country‟s liberation.  By the summer of 1944, therefore, 
SOE had a strong working relationship with both FO and Milorg, which would be 
crucial to the implementation of the Allies‟ plans for Norway in the months running 
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up to and the days immediately after the capitulation of German forces in May 1945.
  
 
 
I 
SOE and Military Resistance in Norway 1940-1941: Control over Long- Term 
Policy 
To understand why the early relationship between SOE and Milorg was so 
difficult it is important to examine the nature of the occupation of Norway in the 
summer of 1940 and the forms of resistance that this gave rise to.  It is, however, 
outside the limited confines of this work to go into all facets of resistance to the 
German occupation, either because it is not pertinent to this thesis or because it has 
been extensively written about before.
2
  Nevertheless, an understanding of the origins 
of Milorg will help to explain its initial attitude toward clandestine activities, which 
were so out of line with those of SOE.     
Resistance in Norway after the German occupation in the spring of 1940 was 
stimulated and shaped by political events within the country, specifically those that 
occurred during the following summer.  These were the negotiations 
(Riksrådforhandlingene) between the German Reichskommisar, Josef Terboven, and 
the Presidential Board of the Norwegian Storting to establish a new constitutional 
government in Norway, and which included a request to King Haakon and the 
government in London to step down.  The King rejected this invitation and the 
negotiations were finally ended on 25 September when Terboven banned all political 
parties in Norway except the Nasjonal Samling (NS),
 3
 the Norwegian Nazi party led 
by Vidkun Quisling.
 4
  From this point the German occupying regime through NS, set 
out to form a „national socialist state‟ in Norway.5  Although there were many acts of 
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individual and spontaneous protest in the country from the early months and 
throughout the occupation,
6
 by the summer of 1940 a small and central resistance 
leadership had also appeared in response to these developments.  It consisted of major 
political, judicial, and business figures and was located in Oslo, close to political 
events.
7
  From and early stage, therefore, there were signs that resistance in Norway 
would be both organised and centralised.  And by the spring of 1941, the two 
resistance movements that would dominate occupied Norway over the following 
years, the civilian based resistance and the military based resistance, eventually 
known as Sivorg and Milorg respectively, had begun to take shape.
8
   
In the broadest terms the civilian resistance movement took the form of an 
unarmed but organised and active „rejection of the Nazi ideology as it was expressed 
in Norway‟, and which is described by Norwegian historians as the Holdningskamp.  
It was fundamentally political and the „dominant‟ form of resistance within the 
country.
9
  Military resistance crystallised around Milorg, an illegal and underground 
organisation that began to develop from late 1940, and which set out to create a 
„clandestine army‟ that would be preserved intact to assist in its country‟s eventual 
liberation.
10
  The relationship between these two movements, despite some difficulties 
in 1943 was never plagued by widespread conflict.  By late 1943 they were working 
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together and the leadership of both had formed a close understanding.  Nevertheless, 
it was the civilian resistance leadership that took the title Hjemmefrontens Ledelse, the 
Homefront Leadership (HL) and was recognised as the national leadership within 
Norway with the „right to represent and speak on behalf of occupied society‟, whilst 
Milorg remained directly subservient to FO in London.  During the winter of 1944/45, 
however, in the critical period running up to the liberation, a new structured and 
formalised HL was formed, which represented the various groups in Norway, 
including Milorg.  It had a central committee that met weekly, and an arbeidsutvalg, a 
working committee consisting of four members including Jens Chr. Hauge, which met 
daily.
11
  Resistance in Norway was therefore ordered, developed good working 
relations with the government in London, and was not riven by factions or internal 
feuding.  Consequently, SOE did not have to confront a difficult political background, 
something that often complicated and degraded its activities in other occupied 
countries across Europe.  Nevertheless, it did have to contend with resistance 
movements that had strong leaders who were prepared to articulate and defend their 
position on the role that they believed their organisations should play in occupied 
Norway and which had the ear of their government in London. 
      Moreover, there were several Communist resistance groups within 
occupied Norway that did not conform to the careful and predominately non-violent 
line followed by Sivorg and Milorg.  Their activities also had an impact on the 
development of resistance policy, and therefore should be considered.   The most 
prominent and influential faction was the „Osvald Group‟, which was a continuation 
of a Norwegian offshoot of the Wollweber Organisation, an anti-fascist group created 
in 1935 by the NKVD, the Soviet secret service.  Its aimed to continue the struggle 
against fascism through active measures, initially ship sabotage, and prepare the way 
for partisan or guerrilla warfare behind the frontline in a future world war.  
Consequently, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, there was a Communist 
organisation already in place within Norway that was prepared to take action against 
the occupying regime.  It carried out its first operation on 21 July 1941 and over 100 
further attacks in Norway, largely against the railways, before it was wound down in 
1944.  Although it was directly linked to the NKVD, the group also had contact with 
the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) and from 1942 operated as its sabotage 
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organisation.  Other Communist sabotage groups were also formed, such as the Pelle 
Group in Oslo and Saborg in Bergen, which had links to the NKP and continued the 
tradition of open and violent resistance to the German occupation.   Unlike other 
countries in Europe, however, the Communist movement in Norway remained 
peripheral and was never represented within HL.  Nevertheless, the Communist‟s 
„active‟ approach to resistance was eventually to have consequences for Milorg and 
its relationship with SOE, although unlike other countries in occupied Europe it never 
had a major impact on SOE‟s plans for this theatre.12 
 In the autumn of 1940 members of the embryonic resistance leadership that 
had gathered in Oslo included army officers such as Major Olav Helset and Captain 
John Rognes, who had fought during the previous spring.  They had been imprisoned 
but released after eventually pledging not to take up arms against the German 
occupiers.
13
  During the winter of 1940-1941 these men and other army officers, 
sometimes connected to the Norwegian General Staff from before the occupation, 
began to form an underground military organisation within Norway by contacting and 
pulling together the many small informal groups of army veterans that had come 
together across the country after the fighting had concluded the previous June.
14
  
Legitimacy was given to this process when in October 1940 General Otto Ruge, the 
imprisoned Norwegian Commander in Chief,
15
 passed on his authority to these Milorg 
pioneers.  At the time, however, he only spoke of undertaking military appraisals, 
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which was interpreted as a call for unarmed resistance and not action.
16
  
Consequently, Milorg‟s leadership was founded upon the experiences of the spring of 
1940 and predominately influenced by men whose background was within the pre-
war Norwegian military structure, which was set up to create a mobilisation army that 
would only form in the event of an invasion.
17
  Milorg was, therefore, initially built on 
the conviction that it should be an underground army that would only go into action to 
support major operations to reoccupy the country.  In the meantime it would not 
undertake any active resistance against the German occupation that could lead to its 
destruction, but quietly prepare in readiness to mobilise when called upon.
18
 
Through the winter of 1940-1941 small groups slowly came together in the 
provinces under local leadership and were organised into five kampgrupper (fighting 
groups), that corresponded to the country‟s old pre-war divisional borders, a process 
that has been described as an „illegal re-forming of the Norwegian army‟.  Attempts 
were also made to link these groups to the central leadership that was gradually taking 
shape in Oslo, although at this early stage contact was tenuous.
19
  This incipient 
organisation eventually decided that it needed to formalise its leadership so that it 
could „take a position on all the principal questions, appoint those that would occupy 
the leading positions within the organisation, and execute control over operations‟.20  
Consequently around Easter 1941 a military council (the Råd) was formed to act as 
the highest executive authority.  Under this an administrative infrastructure was also 
gradually put in place to run the organisation and which collectively became known 
as the Sentral Ledelse, Central Leadership (SL).
21
  By the late spring of 1941, 
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therefore, Milorg was developing into a hierarchical organisation based in Oslo, but 
with only weak links to regional groups in southern Norway.  In October 1941, it was 
claimed that the organisation could call on between 20-25,000 volunteers, although at 
this stage these numbers probably consisted of no more than lists of names.  There 
were also only a few officers and with the exception of batches of rifles that had been 
hidden away after the campaign in 1940, the men were largely unarmed.
22
  By the 
autumn of 1941, therefore, although Milorg was an organisation with potentially 
considerable manpower reserves, it was a long way from constituting an underground 
army.   
Between the autumns of 1940 and 1941, SOE attempted to make use of, 
develop, and control „anti-Nazi‟ groups within occupied Norway. 23  Its initial policy 
of instigating a rebellion meant that even whilst Milorg was in its embryonic state, 
SOE had attempted to make contact with and direct local resistance organisations.
 24
  
It planned to get in touch with individuals or groups that might be used to form 
military cadres, trained units that would stimulate and eventually lead an uprising by 
the civilian population across Norway.  A lot of the early work was done through 
Malcolm Munthe in Stockholm, although at this stage of the German occupation 
resistance in the regions of Norway was still small-scale, local and improvised, and 
therefore his contacts, with the exception of those in Trondheim, do not appear to 
have led to much.
25
  They do, however, illustrate that SOE was anxious to link up 
with any rudimentary group that it could eventually use for its own purposes. 
By late 1940, the concept of a widespread rebellion had been replaced by 
plans to organise a secret army in Norway and in SOE‟s first directive one of the aims 
was to make the ground ready for offensive operations in southern Norway, and this 
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included preparing an „organisation‟ that could co-operate with British forces.26  This 
was immediately reflected in SOE‟s policy for Norway.  From December the 
intention was that a separate „anti-Nazi‟ organisation, a euphemism for armed 
resistance groups, would be prepared in each region, from Bodø north of Trondheim 
and across the main strategic areas of Norway, including Oslo.  SOE was aware that 
in the capital there was already the „nucleus of an organisation‟ and this would be 
„fostered‟, although on „somewhat special lines‟.  This cryptic phraseology probably 
refers to Milorg.  The regional organisations would be formed from groups that SOE 
was either already in touch with, as in Trondheim, or where there was no 
organisation, new ones would be established.  Each organisation would be kept in 
contact with SOE through Stockholm or across the North Sea and „carefully picked 
members‟ from each group would be sent to the Shetlands for training.27  
Consequently, from the autumn of 1940 and during the following eighteen months 
attempts were made to send agents to western and southern Norway to contact or form 
local resistance groups.
28
  Efforts were also made during 1941 to bring back parties to 
Britain from Norway, which after training would return home to help organise and 
lead the preparation of local networks.  Moreover, contact was made with the Milorg 
leadership in Oslo, and as with other organisations it was also requested to send back 
officers for „preparation‟.29  SOE‟s objective was to „direct‟ the „operations‟ of all 
these organisations in readiness for a „simultaneous uprising all over Norway on the 
occasion of, but on no account in advance of, either a landing by an Allied 
expeditionary force, or an incipient German collapse‟.30  
From the spring of 1941, however, two organisations were taking the first 
small steps toward organising a clandestine army in Norway.  SOE set out to create an 
armed and fully prepared military force, based on any suitable organisation it was in 
contact with, and which could eventually be used to operate in tandem with regular 
units.  Alongside this a group of pre-war officers in Oslo was in the early stages of 
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preparing an illegal underground army, which would only be mobilised to assist the 
expected Allied re-occupation of Norway or after a possible German withdrawal.  
They did not, however, despite sharing the same long-term objective, succeed at this 
stage in working together harmoniously.  A number of issues including SOE‟s 
determination to assert control, whether or not a clandestine army should be armed 
and trained in readiness to support operations by regular forces and whether or not it 
should become active in the period prior to the country‟s re-occupation, all led to 
disagreement. 
At this time SOE‟s attitude toward resistance groups in Norway was that it 
would „sponsor any responsible organisations of sufficient size to be useful‟,31 which 
included Milorg.  Therefore, until the autumn of 1941, its policy was, through 
employing ex- Milorg pioneers in London and Stockholm and using couriers from the 
Shetlands and across the Swedish border, to make contact with Milorg‟s leadership in 
Oslo and thereby incorporate it into its vision of a secret army.  SOE used its contact 
with the Norwegian authorities in London in order to make use of John Rognes,
32
 and 
thus „bring his whole organisation‟ under its „control‟.33  Rognes was initially based 
on the Shetlands so as to establish a link with the headquarters of Milorg,
34
 through 
which „advice‟ could be sent to the organisation on „how to proceed‟ with its work 
and attempts made to bring back men to be trained as „instructors‟ in SOE business‟.35  
The original intention was that Rognes would have radio contact with Ålesund on 
Norway‟s west coast to help improve communications and thereby strengthen the link 
with the Shetlands Base.  From mid-March, however, communication was established 
with Oslo through a courier, Arne Ekornes, who had been sent over to the Shetlands 
by Milorg.
36
  SOE also hoped to improve contact with Norway and speed up its 
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preparation of resistance groups through a plan to send fishing boats from the 
Shetlands at fortnightly intervals to pre-determined locations on the Norwegian coast.  
Using the BBC‟s Norwegian broadcast, the aim was to send a signal five days prior to 
a boat‟s arrival in the country.  This would have been a real, scheduled „bus service‟ if 
it had ever been implemented.
37
  Furthermore, SOE saw Paal Frisvold in Stockholm 
as someone belonging to an „organisation‟ that it was „working with‟, and although 
Frisvold proved less pliant than Rognes he became another route through which the 
organisation attempted to communicate with and direct Milorg.
38
 
SOE‟s activities in Norway and its attempt to control Milorg, however, soon 
led to some expressions of concern.  It became evident during the spring of 1941 that 
there were reservations in Oslo over what SOE was trying to do, although initially 
Milorg reluctantly continued to go along with British requests and agreed to send 
groups over to the UK for specialist training.  Arne Ekornes reported that Frisvold, 
before he left for Sweden, had told him that future work must proceed „very quietly 
and slowly‟ and that weapons must be left to later.  He also claimed that Jacob Schive, 
Frisvold‟s replacement, had told him that weapons dumps were not welcome and that 
Milorg was not prepared to undertake hostile actions against the Germans.  
Nevertheless, when Ekornes was in Oslo in March he asked Milorg, on behalf of 
SOE, to send ten men to Britain to be trained as „instructors‟ and an attempt was made 
to pick these men up from the Norwegian coast in early April, but was unsuccessful.  
Later Jacob Schive was instructed to send eight men to Britain, and these were 
successfully picked up at the end of May.  In  June, Munthe was also told to contact 
Schive and arrange for four wireless operators to travel Britain for six weeks 
training.
39
  During spring 1941, therefore, the concerns of Milorg were ultimately 
ignored and at this stage had no impact on SOE‟s plans.    
With the formation of Rådet, its military council, however, Milorg not only 
began to take control of its own activities, but it also started to assert its own position 
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on key matters.  Importantly it turned to its king and government in London for 
legitimacy.  In June 1941, in its „report‟ addressed to King Haakon in London it stated 
that weapons should not be delivered until „immediately‟ before they were required.  
It also expressed its strong opposition to sabotage, which it believed would put at risk 
both its organisation and the local population.  Its immediate purpose was to provide a 
military apparatus that would be available to any internal leadership that was 
recognised and responsible to the king.  It was this civilian authority that would 
decide when it would be used.
40
  Milorg was effectively rejecting the control and 
ideas that SOE was attempting to impose upon it. 
SOE‟s reply to Milorg, the revealingly entitled, „Directive to the Military 
Organisation in Norway‟, was sent to Oslo via Stockholm in August and despite an 
initial welcoming of Milorg‟s report it largely rejects the views expressed within it.  
The directive outlines SOE‟s objectives in Norway, to form a secret army and 
undermine German fighting capability through sabotage undertaken by teams from 
outside or by groups within Norway.  A clandestine army, however, must receive 
arms and training „in advance‟ so that it could „play its part at a given signal and in 
accordance with a pre-arranged plan‟ for either a separate invasion of Norway or as 
part of a „general offensive‟ and the calling out of secret armies all across Europe.  It 
was also important to carry out sabotage to cause the Germans in Norway „as much 
trouble as possible and to force them to keep large garrisons there‟. Although SOE 
recognised that the work had to continue carefully and therefore not put at risk either 
the resistance groups or the local population, it rejected the unarmed, untrained, and 
passive approach recommended by Milorg.
 41
  
A few weeks later this divergence of views between SOE and Milorg 
continued when Jacob Schive in Oslo drafted a reply to SOE‟s directive.  In this he 
states that only „men living in Norway should be allowed to decide upon the uses to 
which the Military Organisation could be put, and that the organisation stood directly 
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responsible to the „King and Government in London‟.42  A conflict over the control 
and use of Milorg was underway and at its centre were the issues of sabotage and the 
lines along which a secret army should be developed in the period prior to its 
anticipated use.  This was the start of difficult relationship between SOE and Milorg 
that would last until well into 1943 and which would eventually result in changes in 
aspects of British policy on clandestine activities in Norway.  
 
 
II 
SOE and Milorg 1941-1942: From Control to Separation 
In the spring of 1941, Milorg became a hierarchical organisation with a central 
leadership that began to formulate a position on principle issues such as the supply of 
weapons and sabotage.  Some of its leaders had already been arrested or forced to flee 
the country, which appeared to justify its careful, go-slow approach to the 
organisation of a secret army.  Moreover, in a search for recognition, approval of its 
views, and to strengthen its status with the British, it looked to its government in 
London for the authority to continue its work.
43
  This ultimately resulted in an 
irrevocable change in its relationship with SOE. 
In October 1941, after their arrival in Britain, Jacob Schive and Johan Holst 
reported on their organisation direct to the Norwegian authorities.
44
  From this point 
other members of the Norwegian government, not just its Foreign Minister, were fully 
aware of Milorg‟s existence, its work and its difficulties with SOE.  Therefore a 
decision had to be made about its future.  The government concluded that it could not 
allow a military force to operate in Norway independently, and accordingly it was 
decided to bring Milorg under its control.  Consequently, in November 1941, it was 
formally recognised and placed under the authority of initially HOK, and from 
February 1942 under FO.
45
  From then on Milorg was the fourth arm of the 
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Norwegian armed forces, with its members under military command, and it was the 
only authorised military resistance movement in Norway.   This not only altered 
SOE‟s relationship with the Norwegian authorities but also Milorg, which it could no 
longer influence directly or shape as it wished.  It would only be able to achieve its 
vision of a secret army in Norway through working with FO and using it as a means 
to bring Milorg in line with British views.  This proved to be a difficult and 
problematic process, and would ultimately only be successful when Milorg, in 
response to developments and changes within Norway, decided to change. 
On 28 October when Harry Sporborg and Malcolm Munthe met Jacob Schive 
and Johan Holst, Schive again raised Milorg‟s concerns over the issues of sabotage 
and the supply of arms.
46
  In response, through Sir Charles Hambro‟s memo on 
Anglo-Norwegian collaboration that led to the formation of the ANCC, SOE 
acknowledged that it was important to have a system in place that considered the 
views of Milorg.  And one of the tasks of a future, joint committee would be to 
prepare a secret army for action within Norway in conjunction with the heads of this 
clandestine organisation.  There were, therefore, signs that SOE was prepared to work 
with Milorg, give it a degree of parity, and no longer saw it as simply another 
indigenous resistance group.  Nevertheless, SOE still believed that a future 
underground army should be based on well-trained and equipped military cadres in 
each district of Norway, all with radio contact with the UK.  It would therefore be a 
decentralised organisation that could be controlled from London to ensure that „the 
work in Norway‟ was kept in line with its „policy in other parts of occupied Europe‟.  
Hambro‟s memo also emphasises that sabotage against key strategic targets would 
have to be continued, but with the important concession that in the future it would be 
„confined‟ to attacks against key targets undertaken by special sabotage teams sent in 
from the UK.  These would be kept separate from the secret army, in order to preserve 
its integrity, and have the approval of a joint committee.
 47
  Passive resistance was still 
acceptable and the commitment to the eventual and „appropriate‟ use of „separate 
sabotage cells‟ was held onto within SOE‟s ranks, but whilst there was opposition 
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from the Norwegian government and Milorg, they would not be developed.  SOE, 
however, did not compromise its belief that a clandestine army in Norway should be 
based on local groups, armed, trained, and controlled from the UK.  This was very 
different from Milorg, which wanted a centralised organisation that would wait 
passively for the day when Allied forces arrived and only then receive arms and go 
into action.  The issue was how to accommodate these two different views.      
From the late autumn of 1941 and especially after the establishment of the 
ANCC in February 1942 to „control the Secret Organisation in Norway‟,48 SOE 
worked closely with the Norwegian military authorities in order to achieve its idea of 
a jointly controlled de-centralised guerrilla army in Norway.  It did not set out to 
create its own organisation separate from Milorg that could be „active‟ in Norway 
through sabotage in the period prior to an eventual liberation,
49
 but decided that a 
clandestine army in Norway should be built on a combination of local SOE groups 
and Milorg district organisations.  SOE objected to Milorg‟s structure with a 
leadership based in Oslo that had links to the regions.  The arrest of several members 
of Milorg‟s leadership during 194150 was in the eyes of SOE a symptom of the 
organisation‟s over centralisation, which it believed made it a security threat.  It was 
considered by some that the Råd would be „of very little use in the event of military 
operations directed from Britain‟, and therefore SOE decided it should „entirely 
disassociate from the old central organisation in Oslo‟.  Work would be directed „for 
the time being‟ through individual agents rather than through „high military 
personages connected with the Norwegian army‟.51  SOE wanted a secret army based 
on local „guerrilla organisations‟ in the key strategic areas of the country.  They 
would consist of trained and equipped military cadres, each the nucleus of a military 
force that could expand if required.  These cadres would be made up of small ten man 
guerrilla units recruited from local Milorg organisations or independent groups that 
SOE had set up, and which in support of regular forces could lead attacks against key 
tactical targets, such as communications and local garrisons.
52
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To achieve its objective SOE set out to persuade Milorg to revert to a more 
decentralised structure based on separate and independent districts.
53
  Each local 
district would be made up of these cadres of armed and equipped men in contact with 
an organiser supplied by SOE, if it was believed safe.  It would also have propaganda 
cells to keep up the morale of the local people, where appropriate separate sabotage 
cells, and be put in touch with the UK through the provision of radio operators from 
Britain.  Milorg‟s central council would be discouraged from having contact with 
these districts.  Alongside this SOE also considered itself free to set up its own local 
groups that would have no contact with Milorg units, whilst specific acts of sabotage 
would be undertaken by teams sent in from the UK but without the knowledge of the 
local branch of Milorg.
54
  In effect a secret army would consist of both SOE groups 
and Milorg district organisations.  They would be kept „distinct‟, and there would be 
no „crossing of lines‟, but the intention was that they would be two parts of one 
clandestine force in Norway.
55
   
This vision of a composite and decentralised guerrilla army directed from 
London was formally and officially recognised in May 1942.  At a meeting of the 
ANCC, attended by General Hansteen, it was agreed that Milorg groups, described as 
the „Secret Army‟, and SOE groups, both under the authority of the Norwegian 
Commander-in-Chief, should be kept apart until it was decided to combine them.  It 
was, however, also accepted that there could not to be complete separation.  Local 
radio operators, through the use of a „cut-out‟, could in exceptional circumstances still 
serve both organisations, and SOE would provide Milorg with arms and demolition 
instructors.  It was also envisaged that small „guerrilla bands‟ could be detached from 
Milorg to be trained by SOE to operate in advance of the main Milorg forces.
56
   
Both SOE and the Norwegian military authorities, therefore, at this point 
believed that it was necessary to organise two parallel organisations in Norway.  SOE 
had lost all confidence in Milorg‟s leadership and in June 1942, Lt. Colonel Wilson 
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launched a vitriolic attack against what he described as „the military clique‟ of 
officers that „demand to be informed of everything that is going‟ and „resent outside 
interference‟.  To him they were „amateurs‟.57  The Norwegian military authorities 
were also fully aware of the important contribution that Milorg could make to an 
eventual liberation, but understood, however, that the organisation lacked officers, 
arms, and equipment, and it was nowhere near ready for action.  It still needed a great 
deal of time and preparation to make it ready and it therefore had to be protected.  
Direct involvement with another organisation could threaten its future.
58
 
 SOE‟s long-term aim was through collaboration to put in place its vision of a 
secret army, which was based on the concept of using guerrilla units behind enemy 
lines in support of operations by regular forces.  It was an idea that can be traced back 
at least to the work done within MI (R).
59
  In the spring of 1942, Milorg was seen as 
one strand of an underground army that would consist of two parallel but detached 
organisations controlled from London not Oslo.  It was a pragmatic approach that 
attempted to accommodate Milorg at a time when it was believed that its leadership 
was neither ready nor prepared to comply with SOE‟s wishes.     
     
 
III 
SOE and Milorg 1942-1943: A Move to Integration 
In June 1942, Lt. Colonel Wilson wrote that, „SOE‟s role [was] to endeavour 
to steer a safe passage amongst all these shoals and difficulties so as to create the 
maximum opposition and resistance to the enemy in event of an Allied landing‟.60  
Attempts to steer a secret army in Norway composed of two „distinct‟61organisations, 
however, quickly proved unrealistic.  The leadership of SOE‟s Norwegian section was 
also never totally convinced that this approach was viable.  In a paper written in late 
June 1942, Lt. Col. Wilson expressed reservations about allowing two organisations 
to operate in a country with such a small population,
62
 and by the end of the month, 
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after a series of local difficulties with Milorg, he felt that it was impossible „to keep 
two or more separate secret organisations from becoming hopelessly entangled‟.63  It 
nevertheless remained essential for SOE to ensure that key military decisions were 
made in London, not Oslo.  Consequently, Lt. Col. Wilson, in a paper produced at the 
end of June 1942, emphasised the importance of establishing a direct link between the 
Milorg leadership and the „Norwegian C-in-C‟ in London through the provision of a 
radio operator.  Milorg was a „latent body‟ that would come into „operation‟ only 
„under the instructions‟ of the Norwegian military authorities in „the event of an 
Allied landing‟. 64  Copies of this paper went to Colonel Christophersen in the 
Norwegian General Staff and to Brigadier Colin Gubbins, SOE‟s Director of 
Operations and Training.  Gubbins‟ reply is very revealing and indicative of SOE‟s 
attitude.  He wrote that SOE was „to assist Hansteen in every way possible to gain 
confidence and control of SMO [Milorg]‟, and by doing this SOE would „eventually 
have Hansteen and SMO‟.65  In other words at the heart of SOE‟s relationship with 
both FO and Milorg was a resolve to dominate both, and during the first few months 
of 1942 it was believed that control over Milorg could best be achieved through direct 
contact with its local branches and by avoiding the central leadership in Oslo.                
 This policy was, however, abandoned in August 1942.  There were two 
reasons for this.  Firstly, with the arrest or departure abroad of many of the leading 
members of Milorg in 1941 a new leadership began to emerge in Oslo that was not as 
closely linked to the pre-war army.  This resulted during 1942 in a series of reforms 
that led Milorg to become what has since been described as a „countrywide guerrilla 
organisation‟, which could support an Allied landing through guerrilla warfare.66  The 
five kampgrupper were abandoned and Milorg was initially re-organised into fourteen 
districts, numbered eleven to twenty four, later revised so that the districts were 
numbered eleven to twenty seven in southern Norway and forty and forty-one in the 
north.  Each district was made up of smaller administrative and operational units and 
had a District-Chief and staff. 
67
  General guidance still emanated from Milorg‟s 
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central leadership through a series of directives, a total of twenty between summer 
1942 and spring 1945, but this new structure was a move toward de-centralisation and 
therefore a break with the past.  Alongside this Milorg also announced that it was 
prepared to accept weapons and equipment from outside and to allow its men to be 
trained so that they would be able to support future Allied operations.
68
  This re-
organisation meant that Milorg now had a structure and a view of its future role that 
was more in tune with SOE.  Moreover, in spring 1942, in response to the difficulties 
that had occurred between SOE groups and Milorg in Norway, FO decided to send 
Jacob Schive to Oslo in attempt to improve relations.
69
  He met leaders of the Home 
Front and on his return provided SOE with a copy of Milorg‟s first „General 
Directive‟, which set out the changes to the organisation, and reported on his visit.70  
After meeting Schive, the attitude within the Norwegian section altered.  The opinion 
was that there had been „a considerable change for the better‟, „safety‟ was the 
„watchword‟ and importantly Milorg was prepared to „receive the orders of General 
Hansteen as C-in-C‟.71  For SOE this meant the Milorg leadership had become less of 
a security risk and there were indications that it was prepared to accept central 
direction.  It was also accepted that the decision to allow two secret armies to develop 
in an occupied country with a small population, such as Norway, had proved 
unworkable.  The difficulties in the field that SOE experienced with Milorg groups 
during the spring of 1942 were seen as a security risk that threatened both groups, and 
therefore, where possible, it was felt that in the future it was better to co-ordinate SOE 
activities through the local Milorg organisation.
72
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
made up of 2-4 Lag (teams).  The team was the smallest fighting unit of 6-12 men. See: map entitled 
„Milorg Districts‟, pp. xi - xii. 
68
 Milorg issued its first „Directive‟ in summer 1942, which stated that the organisation was to prepare 
„itself for guerrilla and sabotage actions on an Allied invasion of Norway‟.  During the waiting period 
groups should be trained for such warfare and accept weapons and equipment from outside.  Altogether 
it issued 20 directives, the last one dated 6 May 1945.  See: Kraglund & Moland, „Hjemmefront‟, vol. 
VI in Skodvin (ed.), Norge i Krig, p. 120. 
69
 Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 193. 
70
 The report on Milorg was presented to Lt. Colonel Sporborg and Lt. Col. Wilson on the evening of 
13 August.  PRO: memo from SN (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson) to D/CD (0) (Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins), 
ref. SN/1305, 8 September 1942, including paper entitled, „The Norwegian Home Front: General 
Directive‟, ref. SN/1305.  Memo from SN (Lt. Colonel J.S. Wilson) to D/CD (0) (Brigadier Colin 
McV. Gubbins), ref. SN/1162, entitled „Recent Mission to Secret Military Organisation Headquarters, 
Oslo‟ 15 August 1942, both in HS2/232. 
71
 PRO: letter to SOE Stockholm for 6207 (Mr. P. Falk) from SOE HQ, signed by SN (Lt. Col. J.S. 
Wilson), 14 August 1942 in HS2/232. 
72
 PRO: memo entitled,  „Recent Mission to Secret Military Organisation Headquarters, Oslo‟ from SN 
(Lt. Colonel J.S. Wilson) to D/CD (0) (Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins), ref. SN/1162, 15 August 1942 
in HS2/232. 
 135 
 In August 1942, in response to these developments, Brigadier Colin Gubbins 
issued a „Directive as to Future Policy‟ in Norway.  In this document Milorg is 
described as an organisation of 25,000 members, divided into military districts, and 
with a leadership that is prepared to receive arms and instruction.  It expresses the fear 
that if SOE agents arrived in the districts without proper accreditation they risked 
being treated as „agents provocateurs‟, and that therefore contact with Milorg should 
be extended with the „establishment of direct W/T communication, the provision of 
instructors, and the supply of arms‟.  Most significantly, in the future Milorg and the 
existing SOE organisations would „be linked up as far as possible‟.73       
 In September 1942, after „cogitation‟ on Gubbins directive on Norway, Lt. 
Col. Wilson issued a paper entitled, „SOE Long Term Policy in Norway‟.  This 
document sets out in more detail SOE‟s future approach to Milorg.  With regard to the 
development of a clandestine army, SOE would endeavour to meet the requests of the 
Norwegian military authorities in London and Milorg, although initiative and 
planning would remain with SOE, with the agreement of FO.  Most importantly 
control should not be allowed to pass from „London to Oslo‟ as the direction of „final 
operations‟ had to remain „with the Allied High Command‟.  Copies of this document 
were sent to Brigadier Gubbins, Charles Hambro, who by this time was the Executive 
Director of SOE, General Hansteen, and to the British and Norwegian Legations in 
Stockholm.  Not everyone accepted its contents; Malcolm Munthe was very critical, 
arguing that too much power was being placed in the hands of the Norwegian 
authorities.  Nevertheless, the policy on relations with Milorg as articulated in this 
document remained in place for the remainder of the war.
74
 
 By late 1942, after a number of shifts in policy, SOE finally accepted that the 
creation of a clandestine army in Norway had to be a collaborative and joint effort.  
Its earlier attempts to assert direct control and work outside the leadership in Oslo had 
proved unworkable.  This collaboration still did not, however, at this stage, extend to 
sabotage.  Milorg warned against actions that might lead to reprisals and even 
                                                          
 
73
 PRO: paper entitled „Present Situation in Norway and Directive as to Future Policy‟, from D/CD (0) 
(Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins) to SN (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson), ref. DCDO/1255, 26 August 1942 in 
HS2/232. 
74
 Norwegian historians incorrectly see SOE‟s change in its relationship to Milorg originating with 
Wilson‟s paper in September 1942.  PRO: paper entitled, „SOE Long-Term Policy in Norway‟, ref. 
JSW/1400, 21 September 1942 in HS2/218. Note from D/CD (0) (Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins) to 
C/D, (Charles Hambro), 1 October 1942 in HS2/232.  Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 184, and Riste, 
London regjeringa, vol. II, p. 28. 
 136 
requested that „instructors and other agents that came from Britain must be ordered 
not to shoot Germans, even in self-defence‟.75  Despite a request by Brigadier 
Gubbins for an increase in „incendiarism‟ and for an attack against a target in the 
interior of the country to be carried out by an „existing organisation‟,76 SOE also 
realised that the ANCC had „in part‟ to be guided „by the views of those directing‟ 
activity in Norway in working out policy.  This meant that at this stage, although 
„passive‟ resistance, the adoption of „go-slow‟ methods, was still acceptable, it 
continued to be only trained teams „sent over to Norway to do the job‟ that would 
undertake sabotage in Norway.
77
   
It was therefore not only its relationship with the Norwegian government but 
also with Milorg that had an impact on SOE‟s plans for Norway.  It remained a 
priority for SOE to work with both these parties not only because they were the 
source of the important manpower reserves and the support that it needed in order to 
complete its military tasks, but because it was seen as the only way to ensure Allied 
control over special operations in this theatre.  Co-operation was, therefore, a means 
to help SOE achieve its aims.  Nevertheless, despite a shared long-term aim relations 
with Milorg had been difficult and problematic and therefore even by the end of 1942, 
there was still not a unified and prepared underground army in place in Norway.  As 
with the Norwegian authorities, however, SOE‟s relationship with Milorg would 
eventually turn out to be beneficial for the Allies.       
 
 
IV 
SOE and Milorg 1943-1945: in the Shadow of the Liberation. 
Between early 1943 and May 1945, the relationship between SOE and Milorg 
developed into an effective and valuable working relationship.  Owing to the 
significant role assigned to clandestine forces during Norway‟s liberation this was 
important.  Initially, however, difficulties remained as SOE continued to be concerned 
about the centralisation of Milorg.  But as contact and communication between FO 
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and Milorg improved, and its leadership in Oslo formally accepted that it had to be 
subordinate to decisions made in London, relations improved.  Moreover, a change in 
policy by the Home Front, which allowed Milorg groups to become active within 
Norway prior to the liberation, helped to extend co-operation between SOE and 
Milorg at a local level.   
In the autumn of 1942, a set of instructions was drawn up jointly by SOE and 
FO for teams or agents going into Norway.  From this point the policy was that in 
districts where only Milorg existed, in the future NIC (1) teams would provide help, 
whilst in areas where only SOE groups operated, Milorg would when possible offer 
support.  In areas where both organisations existed, however, SOE groups would 
come under the control of Milorg.
78
  This indicates that in future Milorg would 
constitute the core of a clandestine army, although it would not necessarily be the 
only component.  Nevertheless, despite this attempt to formalise relations, the 
problems associated with a policy of allowing separate groups to operate within 
Norway did not immediately disappear.  During the autumn of 1942, local Milorg 
organisations continued to face difficulties due to the activities of SOE teams.
79
  
Frustration within Milorg was so strong that it was claimed after the war that the 
organisation even considered „giving up‟.80  At the centre of this was poor 
communication, especially between the UK and Oslo.  An attempt in autumn 1942 to 
provide the Milorg leadership with radio contact failed after only a few weeks.
81
  
Importantly, these problems continued to fuel scepticism within SOE, which was 
quick to re-affirm „the difficulties [that] one is up against when dealing with the 
Home Front‟.82  
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From December 1942, however, SOE began working closely with FO IV in 
London in an attempt to resolve these issues.  In early 1943, through the ANCC, both 
organisations re-emphasised the importance of de-centralisation, and that contact with 
groups in Norway should be made not only through Oslo but direct to the districts.  
The Milorg leadership would, however, in the future be advised when teams where 
sent to Norway.
83
  This was not about SOE distrusting or deciding to work outside 
Milorg;
 84
 the policy of working with and through Milorg groups when possible 
remained intact.  By this stage SOE were clear that large-scale subversive activity in 
Norway could only be carried out through „the local military organisation‟.85  
Nevertheless, it shows that there was still some scepticism toward the Milorg 
leadership and a determination to ensure that control and authority was exercised from 
the UK.   
From the late spring of 1943 contact with Milorg began to improve which 
ultimately and significantly led to greater level of accord.  The first of a series of 
conferences involving representatives of Milorg and FO was held in Sweden in May - 
others followed in October 1943 and in March 1944
86
 – and this marked the start of a 
close working relationship between Bjarne Øen and Jens Chr. Hauge.
87
  The meeting 
in May discussed Milorg‟s role prior to an invasion, during an invasion, and 
immediately after re-occupation.  It was agreed that only FO would decide „if, and to 
what degree, units of Milorg‟ would be used in the event of an invasion and that it 
would be trained in the use of arms in readiness to provide support „from within‟.  It 
was accepted that FO had contacts in certain areas with other groups and that Milorg 
districts would have direct radio contact with FO, and most significantly Milorg‟s 
central leadership would in the future only „co-ordinate and administer‟ the work 
across the country.  This agreement was a watershed in the relationship between 
Milorg, FO, and ultimately SOE.
88
  Although it did not take part, SOE was aware of 
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the „general agreement‟ reached in Sweden, which it saw as providing FO with the 
authority to issue „directives‟, whilst Milorg was confined to „general supervision‟.  
Moreover, it was also accepted that as Milorg was more likely to accept instructors it 
could be better prepared for its contribution to the eventual re-occupation or liberation 
of its country.
89
  Nevertheless, there were still some residual concerns over Milorg‟s 
tendency to centralise, and it was re-iterated that SOE could not allow itself to be 
governed by „the wishes‟ of the „Military Organisation‟ in Norway.       
At this time the ranks of Milorg were increasing in number and by mid-1944 
they totalled around 32,000 spread across the south of the country.  Of this total, 
however, about 24,000 were in eastern Norway, the area around Oslo and along the 
Swedish border.  In comparison, for example, Milorg had only about 1100 members 
in the counties of Møre and Trøndelag, on the west coast around Ålesund and 
Trondheim.  There were, therefore, still areas, particularly in the west, where SOE 
continued to build its own organisations and it persisted with a policy that at the time 
it described as a „mid-way course between the Scylla of separation and the Charybdis 
of SMO [Milorg] centralisation‟.  Although as relations with the leadership in Oslo 
improved the relationship between SOE and Milorg groups across the districts 
strengthened and increasingly they worked together.
90
  Eventually, they became 
indistinguishable and were no longer „distinct‟.   
The uncertainty surrounding Norway‟s liberation, which led to a realisation in 
SOE that the contribution of „local organisations‟ and SOE groups might not only 
involve support for an Allied landing but also attempts to delay the withdrawal of 
German forces, prevention of enemy destruction, or maintaining order before the 
arrival of Allied troops, also began to have an effect on the resistance movements in 
Norway.
91
  Milorg was equally  aware that the country‟s future was unsure and in 
August 1943, the Råd sent a letter on this subject, written by Hauge, to FO.  It also 
examined the possible contribution of the organisation during a future German 
evacuation, collapse, or surrender.  There was concern over what might happen in the 
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transitional period before the arrival of Allied forces, and it was felt that in certain 
circumstances Milorg might act as either a protective force or a force for law and 
order in the potential chaotic conditions that could arise.  It should, however, avoid 
becoming embroiled in military clashes with German forces.
92
  There were therefore 
signs of a convergence of views between SOE and Milorg over the eventual role of 
clandestine forces in Norway. 
In October 1943, a further meeting to discuss this issue was held in Sweden 
between representatives from Milorg and FO, and in November Milorg and the 
civilian resistance leadership sent a joint communication to the Norwegian Prime 
Minister on the matter.  This states that a principal objective of the Råd would be to 
create a state of military readiness in Norway that could be used by the military 
authorities as part of their „operational plans‟ to re-occupy the country.93  A consensus 
was therefore also developing between the resistance movements in Norway that an 
indigenous military force would probably be required to play a central role at the time 
of the country‟s liberation.  Moreover, with an improvement in communication 
between FO and Milorg through the establishment of reliable radio links during the 
latter months of 1943, it became easier to ensure that the eventual contribution of an 
underground army in Norway could be closely controlled and co-ordinated with wider 
strategic, political, and military requirements.
94
       
 A final conference involving Milorg and FO was held between 14 and 28 
March 1944 in Sweden to discuss yet again the contribution of clandestine forces after 
a German capitulation, or during an evacuation or Allied invasion.  By this time the 
Norwegian authorities and Home Front together were anxious to create „a state of 
readiness‟ within Norway with the aim of „preventing chaos and relieving pressure on 
the civilian population‟.  Unlike the previous May, however, little time was spent 
considering an invasion.  It was envisaged that Milorg would act as a force for law 
and order, to defend Norwegian lives and property during the potentially unstable and 
chaotic period before the arrival of Allied forces or within newly conquered areas.  It 
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 Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 314.   
93
 ROH, document no. 183, letter „To the Prime Minister from the military committee, police 
leadership and the civil leadership, 15 November 1943‟, p. 331.  Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, pp. 314-
318. 
94
 NHM: „Report on the Wireless Service between SL and UK and in Districts 11-16 and 24 and 25, 
from the autumn of 1943 to April 1944‟ by Lt. K. Haugland in SOE archive, boks 22, mappe 15/3/1.  
„Operation Instructions for Curlew‟, 6 October 1943, in SOE archive, boks 14, mappe 13/1/8.   
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was no longer seen as a guerrilla force but more of a protective force.
95
  SOE had no 
direct involvement in these negotiations as it was believed that it might commit it „to 
a line of action which might not be approved‟ in the UK or by SHAEF.96  
Significantly, it was in London in August 1944 that agreement was finally reached on 
Milorg‟s military contribution.  With the trips made by Jens Chr. Hauge to Britain 
during the summer and autumn of 1944, along with the integration of the staffs of FO 
IV and SOE‟s Norwegian section, a tripartite coalition was formed.  It was pressure 
from this coalition along with Scotco that persuaded SHAEF that the resistance 
groups in Norway should be prepared and preserved to act as a protective force or a 
force for law and order within Norway in the days immediately after the liberation.  It 
was the role that the Norwegian resistance leadership had already envisaged for 
Milorg, but importantly the authority and the resources in arms and equipment needed 
to carry it out would come from SHAEF through Special Forces HQ in London.
97
  
During his visit to London in the summer of 1944, Hauge also received 
approval for a draft paper that set out the contribution of the Milorg districts during 
the liberation.
98
  This was the „September Directive‟, which was issued by SL to the 
District Leaders after Hauge‟s return to Norway.  It details the actions that 
Hjemmestyrkene, the Norwegian Home Forces (HS), as Milorg units were referred to 
by this time, would take in the case of a German surrender, disintegration, 
withdrawal, or most unlikely, an Allied landing.  With the emphasis on protection and 
preserving law and order the document closely resembles the directive on the 
employment of resistance issued by SFHQ earlier in September.  After Hauge‟s 
second visit to London in November 1944, the section of the document dealing with 
the defence of Norwegian property against demolitions, was updated and extended.
99
   
The long-term objective of preparing a secret army to assist in the 
reoccupation of Norway was coming to fruition.  By the autumn of 1944 a consensus 
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 PRO: „Report from a Conference in Stockholm in March 1944‟, (translation), April 1944, in 
HS2/233. 
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 PRO: memo from D/S (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson) to AD/E (Brigadier E.E. Mockler-Ferryman), ref. 
DS/1349, 26 February 1944, in HS2/235. 
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 PRO: „Minutes of the Thirty Second Meeting of the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee 
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A/CD, ref. ADX/97, concerning Hauge‟s visit to London during November 1944 in HS6/619.  Hauge, 
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 F. Færøy, Frigjøringen, (Oslo: NHM, undated), p. 20. 
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 PRO: „Directive from the Central Leadership (SL) to the District Leadership (DS) regarding the 
Norwegian Home Forces (HS)‟, September 1944 in HS2/235.  NHM: „Directive to the District Leaders 
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had been reached between London and Oslo, backed by the authority of SHAEF and 
therefore under Allied control, on the contribution that resistance groups, especially 
Milorg would make to the country‟s liberation.  There was, therefore, at this crucial 
stage of the occupation, complete synergy over long-term policy for Norway, which 
as SOE had always intended was in step with both strategic and military requirements 
for this theatre of operations.
100
 
The decision to develop a secret army in Norway through collaboration, 
however, continued to have an impact on SOE‟s short-term policy.  The request by 
SOE in May 1943 for its organisations in the Oslo area to take part in overt acts of 
sabotage did not lead to a change in Milorg‟s official policy on this subject.  Attacks 
against industrial or military targets in Norway continued to be confined to NIC (1) 
teams sent in from Britain, although these began to remain in the country for longer 
periods and increasingly used local help.
101
  The resistance leadership in Norway, 
both military and civilian, remained totally opposed to any form of violent armed 
action that could lead to severe reprisals against the civilian population and its 
organisations.  During the latter months of 1943 and early 1944, however, in response 
to events both outside and inside Norway, it changed its view.  
 
 
As the liberation drew nearer it was accepted in Norway that an armed and 
trained military force would be required in the country during the potentially unstable 
period immediately after a possible German surrender or withdrawal.  Closely related 
to this it was seen as important to ensure that all actions within the country were 
controlled and directed, and that the Communists‟ active policy, which could 
undermine preparations for the liberation, should not be allowed to prevail.  Although 
the British saw the Communist groups in Norway as an „aggressive minority‟ without 
Russian backing, they also believed that they should be brought under the influence of 
the Home Front leadership.
102
  There was also the threat posed by German plans to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(DS) from Milorg‟s Central Leadership (SL), December 31st 1944 in SOE Archive, boks 5, mappe 
10/3/20. 
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 See Chapter two, pp. 79-80. 
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 PRO: „Directive for Future Sabotage Policy in Norway‟, from AD/E, (Brigadier E.E. Mockler-
Ferryman) to SN (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson), ref. ADE/20, 31 May 1943 in HS2/128.  Chapter two, p. 75.  
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 ROH, document no. 183, letter „To the Prime Minister from the military committee, police 
leadership and the civil leadership, 15 November 1943‟, p. 331.  Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, pp. 314-
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193-198.  PRO: letter from T. E. Bromley and P. N. Loxley, British Foreign Office, ref. N. 3257/24/G, 
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Foreign Office, ref. JSW/1406, March 1944, in HS2/234. 
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mobilise the Norwegian workforce for military service on its eastern front, which the 
resistance leadership decided to actively resist.  And there was a growing restlessness 
within Milorg‟s ranks arising out of a wish to make some immediate contribution to 
the Allied war effort combined with a natural hardening process within the resistance 
leadership in response to German threats and reprisals.
103
  It was, therefore, a 
combination of factors linked directly to conditions in occupied Norway that 
eventually resulted in a change in policy by Milorg and that enabled it to co-operate 
with SOE on the issue of sabotage.  
In November 1943 the civilian and military resistance stated in their joint 
communication to London, the „Fellesbrev’, that Milorg could be used for the solution 
of „operational tasks‟ prior to the liberation, if required.104  This apparent change in 
policy was further crystallised in the conference held in Sweden in March 1944 
between representatives of Milorg and FO, when it was agreed that „it may become 
necessary for the organisations to co-operate with, or themselves put into effect, 
individual operations against objectives of military importance during the waiting 
period‟.105  Consequently, from May 1944, local Milorg units in co-operation with 
SOE teams resident in Norway, initially in attempts to disrupt the mobilisation of 
Norwegian workers, began to undertake overt acts of sabotage.
106
  From this point 
until the liberation, Milorg and SOE, where possible, worked together and undertook 
a large and widespread number of attacks against key tactical sites in Norway.  
Therefore, by spring 1944, three years later than hoped, SOE was able to achieve its 
objective of carrying out sabotage within Norway using local groups and 
organisations.  The irony was that by this stage of the war after the launch of 
Overlord, sabotage was no longer the priority in Norway.  
 
 
Conclusion 
SOE could not fulfil its plans for Norway without the support of either the Norwegian 
government in London or resistance groups in the country, particularly Milorg.  They 
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 PRO: „Report from a Conference in Stockholm in March 1944‟, (translation), 14 April 1944, in 
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had authority or control over the important manpower reserves that SOE required to 
carry out its activities in this theatre.  Consequently, SOE did not decide to ignore 
either party but from the beginning chose to work with them, although on its terms so 
as to ensure that special operations in Norway remained under Allied direction.  In 
this regard, SOE was ultimately successful. 
Milorg was initially another resistance organisation that SOE decided it should 
make use of and incorporate into its vision of a decentralised guerrilla army that 
would eventually be capable of supporting operations by regular forces.  The 
difficulty was that conditions in Norway both pre-war and as a result of the nature of 
the occupation initially gave rise to a Milorg leadership that did not share this vision.  
The official recognition of Milorg also meant that SOE could no longer exercise 
independent control over it or completely ignore the concerns of its leadership.  In the 
future it would have to work closely with the Norwegian military authorities if it 
wanted to retain any influence over its development.  And in order to reinforce this 
relationship it accepted that parts of its policy, particularly sabotage, would have to be 
modified, although it was not prepared to compromise its vision of a clandestine army 
controlled from the UK.  To accommodate its concerns toward Milorg, especially its 
centralised structure, SOE decided, along with FO that two distinct underground 
organisations should be developed within occupied Norway.  But this policy was 
completely unsuitable for a country with such a small population.  Fortunately, 
internal reforms within Milorg, changes in its leadership, and advances in its policy in 
response to events within the country and the approaching liberation ultimately not 
only made it more acceptable to SOE but created a synergy of views over its role that 
eventually enabled the two organisations to work closely.   
The nature of the occupation of Norway and the consequential emergence of 
an organised and largely unified resistance movement that was recognised and 
supported by its government in London had a significant influence on the relationship 
between SOE and Milorg.  Prior to 1943, SOE‟s uncompromising determination to 
impose its own notion of a secret army undoubtedly disrupted and complicated its 
long-term plans for Norway.  It had to wait for Milorg to change.  Ultimately this was 
not a major problem as it was only during the final stages of the occupation that a 
secret army began to have any military significance in Norway.  Only then when 
strategic and political conditions required it was SOE able to implement its long-term 
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plan: to arm, equip, train and prepare a secret army that could, under Allied authority 
and direction, make a significant contribution to the country‟s liberation.   
Overall the impact of SOE‟s relations with the Norwegian government and 
Milorg on its policy, although very important, was unlike strategic factors, always 
formative rather than fundamental.  SOE‟s relationship with the Norwegian 
government and resistance was, however, not the only collaborative factor that had an 
impact on its policy.  It also had to consider the other military organisations that 
operated in this theatre.              
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   CHAPTER FIVE 
 
SOE AND THE OTHER NEW ORGANISATIONS OPERATING IN 
NORWAY 1940-1945: A MILITARY ALLIANCE 
 
 
Introduction 
SOE‟s overall plan for Norway was not only shaped by strategic and political factors, 
but also by its ability to collaborate with the other new military organisations that 
were created during the war and which operated in this theatre.  These included the 
Director of Combined Operations (DCO),
1
 created in June 1940 and responsible for 
the planning and execution of raiding operations against the enemy coastline,
2
 the 
Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which in August 1941 took over from SOE 
responsibility for covert „black‟ propaganda in the occupied countries, and the 
American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), formed in June 1942 with a Special 
Operations department (SO) the equivalent of SOE. 
This chapter will examine the relationship between SOE and these 
organisations in Norway, and show that at both an organisational and a local 
operational level it was largely successful, and beneficial to all parties.  This was 
because they shared the same strategic objective of using a range of amphibious, 
irregular or subversive activities to undermine German military capability and morale.  
Norway was also relatively easily accessible and ideally suited for these types of 
military operation and therefore it was a theatre in which these organisations, often 
from an early stage, could take the offensive, albeit on a small scale.       
Military collaboration between SOE and the other organisations active in 
Norway was not, however, undertaken in isolation.  The involvement and interests of 
                                                          
 
1
 Combined Operations changed its title on several occasions during the war.  In June 1940, Lt. General 
Bourne was appointed „Commander of Raiding Operations‟.  Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes 
replaced Bourne in July 1940 and was given the title Director of Combined Operations (DCO).  In 
October 1941 Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced Keyes as Adviser on Combined Operations 
(ACO) with the rank of Commodore.  To confuse matters in December 1941 the COS decided that 
when Mountbatten was exercising his executive functions he could use the title Commodore Combined 
Operations (CCO).  In March 1942 Mountbatten was given the title Chief of Combined Operations 
(CCO), made a Vice Admiral and permitted to attend meetings of the COS Committee.  In December 
1943 Major-General R. E. Laycock replaced Mountbatten, and remained CCO until the end of the war.  
See: PRO: DEFE2/697 and 1773, „History of the Combined Operations‟. 
2
 PRO: COS (41) 166, Directive to the Director of Combined Operations, 14 March 1941 in 
DEFE2/1773.  
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the Norwegian authorities and Milorg also had an important influence.  The 
Norwegian military authorities supplied volunteers from their armed services, who 
had the necessary skills to operate in occupied Norway, as well as important 
economic and industrial intelligence.  The government in exile, however, also used its 
close association with SOE to ensure that proper consideration was given to the 
impact of joint operations on the local population and that damage to industrial sites 
and therefore the Norwegian economy was minimised and contained.  Its involvement 
therefore came at a cost.  
Military collaboration had an impact on SOE policy in Norway and ultimately 
on its operations in several ways.  It meant that attacks against economic targets in 
Norway could commence from a very early stage, even before SOE was in a position 
to undertake its own, independent activities.  It also resulted in a scale of sabotage and 
coup de main activity in Norway that SOE could not have undertaken alone.  Many 
attacks against economic or military targets were the result of a pooling of skills.  The 
co-ordination of operations also meant that they were largely not undermined by 
internal squabbles, clashes in the field or duplication of effort.  Disagreements over 
priorities were regularly negotiated to a satisfactory conclusion.  Discussions over the 
type of target, its location, the levels of security surrounding it, invariably determined 
which organisation would carry out the operation.  SOE‟s activities in Norway were 
part of a wider collaborative, strategic effort that was applied across Western Europe.   
As the impact of collaboration was not only apparent at an organisational level 
but also at a local operational level, this chapter will analyse some of the many 
operations that SOE contributed to alongside the other organisations that were active 
in Norway.  It will therefore mark a transition from considering the development of 
policy within the broader context, to showing how many of SOE‟s activities were the 
result of a blend of influences, strategic, political and collaborative.  The nature of 
SOE‟s relationship with each of these organisations, however, had a somewhat 
different impact on its plans for Norway, and therefore the chapter will be divided 
into three sections to reflect this.  The first will examine the relationship between SOE 
and Combined Operations (henceforth COHQ)
3
 and show that between autumn 1940 
and summer 1943 they co-operated closely both organisationally and at a local 
operational level.  Up until early 1942, SOE operations against economic and military 
                                                          
3
 To avoid the confusion over the various titles that Combined Operations went under from 1940, this 
thesis will use the acronym COHQ throughout.   
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sites in Norway were primarily confined to its involvement in a series of amphibious 
raids that were planned, attempted, or carried out under the auspices or with the 
involvement of COHQ.  And even after SOE began to carry out its own coup de main 
operations both parties continued to work closely and on occasion still combined 
efforts.  They were ideal partners.  
The second section will analyse the relationship that developed between SOE 
and PWE, which together recruited and trained Norwegians to undertake underground 
propaganda activities in Norway with the intention of both supporting Norwegian 
spirits and undermining German morale.   
 The final section of this chapter will examine the relationship between SOE 
and the Special Operations section (SO) of OSS.  In the spring of 1943 an agreement 
was reached with the British and Norwegian authorities that meant that the Americans 
would only be able to carry out special operations in Norway with the consent of and 
in collaboration with SOE and FO.  Therefore, OSS was a junior partner in this 
theatre and unable to act independently.  Nevertheless, it undertook an important 
supportive role, providing additional transportation, resources, and on occasion 
specially trained teams.   
 
 
I 
SOE and Combined Operations in Norway: The Ideal Partnership 
From the autumn of 1940 until the summer of 1943 the Scandinavian and Norwegian 
sections of SOE worked with COHQ in planning, preparing, and carrying out 
amphibious raids and coup de main operations in Norway.  Combined Operations, 
like SOE, had strategic origins.  As part of Britain‟s „future offensive strategy‟ it was 
created in the summer of 1940 to carry out raids against the coastline of occupied 
Europe.  The objective was to „harass the enemy‟, „cause him to disperse his forces‟, 
and „cause material damage‟ from an area from the north of Norway to the West 
Coast of France‟.4  In SOE‟s first directive, the COS affirmed the significance of raids 
and subversive activities as part of a „strategy of attrition‟.5 
                                                          
4
 PRO: WP (40) 362 „Future Strategy‟, an appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 4 September 
1940, in CAB 66/11.  COS (40) 468, „Raiding Operations Directive to General Bourne‟, 17 June 1940 
in DEFE2/1773. 
5
 PRO: COS (40) 27 (0), „Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy‟, 25 November 1940, in CAB 
80/56. 
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 Consequently, from the beginning SOE and COHQ were natural allies.  By 
September 1940, SOE‟s Scandinavian section had decided that it should establish 
close liaison with COHQ, as it feared uncontrolled raids could lead to a premature 
uprising in the country.
6
  During that autumn, however, it also recognised the value of 
small raids against targets in northern Norway,
7
 and by December 1940 „assistance 
with tip-and-run landings‟ had become part of its immediate objective of making 
Norway „a thorn in the German side‟.8  At the same time Hugh Dalton reached an 
agreement with Sir Roger Keyes, the Director of Combined Operations, over 
responsibility for raids.  It was accepted that COHQ would have authority over attacks 
against coastal objectives on the western seaboard of Europe using parties of fifty or 
more British troops that would be withdrawn later, whilst SO2 operations would be 
carried out by parties of not more than thirty, usually foreigners.
9
  It was also agreed 
that the two organisations, and SIS, should keep each other informed at an early date 
of projects under consideration, and should examine coastal targets „with a view to 
collaboration‟.10   Therefore, by the end of 1940, raids were an explicit element of 
Britain‟s forward strategy, and the two organisations, SOE and Combined Operations 
were both ready to work in tandem to undertake offensive operations against the 
enemy. 
Accordingly, between September 1940 and January 1942 at least seven raids 
against targets close to the Norwegian coast were planned, attempted, or completed, 
and SOE and COHQ collaborated on five of them.
11
  The main objective of these 
operations was to further the pressure on Germany and thereby help to weaken its 
military capability.  They were the continuance of an economic interest in Norway 
that had begun during the First World War, when for example Britain had gone as far 
                                                          
 
6
 PRO: paper entitled „Norway‟, 1 September 1940, in HS2/240.   
7
 PRO: paper entitled „Winter Policy for Norway‟, by F. Stagg, 25 November 1940 in HS2/128. 
8
 PRO: paper entitled „Norwegian Policy‟, 11 December 1940, in HS2/128. 
9
 PRO: paper entitled „Raiding Parties: Relationship between DCO & SO2‟, ref. pa/xx/95, 14 
December 1940 in HS8/818.  Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, pp. 94, 361. 
10
 Initially, until February 1941, Commander Fletcher, who had been a member of the Guerrilla 
Warfare Committee, was the DCO liaison officer with SOE.  Later in 1941, Major D.A. Wyatt (L/PW) 
was appointed SOE‟s liaison officer with COHQ.  He retained this position until his death in the 
Dieppe raid in August 1942. See: PRO: minutes of 42
nd
 Meeting held at DCO‟s office at 15.30 hrs, 16 
December 1940 in HS8/818. 
11
 The raids were: „Mandible‟ (formerly „Castle‟), „Claymore‟, „Hemisphere‟, „Kitbag I‟, „Archery‟, 
„Anklet‟, and „Kitbag II‟.  For details see, Appendix E, „Sea-Borne Operations Instigated by or 
Involving SOE along the Norwegian Seaboard 1940-1945‟, pp. 328-333. 
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as to purchase seventy to eighty percent of one year‟s catch of fish in the country.12  
This interest was resumed prior to the outbreak of conflict in 1939,
13
 and continued 
right through to the summer of 1940 when SOE highlighted herring oil production 
and the mining of specialist metals as important targets.
14
  Nevertheless, these raids 
also had other important benefits.  They heightened the fear of a British invasion, 
which induced Germany to increase its military commitment in Norway, and led to 
the capture of some important cipher equipment, which helped in the breaking of the 
German Enigma codes and thereby contributed to the Allied victory in the Battle of 
the Atlantic.  
By October 1940, COHQ had begun to consider an operation against ilmenite 
production at Titania A/S near Sokndal just six kilometres from Jøssingfjord in 
southern Norway.  It was believed that an attack against this target would, apart from 
denying Germany a significant although not vital war material, also give the 
organisation some practical experience in raiding operations, raise Norwegian morale, 
and generally annoy and create alarm amongst the Germans.
15
  Preparations therefore 
began for Operation Mandible (formerly „Castle‟), a planned attack against the 
hydroelectric power station and loading appliances for ilmenite at the head of 
Jøssingfjord.  It would be a joint operation, with SOE providing Norwegian guides, 
COHQ supplying Special Service troops to carry out the „tip and run‟ raid, and the 
Royal Navy (RN) making three destroyers and a submarine available.
16
   It is 
significant because it serves as an early example of the series of amphibious raids that 
were undertaken along the Norwegian seaboard during 1941.  They targeted economic 
sites that were easily accessible and were at the time one of the few ways that Britain 
could take the offensive.  On this occasion, however, although the COS and the 
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 Olav Riste, The Neutral Ally – Norway’s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War, 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1965), p. 98.    
13
 PRO: document of the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) entitled „German Import Trade‟, ref. 
ICF/265, 20 December 1938 in FO837/427.  Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive, p. 118.    
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 Between September 1939 and March 1940, there were ongoing negotiations on a war trade 
agreement between the British and Norwegian governments.  Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, vol. 
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held on 10 September 1940 in HS8/194. PRO: memo to D/G Mouse (Lt, J. Chaworth-Musters) from 
D/C, 20 August 1940, in HS2/201.     
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 PRO: letter from S (Charles Hambro) to S1 (F. Stagg) and S2, 21 December 1940, in HS2/201. 
Operation instructions for Operation Castle in DEFE2/353. 
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 Initially Munthe was asked to recruit local resistance groups to assist the operation, but after a 
change of heart it was decided to use Norwegians recruited locally in London.  PRO: a summary of 
Operation Castle, 27 December 1940 in DEFE2/353.  Letter from S (Charles Hambro) to SZ (Harry 
Sporborg), S1 (Frank Stagg), and telegrams from Charles Hambro to 4301 (Malcolm Munthe) in 
Stockholm, 21 and 28 December 1940 respectively, in HS2/201.   
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Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet approved „Mandible‟ they were overruled by 
Churchill, who at the time objected to disturbing the Norwegian coastline for objects 
he considered „trivial‟.17  Churchill‟s attitude caused frustration within SOE but it did 
not initially hinder preparations for further similar operations.  The target changed, 
however, to the supply of Norwegian fish products to Germany.  In the spring of 1941 
three operations, against the Norwegian herring, cod oil, and fish industry – 
„Claymore‟, „Hemisphere‟, and „Almoner‟ - were proposed, which indicates the 
importance that the British and SOE placed on this product at the time.  There was an 
initial belief that fish oil was used in the manufacture of glycerine for explosives, but 
by early January 1941 this had been discarded although it was still believed to be an 
important source of vitamins „A‟ and „B‟ for Germany, and the country‟s „most 
important deficiency foodstuff‟.18  
Operation Claymore, the raid against the Lofoten Islands off the northwest 
coast of northern Norway in early March 1941 requires brief consideration, not only 
because it was another important example of collaboration between SOE and COHQ, 
but also because it has attracted significant interest amongst historians.  Churchill was 
against this operation and his opposition was only overcome after the COS persuaded 
him that because it was not against a target on the mainland it was less likely to stir up 
the Norwegian coastline.
19
  There have also been claims that the operation‟s main 
objective, unknown to SOE, was to capture German cipher material.
20
  It was, 
however, another offensive strategic operation against an economic target, the herring 
and cod oil industry, but also with the intention of destroying German garrisons and 
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(Oslo: Schibsted Forlag, 2001), p. 136. 
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bringing back Norwegian volunteers.
21
  Its primary aim was to deny Germany what at 
the time was considered a significant war material; something championed by SOE 
from the summer and through the early winter of 1940.
22
  It was, therefore, pressure 
from SOE that led to „Claymore‟.  Planning began under the direction of COHQ in 
consultation with SOE in late 1940, and this eventually ended in a combined 
operation involving SOE, Special Service troops, the Royal Navy, and Norwegian 
men, officers, guides and naval pilots.  It was carried out on 4 March 1941, and 
resulted in the destruction of factories, shipping, and oil tanks, and the important but 
largely fortuitous capture of German cipher material.
23
  It is unlikely that an operation 
involving five naval destroyers, 500 commandoes from the Special Service Brigade, 
and over fifty Norwegians, would be undertaken in the hope that some enemy cipher 
equipment might be captured.  It seems more likely that the Admiralty decided that if 
during the operation an opportunity arose to board an enemy vessel and search for this 
material, it should be taken.  To the RN and Naval Intelligence such an action would 
have been of major importance in light of its campaign against the German U-boats 
operating in the North Atlantic.  This is, however, conjecture, as there does not appear 
to be anything in not only SOE files, but also Combined Operations files, Royal Naval 
files, or the Prime Ministers files that provides an unequivocal answer to this issue.   
„Claymore‟ shows how important collaboration with COHQ was to SOE at a 
time when it did not have the capability to undertake its own, independent activities.  
Moreover, it was a small operation that ironically, despite the assurances of the COS, 
stirred-up the Norwegian coast and led „to reinforcements of German forces on the 
peninsula‟.24  For that reason, despite leading to reprisals against the local 
                                                          
21
 PRO: appreciation written by the DDCO, 10 January 1941, in DEFE2/141. Minutes of a meeting 
held at DCO‟s office, 27 January 1941 to discuss Operation Claymore in HS2/224.   
22
 PRO: paper entitled „A Winter Policy for Norway‟ by S1 (Frank Stagg), 25 November 1940, in 
HS2/128. Letter from Hugh Dalton to Winston Churchill, ref. Sc/1589/6, 17 January 1941, in CAB 
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Brigadier J. C. Haydon, consolidated results of Operation Claymore, 4 March 1941, in DEFE2/140.  
Letter from Lt. Col. H. N. Sporborg to Capt. J. Knox, 3 January 1941, in DEFE2/141.  Sebag-
Montefiore, Enigma, pp. 132-136 and D. Kahn, Seizing the Enigma, (London: Arrow, 1996), pp. 127-
136.  
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 Hugh Sebag-Montefiore claims that Churchill wanted more troops diverted to Norway and that 
therefore Claymore was a diversionary raid.  What it was a diversion for is not stated.  The COS 
actually assured Churchill that this operation would not lead to reinforcements in Norway.  See: PRO: 
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p. 132.   
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population,
25 
it was a small but significant strategic success.  On 26 March 1941, as a 
direct consequence of „Claymore‟, Hitler issued a directive that led to a „substantial 
flow of reinforcements‟ to the country, plans to construct 160 coastal batteries, and 
instructions to build training camps in Norway so that a defence reserve could be built 
up.  It also confirmed Hitler‟s view that the British would attempt a landing in the 
country.
26
  As the operation included a significant Norwegian military contribution 
and, as far as SOE was concerned, it had the „enthusiastic‟ support of its Foreign 
Minister, it was also a truly joint operation.
27
   
Despite the relative success of „Claymore‟ no more raids were carried out in 
this theatre before December 1941.  The reason was a combination of Churchill‟s 
opposition to small operations along the Norwegian coast,
 28
 and the diversion of 
COHQ resources to Operation Pilgrim, the proposed seizure of the Canaries, which 
was the organisation‟s main preoccupation during the first half of 1941.29  After the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, however, which included an 
advance by Axis forces from the north of Norway into Finland, the strategic context 
changed.  The Prime Minister‟s eagerness to support the Soviet Union through the 
creation of a Second Front in Western Europe intensified interest in Norway, but after 
the COS had successfully resisted Operation Ajax,
30
 a myriad of smaller plans 
emerged.  These set out to establish a temporary military presence in the north of 
Norway, to cut German land and sea communications with its forces in the north of 
the country, and to attack economic and military targets.
31
  They eventually 
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Almost 100 Norwegians were arrested, and the houses of those that fled to Britain were burnt down.  
Nøkleby, „Nyordning‟, vol. II, in Skodvin (ed.), Norge i Krig, p. 167. Dahlø, Skjebnetråder, p. 135.  
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Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War‟, Intelligence and National 
Security, vol. 2, July 1987, p. 317.  Report by the C-in –C., Navy, to the Fuehrer on March 18, 1941, 
cited in Fuehrer Conferences on Naval affairs 1939-1945, p. 183. 
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 According to Hambro, Trygve Lie was „more than ready to support a direct attack on the German 
fish supplies from Norway‟, provided there was no damage to the fisherman‟s property.  The 
Norwegian Prime Minister also received the expedition when it returned to Britain.  PRO: answer to a 
series of questions from DCO on Operation Claymore, provided by SO2, 3 February 1941, in HS2/224.  
„Enclosure no. 9‟, including „Note from Mr C. Hambro‟, dated 6 January 1941, in HS8/306.  Riste, 
London regjeringa, p. 118.  
28
 PRO: paper entitled, „Scandinavian Policy‟, 16 April 1940, in HS2/10.   
29
 PRO: file DEFE2/697.  Mann, British Policy, p. 103.  
30
 See chapter two p. 64. 
31
 The COS gave instructions to plan and execute a series of small raids and one large raid in the order 
of 700-800 men.  The aim of the large raid was to cause losses to German forces and equipment.  Two 
plans were originally considered: „Ascot‟, which aimed to cut German communications between 
southern and northern Norway and eventually became „Anklet‟, and Stumper‟ a raid against Tarva 
outside Trondheim that evolved into „Kitbag‟ and „Archery‟.  „Thresher‟ a series of small raids along 
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crystallised into four operations, „Anklet‟, „Archery‟, and „Kitbag‟ I &II, which were 
carried out in December 1941 and January 1942 with varying degrees of success.  All 
were under the supreme command of the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet and 
included contributions from SOE, the RN, RAF, the Norwegian armed forces, and 
COHQ.  They were, therefore, a further indication of a willingness within the British 
armed forces, SOE and COHQ to collaborate on strategic operations against targets 
along the Norwegian seaboard.
32
  SOE, in consultation with COHQ, supplied 
Norwegian volunteers including local guides, naval pilots, and radio operators.
33
   It 
also made a direct contribution through its own operation called „Wallah‟, a plan 
conceived in the spring of 1941 to paralyse German sea-borne traffic along the 
Norwegian coast during the following winter and which was the original basis for and 
eventually became part of „Anklet‟. 34  It was also intended that another SOE 
operation called „Archer‟, a plan to use a team of men to attack ferries, an aerodrome, 
and a major bridge around Mosjøen, would be part of the Lofoten operation.  After 
the scaling-back of Anklet it was, however, never required.
35
  
SOE‟s co-operation with COHQ during 1941 not only resulted in their joint 
operations acquiring the prefix „Knottgrass‟,36 but it also enabled the organisation to 
pursue its short-term aim of attacking enemy targets in Norway at a time when it was 
largely incapable of acting alone.  And although individually each raid achieved 
relatively little,
37
 altogether they represented one small way in which Britain could 
take the offensive at a time when it lacked the resources or ability to undertake large-
scale land operations.
38
  Furthermore, a series of pinpricks, such as these raids, can 
quickly become a major irritation, especially in a sensitive area, which Norway was to 
Hitler. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the Norwegian coast was eventually dropped.  PRO: COS (41) 240 (0), „Raids on the Coast of 
Norway‟, directive to C-in-C Home Fleet, C-in-C Home Forces, and the Adviser on Combined 
Operations (ACO), 24 October 1941, cited in DEFE2/80.  Riste, London regjeringa, vol. I, pp. 142-
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33
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 PRO: „Operation Instructions no. 1 for Archer‟, December 1941, in HS2/147.  
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 „Anklet‟ was given the name „Knottgrass-Butter‟; „Kitbag‟ became „Knottgrass-Bread‟; „Archery‟ 
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 Mann, British Policy, p. 123. 
38
 PRO: COS (40) 27 (0), „Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy‟, 25 November 1940, in CAB 
80/56. 
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In January 1942, the COS pointed out that raids had a „considerable moral 
effect and forced the Germans to keep more land and air forces in Norway than would 
otherwise have been the case‟.39  In response to „Anklet‟ and „Archery‟ the number of 
German troops stationed in the country was increased from 100,000 to 250,000, new 
fortifications built and a large part of the Germany surface fleet moved to Norwegian 
waters.
40
  This was a large military commitment in a peripheral theatre and therefore 
there is considerable merit in the assertion that there „was no need for Allied 
deception operations to persuade Hitler to reinforce his troops‟, in Norway.41  More 
significantly this meant that there was a sound strategic reason for continuing raids 
and coup de main operations, especially if they could be undertaken with only a small 
cost in men and equipment,
42
 which is ultimately what happened.  The German 
reinforcement of Norway especially the expansion of its air cover and the arrival of 
the battleship Tirpitz, meant that large-scale British raids involving hundreds of 
Special Service troops and the employment of capital ships from an over-stretched 
RN were abandoned.  After a gap of a few months, however, they were replaced by 
smaller sea-borne raids or by coup de main operations against inland targets.
43
  The 
basis of these activities also did not change and important economic and military 
targets particularly the specialist ores and metals that were mined or produced in 
Norway remained the priority.   
 Despite the productive working relationship between SOE and COHQ during 
1941, Lt. Colonel Wilson wrote that in the following year Combined Operations was 
„inclined to usurp SOE‟s function of coup-de-main activities in Norway‟.44  A total of 
five such operations were carried out during 1942, two organised by COHQ with SOE 
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meeting 30 December 1942, all cited in CAB121/445.  Mann, British Policy, p. 164. 
44
 PRO: HS7/174, SOE‟s Norwegian Section History. 
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involvement, and three by SOE.
45
  Wilson‟s claim is therefore difficult to understand.  
Nonetheless, from early 1942, both organisations operated independently and this 
inevitably led to some rivalry.  At a local operational and organisational level, 
however, co-operation continued, and many of the coup de main operations in 
Norway in 1942 and 1943 were joint efforts involving not only COHQ but also the 
Norwegian military authorities.  From early 1942, through better relations with SOE 
and with the creation of FO, the Norwegian government became more closely and 
formally involved in British operations against targets on its territory.  Its 
participation was largely advantageous and supportive and was backed up by the good 
relationship that developed between Lord Mountbatten, Chief of Combined 
Operations (CCO) from March 1942 and General Hansteen, the Norwegian 
Commander-in-Chief.
46
  Nevertheless, it also meant that the Norwegian government 
endeavoured to use its increasing involvement in order to minimise what it considered 
to be unnecessary long-term damage to the Norwegian economy and the risks to the 
local population.  By early 1942, it had already ensured despite objections from the 
MEW, that herring oil production in Norway was no longer an Allied target.
47
 
SOE, assisted by the Norwegian military authorities, was involved in and 
contributed to four coup de main operations brought together by COHQ between the 
summer of 1942 and the end of the winter of 1943 against economic targets in 
Norway.  Altogether they evince how relevant collaboration with COHQ and FO was 
to both the nature of many operations in this theatre and to the fulfilment of SOE‟s 
objectives, particularly at a time when its priority was to promote economic and 
industrial dislocation across Europe.  The first in September 1942, Operation 
Musketoon, referred to as „Knottgrass-Unicorn‟ in SOE files, was against the 
Glomfjord power station, which supplied energy to the aluminium smelting factory at 
Haugvik in northwest Norway.  SOE provided Norwegian guides from NIC (1), 
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 Operation Musketoon and Operation Freshman were the two COHQ led operations. Operations 
Redshank, Kestral, and Marshfield were SOE led.  For details of the SOE operations see: Appendix D, 
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training, intelligence, and specialist equipment.
48
  The operation was successfully 
carried out and made a small but valuable contribution to the failure of Germany's 
ambitious plans for aluminium production in Norway.
49
   
In January 1943 another operation, „Cartoon‟, assembled by COHQ, but under 
the command of ACOS was undertaken to disrupt the mining of pyrites at Lillebø on 
the island of Stord, south of Bergen.  SOE initially suggested the operation and in co-
operation with FO, which approved it, again provided intelligence and a Norwegian 
guide.  The Norwegian authorities were, however, concerned about possible reprisals 
against the local population, and therefore widened the role of their guide to include 
protection of Norwegian interests and forbade the Norwegian commandoes that took 
part from wearing the national flag on their uniform.
50
  Significant damage was done 
to the mining and transportation equipment and even by summer 1945 production at 
the site had only reached a third of its original level of about 150,000 tons per year.
51
   
In February 1943, SOE and CCO also attempted to link operations against 
economic and military targets in southern Norway.  At the beginning of January 1943, 
SOE and Norwegian naval operation „Carhampton‟ sailed with the aim of capturing a 
transport convoy off the coast of southern Norway thereby disrupting the 
transportation of important war materials to Germany.  This ambitious project 
eventually failed in its objective, and the party sent in to undertake it withdrew to the 
mountains.
52
  In early February it was decided to combine this operation with the 
COHQ operation „Yorker‟, a planned attack against the titanium mines at Sandboek 
also in southern Norway, which were of major significance to German armament 
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 Two officers and eight other ranks from no. 2 Commando undertook this operation, which initially 
was called „Centaur‟.  It also included two Norwegians from NICI (1), Sergeant Magnus Erling 
Djuptredt and Corporal Sverre Grunland.  Seven of the Britains and one Norwegian, Djuptredt, were 
captured, whilst four men escaped to Sweden.  At the time it was estimated the plant had a capacity to 
produce 5-9000 tons per annum and was being expanded.  See: PRO: DEFE2/364 & 5 and NHM: 
FOIV archive, boks 56, mappe 17-C-2, „Knotgrass/Unicorn‟.  
49
 A. S. Milward, The Fascist Economy in Norway, (Oxford: OUP, 1972), p. 264.  H. Paulsen, „Tysk 
økonomisk politikk i Norge 1940-1945‟, in Dahl (ed.), Krigen i Norge, p. 84. 
50
 The Norwegian guide was Lieutenant Welle-Strand, and a local man supplied intelligence.  The raid 
also included men from D troop of 12 Commando and Norwegians from no 10 (Inter Allied) 
Commando.  They were carried and escorted by Motor Torpedo boats (MTBs) from the 30
th
 Royal 
Norwegian Navy (RNorN) MTB flotilla.  See: PRO: DEFE2/122, Operation Cartoon, and NHM: FO 
IV archive, boks 56, mappe 17-C-6, „Cartoon/Barter‟.   
51
 PRO: paper entitled „Attack on the Pyrite Mines etc. on Stord Island in Southern Norway on the 
night of 23/24 January 1943‟, in DEFE2/122.  Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 215. 
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annually by sea along the Norwegian coast on its way to Germany.  For details see: PRO: a note with 
enclosed report from Ottar Grundvig to Mr Hysing Olsen in Notraship, to D/CD (Charles Hambro) 
from the Ministry of War Transport, 1 April 1942, in HS2/180.  Appendix E, „Sea-Borne Operations 
Instigated by or Involving SOE along the Norwegian Seaboard 1940-1945‟, pp. 328-333. 
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production.  Yorker was never carried out due to continual severe weather in the 
North Sea and the Carhampton team was eventually forced to make its own way back 
from Norway, which ended in tragedy for a large part of the expedition.
53
  
Collaboration with COHQ, supported by the Norwegian authorities enabled 
SOE to widen and intensify its foremost aim, which in 1942 and 1943 was to use 
„every present means‟ to harass the enemy and damage his war effort.54  These 
operations were still only „pin-pricks‟ but altogether they had a significant strategic 
payback, disrupting the production and supply of important war materials and more 
importantly fostering German fears over British intentions toward Norway.  As a 
result of „Cartoon‟ coastal artillery in Norway was reinforced and Hitler himself 
intervened.  It was eventually decided that a mobile reserve should be built up, 
additional troops sent, and more artillery and small vessels allotted to the Norwegian 
Command.
55
 
Collaboration between SOE and COHQ was also directed against what at the 
time was considered as one of the most important military targets of the war.  This 
was Operation Freshman, the attempt to halt the production of heavy water at the 
Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork in southern Norway.  This substance, a by-product of 
the electrolysis of water, a process undertaken to produce hydrogen and oxygen for 
use in the local production of nitrate fertilisers, was potentially an important 
constituent in German attempts to develop an atomic bomb.
56
  Consequently, a great 
deal has been written about the detail of this operation and therefore will not be 
repeated.
57
  Nevertheless, it raises a number of important issues concerning SOE 
interest and involvement in Norway that are relevant to this thesis. 
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involvement.  The exception is Poulsson‟s recollections.  He was leader of SOE‟s „Grouse‟ reception 
team that was sent in to receive the Freshman operation.  R. Wiggan, Operation Freshman, (London: 
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SOE was aware of heavy water production in Norway from as early as August 
1940
58
 and targeted it in 1941 as part of Operation Clairvoyant, its ambitious plan to 
„immobilise‟ important industries in southern Norway through attacking local 
hydroelectric power stations.  It was, however, decided that the plant that supplied the 
power for production at Vemork, which consisted of ten generators was too big for a 
SOE team and therefore bombing was recommended.  Unfortunately, Norwegian 
concerns eventually resulted in the abandonment of an air operation.
59
  Nevertheless, 
this focus on attacking the local power plant, a relatively large target, is crucial in 
understanding „Freshman‟. 
In the spring of 1942, in response to intelligence coming out of Norway, the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), which was part of the 
Directorate of Tube Alloys the organisation responsible for Britain‟s atomic bomb 
project, became concerned over production levels of heavy water at Vemork and 
contacted SOE.
60
  The significance of the involvement of DSIR is that from this point 
disquiet over heavy water production in Norway circulated within much higher levels 
in government and was no longer confined to SOE.
61
  It was, however, again made 
clear that the best way to interrupt production was to target the power station.  Owing 
to its size this would, however, in the absence of bombing, require a „combined 
operation‟.62  In other words, SOE continued to believe at this point that the target 
was too large for it to take on alone and it required collaboration.  Out of this came 
Operation Freshman, a joint effort to interrupt heavy water production at Vemork by 
putting the local power plant out of action and destroying ancillary equipment and 
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stocks.  It was co-ordinated by COHQ, and included contributions from the 1
st
 
Airborne Division, No 38 Wing of the RAF, SOE, and FO.
63
    
SOE provided training for the Royal Engineers who were chosen to undertake 
the demolition of the power station,
64
 and FO supplied important intelligence on the 
site.  Leif Tronstad, who had helped set up the plant in the 1930s was in contact with 
Jomar Brun, its Chief Engineer, who up to autumn 1942, when he fled to Britain, sent 
back a flow of information, including building plans, details on production levels, and 
samples of heavy water.
65
  The hydroelectric plant at Vemork, however, was part of a 
network of power stations in the area that supplied sixty percent of the electricity 
requirements for eastern Norway.
66
  It therefore had huge economic significance for 
the local population and the involvement of the Norwegian military authorities 
provided them with an opportunity to voice their concerns.  Consequently, it was 
eventually agreed that of the ten generators at the power plant only eight would be put 
out of action, leaving two intact to provide at least enough energy for the production 
of fertilisers at the Norsk Hydro plant at Rjukan further down the valley.  This would 
mean that phosphate supplies to local farmers could continue.
67
   
SOE and FO also made available a NIC (1) team, „Grouse‟, which was given 
the task of receiving the party of engineers and guiding them to the target.  On 28 
March 1942, Einar Skinnerland had been parachuted into Norway to prepare the way 
for this operation, which was to follow at the end of April and organise small local 
guerrilla groups around the strategically important Vestfjord valley, where Vemork is 
located.
68
  Air transport, however, was not available before the lighter nights set in 
during May and therefore „Grouse‟ was delayed.  It was only in September when 
planning for „Freshman‟ was under way that the decision was made to use „Grouse‟ as 
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a forward party.
 69
  The men were dropped into Norway in October, although 
unfortunately, after the two gliders carrying the engineers crashed effectively ending 
the operation, their support was never required.  On 23 November, therefore, for 
security reasons, the „Grouse‟ party was renamed „Swallow‟.70  „Freshman‟ was a 
joint operation against potentially the most important war material produced in 
Norway.  It was, however, the initial conviction that the only way to stop production 
was by destroying the power station, a target too large for a SOE team, which 
determined that it would be a combined operation.  „Freshman‟ was also significant 
not only because of the target, but also because of what it symbolises.  It highlights 
how strategic, political and collaborative factors came together to shape special 
operations carried out in this theatre. 
Co-operation at a local operational level during 1942 and 1943 was also 
assisted by organisational collaboration between SOE and COHQ through the 
exchange of target lists, discussions over target priority and by a general effort to co-
ordinate activities in Norway.  Both organisations, however, increasingly planned 
their own independent operations and therefore a degree of competition inevitably 
broke out.  All of this is illustrated by the conflict that ensued over whether the 
combined operation „Musketoon‟ or Operation Seagull, SOE‟s proposal to attack the 
Sulitjelma mines in northern Norway around the same time and which were only 
seventy miles from Glomfjord, should have priority.  In the end, however, after 
lengthy discussions it was decided that both operations would go ahead, although 
„Seagull‟ was eventually and rather ironically cancelled due to the increase in security 
in the area that was a result of the attack against the Glomfjord power plant.
71
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Furthermore, after the Prime Minister‟s call in October 1942  for an 
intensification of „small-scale raids‟ by COHQ,72 Norway became an increasingly 
popular choice for small sea-borne operations.  With several Allied organisations 
operating along the Norwegian coast it therefore became increasingly necessary to co-
ordinate and prioritise their activities.  Consequently, in November 1942 the 
Admiralty appointed ACOS, Vice-Admiral L.V. Wells as the „co-ordinating authority 
for small operations on the Norwegian coast‟.73  In January 1943, the COS stamped 
their seal of authority on this decision when they confirmed that all planning of 
clandestine sea-borne operations, whether originated by SOE, SIS or CCO, would be 
overseen by the „Admiralty or a Flag Officer delegated by them‟.74  These activities, 
with the agreement of SOE, were also prioritised, with intelligence on the German 
fleet at the top, followed by interference with the enemy‟s communications along the 
coast, operations that extended the enemy‟s defensive efforts, and lastly the building 
of resistance.
75
 
It was within this framework that during the winter and spring 1943 COHQ 
continued to consult with SOE on its proposals for Norway, even though Operation 
Cartoon was the last operation on which they directly co-operated.
76
   SOE was not 
reluctant to raise objections if it was felt that they directly interfered with its own 
operations.  It opposed Operation Pullover, a plan to destroy the Nordals Viaduct near 
Narvik in an attempt to interdict the transportation of Swedish iron ore.  It argued that 
the loss of supplies to Germany would be relatively small, as it involved a landing in 
Norway it would undermine its efforts in the area, and because Special Duty aircraft 
would be used other SOE missions could be delayed.  The operation was, however, 
eventually cancelled due to „lack of suitable weather‟.77  SOE also objected to 
Operation Cobblestones, a plan to leave parties of No. 14 Commando on islands off 
the Norwegian coast from where, by using kayaks or canoes to attach limpet mines, 
they could attack enemy shipping.  Again SOE felt that this would disturb the local 
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conditions, and therefore refused the loan of fishing vessels to carry out the 
operation.
78
  The Norwegian military authorities also protested against „Cobblestones‟ 
because it was believed that such operations could put the local population at 
unnecessary risk.
79
  The Admiralty was, however, the final arbiter in these matters and 
if an operation did not directly clash with SIS or naval activity, it was invariably 
allowed to go ahead.
80
  It was the severe weather conditions that regularly occurred in 
the North Sea, not organisational differences, that was the most disruptive factor in 
operations in this theatre.
81
  And despite these differences, SOE‟s view of COHQ was 
that it had sought consultation from the beginning, was prepared to modify aspects of 
its proposals as a result of SOE‟s recommendations, and that „co-operation was more 
likely to intensify than otherwise‟.82   
As COHQ became increasingly involved in preparations for the invasion of 
northwest Europe in 1944 the Commando groups operating out of the Shetlands were 
gradually moved south or disbanded during the summer of 1943.  Consequently, co-
operation between SOE and COHQ in Norway came to an end.
83
  The two 
organisations had been natural partners and by working together they had from an 
early stage been able to take the offensive against German interests in this theatre.  
Their close relationship also illustrates how beneficial collaboration was for SOE in 
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carrying out its plans in Norway, although by 1943 it was more than capable of 
operating independently.
84
  
 
 
II 
SOE and the Political Warfare Executive: Subversion through Propaganda 
According to its Charter one of SOE‟s responsibilities was also to co-ordinate 
subversion against the enemy overseas, and an important element of subversion was 
propaganda.
85
  In the years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War two new 
organisations, Electra House (EH) and Section D had begun to examine the possible 
contribution of covert propaganda in the war against Germany.
86
  But with the 
creation of SOE in July 1940 a re-organisation occurred and SO1 took over this 
responsibility.
87
  
 In 1940, subversive propaganda was another small element of Britain‟s 
forward strategy, which set out to undermine not only the strength but also the spirit 
of the German armed forces, „especially in the occupied countries‟.88  The 
establishment of SO1 did not, however, end the fragmentation and overlapping that 
characterised the dissemination of and responsibility for propaganda, and it was a 
further attempt to co-ordinate activity and agree responsibility within this field that 
led in August 1941 to the creation of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE). This 
new organisation, initially run by an Executive Committee responsible to a ministerial 
team with representatives from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Information (MOI), 
and SOE, was set up to „co-ordinate and direct‟ all „propaganda to enemy occupied 
countries‟. 89  This cumbersome structure lasted until the following spring when day 
to day responsibility passed to Bruce Lockhart, its Director General.
90
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PWE was responsible for creating and laying down policy on political warfare, 
including both overt and covert propaganda, and with its creation the short life of SO1 
was ended.  It was divided into regions, including Scandinavia, under Regional 
Directors, who were responsible for administrating and controlling the work in their 
respective theatres.
91
  As part of the agreement that led to its formation it was 
accepted, however, that „all activities of the Political Warfare Executive outside Great 
Britain‟ would be „conducted through the medium of the Special Operations 
Executive‟.92  This was re-affirmed in a new agreement signed in September 1942, 
which stated that all work in the field will „continue to be done by SOE as agents for 
PWE‟.93  To enable it to undertake subversive propaganda activities in Norway, PWE 
therefore required the assistance of SOE, which was the source of its Norwegian 
agents as well as equipment and transportation.  Moreover, it was part of SOE‟s remit 
to ensure that the German forces in Norway remained „generally as uncomfortable as 
possible‟.94  It was, therefore, beneficial for both parties to work together. 
 There was, however, also a political dimension to the use of propaganda that 
made the implementation of this type of subversive activity in Norway extremely 
problematic.  The Norwegian government considered that the dissemination of all 
information in Norway was both its constitutional responsibility and an important 
element in rebuilding its relationship with the Norwegian people after it had been 
severely damaged by the German occupation.
95
  This determination to retain control 
over all forms of communication with its people would both delay and complicate 
PWE‟s and SOE‟s efforts to undertake their own subversive propaganda operations.  
Ultimately, it was only through using its close relationship with FO, and by confining 
subversive propaganda to undermining the morale of the German forces, that SOE 
was able during the final months of the occupation to undertake this type of activity in 
Norway  
 It is „operational propaganda‟, the production and distribution of leaflets, 
posters, and clandestine newspapers, through agents working in Norway, something 
particularly dependent on SOE involvement, which will be examined in this section.  
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It will not be possible within the confines of this thesis to consider propaganda 
disseminated to Norway through the BBC, „Freedom Stations‟ (clandestine 
broadcasting), the dropping of leaflets, or by the spreading of subversive rumours or 
„Sibs‟ as they were referred to, even though SOE made a contribution to all of these.96 
 In the COS directives to SOE, studies by the British Planning Staff, and in 
SHAEF directives, there was from as early as the autumn of 1940 regular reference to 
the use of propaganda as a means to subvert the morale of German troops.  It was part 
of a policy that set out to „soften up the enemy‟.97  It was therefore another small 
strategic tool that the Allies attempted to employ in the war against Germany.  From 
the summer of 1940, SO1 began to consider the use of subversive propaganda in 
Norway, and in July the Norwegian born journalist Thomas Barman produced the first 
of a series of lengthy papers on the subject.  Until SOE‟s ideas had „further matured‟, 
however, Barman was largely interested in disseminating information through leaflets 
or radio broadcasts, which he believed should be done in collaboration with the 
Norwegian authorities.  Although Barman did not always practice what he preached, 
often upsetting his Norwegian colleagues, he did develop a close working association 
with a fellow journalist, H.K. Lehmkuhl at the Informasjonskontor, Information 
Office (IK), which was set up in London in February 1941 to co-ordinate propaganda 
on behalf of the Norwegian government.
98
  This is significant because it is indicative 
of the future working relationship that developed between SOE and Norwegian 
authorities on the issue of propaganda: it was pragmatic and based on a realisation 
that both parties had to find a way of accommodating each other‟s concerns and 
requirements.  
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 From the summer of 1941, PWE continued the interest in Norway as a country 
where subversive propaganda could be used to „demoralise the German armies of 
occupation‟.  This interest had by this stage, however, gone beyond simply using 
radio broadcasts or dropping leaflets, and included sending specially trained 
propaganda agents into the country.  Consequently, from the autumn of 1941, PWE 
and SOE began to work together with the objective of disseminating propaganda 
within Norway in order to make the German occupation „a drain on enemy resources‟ 
and to maintain Norwegian morale at a time when „no Allied initiative of any 
importance‟ was expected in the country.99  The agents, transportation, security, and 
communications would be supplied through SOE, training and directives in 
propaganda would come from PWE.
100
  At this time Captain Hackett (later Major) 
head of PWE‟s training school visited STS 26 at Aviemore and eventually with the 
backing of Charles Hambro began to recruit Norwegian volunteers.  Between 1941 
and the spring of 1943 at least fifteen Norwegian SOE agents eventually received 
propaganda training.
101
  Hackett‟s initiative was the beginning of a joint SOE/PWE 
project that aimed to get „field-workers‟ into Norway to undertake subversive 
propaganda work.  The initial steps would be low-key with agents sent in to survey 
and collect information on local conditions, although activities such as staging passive 
„go-slow‟ resistance and setting up „patriotic black markets‟ to undermine German 
rationing were also envisaged.
102
 In February 1942, however, in a „Plan of Political 
Warfare against Scandinavia‟, it was concluded that the co-operation of the 
Norwegian government was necessary if this type of activity was ever to be carried 
out successfully.
103
 
 After arriving in Britain it was important for the Norwegian government, at a 
time when many blamed it for Norway‟s lack of readiness in April 1940, to make 
contact and strengthen its position with the Norwegian people.  It also believed it was 
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vitally important for it to retain control over all forms of communication with the 
Home Front, whether through BBC broadcasts, the dropping of leaflets, or the 
sending of propaganda agents into the field.  It therefore instituted a series of 
measures, including the setting up of IK in early 1941 to maintain and strengthen 
links with occupied Norway and to represent the country‟s interests with her allies 
and neutral countries.
104
   
 Although there were difficulties between the British and Norwegian 
authorities on issues such as BBC broadcasts and the dropping of leaflets,
105
 the 
practical view that Norwegian support would be beneficial when undertaking 
propaganda activities that aimed to help the „Allied cause‟ prevailed.106  It was, 
however, the close collaboration between SOE and FO, exercised through the ANCC 
that ultimately proved decisive in creating a framework within which the planning and 
implementation of subversive propaganda operations in Norway could be carried out.  
With the establishment of the ANCC all subversive operations were dispatched to 
Norway under the joint authority of SOE and FO.  Consequently, from this point the 
sending in of „field-workers‟ to undertake propaganda activities, directed by PWE but 
using SOE agents and facilities could only be achieved in collaboration with the 
Norwegian authorities.  Therefore, between April and July 1942, through the medium 
of the ANCC, a series of discussions was carried out with the aim of setting up an 
organisational structure for conducting propaganda operations.
107
  This eventually led 
to an agreement that gave the Norwegian government a significant measure of control 
over the production and distribution of subversive material.  The IK was made 
responsible for propaganda and the directives that were passed to the Norwegian 
agents, FO and SOE were together to manage the agents, whilst a sub-committee 
ensured collaboration with PWE.  A Propaganda Office under Bård Krogvig was also 
set up to represent FO.
108
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   This collaborative framework, despite its bureaucratic complexity, led in the 
summer of 1942 to a joint British/Norwegian plan called the „Operational Propaganda 
Field-Work Scheme‟, which was the culmination of the work that SOE and PWE had 
begun the previous autumn with the training of specialist propaganda agents.  This 
divided southern Norway into ten districts, each with its own separate team including 
a radio operator that would undertake propaganda activities in the local area.
109
  The 
hope was that propaganda agents would begin to operate in Norway from mid 
September 1942, but despite its involvement the Norwegian government was slow to 
accept the scheme and it was November before it was approved.  Moreover, it was 
also agreed by both SOE and the Norwegian authorities that the plan should be laid 
before the Norwegian Home Front before implementation and on 27 November 1942 
Gunnar Fougner, with the code-name „Petrel‟, travelled to Norway to meet resistance 
leaders.  He eventually returned to London via Stockholm, indicating that the scheme 
had been well received.  In late February 1943, however, a letter arrived in London 
rejecting the plan because it was believed that the further infiltration of agents from 
outside was unwise and because such activity could be done better from Oslo.  
Consequently, at a time when the Norwegian government‟s relationship with the 
resistance leadership was at a delicate and difficult stage, the project was 
abandoned.
110
 
Collaboration between SOE and PWE had begun in the autumn of 1941, but 
Norwegian support was important in the carrying out of this type of subversive 
activity.  The dissemination of underground propaganda was, however, delayed, 
complicated and ultimately obstructed by the concerns of both the Norwegian 
government and the resistance leadership in Oslo.  Because it was also targeted at the 
civilian population in occupied Norway, it played a role in the development of the 
relationship between the Home Front and the Norwegian government and resistance 
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leadership, which was a sensitive political issue.  It was this that ultimately set back 
and restricted its military use in this theatre.       
Despite these difficulties, however, SOE and PWE did not give up and 
continued with their efforts to instigate operational propaganda in Norway.  The 
Norwegian Home Front was contacted again in June 1943, but once more rejected 
Allied advances, arguing that with a large underground press and many people still 
listening to the BBC‟s London radio the population was already fully aware of and 
largely supported the British view.
111
  Attempts were also made to have an officer 
with responsibility for „black‟ propaganda attached to the Press Office at the 
Norwegian Legation in Stockholm, but this was also rebuffed.
112
  Nevertheless, 
during the second half of 1943 and early 1944, SOE and PWE began to make some 
headway.  In response to Norwegian concerns they changed their approach to 
propaganda operations in Norway in two important ways.  Firstly, the plan to use 
separate propaganda teams was abandoned; teams already assigned to Norway on 
other tasks would carry out propaganda as an additional role.
113
  This allowed PWE to 
hide behind SOE respectability in the eyes of the Norwegian military authorities and 
therefore avoid the suspicions of its government toward propaganda operations.
114
  
Secondly, the Norwegian authorities were advised that future propaganda undertaken 
by SOE teams would only be directed against the morale of the German occupying 
forces.
115
  In the future, therefore, it would be a purely military exercise and the 
Norwegian population would not be involved, thereby excising the political element.  
Compared to what had originally been planned this compromise curtailed the extent 
of operational propaganda operations in Norway during the final stages of the war, but 
meant that they could at last be carried out.  This was at a time, in the run up to the 
liberation and whilst several enemy divisions remained in the country, when it was 
especially important to undertake any activity that might undermine German morale 
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and thereby help to achieve the objective of a peaceful capitulation rather than a 
violent last stand.     
Prior to these changes, little in the way of subversive propaganda was carried 
out in Norway.  In March 1943, Operation Mardonius, consisting of Gregers Gram 
and Max Manus, which had the task of attacking shipping in Oslo harbour, also 
undertook work that had propaganda implications.
116
  Both agents had received 
propaganda training,
117
 and whilst in Oslo they conducted a Gallup Poll, which was 
used as the basis of a report on conditions at home.  It was eventually passed to 
PWE.
118
  Furthermore, by this stage a PWE/SOE Co-ordination Committee had been 
established to discuss issues of policy and which included members from both SOE‟s 
Norwegian section and the Northern Region of PWE.
119
  Nevertheless, little was 
happening at a local operational level and in June 1943, Lt. Col. Wilson made the 
self-evident observation that Anti-Axis propaganda required „development‟.  In an 
attempt to accelerate efforts a decision was therefore made to give „basic propaganda 
training‟ to all the members of NIC (1), „so that those who go out into the field can 
deal with this requirement in addition to their other duties‟.120  This was the first sign 
that SOE was abandoning the idea of sending independent propaganda „field-workers‟ 
into Norway.  A few months later Operation Bundle, which also included Manus and 
Gram, was initiated.  It was another operation against shipping in the Oslo fjord but at 
the request of PWE the operation would also examine a number of propaganda issues, 
including ways to demoralise the Wehrmacht.
121
  Due to the strict security measures 
implemented by the German authorities around Oslo, especially the harbour areas, 
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„Bundle‟ was initially a failure.  The large amount of information on conditions in 
Norway accumulated by Gram and Manus whilst in Oslo, which the following 
February was passed on to PWE, and their establishment of an underground 
newspaper called „Aftonbladet‟, indicates, however, that their propaganda activities 
were more fruitful.
122
 
This led in January 1944 to the implementation of Operation Derby, a plan for 
Gram and Manus to undertake activities that were designed to undermine the morale 
of the German forces in the Oslo area.  It was instigated from Stockholm and given 
priority over „Bundle.‟   It resulted in the establishment of a propaganda organisation 
that produced illegal newspapers and distributed posters, stickers and leaflets across 
eastern Norway.
123
  It was carried out with the acceptance of the Norwegian 
authorities in London, and knowledge but non-involvement of the resistance 
leadership in Oslo.
124
  It eventual employed almost 500 people, divided into nine 
districts stretching from Drammen in the west to Sarpsborg in the east, and produced 
two German papers „Beobachter’ and „Im Westen nichts Neues‟. 125  Through 
Operation Durham a similar endeavour was undertaken in Trondheim between March 
1944 and April 1945.  Minor propaganda activities had been carried out in this area 
before, but „Durham‟ supplied with material primarily out of Stockholm, operated on 
a large scale.  It had over 100 men producing posters, pamphlets, and brochures with 
the aim of irritating the Germans, undermining their morale, and even encouraging 
them to desert to Sweden.
126
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These operations are significant as they mark the late but eventual initiation of 
SOE‟s plan to undertake subversive propaganda in Norway.  They were built on the 
back of SOE teams or agents that were already in the field and they denoted the 
opening of a propaganda offensive that targeted the morale of the German forces in 
Norway in the period running up to the country‟s liberation. The scale of these 
operations also gives an indication of the weight that was ultimately placed on 
subversive propaganda as a means of helping to ensure a peaceful capitulation in 
Norway.  This was especially important when with Allied military resources 
concentrated elsewhere, other more unorthodox measures became a particularly 
valuable additional tool in this theatre. 
PWE initially felt that the attitude of the Norwegian government had limited 
the scope of propaganda activities in Norway, and even at the end of 1943 it still 
hoped to recruit independent Norwegian „political warfare agents‟, to go into Norway 
to support SOE tasks that aimed to undermine German morale and prepare the 
population for an Allied invasion.
127
  By the following spring, however, it 
acknowledged that in respect of operations against the Germans, the „Norwegian 
authorities had accepted that this was a British province‟, and that through SOE 
„practical progress had been made‟.128  From spring 1944, therefore, PWE began to 
shift its attention away from operational propaganda and toward preparing the 
Norwegian people for the country‟s liberation, and began to work closely with Scotco 
and the Norwegian government.  A Political Warfare Branch was set up within Scotco 
under Lt. Colonel Petch,
129
 and in July Mr Brinley Thomas from PWE was appointed 
liaison officer between the Political Warfare Division (PWD) of SHAEF and the 
Norwegian authorities.
130
  The focal point of their work over the following months 
was the distribution of leaflets to Norway.  SOE involvement was limited, although 
after initial reluctance it agreed to allow the use of Special Duty aircraft to drop these 
leaflets.
131
    
The use of subversive propaganda in Norway was another strand of SOE‟s 
policy that depended on collaboration.  It was, however, yet again the mix of strategic, 
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political and collaborative issues that ultimately shaped the nature of these activities.  
They had strategic origins, were implemented jointly by SOE and PWE with 
Norwegian assistance, but held back by the sensitivity of the Norwegian government 
and resistance leadership to anything that involved communication with the local 
population.  
     
 
III 
SOE and OSS in Norway: American Subjugation 
Finally, SOE‟s plans and activities in Norway were also influenced by its relationship 
with a new American clandestine organisation that was created in June 1942.  After 
the USA joined the war against Germany it entered into a close military partnership 
with Britain.  This alliance was quickly extended into the area of special operations 
and in the summer of 1942 the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the 
leadership of William Donovan entered into discussions with SOE over their future 
relationship.  The close organisational and operational relationship between the two 
organisations in northwest Europe was symbolised by the constitution in May 1944 of 
the Special Forces HQ (SFHQ).  This collaboration was also extended to Norway.  In 
the spring of 1943, it was agreed that this country would be a SOE sphere of 
operations and that the Special Operations section of OSS (SO), which was 
responsible for sabotage and subversion, would have to work with SOE and FO 
through the forum of the ANCC.  A triumvirate was therefore formed, although in 
Norway, SO was always the junior partner. 
SOE policy and operations benefited from SO support in two ways.  Most 
importantly through OSS, and the direct contact it had to the American Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), SO provided additional resources, especially equipment and 
transportation, which often helped to advance special operations at a local level within 
Norway.  SO was, however, also anxious to carry out its own sabotage and 
subversion, whilst SOE was keen to make use of OSS American/Norwegians recruits 
as a source of additional manpower.  Consequently, there was a good reason for them 
to combine their efforts and several attempts were made to make use of American 
volunteers, although ultimately with very limited success.  Direct American 
involvement in special operations in Norway was therefore primarily supportive, but 
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nevertheless an additional factor in shaping certain aspects of SOE activity in this 
theatre. 
The relationship between SOE and SO in Europe and Norway was eventually 
based on negotiated agreements.  After OSS was formed in June 1942, it was decided 
that both organisations should co-ordinate their activities in the various theatres of 
operations across the globe.  Discussions began almost immediately and an agreement 
was reached and confirmed by both countries the following September.  Norway was 
perhaps surprisingly defined as an „Invasion‟ country where there would be „one 
integrated Field Force controlled jointly by SOE and the London Office of OSS‟.132  
This arrangement, however, did not prove to be enough to ensure „joint‟ control over 
special operations in this theatre.  In the autumn of 1942, OSS made contact with a Lt. 
Stromholtz, who had been sent to the USA on a lecture tour by the Norwegian 
authorities, with a view to recruiting him and sending him to Norway as its own 
agent.
133
  This provoked concern both within SOE and FO.  Therefore, after an 
American proposal to carry out psychological warfare in Norway from a base in 
Iceland, again using its own agents, discussions were instigated in early January 1943 
involving SOE, SO, and FO in order to clarify their relationship.
134
  An accord was 
quickly reached.  It was accepted that SO would set up a Norwegian desk in London 
and that all its personnel would be under the control of and be administered by the 
ANCC, which would have an American representative.  All supplies and training 
facilities would also be pooled, although SO would normally service operations north 
of parallel 65ºN, (around Namsos, north of Trondheim).
135
 
 This provisional agreement and OSS proposal for operations in Norway using 
a base in Iceland were then repeatedly placed before the COS during the spring of 
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1943.  With the Admiralty anxious to protect SIS from the potential risk of another 
organisation operating in this theatre, it was April before there was unanimity and the 
proposals accepted and clarified.  The proviso that was eventually added was that 
although all OSS operations would be subject to the control of SOE and the 
Norwegian High Command, sea-borne operations would come under the authority of 
the Admiralty, and would be subject to agreement with SIS.
136
  
 The SO section of OSS had therefore accepted that the whole of Norway was a 
SOE sphere of operation and that it had to work with both SOE and Norwegian 
military authorities.  As a result in May 1943, Sir Frederic Cromwell from SO was 
attached to SOE and joined the ANCC until April 1944 when Lt. Commander F.W.G. 
Ungar Vetlesen replaced him.
137
  Significantly, this meant that in the future SO could 
and would not act independently anywhere in Norway, even in the north where it 
eventually made its largest contribution.  Importantly, therefore, any possibility of a 
„crossing of lines‟ or duplication of effort was at least theoretically ruled out.   
This arrangement was quickly replicated in Stockholm where it was agreed in 
June 1943 that an American special operations base could be established.   In August 
Major (later Lt. Colonel) George Brewer visited the city to commence preparations,
138
 
and in October 1943 an covenant was drawn up for the operation of this base, named 
„Westfield‟, which was eventually located at the American Legation.  It was also 
accepted that all OSS missions out of Stockholm would be considered joint SOE/SO 
operations, that consultations would be held in advance and that there would be a full 
exchange of personnel and equipment when possible.
139
 
 By mid 1943, therefore, SO had not only subordinated itself to SOE and FO 
partnership, but become part of the network of organisations that played such a 
significant role in shaping SOE plans and operations in Norway.  From this point it 
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began to make a direct contribution to special operations in this theatre.  Firstly, and 
most significantly American power came into play through the provision of additional 
equipment and resources.  OSS helped in obtaining the three American submarine 
chasers; the 110-foot diesel engined boats that from autumn 1943 were used to 
transport men and equipment across the North Sea to Norway‟s west coast.  The loss 
of several of the fishing boats from the Shetlands Base during the winter of 1942-43, 
resulted in SOE‟s decision to replace them, but unfortunately the Admiralty was 
unable to help.  Eventually it was General William Donovan that persuaded the JCS 
to agree to allow three American fast craft to join the Norwegian flotilla, under OSS 
command, provided the American „Theatre Commander‟ agreed.  Through the help of 
Admiral Stark, US naval representative in London since 1941, agreement was 
obtained and over the next eighteen months SOE was able to use these vessels to 
safely and significantly increase the volume of men and equipment it delivered to 
Norway.
140
 
 William Donovan and Colonel David Bruce, head of SO in Europe, were also 
directly involved in establishing Operation Sonnie.  This set out to create an air 
transportation service adequate to bring initially 2000 Norwegian refugees from 
Stockholm to Britain.  The project began in early 1944, when five B-24 Liberators 
from the American 492
nd
 Bomber Group were assigned to the US Army Air Force 
officer Bernt Balchen.  The first flight to Stockholm was at the end of March 1944 
and over the next seven months 1,547 Norwegians were flown back to Britain to 
become another pool of potential recruits for the Norwegian armed forces and 
merchant navy during the final stages of the war.  By the end of the war Operation 
Sonnie had flown over 5000 refugees out of occupied Europe.  As an offshoot of this, 
however, Balchen also managed to obtain the use of the six Liberators that carried out 
sixty-four sorties to Norway between June and September 1944 to drop supplies to 
Milorg groups.  OSS personnel were attached to this unit and organised the provision 
of supplies, including food, medicine, and sabotage materials, from their packaging 
station near Birmingham.
141
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It was also OSS that requested that SHAEF back a request for the provision of 
Arctic equipment from the USA in order to supply a series of reception camps for 
members of Milorg that SFHQ planned to set up in the Norwegian mountains during 
the final months of the war.
142
  In early February, the JCS gave approval for OSS to 
ship 450 tons of equipment, sufficient for 30,000 to 40,000 Norwegian resistance 
fighters, to the UK.  By mid-March, this material was ready for transportation to 
Scandinavia, although by this time it was too late for it to be distributed and thereby 
be of any significant benefit to Milorg.
143
     
 It was also hoped that the Americans could provide additional manpower in 
order to help escalate special operations in Norway.  In discussions in October 1942 
over how to put the Knaben molybdenum mines in southern Norway out of action, the 
use of Americans was at one stage proposed.
144
  In February 1943, OSS was offered 
the opportunity to contribute to Operation Midhurst, a plan to attack the frostfilet 
factories at Hammerfest and Melba in northern Norway.  The Norwegians approved 
the operation and although OSS initially received its invitation to take part with 
„alacrity‟ there were bureaucratic difficulties.  The mission was, however, eventually 
cancelled due to local operational difficulties.
145
 
After the inception of OSS, William Donovan also began to examine the 
possibility of preparing groups of uniformed guerrilla soldiers recruited from ethnic 
Americans or foreign nationals, which could be used to operate behind enemy lines in 
areas specific to their language skills.  This led in May 1943 to the setting up of OSS 
Operational Groups (OGs) Branch.
146
  In July 1942 the American War Department 
had also constituted the 99
th
 Infantry Battalion (Separate), which would be made up of 
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either Norwegian citizens or Norwegian speaking American citizens.  From the 
summer of 1943, this unit became the source of recruits for a Norwegian uniformed 
guerrilla unit called OSS Norwegian Operational Group (NORSO).
147
 
 Liaison between the Norwegian military authorities and OSS in the USA was 
established from early 1943 and with the NORSO group from that summer.
148
  In 
December 1943, however, this unit, composed of eighty-four men and twelve officers, 
sailed for the UK.  After its arrival it was temporarily housed, equipped and trained at 
Forest Lodge, part of STS 26 near Aviemore.  By April it had been divided into two 
groups and a Field Service HQ and totalled 11 officers and 80 men.
149
  Whilst it was 
accepted that NORSO was technically a „Commando‟ group for use behind enemy 
lines and therefore primarily designed for „D-Day‟ operations in Europe,150 SOE‟s 
Norwegian section wanted to make use of this additional manpower in Norway.  After 
some deliberation, therefore, it was decided to use the Americans for Operation 
Barter, a proposed attack against the pyrite mines on the island of Stord south of 
Bergen.  SOE, FO, and SO jointly prepared plans, but after some acrimony with 
William Donovan over the use of the American sub-chasers, it was eventually 
accepted that there was a lack of suitable transport and the operation was cancelled.
151
  
„Barter‟, however, indicates that SOE saw NORSO a means through which it could 
continue its attacks against important economic targets close to the Norwegian 
seaboard, particularly at a time when due to the preparations for Overlord it could no 
longer rely on the support of COHQ. 
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In May 1944, however, NORSO was allocated to post D-Day activities in 
France, although they were not actually committed until 19 August.  Consequently, 
despite protests from Scotco, who wanted them for „Rankin B‟ preparations, the case 
of a sudden German withdrawal from Norway, the unit was at least temporarily, not 
available for operations in Norway.
152
  This did not, however, end OSS support for 
SOE and Norwegian activities, particularly in northern Norway.  In spring 1944, in an 
effort to obtain much needed equipment for Milorg groups in the counties of Troms 
and Nordland contact was made between the MI IV office at the Norwegian Legation 
and the Westfield Mission in Stockholm, which was seen as a potential source for 
these supplies.
153
  It was, therefore, another attempt to tap American resources that led 
to the „Sepals/Perianth‟ plan to establish bases along the Swedish border that under 
the cover of an intelligence operation and with the support of C-Bureau, the Swedish 
Intelligence Service, would act as a supply points.  By mid September 1944, two 
bases, „Sepals‟ and „Sepals I‟, and three field parties „Perianth‟ and „Perianth I and II‟, 
were established in northern Sweden close to the Norwegian border in the area of 
Narvik.
154
  OSS paid for most of the cost of setting up and running these bases, as 
well as supplying the initial two and half tons of arms and equipment.
155
   
After German forces had withdrawn from Finland into northern Norway in 
November 1944, however, the military importance of these bases increased and they 
were no longer simply involved in supporting local resistance groups or collecting 
intelligence.  Their role was widened to include the sabotage of enemy fuel, 
ammunition dumps, and its communications in the area.
156
  It was also agreed that 
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three new bases should be set up on Swedish territory.
157
  Nevertheless, it was 
difficult to supply these bases and by the end of the year only a few handguns had 
been delivered and no sabotage material.
158
  The only effective way to equip these 
remote locations, which were 300 kilometres from the nearest Swedish railhead, was 
by airdrop.  Consequently, in early November, SFHQ contacted the American 492
nd
 
Bombardment Group (H), but was told that there were no suitable aircraft.  After this 
OSS became involved and in December wrote to the „Commanding General, United 
States Strategic Air Forces‟ in Britain, and asked for long range aircraft to be made 
available, but apparently with no success.
159
  Despite the involvement of the Swedish 
Intelligence Services, the Swedish government had also not been informed of these 
operations and it was 10 March 1945 before permission was received to transport 
military material from Britain to Bromma airfield outside Stockholm.
160
  Prior to this, 
supplies, arms and equipment were flown from the UK in Norwegian diplomatic bags, 
and although some of it eventually got through to the bases, it was a trickle and not 
the significant flow of material that was required.  
Eventually six bases were established in Sweden close to the county of 
Nordland: „Sepals‟ I, II, and III, „Sepals Gorgon‟, „Freethorpe‟ and „Coton‟.  
Altogether about eighty men worked from these camps carrying out a range of 
activities including sabotage, gathering intelligence, and supporting local Milorg 
forces in preparation for the liberation.  Nevertheless, even after the flow of supplies 
to the area increased, by the time of the German capitulation many of the Milorg 
groups in the region were still largely unarmed.  Nevertheless, the „Sepals‟ operations 
illustrate again how OSS was seen as a source of arms and equipment for activities in 
this theatre, although even with American support operating in such a remote border 
area in the north of Norway proved extremely problematic.
161
   
 SOE also looked to American assistance for its operations elsewhere in 
Norway.  After completing its work in France, NORSO returned to England, although 
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eventually more than half of the unit was shipped back to the USA.
162
  As early as 
September 1944, however, Scotco, SOE and SO had attempted to have the group 
assigned for railway sabotage.  The original plan was to use two units of NORSO in 
northern Norway around Bodø to disrupt rail and highway transport, harass the 
enemy, destroy supplies and transmit intelligence.
163
  But this came to nothing and the 
decision was taken to place them under the „operational control‟ of Scotco in 
preparation for Operation Apostle, the plan to take control of Norway after a final 
German surrender.
164
  In December 1944, however, after SHAEF authorised 
unrestricted operations against the Norwegian rail network, it was decided to make 
use of the remainder of the NORSO unit on operations in northern Norway, where it 
was felt the use of uniformed troops would not provoke a widespread German 
reaction.
165
  By mid January the decision had been taken to „despatch an OG of thirty 
men by air to attack the railway north of Trondheim‟.166  Consequently, a party of 
thirty six men under the command of Major William E. Colby, a future Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was prepared for Operation Rype, an attack 
against the Norwegian rail network in the county of Troms.  Unfortunately, only 
sixteen men were successfully dropped in March 1945, but they remained in the field 
until the liberation carrying out a small amount of sabotage as part of the widespread 
effort to delay German troop movement southwards.  This was significant because it 
was ultimately the only example where OSS forces were used in active operations 
within Norway.
167
  At a local operational level, therefore, the Americans only made a 
very small and largely ineffectual contribution to clandestine activities in Norway. 
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 From the spring of 1943, the SO section of OSS was a subordinate partner in 
the triumvirate that included SOE and FO, which meant that it never attempted to 
operate independently in Norway.  American involvement was confined to the 
provision of equipment and transportation, and its overall influence on SOE‟s plans 
and activities, although supportive, was therefore minimal.  Even American power 
and resources could not overcome the many difficulties of operating in this peripheral 
theatre, especially in the north where distances and local conditions made it so 
difficult to sustain clandestine operations over a long period.   Along with COHQ, 
PWE, and the Norwegian military authorities, however, OSS became part of the wide 
collaborative effort that was behind special operations in Norway, and which 
altogether had a largely favourable and expansive impact on SOE‟s plans for this 
theatre.  
   
 
    Conclusion  
SOE did not operate alone in Norway, and many of its activities in this theatre were 
either assisted by other organisations or were a collective effort.  Its policy for 
Norway also recognised that through collaboration it could help to increase the 
military pressure on Germany.  Consequently, apart from the eventual partnership it 
forged with the Norwegian military authorities and Milorg, SOE also worked with the 
other new British and American organisations created after 1939 to undertake 
subversive and clandestine operations across occupied Europe.  It therefore never set 
out to work in isolation and was fully aware that it was part of a joint military effort. 
 All the sections of this chapter also demonstrate that it was the coming 
together of several factors that eventually shaped the development and 
implementation of many aspects of SOE‟s plans for Norway.  Coup de main and 
propaganda operations were strategic, but often reliant on the ability of SOE to work 
alongside other organisations for their implementation.  The nature of this co-
operation differed, however, depending on the type of operation or the circumstances 
within which it developed.  SOE‟s most effective and significant working relationship 
in Norway was with COHQ, which shared SOE‟s eagerness to carry out attacks 
against economic and military targets along the Norwegian seaboard and inland.  The 
Norwegian authorities also became an active partner in these operations as they saw 
this as the best way of protecting national interests whilst at the same time assisting in 
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the war against Germany.  Co-operation between PWE, SOE, and the Norwegian 
authorities was, however, more problematic because of the political nature of 
propaganda operations.  Consequently, it took a long time to reach agreement over the 
form of these operations and the circumstances within which they could be carried 
out.  Finally, Norway was a SOE sphere of operations and therefore OSS always had 
a junior and largely supportive role in the theatre.  It was never permitted to act 
independently, although it provided important material support. 
It was, however, not only relations with the new organisations that shaped 
SOE policy and operations in Norway, but also relations with the long established and 
traditional armed forces.  The RAF, USAAF, and RN took a relatively small but 
significant interest in Norway, but, as the next chapter will show, despite their 
reservations over this new organisation, from late 1940 they worked closely with SOE 
on a number of undertakings and were therefore also an important influence on its 
plans and activities in this theatre.   
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 CHAPTER SIX 
 
SOE AND THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES OPERATING IN NORWAY 
1940-1945: AN UNEXPECTED PARTNERSHIP 
  
 
Introduction 
The Royal Navy (RN), the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) and the Royal Air 
Force (RAF), for a combination of operational and strategic reasons, along with SOE 
and the other new clandestine organisations, also took an active military interest in 
Norway.  There is, however, a view that the „professional military‟ at the highest level 
was particularly sceptical toward SOE and had little appreciation of what it was 
attempting to achieve.
1
  Therefore, there was the potential for a conflict of interest 
within this theatre of operations, which could have had a detrimental impact on SOE‟s 
plans.  In Norway, however, SOE often worked closely with both the RN and RAF in 
carrying out attacks against important military and economic targets, and therefore 
rather than being undermined by difficult relations it was once more able to broaden 
its effort through collaboration. 
 Co-operation was again based on the shared strategic aim: to make Norway a 
continual strain on the German war effort.  Through developing separate working 
relationships with the RAF and RN, SOE was in different ways able to assist in the 
implementation of this objective.  Although strategic bombing in this theatre was very 
limited, it was often carried out either in partnership with SOE, which provided 
intelligence on targets, or independently after agreement had been reached that a 
particular site was deemed to be more suitable for an air attack than a local sabotage 
operation.  Throughout the war in Europe the Admiralty also had powerful reasons for 
taking an interest in Norwegian coastal waters.  It was an important route for 
transporting both war materials and enemy forces, and from early 1942 was the 
location of the bulk of Germany‟s surface fleet, including the 52,600 ton battleship, 
the Tirpitz, which exceeded the most modern British capital ships in her combination 
of speed, size, and power.
2
  Consequently, the RN carried out a series of operations 
against economic and military targets in Norwegian waters, particularly enemy 
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shipping, often in close partnership with SOE, which provided intelligence, recruits, 
and specialist equipment.  SOE also undertook its own operations in collaboaration 
with or on behalf of the RN, often because more established methods had failed or 
were deemed unsuitable.  
 SOE‟s policy and operations in Norway were bolstered by the largely 
beneficial relationship that it had with the regular armed forces.  Its activities, 
contrary to previous assertions,
3
 were also not significantly hindered by its distinctive 
relationship with the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), which was very active in 
Norway from the summer of 1940.  Although SIS, which was responsible through its 
agents for collecting military intelligence from the occupied countries, was not one of 
the regular armed services, it had a particularly close relationship to the Admiralty 
with regard to Norway.  It was given strategic priority over SOE in northwest Europe, 
a position that was formalised for Norway in early 1943, but this never seriously 
curtailed SOE operations in this theatre.  The two organisations often co-operated, 
both organisationally and at a local level. 
 The Norwegian government also had an involvement in and an impact upon 
many of these collaborative activities.  It endeavoured to have some operations 
curtailed or at least restricted to targets that had been approved by all parties.  This 
was particularly the case with air attacks, which could have a disproportionate impact 
on the local population and therefore significant political ramifications.  Overall, 
however, its contribution was again largely supportive and its provision of men, 
materials, and local intelligence was often vital for the successful completion of many 
of the joint Allied operations within this theatre.         
 From the beginning working with the regular armed services was part of 
SOE‟s plans for Norway and the many joint operations that it took part in are 
evidence of the effort it made to implement this aspect of its policy.  The nature and 
consequence of its relationship with SIS, RN, and RAF differed, however, and 
therefore it is best to examine each case separately.  The first section of this chapter 
will analyse SOE and SIS relations in Norway.  It will show that at both an 
organisational and local operational level they managed a level of collaboration that 
ensured that SIS interests did not significantly interfere with or hinder SOE‟s 
activities in this theatre.
4
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 The second section will consider the relationship between SOE and the RN, 
particularly through the Shetlands Base and ACOS, and show that a shared strategic 
and military interest in Norwegian coastal waters meant that they co-ordinated 
activities and collaborated on numerous operations, especially against enemy 
shipping.  They also received significant assistance from the Norwegian authorities, 
initially from their naval staff, but also from early 1942 through FO. 
 The final section will examine SOE‟s relations with both the RAF and 
USAAF.  This will show that from autumn 1940, SOE recognised that an important 
constituent of its activities in Norway would be to assist strategic bombing operations 
against economic and military targets.  It was not a choice between sabotage or 
bombing as they were both seen as valuable strategic tools: it was the target that 
invariably decided which medium was used.  The Norwegian authorities, however, 
were particularly anxious to ensure that bombing was employed sparingly, although 
rather paradoxically, through their close relationship with SOE, they were not averse 
to calling on support from the RAF for their own political needs, even if this caused 
considerable harm to the local population.  What links the sections of this chapter, 
however, is that they all show how a substantial share of SOE‟s operations in Norway 
was shaped by not only strategic and political factors, but also by its ability to 
collaborate with the regular armed services that in this theatre do not appear to have 
had any „lack of sympathy‟ for SOE‟s „irregular operations‟.5 
 
   
I 
SOE and SIS in Norway: Ship Watching and Sabotage manage to Co-exist 
SIS, established in 1909 as the foreign section of the Secret Service Bureau and 
responsible for espionage and counter-intelligence was very active in Norway 
between 1940 and 1945.
6
  It recruited over 200 agents and sent 190 operations to the 
country to obtain and through wireless telegraphy (W/T) send back military 
intelligence to Britain.
7
  The chief duty of SIS in Norway „was to provide shipping 
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intelligence‟,8 and most of its radio stations were situated along the coast, particularly 
around Trondheim,
9
 the main German naval base in Norway, and where the Tirpitz 
was berthed during eight of the first fourteen months of its stay in Norwegian 
waters.
10
  
 From the summer of 1940, SIS agents were sent to Norway
11
 followed soon 
afterwards by SOE teams.  This dual interest and activity in the country continued 
over the following years within a context that included a battle for influence and 
control between the two organisations at a higher level that at times threatened the 
very existence of SOE.
12
  Nevertheless, despite the natural conflict between 
intelligence gathering and special operations,
13
 and the strategic priority accorded to 
SIS in northwest Europe,
14
 the two organisations operated in Norway with relatively 
little conflict and both at an organisational and local operational level there is 
significant evidence of co-operation.  For SOE this meant that its ability to pursue its 
aims in Norway, particularly attacks against economic and military targets, was not 
significantly degraded by the priority accorded to SIS, and at times a degree of co-
ordination and collaboration even assisted SOE activities. 
 From the autumn of 1940, SOE‟s Scandinavian section gradually began to 
communicate and share intelligence with its counterpart within SIS.  The initial 
impetus behind this was the contact that both organisations made with the Norwegian 
authorities in London during summer 1940 in an effort to enlist new recruits.
15
  This 
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eventually led both of them to work with FD-E, which in January 1941 under Captain 
Finn Nagell had been made responsible for contact with the „English Secret 
Services‟.16  Both SIS and SOE had interviewed Nagell shortly after his arrival in 
Britain,
17
 and therefore from an early stage and through that year he was in contact 
with and worked with both organisations.  It was probably this tripartite relationship 
that created a closeness between the organisations that in January 1941 enabled J. B. 
Newill in SIS to send to SOE a report entitled „Military Organisation in Norway‟, 
which had been produced by one of his agents recently in the country.  It included 
details of the agent‟s contact with a member of the emerging military resistance 
movement,
18
 and was not the last time during 1941 that SOE received important 
intelligence on Milorg from SIS.  By the following summer, after it feared that the 
Germans had penetrated the leadership of Milorg, SOE readily turned to SIS for 
help.
19
  All of this is an early indication of a preparedness to co-operate and share 
intelligence.   
A second factor that helped to increase contact between these two 
organisations was their shared use of the Shetlands Base.  It was SIS officer, Captain 
L.H. Mitchell, who had worked in Oslo during the winter of 1939-1940,
20
 who 
initially commanded the base, and in the beginning he kept an eye on where SOE and 
SIS trips were heading, „thus avoiding a clash‟.21  This process was undermined, 
however, when in July 1941, SIS opened its own naval base at Peterhead in Scotland.  
It did not supply SOE details of the operations that it despatched from this base, 
unless requested.  Therefore, from the summer of 1941 there was the possibility that 
both organisations could send agents to the same location at the same time,
22
 which in 
the spring of 1942 was believed to have been the cause of the major tragedy that 
occurred in the small west coast settlement of Televåg near Bergen.  A SIS operation 
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from Peterhead and a SOE operation from the Shetlands in quick succession sailed to 
similar points on the island of Sotra, where Televåg is situated.  Information obtained 
soon afterwards indicated that SIS operation had attracted local attention and 
therefore when SOE team arrived the suspicions of the local security police were 
already aroused.  This ultimately led to a clash between two SOE agents and the 
Gestapo, with horrifying consequences for the local population.
23
  This terrible 
incident, however, had one positive result in that it induced SIS in future to „exchange 
lists of projected trips in advance‟,24 and in September 1942 SOE re-affirmed this 
liaison to avoid any future „crossing of lines‟ as far as transport and reception were 
concerned.
25
 
 A further indication of a growing working relationship between SOE and SIS 
was their willingness to exchange both staff officers and more significantly agents 
who had already worked in the field.  For example, in August 1943, Lieutenant 
Chaworth-Musters, who had helped establish the Norwegian section of SOE and was 
therefore a significant figure within the organisation, moved to SIS with the support 
of the organisation‟s senior hierarchy.26  There are also several examples of men who 
began their career working for SIS in Norway, either as agents sent from England or 
as agents recruited within the country, who eventually moved on to work for SOE.
27
  
Perhaps the best example is Knut Haukelid, who through his friendship with SIS 
agent Sverre Midtskau began his wartime career working for British intelligence in 
Norway.  On arriving in England in 1941, however, Haukelid, anxious for more active 
work and with the recommendation of SIS, joined SOE and became a member of its 
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„Gunnerside‟ team that attacked the heavy water plant in Vemork in southern Norway 
in February 1943.
28
 
 The passing of intelligence by SIS, the attempts to co-ordinate the North Sea 
crossings, and the movement of agents from SIS to SOE, all indicate that SOE and 
SIS Norwegian Sections were to a some degree working in tandem, when possible 
prepared to assist each other, and not adverse to each other‟s existence.  Even in the 
early stages of the war, therefore, SIS‟s intolerance of SOE at a senior level does not 
appear to have had a detrimental effect on SOE‟s plans for Norway.  Moreover, it is 
possible to argue that the relationship between the two organisations ultimately had a 
positive impact, because the willingness of both to share intelligence led to closer 
contact and a growing co-ordination of activities. 
 Lt. Col. Wilson, in his internal history of SOE‟s Norwegian section, claims 
that there was „frequent intercommunication between the two sections‟, and that 
although weekly meetings eventually failed, „information of any interest was passed 
immediately to SIS‟.  He does, however, criticise SIS for not being as helpful.  This 
appears to be unjustified.
29
  In January 1941, SOE‟s agent, Odd Starheim (Operation 
Cheese), was landed by submarine off the coast of southern Norway.  He soon 
established wireless contact and sent back a stream of intelligence that contained 
details of potential sabotage targets, German troop dispositions, and importantly for 
SIS shipping movements including information on the location of the German 
battleship Bismarck.  Although at this time all wireless traffic was sent using SIS 
equipment and intelligence had to be passed to it before general circulation, SOE still 
made an effort to contact SIS and urged it to make immediate use of the material 
provided by Starheim.
30
 
 SOE and SIS also both took an active interest in the production of heavy water 
at the Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork, which led them to communicate regularly and 
work together on the issue.  In the spring of 1941, a SIS station, „Skylark B‟, which 
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operated in and around Trondheim, was used to request up-to-date information on the 
site,
31
 and from this point SIS made a concerted effort to obtain intelligence on 
Vemork, often with the help of SOE.  Professor Leif Tronstad and Jomar Brun, who 
were the key figures in the provision of intelligence and planning of operations 
against the plant, worked closely with both Eric Welsh, head of SIS‟s Norwegian 
section and its scientific liaison officer with DSIR, and Lt. Colonel Wilson of SOE.  
They effectively served as a bridge between the two organisations.
32
  Moreover, in 
April 1943, Lt. Colonel Wilson wrote that with regard to Operation Gunnerside, SIS 
was „fully cognisant of this operation beforehand, as a result of information 
personally conveyed to them by me‟.33  From this point SOE, using the intelligence 
supplied by its „Swallow‟ W/T station, regularly sent information to SIS on heavy 
water along with details of the final operations carried out against its production and 
transportation.
34
 
 This stream of intelligence was not, however, one way, but also flowed from 
the offices of SIS to SOE.  The furnishing of information about Milorg was only the 
beginning.  Over the next four years there were several examples of SIS forwarding 
intelligence provided through its radio stations in Norway, on to SOE.  SIS station 
„Theta‟ supplied details on the fate of the two SOE agents „Anchor‟ and Penguin‟, 
who had clashed with the Gestapo outside Televåg.
35
  SOE was informed of the arrest 
of its „Archer‟ W/T operator and of the fate of Operation Martin by SIS.36  SIS was 
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fully aware of „Martin‟ because several months previously both organisations had 
agreed to keep each other informed of their operations.
37
  By June 1943, therefore, Lt. 
Colonel Wilson was able to write that liaison with SIS was „better‟ and that „advance 
notice of operations is exchanged monthly, and weekly meetings are held‟.38    
 All these examples indicate a growing level of co-operation, co-ordination and 
communication between SOE‟s and SIS‟s Norwegian sections.  This is corroborated 
by the degree of collaboration that developed at the local operational level.  Both 
organisations had clandestine wireless operators working in Norway, often in close 
proximity, communicating with the Home Station back in Britain.  But instead of 
working in isolation they often supported each other.  In October 1942, SOE‟s W/T 
operator „Plover‟, Per Solnordal, took over SIS station „Beta‟, and using its equipment 
and signals plan operated it for several weeks on behalf of both SIS and SOE.
39
  At 
the beginning of 1943, SOE station „Swan‟ sent a message on behalf of SIS station 
„Orion‟, which had trouble with its set, and SIS replied to „Orion‟ via „Swan‟.40  In 
1945, when SOE station „Snowflake‟ had problems with its set, the nearby SIS station 
„Roska‟ helped by sending telegrams.41   
 This sharing of stations was not just a consequence of expediency but also the 
result of direct requests from SIS.  In November 1943, SIS asked if it could send a 
ship watcher to link up with SOE wireless station „Arquebus‟.  In September 1943, 
whilst preparations were being made to send SOE‟s „Redwing‟ team to the Bergen 
area, SIS asked if it could be made available to them.
42
  Conditions in Norway, the 
small, isolated communities, meant that SOE and SIS teams often worked in the same 
area, shared the same contacts, and on occasion crossed lines.
43
  Although SIS‟s 
policy was initially to set up wireless stations in isolation from the local community, 
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so-called „hermit‟ stations, this proved impossible.  It has been estimated that as many 
as 2000 Norwegians assisted SIS in Norway,
44
 and its agents not only co-operated 
with SOE agents, but also with indigenous resistance and intelligence groups across 
the country.
45
  
 The influence of relations with SIS on SOE‟s plans for Norway, as indicated 
by these numerous examples of co-operation and co-ordination at an organisational 
and local operational level, was therefore, despite the potential for conflict, often 
favourable.  At the same time, however, SIS was given strategic priority over SOE in 
northwest Europe, including Norway, and it has been suggested that this limited 
certain of its activities in this theatre.
46
  This does not appear to have been the case 
and SOE was able to implement all aspects of its policy, even attacks against 
economic and military targets through coup de main operations, without significant 
hindrance and despite the concerns of SIS. 
 When on 4 January 1943, COS confirmed that ACOS would be „the co-
ordinating authority for small operations on the Norwegian coast‟,47 it was also agreed 
that „where the proposed activities of SOE and SIS and minor raids‟ clashed, SIS 
would „ordinarily be given priority‟.  In the future it would be the Admiralty, through 
ACOS, who would decide whether the activities of either COHQ or SOE prejudiced 
the security of SIS operations in Norway.
48
  At a meeting held at Admiralty House in 
London on 28 May 1943 to discuss operations along the Norwegian coast, and which 
included representatives from the Admiralty, SIS, SOE, and COHQ, it was agreed by 
all parties that „intelligence affecting movements of the German fleet‟ had top 
priority.
49
  Notwithstanding this, however, and despite the many occasions that SIS 
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objected to SOE operations along or near the Norwegian coast, it rarely got its own 
way.  Therefore, the precedence conferred on SIS never resulted in a so-called „ban‟ 
on SOE activities in this theatre.
50
      
 In August 1943, SIS objected to Operation Feather, a planned SOE operation 
against the Orkla pyrite mines in southern Norway,
51
 but the operation eventually 
went ahead on the understanding that the party did not approach anywhere near the 
Trondheim fjord area.  In December 1943, SIS objected to Operation Osprey, a plan 
to send a SOE party to the Stavanger area,
52
 but without success.  SIS also opposed 
some of SOE‟s plans to attack enemy shipping in Norwegian coastal waters using 
kayaks and submersible vessels.  In February 1944 it objected to Operation Vestige V, 
a plan to use kayaks to get close to and attach limpet mines to shipping in Sagvåg 
harbour, the transportation point for pyrites from the Willebø mines on the island of 
Stord.
53
  The operation, however, after its details had been passed to SIS
54
 and it had 
been referred to ACOS, was allowed to go ahead.  It was ultimately a failure, but in a 
spirit of co-operation, the intelligence obtained during the operation was passed to 
SIS.
55
  In August 1944, SOE decided that it would re-attempt the „Vestige V‟ 
operation and SIS again protested.  As it was about to land an agent in the vicinity at 
the same time its objection was upheld and the operation cancelled.
56
  In 1944, SIS 
also opposed three of SOE‟s „Salamander‟ operations; the attacks using the „Sleeping 
Beauty‟ mini-submersible canoe against enemy shipping along the Norwegian coast.  
Five operations were proposed and two appear to have been cancelled due to SIS 
objections; two, however, went ahead and one was cancelled for local operational 
reasons.
57
 
 These are all examples that show how, notwithstanding the priority accorded 
to it, SIS‟s attempts to restrict SOE operations, especially those along Norway‟s 
western seaboard, regularly failed.  Therefore, even though SIS had strategic and local 
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operational priority, this did not significantly curtail SOE‟s capability in this theatre.  
There appears to be no evidence in either SOE archives in London or Oslo that any 
SOE coup de main operation against an industrial target in Norway was called off 
because of a SIS objection.  The strategic importance placed on attacks against war 
materials and against enemy shipping using Norwegian waters meant that these 
operations reached their peak during 1943.
58
 
 The relationship between SOE and SIS has previously been portrayed as two 
organisations in conflict. This does not appear to have been the case in regard to 
Norway.  The activities of both these organisations occasionally led to the arrest of 
each other‟s agents and therefore the break up of operations, and in this theatre SIS 
was equally if not more culpable.
59
  Close examination of correspondence between 
the two organisations also reveals that both made an effort to co-ordinate their 
activities and to co-operate.  Their relationship was largely constructive, which within 
the context of this thesis means that SOE was able to pursue its plans for Norway 
without significant hindrance from and occasionally with the co-operation of SIS.  
Both organisations had important military tasks to carry out and conflict would have 
undermined their efforts.  Collaboration was therefore the pragmatic path that they 
both decided to follow.  
II  
SOE and the Admiralty: New and Old combine in Norwegian Waters 
The attention that SIS paid to Norway is an indication of the importance that the RN 
placed on intelligence on the movements of enemy shipping in this theatre.  
Norwegian coastal waters and particularly the inner leads, the channel of water that 
runs between the many off-shore islands (skerries) and the coastline, where vessels 
can escape from the worst ravages of the North Sea,
60
 were an important artery for 
both the transportation of war materials to Germany and for the movement of German 
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forces, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.  In peacetime 
Germany had taken fourteen percent of Norway‟s exports, of which ninety seven 
percent by value, were sea-borne,
61
 and therefore attacking this artery was yet another 
way to subvert the enemy‟s war effort.   
By early 1942, Norwegian waters had also become the location for both units 
of the German surface fleet and some of its U-boats.  These were seen as a potential 
threat to maritime routes across the Atlantic and an immediate danger to the Allied 
convoys transporting important materials around the North Cape to the Soviet 
Union.
62
  Consequently, between late January 1942, when the first air attack was 
carried out against it, and November 1944 when it was finally put out of action, the 
Tirpitz became a major target for the RN.  A total of fifteen direct attacks were carried 
out against the German battleship: of these seven were by the RAF, seven by the Fleet 
Air Arm, and one under the authority of the Flag Officer Submarines (FOS) using 
midget submarines (X-craft).
63
  The protection of the Arctic convoys from the 
German fleet was, however, an additional unwelcome burden on Britain‟s over-
stretched Home Fleet and added „enormously to the Admiralty‟s global strategic 
problems‟.64 
 Norwegian coastal waters were not, however, only important to the RN.  They 
were a gateway through which SOE sent many of its teams into Norway to carry out 
coup de main attacks or to organise local resistance groups.  Moreover these coastal 
waters were the location of a series of SOE attacks against enemy shipping, and these 
sea-borne operations required naval assistance, either through the provision of 
transportation or technical support.  Several of SOE‟s activities in or close to 
Norwegian waters were also a direct consequence of its assistance to the RN in 
operations against units of the German surface fleet, particularly the Tirpitz.  After 
conventional methods failed, the RN was fully prepared to make use of more 
unorthodox means, including the employment of a selection of submersible vessels.  
SOE was then able to contribute by supplying intelligence, Norwegian volunteers, and 
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special equipment.  Accordingly SOE‟s relationship with the RN was another 
important collaborative factor in shaping both its plans and many of its activities in 
this theatre. 
Furthermore, co-operation between SOE and the RN was assisted by an 
important contribution from the Norwegian military authorities.  The Royal 
Norwegian Navy, and from 1942, FO, became actively involved in SOE‟s operations 
against economic and military targets along the Norwegian seaboard through both the 
provision of vessels, and the supply of expertise and local intelligence.  The 
Norwegian authorities were also less likely to oppose Allied operations in coastal 
waters, as unlike attacks on the mainland they were not liable to lead to severe 
consequences for the local population or resistance.   
Only with the support and consent of ACOS, who had overall responsibility 
for many of the minor operations carried out from the Shetlands against targets close 
to the Norwegian seaboard or in its coastal waters, was SOE able to expedite the bulk 
of its sea-borne activities.  From the autumn of 1940, with the setting up of the 
Shetlands Base, SOE had a good local working relationship with ACOS,
 65
 and when 
an independent Norwegian section was established in early 1942, Major F. W. Ram 
was given responsibility for liaison between the two parties.
66
  Moreover, it does not 
appear that the Admiralty, through the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, ever 
objected to or interfered with this relationship and often contributed to it by directly 
assisting many of SOE‟s sea-borne operations. 
  Toward the close of 1940 both the RN and SOE began to show an interest in 
applying economic pressure against Germany through interdicting the transportation 
of war materials through Norwegian coastal waters.  Churchill‟s interest in hindering 
the movement of Swedish iron ore through Narvik and along the Norwegian coastline, 
which had begun in 1939, resurfaced in late 1940.  On 22 and 26 December 1940, the 
Prime Minister wrote to the First Sea Lord pressing for the sowing of magnetic mines 
in the leads in an effort to stop the export of this important war material to Germany.  
The reply from the First Sea Lord was that the German ore traffic, was „watched 
continuously‟.67  In early 1941, SOE also began to consider the possibility of 
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interrupting supplies of sulphur and ferrochrome from Norway, which led to two 
provisional plans, called „Gertrude‟ and „Landlubber‟.68  It was this shared strategic 
interest in Norwegian waters that ultimately led SOE and the RN to work together on 
a number of projects.  
The first of these was Operation Maundy, a plan to use Norwegian fishing 
boats from the Shetlands to lay mines in the leads, thereby forcing enemy shipping 
into the open seas where it was vulnerable to naval attack. The first „Maundy‟ 
operation left on 29 April 1941, and laid eleven of eighteen „R-Type‟ mines provided 
by the Admiralty, which also loaned a Chief Petty Officer from Rosyth to assist 
preparations.  A second operation left the Shetlands on 19 October 1941 with forty-
two mines, which were laid on 21 October.  A proposal in 1942 to use members of 
SOE team „Lark‟, based in the Trondheim area, to mine the local fjords using a 
rowing boat was never carried out, and four further attempts to lay mines in 1944 
using a submarine chaser failed due to bad weather.
69
  Nevertheless, „Maundy‟ was an 
early example of how SOE and the RN, with the help of Norwegian fishing vessels 
and crews operating out of the Shetlands Base, collaborated and were prepared to use 
„irregular‟ methods in an attempt to attack enemy shipping in Norwegian waters.   
 In the spirit of „Maundy‟ the more ambitious project called Operation Wallah 
was also put together.
70
  It is an important example of how SOE, Admiralty, and 
Norwegian naval authorities were prepared to pool skills and resources in this case to 
paralyse „as far as possible the German sea-borne traffic along the coast of Norway‟.71  
In July 1941, the Admiralty approved the plan and with the assistance of the 
Norwegian Naval Staff and Notraship (the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission) 
the SS Anderson was provided as the base for the operation.   The RN also supplied 
two „Q-ships‟, heavily armed merchant vessels, which would be used to intercept 
German shipping along the coast.  It was also proposed that local Norwegian fishing 
boats should be purchased and used to sail into harbours and affix explosives to 
enemy ships.  To assist collaboration a planning committee was set up and included 
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representatives from the „Q- ships‟, SOE, and Norwegian naval officers.  In October 
1941, the operation was placed under ACOS and in November under the C-in-C 
Home Fleet before it became part of Operation Anklet, which was eventually no more 
than a larger-scale but less ambitious version of „Wallah‟.72  An element of „Wallah‟ 
was, however, resurrected in January 1942 when the two „Q-ships‟ sailed from the 
Shetlands with the aim of attacking enemy shipping using Norwegian coastal waters.  
SOE supplied intelligence, an officer, army and navy personnel, arms, and explosives, 
but the ships were spotted by enemy aircraft and forced to return.
73
 
 Collaboration between SOE and the RN also extended to joint operations 
against economic targets along or close to the Norwegian seaboard, especially the 
Norwegian fish industry.  An early indication of this was Operation Almoner, a plan 
to seize the Norwegian herring fleet and German escorting trawlers working between 
Haugesund and Egersund off the southwest coast of Norway.  The original request for 
the operation came from the Admiralty, but it was believed that SOE would play a 
role through providing the Norwegian seaman who would act as special armed 
guards.  Although the COS approved the operation in „principle‟, by 18 March it had 
been abandoned at the request of the Norwegian government;
74
 the potential damage 
to an important industry was apparently too much for it to sanction.    
Operation Hemisphere, however, the attack against a herring oil plant at 
Øksfjord in northern Norway went ahead a few weeks later. The party, consisting of 
ten Norwegian marines and one SOE agent, sailed on 8 April 1942 on the 
„Mansfield‟, an ex-American destroyer belonging to the Norwegian navy, and 
returned on 15 April having completely destroyed the plant.  Commander Frank Stagg 
from SOE conceived the plan, and SOE provided arms and explosives.  Rear Admiral 
T. S. V. Phillips, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and Captain E. C. Danielsen, the 
Norwegian Naval Chief of Staff, both approved the operation.
75
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 There were, therefore, during 1941 several examples of the RN and SOE 
working together and clear signs that the Admiralty was not averse to employing 
more unorthodox methods in operations against economic targets close to the 
Norwegian seaboard.  This seems to suggest that from an early stage it understood the 
military contribution that SOE could make in this theatre.  Nevertheless, during 1941 
this co-operation achieved very little, and in the first half of 1942, as with the larger 
amphibious raids, small sea-borne operations along the Norwegian seaboard tailed 
off.
76
  From November 1942, however, the RN was able to expand small-scale 
operations against enemy shipping in Norwegian coastal waters through the creation, 
under the command of ACOS, of the Royal Norwegian 30th Motor Torpedo Boat 
(MTB) Flotilla (RNorN MTB Flotilla).  This consisted of eight „Fairmile type D‟ 
MTBs with Norwegian crews, which were used in a series of anti-shipping operations, 
code-named “VP”.  The Special Service Brigade and Norwegian authorities also 
provided the troops for Combined Operations North Force (CONF), which carried out 
boarding actions, provided shore guards, and undertook small raids.
77
   
Furthermore, from March 1943, SOE‟s primary concern in northwest Europe 
was with „current activities‟, a euphemism for sabotage, in order to increase the 
„already severe strain on Germany‟.  And the priority for Norway was „direct or 
indirect interference with coastal shipping‟, which meant that SOE increasingly 
concentrated its efforts in Norwegian waters.
78
  By necessity these had to be based on 
close co-operation between SOE and ACOS, and consequently in the spring of 1943 
Sir George Montagu Pollock RN, who had been specifically engaged by SOE‟s 
Norwegian section to take on responsibility for sea operations, was chosen to act as 
liaison officer between the two parties.
79
   The result of this collaboration was two 
series of operations called „Vestige‟ and „Barbara‟ respectively, which were prepared 
under the command of ACOS, but received the full support of SOE.  The „general 
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intention‟ was to „supplement‟ strikes by surface craft through attacking enemy 
shipping „anchored‟ in Norway‟s coastal waters.80 
Altogether, between September 1943 and April 1944, eight „Vestige‟ 
operations were sent to Norway.  They consisted of teams of Norwegian personnel 
from NIC (1), who had been trained to use a Norwegian designed kayak or the Folbot 
(a folding canoe) to get close to and then attach limpet mines to enemy shipping 
anchored within the inner leads.  ACOS would assist either by making available 
MTBs to transport several SOE teams across the North Sea or by using these vessels 
to force enemy shipping into safe anchorage where it could be attacked.  The 
operations, however, had little success.  The terrible weather conditions that often 
occurred along Norway‟s west coast during the autumn months made the use of 
kayaks particularly hazardous and the delivery and pick-up of these SOE teams 
extremely problematic.  It took five attempts to pick up the „Vestige I‟ team, and 
some of the operations eventually stayed in the field for several months carrying out 
other activities.  The „Vestige IV‟ operation, which arrived in southern Norway in 
March 1944, remained in the country until the end of the war.
81
 
Alongside „Vestige‟ were the „Barbara‟ operations, another plan to attack 
enemy shipping but this time using the Welman one-man midget submarine. SOE had 
begun to develop this vessel in the spring of 1942 in response to an Admiralty request 
for it to consider methods for attacking large capital ships: in particular the Tirpitz.
 82
  
It turned out, however, to be a drawn out and lengthy process but interest in the 
potential of the Welman continued with COHQ, the Admiral (Submarines), and SOE.   
At a meeting in early 1943 it was decided to place an initial order for 150 of these 
vessels, of which eighty would be required by SOE.  It was agreed that the Admiral 
(Submarines) should be responsible for their sea training and handling, whilst SOE 
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 PRO: paper entitled, „Attacks on Enemy Coastal Shipping‟, from AD/E (Brigadier E.E. Mockler-
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 203 
would appoint a liaison officer to assist.
83
  By April 1943, however, ACOS had also 
began to take an interest in the Welman and wrote to the Admiralty requesting an 
allocation of twenty-five vessels, which it planned to use against enemy shipping in 
Norwegian waters.
84
  In July, SOE made Lt. D. A. Howarth responsible for examining 
the possibilities of the Welman, and this eventually led him to work with ACOS on 
the planning and preparation of operations using these craft.
85
  Moreover, seven 
Norwegians from NIC (1) were selected to undergo training in their use and a special 
base was established at Lunna Voe on the Shetlands.
86
   
The perceived potential of the Welman as another unorthodox means to attack 
enemy shipping, therefore, led to further collaboration between SOE and the RN and 
resulted in an attempt to undertake a series of operations in Norwegian waters in the 
autumn of 1943.  Conditions in the North Sea, however, again proved insurmountable 
and of the four proposed Welman operations only the first, „Barbara I‟ was attempted 
on the night of 20 November 1943 against the Laksevaag floating dock and shipping 
in Bergen harbour.  Nevertheless, in order to assist further proposed attacks SOE 
provided forward parties at strategically important locations along the Norwegian 
coastline in readiness to collect intelligence on the movement of enemy shipping.  But 
owing to a range of local difficulties the three remaining „Barbara‟ operations were 
never carried out.
87
   
There were also plans to attack enemy shipping by employing Chariots, self-
driven torpedoes for two, which would be carried on MTBs to be used at an opportune 
moment.  In October 1943, Karl Vilnes was landed on Atløy, a small island off 
Norway‟s West Coast near Florø, to report shipping movements to a MTB that lay in 
wait with Chariots onboard, but no suitable targets arrived.  Owing to the continually 
bad weather, it appears that no further such operations were ever attempted, and as 
with the Welmans, the idea was dropped and never resurrected.
88
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Notwithstanding the failure of the „Vestige‟ and „Barbara‟ operations the use 
of midget submarines and submersible vessels was not, however, completely 
abandoned.  Norwegian coastal waters continued to be strategically important to the 
Allies during 1944.  In August, Sweden placed a ban on the use of its merchant fleet 
for trade with Germany and more importantly in September it closed its Baltic ports to 
Axis shipping.  The Germans were therefore compelled to make greater use of 
Norwegian ports, especially Narvik in the north, and with the withdrawal of German 
troops into Norway from Finland in the autumn of 1944, the inner leads became an 
important route for moving or supplying these forces.
89
  Furthermore, as the Allies 
advanced across France, German U-boats were moved from the Biscay ports to 
Norway to supplement units that were already there.  With new technical 
developments and patterns of deployment, this was seen as a matter for „concern‟ 
within the Admiralty.
90
    
Within this context and with support from within the Admiralty, SOE prepared 
the „Salamander‟ operations, which targeted U-boat depot ships, U-boats, and enemy 
shipping in Norwegian harbours.  Along with sabotage this was SOE‟s contribution to 
the Allied offensive against the German U-boat presence in Norway that began in 
1944.
91
  Altogether five operations to attach limpet mines to ships at anchor, using the 
„Sleeping Beauty‟ motor submersible canoe developed by SOE during 1943, were 
proposed.  Owing to SIS‟s objections and local operational difficulties, however, only 
two were attempted, and these were unsuccessful.
92
  In addition SOE worked with the 
Royal Navy‟s Flag Officer Submarines (FOS) on X-craft (midget submarine) 
operations against the German U-boat presence in Norway.  It assisted in the 
preparation of Operations Guidance and Heckle, attacks carried out in April and 
September 1944 respectively against the Laaksevaag floating dock in Bergen that was 
used for U-boat repairs, by suggesting lurking places and escape routes for the crews.  
On this occasion the operations had some success.  In April a coal ship, the Barenfels, 
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was sunk, and in September four sections of the dock were destroyed along with two 
merchant ships.
93
  
Unlike the actions of Coastal Command and the MTBs,
94
 SOE operations 
against enemy shipping in Norwegian waters using an array of improvised or 
submersible vessels, were largely failures.  This was primarily the result of the 
conditions found in the North Sea in the autumn and winter, which were too extreme 
for such small-scale activities.  Out of the at least nineteen planned attacks against 
enemy shipping using the inner leads in 1943 and 1944, two were cancelled as a direct 
result of SIS objections and two operations achieved some success.  The remaining 
fifteen were either hindered by bad weather, or were unable to identify a suitable 
target at a time when the operation had any chance of success.  This compares 
unfavourably with the efforts of the 30
th
 and 54
th
 Norwegian MTB Flotillas, which 
between the end of 1942 and the spring of 1945 sank at least twenty-one merchant 
vessels, one destroyer, and twelve or thirteen patrol vessels.
95
  Nevertheless, these 
operations show how important collaboration with the RN was for SOE in carrying 
out its objective of attacking economic and military targets close to the Norwegian 
seaboard.  They should also not be seen in isolation but as a small part of the wider 
offensive that was carried out against enemy shipping in Norwegian waters, and 
which helped to divert enemy manpower and resources to this peripheral theatre 
particularly in 1943 and 1944 in the run up to Overlord.
96
   
This offensive against enemy shipping in Norwegian coastal waters was given 
added urgency by the arrival of the Tirpitz off Trondheim in January 1942.  The 
Tirpitz was sent to Norway to protect the German position and to tie down British 
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naval forces in the Atlantic away from other theatres,
97
 and the many operations 
launched against this battleship indicate that at the time it was considered a serious 
threat to British interests.  Furthermore, its presence in Norwegian waters became an 
additional encouragement for the RN, especially after air attack had failed, to work 
with SOE and make use of its unorthodox methods to help sink or at least severely 
disable this powerful vessel. 
It was not only SIS that supplied intelligence on the position and movements 
of the Tirpitz.
98
  SOE organisation, „Antrum‟, which had been established in the 
Ålesund district from December 1941, transmitted telegrams in February and March 
1942 that contained details on the location of the battleship.
99
  From February 1942, 
the first steps were also taken to establish the „Lark‟ team in the Trondheim area.  The 
objective of this SOE operation was to organise, train and arm local guerrilla groups 
in readiness to assist a still anticipated landing in Norway, but its location made it an 
important asset for gathering intelligence on and assisting operations against the 
Tirpitz.
100
 
In March 1942, the Admiralty requested that SOE consider ways of placing 
explosives close to the Tirpitz using a one-man submarine and it was the resultant 
project called „Frodesley‟ that ultimately led to the development of the Welman.  It 
was originally proffered that SOE recruits would be used to carry out the attack, but 
SOE saw it as a job for naval personnel and its role was therefore confined to 
supplying intelligence and possibly transportation.
101
  At the time, however, it appears 
that there was considerable urgency within the Admiralty to undertake some form of 
operation against the German battleship, and as the development of the Welman was a 
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long-term project „Frodesley‟ was dropped.102  Within this context in May 1942, SOE 
began to examine ways of carrying out sabotage against the Tirpitz, and these 
included attacking the submarine nets or smuggling explosives and incendiaries 
onboard the ship through using the „Lark‟ organisation.103  It also continued to 
provide intelligence on the battleship‟s position and defences.104   
In June 1942, however, SOE was approached by the Admiral (Submarines) 
and asked if it would co-operate in a plan to attack the Tirpitz in Åsenfjord, a branch 
of Trondheimsfjord.  This was Operation Title, a proposal to use Chariots to place 
explosives under the battleship.  By June 1942, this new craft was ready for its initial 
trials and therefore, despite an awareness that the German battleship was temporarily 
in northern Norway, preparations for „Title‟ were pressed on with.  The „Lark‟ 
organisation was initially asked to persuade a local man to lend his fishing boat so 
that the Chariots could be towed through the local security controls.  But when this 
failed it obtaining the paperwork that enabled SOE to produce the false documents 
that would allow a boat from the Shetlands to gain close proximity to the German 
battleship.  Preparations were also made by the „Lark‟ organisation to assist the 
escape of the fishing vessel and Chariot crews to Sweden after the operation had been 
completed.
105
  On 26 October 1942, two days after the Tirpitz had arrived back in 
Trondheim to be overhauled, the Norwegian fishing vessel, Arthur, crewed by four 
Norwegians from the Shetlands Base and with two Chariots and six naval personnel 
onboard, left the Shetlands.
106
  The operation was, however, never completed as the 
Chariots were lost whilst being towed in heavy seas.  
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The resolve to sink or disable the Tirpitz, however, remained, and led to 
further collaboration.  As early as October 1942, SOE was asked to provide a 
Norwegian fishing vessel for towing trials of a new and fully equipped miniature 
submarine, the X-craft.
107
  These would eventually be used in Operation Source, a 
successful attempt against the Tirpitz in September 1943.  The initial plan was to tow 
them to an island off Trondheim from where they would proceed independently to 
attack the German battleship.  As with „Title‟ the „Lark‟ organisation would help the 
submarine crews to escape to Sweden if they were forced to swim ashore.
108
  By 
February 1943, however, it had become clear that the craft would not be ready for an 
attack that spring and the operation was postponed to the following season.  In March 
1943, the Tirpitz joined the Scharnhorst in Narvik and then Altafjord in northern 
Norway.  As SOE had no presence in this area its involvement in Operation Source 
ended.
109
  
A significant number of sea-borne operations were carried out by SOE in 
Norwegian waters between 1940 and 1944.  They were a result of both the strategic 
importance placed on attacks against enemy shipping in this theatre and the level of 
collaboration that developed between SOE, the RN, and ultimately the Norwegian 
military authorities.  They were therefore a manifestation of the mix of influences that 
shaped SOE‟s activities in Norway.  Although these sea-borne operations were largely 
unsuccessful, it was never a result of Royal Naval intransigence or opposition.  It was 
not even because of SIS obduracy or the priority accorded to it in this theatre.  It was 
primarily owing to a factor outside everyone‟s control, the extreme conditions found 
in the North Sea during the autumn and winter months, which made any type of sea-
borne operation, especially one using a small fishing boat, kayak, or midget 
submarine, so precarious.  
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III 
SOE and the British and American Air Forces in Norway: Bombing, Sabotage, 
or a combination? 
SOE not only collaborated on sea-borne operations but also with attacks from the air, 
although in comparison to the scale of the strategic air campaign against Germany, 
Norway received very little attention.  Nevertheless, both the Royal Air Force (RAF) 
and the United States of America Army Air Force (USAAF) eventually carried out a 
small number of actions against selective targets in this theatre.
110
  In addition there 
was also the string of operations undertaken by the RAF and Fleet Air Arm against 
the Tirpitz, the dropping of thousands of mines in Norwegian coastal waters and the 
Skagerrak, and Coastal Command‟s campaign against enemy shipping.111  
Previous histories of SOE have tended to focus on its struggle with Bomber 
Command over the availability of aircraft.
112
  There was, however, another aspect to 
the relationship between these two parties that in the case of Norway was far more 
constructive.  From the autumn of 1940, one of SOE‟s objectives in this theatre was to 
make sure that it was in a position to render „active assistance‟ to attacks from the air 
on the few occasions that they were undertaken.
113
  When in the summer of 1941 
strategic bombing was upgraded to the „main campaign aimed at the “wearing down” 
of German power‟ and it was decided that sabotage should be directed „in accordance 
with the bombing policy aim‟, this link between SOE activities and air operations was 
confirmed.
114
  Consequently, from an early stage and throughout the occupation of 
Norway, SOE and the British and American Air Forces often co-operated in their 
efforts to attack important economic and military targets in Norway.   
The use of this powerful and devastating strategic instrument, however, also 
had potentially major implications for the civilian population, which often suffered as 
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a direct result of the RAF‟s recurring inability to hit the intended target.115  Therefore 
it became an important political issue.  The Norwegian government could not ignore 
collateral damage and a large number of civilian deaths, and consequently attempted 
to ensure through co-operation with its allies that strategic bombing was used 
sparingly in Norway and only against what were considered targets of legitimate 
military value.  Here it had some but not complete success.  Rather paradoxically, 
however, the Norwegian authorities through SOE were not adverse to calling on the 
RAF to assist in attacking targets in Norway if it was believed an operation could 
have an important internal political value, such as bolstering morale or encouraging 
resistance.   
Because of its political ramifications, the role of strategic bombing in Norway 
has attracted significant interest amongst Norwegian historians.
116
  Along with coup 
de main and sabotage operations, air attacks in Norway were from the beginning 
another strand of Britain‟s attritional policy and therefore as they both shared the 
same objective there was a good reason for SOE and the RAF to attempt to co-
ordinate their activities.  With, however, the bulk of Bomber Command‟s resources 
focused on Germany, along with the small number of strategic targets and the large 
distances involved, sabotage and coup de main operations were usually more suited to 
attacks against economic and military targets in Norway.  Consequently, unlike on the 
Continent they constituted the predominant means used to attack German power in 
this theatre.  Nevertheless, certain important sites could only be assaulted from the air 
and therefore when required SOE would not hesitate to turn to and collaborate with 
the RAF or USAAF, and if ultimately necessary ignore the concerns of the Norwegian 
authorities.  Decisions over whether to bomb or sabotage a target were therefore based 
on what was practical at the time, not a pre-determined policy.  The aim was 
ultimately the same: to deny Germany supplies of key war materials. 
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 In August 1941, the Butt Report after examining hundreds of photographs and flight reports 
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SOE and RAF collaboration in Norway began as early as the autumn of 1940.  
Representatives of SOE, including Charles Hambro, attended a meeting at the Air 
Ministry in November, which led to Operations Youth and Beauty, three attacks by 
Coastal Command‟s No 18 Group against the railway line and a hotel at Finse, which 
accommodated German troops, northeast of Bergen.
117
  SOE had already identified 
the Oslo-Bergen railway as a potential target and provided the Air Ministry with maps 
and cinefilms of the targets.  According to Coastal Command the aim of the 
operations was to encourage local resistance,
118
 and as SOE had already built up 
contacts with groups in this area, there is good reason to believe this is correct.
119
  
Regular meetings between SOE and Coastal Command were suggested and further 
targets considered, but at a time of restricted resources nothing appears to have come 
of this.  This was, however, a very early and typical example of how SOE was 
prepared to work alongside the RAF on operations in Norway. 
As shown, during 1941, raids were the predominate form of operation against 
economic and military targets in the Norwegian theatre.
120
  There were a small 
number of attacks carried out by the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command against 
economic targets along or close to the Norwegian coastline during the autumn and 
winter of 1941-1942.
121
  But at a time when Bomber Command lacked the resources 
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support its development.  Olav Riste, however, argues that the attacks were a defensive measure aimed 
at hampering any proposed invasion of Britain from Norway.  I have found no evidence to support this 
hypothesis and SOE „s „Claribel‟ schemes, which were designed exactly for this purpose, were not put 
together until after these operations were carried out.  PRO: papers entitled „Rebellion in Norway‟, 6 
August 1940 and „Norwegian Project‟, 3 November 1940‟, in HS2/128.  Riste, London regjeringa, vol. 
I, p. 108. 
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 See chapter five p. 149-150. 
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 In September 1941, planes from HMS Victorious, part of „Force M‟ that had sailed with the first 
convoy to the Soviet Union, attacked the quay to the A/S Frostfilet near Bodø, whilst planes from 823 
squadron attacked the power station at Glomfjord and the aluminium works in Haugvik.  In December 
1941and January 1942 planes from Coastal Command attacked herring oil factories along the 
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to undertake anything close to a sustained and widespread air campaign against 
Germany, Norway was largely ignored.
122
  Nevertheless, SOE began to prepare its 
own operations against major sites, and whilst putting these together it became clear 
that certain targets, because of size or location, were more suited to attacks from the 
air.  Consequently, toward the end of 1941 and in early 1942, SOE again turned to the 
RAF to carry out operations that it felt unable to undertake.   
From the spring of 1941, SOE‟s Norwegian section began to prepare 
Operation Clairvoyant, the proposed action against crucial hydroelectric power plants 
across southern Norway, including the one at Vemork, which was deemed more 
suitable for an air attack than sabotage.  The plan was that support would be provided 
by SOE on the ground through a party of three under Jens Poulsson, the future leader 
of the „Grouse‟ operation, which would light flares to lead the aircraft to the target.123  
This early proposal to attack Vemork is significant, however, not only because it 
shows that SOE was in certain cases prepared to recommend and assist an air attack, 
but because it is an example of a key military target in Norway around which 
crystallised the dilemma over what were the most suitable military means to use, both 
at a local operational level and politically.   
Bombing was initially abandoned because of the objections of the Norwegian 
military authorities,
124
 but the idea of using an air attack against Vemork never 
completely went away.  During preparations for Operation Freshman, COHQ saw a 
daylight raid by the American Air Force as the „best alternative‟ should their plans 
prove impracticable.  SOE apparently raised no objections to this, although they felt 
„in the best interests of future co-operation‟, General Hansteen should be informed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Norwegian coast. See: Hafsten (et al), Flyalarm: Luftkrigen over Norge 1939-1945, p. 126.  Den 
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archive, boks3a, mappe 10/3/8b. 
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beforehand.
125
  The Americans also approached the Norwegian authorities at this time 
suggesting a daylight-bombing raid by USAAF, but were turned down.
126
  After the 
failure of „Freshman‟ the idea of bombing was resurrected through Operation Gerd, a 
plan to attack either the intake dam for the water for the Vemork and Såheim power 
stations or the ventilator plant that regulated the supply of water.  Norwegian concerns 
over civilian casualties, however, meant an air attack was again at least temporarily 
sidelined.
127
     
By the summer of 1943, however, intelligence provided by the „Swallow‟ 
team made it clear that „Gunnerside‟, the SOE‟s sabotage operation against the 
Vemork plant the previous February, had not achieved the interruption in heavy water 
production that was expected. 
128
  Therefore, FO began to reconsider ways of halting 
supplies, including an attack on the intake dam or by stopping its transportation to 
Germany.  Leif Tronstad was, however, convinced that the bombing of the heavy 
water plant, which was structurally well protected, would fail.
129
  Nevertheless, SOE 
believed that every option should be considered, including an air attack.
130
  Moreover, 
there was still a great deal of uncertainty amongst the British and American 
authorities as to Germany‟s progress toward the development of an atomic bomb.  
Although through SIS and Norwegian authorities information and intelligence was 
obtained from several scientific sources including Leif Tronstad and Jomar Brun, 
Brunnulf Ottar and Professor Harald Wergeland in Norway, Njål Hole in Sweden, 
Paul Rosbaud in Germany, and Professor Nils Bohr in Denmark, it was „ extremely 
difficult to form a definite opinion as to the urgency and purpose‟ of Germany‟s 
atomic research.
131
  Therefore, the opinion within DSIR was that production at 
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Vemork should be stopped, and that „only a daylight bombing attack would be really 
successful‟.132  On 5 October 1943, Sir John Anderson, who had ministerial 
responsibility for Britain‟s atomic bomb project, asked SOE to produce an 
appreciation on the matter.  Based on a report produced by J. C. Adamson, SOE 
recommended that sabotage had little chance of success and that a daylight-bombing 
raid was the only effective way to end the production of heavy water in Norway.
133
  
Furthermore, by this time the American authorities also placed „great importance on 
the thorough destruction of the plant‟.134  There was therefore a growing consensus, 
despite Norwegian objections, that Vemork should and could only be attacked from 
the air. 
  Later in October, Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, contacted General 
Eaker commanding the American 8
th
 Air Force in Britain, who thought that „his 
forces would be able to attack the objective‟ [Vemork], as a „convenient alternative to 
targets in Germany when attacks on the latter were prevented by weather‟.135  
Consequently, on 16 November 1943, as part of Operation 131, 160 B-17 and B-24 
American aircraft from bases in Britain attacked the electrolytic hydrogen works at 
Vemork, where heavy water was produced, and twelve aircraft attacked the Norsk 
Hydro nitrate plant at Rjukan, a few miles down the same valley.
136
  Although the 
operation did not substantially damage the heavy water plant and only fifty kilograms 
of the liquid were destroyed, the bombing led to a decision by the authorities to 
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 On 16 November the American 8
th
 Air Force undertook Operation 131, which included three 
missions in Norway.  The first was against the Oslo-Kjeller aerodrome, with the Electrolytic Hydrogen 
plant at Vemork as a secondary target, and the nitrate plant at Rjukan as a target of „opportunity‟.  The 
second mission was against Knaben, with the nitrate plant at Rjukan as a target of „last resort‟.  The 
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attacked the primary target and 4 the target of opportunity.  For Mission no 1, 17 B-24s attacked the 
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Electrolytic Hydrogen works in Vemork, whilst 16 attacked the nitrate works in Rjukan. PRO: 
Operation 131, Provisional Main Reports, 18 November, in AIR40/481.       
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dismantle the site and transport the equipment and its contents to Germany.
137
  These 
attacks, which resulted in twenty-one civilian deaths, produced a sharp response from 
the Norwegian government, which had not been informed beforehand.  There was 
anger and frustration that they had not been consulted on the decision to bomb the 
plant, especially as since the summer of 1942 the Norwegian authorities had worked 
closely with the Air Ministry in producing a „target list‟ for Norway.  On the list 
Vemork was marked as a site better suited for attack by other means.  Nevertheless, as 
with other air operations in Norway, such as the one against the Nordisk Lettmetall 
(light metal) and Eidanger Salpeter (Saltpetre) plants on Herøya in southern Norway 
in July 1943, the Norwegian authorities often had little influence over the final choice 
of target, which was often decided by other factors such as economic and military 
priorities, opportunity, availability of resources, and even weather conditions.
138
 
SOE‟s contribution to the decision over whether or not to bomb the heavy 
water plant and its eventual support for an air attack is significant for a number of 
reasons.  It is a further illustration of how operations against key military targets in 
Norway were ultimately the result of a combination of factors.  The nature of the 
target: the production of heavy water was considered so important that a series of 
methods to halt production, including air attack, were considered and ultimately used.  
The political concerns of the Norwegian authorities did, however, have an impact and 
meant that an air operation was a last choice, although when sabotage failed to 
achieve the expected results, these concerns were put to one side and SOE, as it had 
from the beginning was fully prepared to support the use of air power.  This means 
that the previous assertions that SOE did not participate in the decision to bomb 
Vemork are incorrect: it was directly involved.
139
  This operation also illustrates that 
when a target was identified as being of major significance to the German war effort, 
the various military agencies, whether unorthodox and new such as SOE, or part of 
the „professional‟ military services such as the RAF, were fully prepared and capable 
of working together.  There was no pre-determined policy as to what were the best or 
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most expedient measures to use in Norway; the only policy was a shared commitment 
to take every opportunity and use whatever means available to undermine German 
power.    
Vemork was not the only economic target in Norway that SOE viewed as 
more suitable for air attack than a coup de main or sabotage operation.  The Knaben 
molybdenum mine near Fjotland in southern Norway was considered by the MEW as 
the „most outstanding objective in Norway from the economic point of view‟.140  
Molybdenum was used in the production and hardening of specialist steel for German 
armaments production and once war broke out Germany obtained eighty percent of its 
supplies from this mine.  Consequently, by the early autumn of 1941, SOE had begun 
to consider an operation against this site.
141
  It was, however, eventually decided that 
it was a target more suitable for an air attack, probably because of its position sixty 
miles from the coast in remote and difficult countryside.  Therefore, in March 1942, 
negotiations commenced with the Air Ministry to „secure the bombing of the Knaben 
mines‟, and arrangements were made with Operation Cheese II, Odd Starheim and 
Andreas Fasting, who had been dropped into southern Norway in January, to lay out 
guiding lights.   By mid April, Bomber Command had accepted the target but a few 
weeks later it advised SOE that there were not the „machines‟ available and 
consequently it was unable to undertake the operation.
142
   
SOE‟s project to put the Knaben mines out of action, which was given the 
code name „Alfriston‟, was, nevertheless, not abandoned and therefore during 1942 
there were negotiations involving SOE, COHQ and OSS as to what were the most 
suitable means to attack the plant.  SOE targeted the local power supplies, but 
believed a really effective operation would require a parachute attack against the mine 
installations, which fell under the remit of COHQ.  The position of the mine, 
however, made a successful withdrawal impossible and it was therefore offered as a 
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„suicide‟ operation to OSS.  All these proposals were, however, ultimately rejected 
because the „tactical difficulties were too great‟, and therefore it eventually came back 
to using air power.
143
   
By early 1943, after the small supply of molybdenum that Germany had 
obtained from French Morocco was cut off, Knaben became almost the sole source of 
this material and as a result by mid February 1943, Bomber Command had it „under 
review‟.144  Eventually, with assistance from FO, which provided important local 
intelligence, and SOE, which attempted to retain agents in the area of the mine, it 
agreed to undertake an air attack against the plant.  On 3 March 1943, therefore, ten 
Mosquito aircraft from No. 2 Group Bomber Command attacked Knaben, with the 
result that full production could not recommence until August.  This was followed by 
further attacks in November 1943, when 132 B-17s of the American 8
th
 Air Force 
dropped 282 tons of high explosive on the site, and again in December 1943.
145
 
Knaben is an additional but important example of how the strategic 
importance of a site was essential in determined the level of military interest and 
ultimately collaboration.  SOE accepted that it did not have the means to undertake an 
operation against such a difficult target and therefore it was fully prepared to work 
with COHQ, OSS, and ultimately the RAF in order to halt the production of this 
important war material.  It was quick to recognise that the best method was probably 
an air attack and in line with its stated policy set out to provide „active assistance‟.  
On this occasion SOE also had the support of the Norwegian authorities, and therefore 
collaboration between all parties was a central factor in determining both the nature 
and eventually the success of this operation. 
Co-operation between SOE and the RAF was not, however, confined to 
attacks against military or economic sites.  The Norwegian resistance, both civilian 
(Sivorg) and military (Milorg) through their government in London, and for political 
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reasons twice called on SOE to obtain the assistance of the RAF in attacks against 
targets in Norway.  In the summer of 1942, Sivorg requested the bombing of the 
headquarters of the German security police in Oslo, which included the offices of the 
Gestapo, and the RAF after the intervention of SOE attacked the site in September.  In 
December 1944, RAF undertook a further attack against the same target after a 
request from the leadership of Milorg was received through SOE.  Both operations 
achieved little, apart from the death of many civilians and the destruction of 
surrounding buildings, but these political gestures were considered legitimate by the 
Norwegian authorities and they were fully prepared to use their close relationship 
with SOE to gain the assistance of the RAF.
146
 
As the final stages of the war in Europe arrived, especially after the assault 
phase of Overlord was complete, air attacks against military targets in Norway, such 
as the U-boat bases in Bergen and Trondheim, oil and petrol stores, and enemy 
shipping, increased and were part of the final campaign against Germany.
147
  Calls for 
air support for SOE operations also continued, especially as part of the effort to slow 
down the movement of German forces southward through Norway in the winter of 
1944-1945, although on this occasion without success.  The request was given full 
consideration but it was believed that in this case the bombing effort was better 
targeted against shipping.
148
   
SOE recognised that in order to achieve its strategic objectives in Norway it 
would on occasion be required to assist and work with the RAF on operations in 
Norway.  The number of examples of collaboration is small, however, which was not 
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the result of difficult relations, but because most of the targets in Norway were more 
suitable for sabotage and therefore an air attack was unnecessary.  Moreover, the 
Norwegian government was also a significant restraining influence.  Nevertheless, 
sabotage was not always viable, and therefore in a number of high profile cases it was 
necessary to make use of air attack, even though the collateral damage, both 
physically and politically, could be significant. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Previous histories have tended to focus on collaboration or the lack of it between SOE 
and the Norwegian government and Milorg.  Collaboration, however, also extended to 
SOE‟s relations with the other British and American armed forces that took an interest 
in Norway, and was an additional significant element in the development and 
implementation of its policy in this theatre.  In the spring of 1942, soon after taking 
over from Hugh Dalton and in response to the many earlier criticisms that had been 
directed toward the organisation, Lord Selborne produced an examination of the 
current state of SOE.  In this report he described relations with „the Services‟ as 
„cordial‟.149  At a local operational level within Norway, however, as this chapter has 
shown, the relationship was also functional and often effective.   
The basis upon which this collaboration flourished, despite the difficulties in 
relations at a higher political level, was a shared strategic interest in this theatre.  
Norway was a country where other new organisations, such as Combined Operations, 
PWE, and OSS, along with the British and American armed services were able at little 
cost to undertake a small number of offensive operations against German interests.  
SOE‟s objective from an early stage was not only to contribute to these operations, 
but also to use collaboration as a means to achieving its own aims. 
It is, however, important to recognise that the interests of the Norwegian 
authorities also played a significant part in these collaborative efforts.  Close co-
operation with SOE gave the Norwegian High Command an important say in the 
planning and preparation of many of the military operations in Norway, and through a 
policy of working with its British allies, it made a considered effort to protect 
Norwegian interests.  This often had a major impact, as shown by the problems with 
subversive propaganda.  Moreover, both SOE and the other organisations operating in 
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 PRO: paper entitled „SOE‟, 10 April 1942, in HS8/898.   
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and around Norway were often dependent on Norwegian personnel, local intelligence, 
and expertise, and therefore could not regularly afford to ignore Norwegian concerns, 
unless a target was considered to be such a serious threat to the Allied cause, as in the 
case of heavy water production, that political issues were simply ignored. 
The previous chapters have shown that although SOE‟s policy and ultimately 
its operations in Norway were founded on broader strategic factors, and further 
shaped by its relations with the Norwegian authorities and resistance, they were also 
often dependent upon and therefore influenced by the level of its co-operation with 
the other organisations operating in this theatre.   Nevertheless, as the final two 
chapters will show, SOE undertook most of its activities in this country without the 
direct involvement of the other British and American agencies. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SOE OPERATIONS IN NORWAY 1940-1944: THE COMBINATION OF 
SABOTAGE AND THE ORGANISATION OF A CLANDESTINE ARMY 
 
 
Introduction 
 Most of SOE‟s activities within Norway were prepared under its direct guidance, 
although with the important proviso that they were ultimately carried out in co-
operation with the Norwegian authorities through FO, and later Milorg.  This chapter 
will examine SOE operations in Norway from the autumn of 1940 until the spring of 
1944, whilst the next chapter will appraise its activities within the very different 
context of the final twelve months of the war in Europe and during the run up to the 
country‟s eventual liberation.  They will illustrate how the strategic and external 
political influences, which shaped policy, combined with local operational difficulties 
to determine the nature, extent and outcome of what was the culmination of SOE 
interest in this theatre, its operations.      
In the first instance SOE‟s activities in Norway reflected the composite nature 
of its policy.  The immediate objective was to contribute to a British „strategy of 
attrition‟ that aimed to stretch and wear down the enemy.1  This led to the series of 
attacks against major economic and military sites in Norway that commenced in 1942 
and which intensified during 1943 in order to help prepare the way for an invasion of 
northwest Europe in 1944.
2
  These will be examined in the first section of this 
chapter.  Alongside this, although completely separately, SOE was to prepare the 
ground for future „offensive operations‟ in southern Norway3 through organising a 
secret guerrilla army that would come into action and operate behind enemy lines in 
support of a landing by regular forces.  From the end of 1940, therefore, operations 
were instigated for the purpose of making contact with, controlling, and preparing 
local resistance groups in the key strategic areas of the country.  These operations will 
                                                          
 
1
 PRO: COS (40) 27 (0), „Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy‟, 25 November 1940, in CAB 
80/56. 
2
 PRO: COS (43) 142 (0), „Special Operations Directive for 1943‟, 20 March 1943, in CAB 80/68. 
PRO: paper entitled, „The Prospects of Subversion: A Country by Country Analysis‟, 21 April 1941, in 
HS8/272. 
3
 PRO: COS (40) 27 (0), „Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy‟, 25 November 1940, in CAB 
80/56.  
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be examined in the second section of this chapter.  Norway‟s geographically marginal 
position, however, ultimately meant that a landing by a British or Allied 
Expeditionary force to liberate part or the whole of the country never had strategic 
validity or was militarily viable.  This had an important impact on long-term activity 
as SOE and Milorg groups had to be kept in situ in an occupied country for an 
indeterminate time period and in conditions of uncertainty about the future.  They 
were also subject to regular infiltration and break up as a result of the activities of the 
German and Norwegian Nazi police organisations, and plagued by a shortage of arms, 
equipment, and transportation.  Therefore, the whole process of organising a secret 
army was patchy and hesitant.   
By mid 1943, however, SOE was aware that Norway‟s subordinate position 
meant that its liberation was dependent on the eventual progress and success of Allied 
operations elsewhere in Europe.  This meant that a secret army had to be adequately 
prepared to deal with a number of possible scenarios such as a German collapse or 
withdrawal, and not just an invasion, and with Allied resources concentrated 
elsewhere it also became apparent that clandestine forces would probably undertake a 
significant role in the country‟s liberation.  Accordingly, it became progressively 
important to protect it from infiltration and break up by informers, who were so 
dangerous to its long-term integrity.  As a result a number of operations were 
instigated to undertake the assassination of individuals who it was believed posed a 
serious threat to both SOE and Milorg.  These will be examined in the third section of 
this chapter.    
As these were joint operations, Norwegian interests also played a part in 
determining their eventual shape and outcome.  Protection of Milorg and the 
Norwegian population from German reprisals meant that before 1944 almost all 
sabotage in Norway was undertaken by NIC (1) teams sent in from outside and 
confined to coup de main operations, lightning strikes by small groups against targets 
of agreed military or economic value.  Every effort was made to give the appearance 
that these were British operations.  Although, as the pressure to intensify sabotage 
increased during 1943, SOE teams began to stay in the country longer, especially in 
the Oslo area, and they often made use of local help.  Nonetheless, by having to use 
only teams sent in from outside these operations were subject to the limitations 
imposed by the difficult weather conditions and long daylight hours found so far 
north.  The initial attempts to organise a secret army without the full and equal 
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involvement of Milorg also made the whole process problematic and at times even 
dangerous.  Nevertheless, after the changes in the internal structure of Milorg that led 
to the decision to work with its leadership, co-operation gradually improved.  From 
this point SOE teams increasingly assisted Milorg groups, and it was collaboration at 
a local level that became the basis upon which preparations for the liberation were 
intensified during the final months of the occupation. 
    
 
I 
SOE’s short-term activities in Norway prior to 1944: coup de main operations 
SOE‟s short-term objective in Norway was to contribute to the application of 
economic and military pressure against Germany and between early 1941 and 
September 1944, it considered, planned, attempted, or completed at least twenty-
seven coup de main or sabotage operations in Norway.  Only thirteen of these, 
however, had some success, less than fifty percent, and therefore the overall scale of 
SOE sabotage in Norway prior to 1944 was relatively small.  Seventeen operations, 
the majority, targeted specialist ores or the production of specialist metals, four 
targeted shipping, two the production and transportation of heavy water, one a 
frostfilet factory, one the quays at Narvik, one the rail network, and one Sola 
aerodrome outside Stavanger.  The majority of the actions were therefore against 
economic targets.  Preparation and planning began in the spring of 1941,
4
 and the first 
attempted operation against a military target in Norway by a small team sent in from 
Britain was undertaken in April of that year.  The first major operation, „Redshank‟, 
against the Orkla pyrite mines close to Trondheim was not, however, successfully 
carried out until May 1942 and only one further action was completed in that year.  
Coup de main attacks in Norway were therefore slow to get going and confined to a 
comparatively small time period of two years.  Nevertheless, fifteen operations were 
considered, proposed or completed between the beginning of 1943 and summer 1944, 
which is when SOE attacks against strategic targets in Norway, reached their peak.
5
         
In the autumn of 1940, SOE decided that using small, specially trained teams 
sent in from outside was the best method of sabotaging major strategic targets in 
                                                          
4
 The work of classifying and studying Norwegian targets was carried out methodically and assisted by 
the MEW, which supplied a list of priorities.  NHM: „Consolidated Progress report of S Section‟, week 
ending 28 January 1941, in SOE archive, boks 3a, mappe 10/3/8b.   
5
 For details see: Appendix D, „SOE Coup de Main Operations in Norway 1940-1944‟, pp. 323-327. 
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Norway.  These teams would not be „brought in touch‟ with local resistance groups, 
and would remain „quite distinct‟ from them.  They would also have „intensive 
training and rehearsals for attacks on a particular objective‟ and only remain in the 
country for a short period of time before retreating across the border into Sweden.
6
  
To be able to undertake these operations successfully, however, SOE needed to enlist 
Norwegian volunteers and provide them with the necessary training.  It took twelve 
months from the autumn of 1940 for SOE to increase its total of fully trained 
Norwegian recruits from six to sixty-four.
7
  Therefore, during 1941 it was only able to 
carry out one sabotage action in Norway, Operation Barbara, which was a largely 
unsuccessful attack against the rail network around Trondheim.  To obtain the 
required manpower, this operation used a team of eight Scandinavians recruited in 
Sweden.  Nevertheless, it was necessary to send these men to Britain for their 
training, which was carried out in the Shetlands in over just three weeks by a SOE 
captain sent up from London.  They were then returned to Norway by fishing boat, 
although it took three attempts before they were successfully landed on the 
Norwegian coast.
8
  „Barbara‟ symbolises the improvised and amateurish approach that 
SOE was forced to adopt at a time when as a new organisation it was still building up 
and developing its infrastructure.
9
  To send teams into Norway from outside, whether 
across the North Sea or via Stockholm required transportation, and in the first half of 
1941 only six sorties were flown to northwest Europe on behalf of SOE, and none to 
Norway.  Transport was therefore confined to the handful of small fishing vessels 
operating out of the Shetlands Base, which were subject to the dreadful weather 
conditions that regularly occur off the Norwegian coastline, sidelined by the long 
hours of daylight in the summer, and had a regular propensity to break down.
10
  On 
top of all these logistical problems there was the Prime Minister‟s opposition to 
operations of a „trivial‟ nature in Norway, which not only meant that SOE did not 
                                                          
6
 PRO: paper entitled, „Norwegian Policy‟, 11 December 1940, in HS2/128. 
7
 For full details on the training of Norwegian recruits, see chapter one, pp. 43-44.  
8
 For full details see: Appendix D, „SOE Coup de Main Operations in Norway 1940-1944‟, pp. 323-
327.  See also: note from MZ (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson) to S (Lt. Colonel H. N. Sporborg), 27 February 
1941, telegram from Lerwick, 8 March 1941, and telegram from Lerwick to SO2, 5 April 1941, all in 
HS2/207.   
9
 SOE inherited very little in terms of training establishments from its predecessors. It took over the 
paramilitary training schools in Scotland from MI (R) and Station VII in Hertfordshire from Section D. 
See: Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, pp. 729-736.    
10
 PRO: paper entitled „The Organisation and Control of Special Duty (SD) Operations in northwest 
Europe 1940-1945‟ in AIR20/8224.  SOE Executive Committee - weekly progress reports, week 
ending 21 January 1942, in HS8/220.      
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have backing at the highest level for its policy, but which also created a certain degree 
of uncertainty over its immediate direction.
11
  There were, therefore, severe 
limitations on what this new organisation could achieve in this theatre before 1942. 
Moreover, SOE activities were also circumscribed after its plans to set up 
local sabotage groups to organise attacks against selected targets had by the autumn of 
1941 been postponed in deference to the sensitivity of the Norwegian government to 
the involvement of the civilian population in such actions.
12
  Prior to this some 
sabotage had been attempted or undertaken inside Norway, but without large-scale 
local support was small and ineffectual.  Malcolm Munthe‟s presence at the British 
Legation in Stockholm had provided an early opportunity to instigate operations from 
Swedish soil.  A Norwegian volunteer recruited in Sweden and contacts that Munthe 
had in Oslo were behind an attack on the Oslo-Bergen railway in the winter of 
1940/1941, which resulted in the blowing up of an engine in a tunnel near Voss.   In 
July 1941, Munthe also arranged the placing of „delayed action bomb‟ on a goods 
train that was on its way to Norway.  Unfortunately the bomb went off prematurely 
whilst the train was at Krylbø in central Sweden.  It appears that the aim was to 
disrupt the transportation of armaments from Germany through Sweden to Norway, 
but it just exacerbated relations with the Swedish authorities.
 13
    
These activities were minor, improvised, achieved very little, but were an 
early attempt to do something, move forward, and at least begin the process of making 
Norway a burden on Germany‟s war effort.  At this early stage, however, SOE was 
not capable of launching a widespread sabotage campaign in Norway, especially 
without considerable local support, and therefore its efforts were little more than 
tokenism.  More significant at this time were the preparations that SOE began for 
operations against the mining and production of specialist ores and metals in Norway.  
Early indications of intent were operations „Gertrude‟ and „Landlubber‟, the plans to 
disrupt the supplies of sulphur and ferrochrome to Germany.  These were followed, 
probably as a result of the Prime Minister‟s renewed interest in interdicting the 
transportation of Swedish iron-ore through Norway, by a plan to revise Operation 
Arctic, the old MI (R) plan to sink vessels alongside the quays at Narvik.
14
  Alongside 
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 See chapter two, p. 66-67. 
12
 See chapter three, pp. 103. 
13
 Munthe, How Sweet is War, pp. 129, 132, 149.   
14
 PRO: „Reports, various – Directives and Heads of Sections plans and projects, as at 5 March 1941, in 
HS8/231. Letter from W.S. Churchill to the First Sea Lord, 26 December 1940, in PREM 3/328/6.  
 226 
this SOE began to prepare Operation Clairvoyant its most ambitious plan for 
Norway,
15
 which apart from its scale was typical of SOE coup de main operations in 
this theatre, the influences behind them and the problems of execution.  It, therefore, 
deserves further and closer attention.   
The objective of „Clairvoyant‟ was,16 through attacking the hydroelectric 
plants and ferries in southern Norway, to „immobilise part of the industries in 
Norway‟ that were „of vital importance to the enemy‟.  The primary target was the 
aluminium industry, and it was hoped that the production of aluminium oxide and 
metal could be stopped for at least six months.
17
  At the outbreak of war Norway was 
the sixth largest producer of this metal in the world, and after the occupation Germany 
decided that it would base its future expansion of the Luftwaffe on Norwegian 
supplies.
18
  Preparations for „Clairvoyant‟ were protracted; they began in the spring of 
1941, continued through the summer and autumn, and were ready by early 1942.
19
  
The initial plan was to attack seven different sites in southern Norway using six 
parties, of which five would be dropped on the same night using up to three Halifax 
aircraft and one transported by fishing vessel.  By the third week of January 1942, 
however, probably due to the difficulties of obtaining transportation, the number of 
targets had been reduced to four.
20
  The implementation of the operation was far more 
difficult than the preparation.  It proved to be impossible to obtain the necessary 
aircraft, either directly through the Air Ministry or by means of the COS, and as the 
Norwegian authorities objected to most of the targets „Clairvoyant‟ was eventually 
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 NHM: Consolidated Progress report of S Section, week ending 4 March 1941, in SOE archive, boks 
3a, mappe 10/3/8b.   
16
 William Mackenzie mentions „Clairvoyant‟ in passing but incorrectly states that not a single party 
was dispatched.  Norwegian works do not make any reference to the operation.  See: Mackenzie, The 
Secret History of SOE, p. 206.  Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, and Riste, London regjeringa, vols. I & II. 
17
 PRO: letter from Lt. H. N. Sporborg to Air Vice Marshal C. E. H. Medhurst, (Air Ministry), ref. 
FN/NO/536, including paper entitled „Clairvoyant‟, 2 January 1942, in HS2/218.  For further details 
see: Appendix D, „SOE Coup de Main Operations in Norway, 1940-1944‟, pp. 323-327. 
18
 Norwegian aluminium production had been built up with significant British support. Normal 
Norwegian production was around 30,000 tonn (metric ton), but Göring planned that by 1943 this 
would increase to 180,000 tonn per year.  The plans proved a fiasco and in 1943 Germany received 
only 17,256 tonn.  See: Milward, The Fascist Economy in Norway, p. 173.  Paulsen, „Tysk økonomisk 
politikk i Norge 1940-1945‟, in Dahl (ed.), Krigen i Norge, pp. 77-86.     
19
 It was initially planned to undertake the operation in autumn 1941 but training did not begin until 
late September under the guidance of Captain Rudolpho and J. L. Chaworth-Musters.  Special 
explosive devices were developed to blow-up the intake pipelines to the power stations. See: NHM: 
„Consolidated Progress reports of S Section‟, weeks ending, 4 March, 29 April, 24 September 1941, in 
SOE archive, boks 3a, mappe 10/3/8b.  PRO: SOE Executive Committee - weekly progress reports for 
months of November and December 1941 in HS8/219. 
20
 PRO: COS (42) 27
th
 meeting, 24 January 1942, cited in CAB121/306.  SOE Executive Committee - 
weekly progress report, for 21 January 1942, in HS8/220.    
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scaled back even further to just one attack against the important Høyanger aluminium 
works north of Bergen.  One attempt was made to drop a sabotage team on the night 
of 25/26 February but owing to the poor weather conditions the aircraft was forced 
return to the UK.  The operation was eventually postponed after members of this team 
were involved in a fatal car crash.  It was revived the following autumn, with plans to 
use SOE‟s  „Pheasant‟ party to reconnoitre the site, but by the beginning of 1943 it 
appears to have been dropped and this time it was never resurrected.
21
 
„Clairvoyant‟ was an over ambitious plan, especially for its time, but although 
it was never successfully completed it is important because it encapsulates the many 
factors that shaped such operations in this theatre.  The primary influence was 
strategic, the aluminium industry in Norway, but the political concerns of the 
Norwegian authorities, which wished to avoid unnecessary damage to the country‟s 
economic infrastructure,
22
 meant that SOE was forced to curtail its ambitions.  
Undertaking coup de main operations using teams sent in from Britain, also meant 
that they were subject to a whole range of logistical and local operational issues, 
particularly the availability of transport and the weather conditions.   
During 1941, SOE planned and prepared operations against several other 
important economic targets in Norway, such as the Knaben molybdenum mine, 
although this was eventually seen as more suitable for an attack by other means.
23
  
The target that received most attention between 1941 and 1944 was the mining and 
export of iron pyrites from the Orkla mines at Løkken just south west of Trondheim.  
The operations against this site are further examples of the array of factors that came 
together to shape SOE coup de main actions in Norway and ultimately limit what the 
organisation could militarily achieve.  About half a million tons per annum of this raw 
material was exported to Germany in the years running up to the outbreak of war, 
which provided about twenty-five percent of its requirements of sulphur and copper.  
After the outbreak of war, however, as ammunition production expanded, Germany‟s 
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 Høyanger was particularly important because it was the only smelting plant to have an alumina plant 
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DEFE2/219. 
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 See chapter six, p. 216. 
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own pyrite mines quickly reached full capacity and therefore Norway became an 
increasingly important source of supply.
24
  Probably owing to Charles Hambro‟s 
influence and previous contacts, the British quickly recognised the strategic 
importance of Orkla and by June 1941 a SOE operation called „Burnous‟, a plan to 
attack the mine and refining process, had been put together.  At the end of August, 
however, it was accepted that the mine was too large for SOE to be able to put it out 
of action for a significant length of time, and therefore it was decided to concentrate 
on the transportation of the ore.
25
  This was typical of many sabotage operations in 
Norway in that a direct assault against the target was often ruled out and it was the 
local transport system or power supplies that were deemed a weak point and more 
suitable for an attack by a small team inserted from outside.  Consequently, between 
May 1942 and the spring of 1944, a total of four joint SOE and FO operations using 
NICI (1) personnel were carried out against Orkla: a final operation „Dodworth‟ was 
commenced in summer 1944 but abandoned due „strong defences‟ and an „altered 
general situation‟ before it could be completed.  These consisted of one attack against 
the transformer station that helped regulate the supply of power to the thirty-kilometre 
railway line between the mine and local port at Thamshavn, an attack against shipping 
at the port, and two attacks against the electric locomotives that transported the ore.
26
  
The regularity of these assaults illustrate the significance placed on Norwegian pyrite 
exports to Germany up to the summer of 1944, especially after Italy, the other major 
source of sulphur, was closed off in 1943.
27
  As these attacks were directed against the 
transportation of the materials and not the plant, they were fully supported by the 
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 Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 222.  PRO: memo from SN (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson) to D/CD (0), 
(Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins), ref. SN/1775, 1 October 1942, in HS2/129. 
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Norwegian authorities.
28
  The location of Orkla, close to the Norwegian coast and the 
Swedish border also made it accessible by sea, land or air, and despite some 
objections by SIS the operations went ahead and had some limited success.
29
  It 
appears that the first operation against the site, „Redshank‟, in May 1942, reduced the 
transport capacity of the railway line by fifty percent for six months and by the 
summer of 1944, only one locomotive was left operating on the Thamshavn railway.  
In desperation the German authorities decided to widen the tracks so that standard 
Norwegian steam locomotives could be used, but the work was not finished until early 
May 1945, too late to be of use.  Consequently, exports during the final months of the 
war were significantly disrupted.
30
  Nevertheless, the actions of the plant management 
probably had a greater overall impact on production and deliveries to Germany.  They 
ensured that only the poorest quality ore was exported and that production levels at 
the mine were forty percent lower than they could have been if the German authorities 
had taken over its running.
31
 The effect of sabotage was invariably only temporary 
and short-term. 
Between 1942 and summer 1944, a further six operations were planned or 
undertaken against the mining and production of specialist ores in Norway.  Only two, 
however, were successfully completed.  These were Operation Kestral against the 
Fosdalen iron ore mines north of Trondheim in October 1942 and Operation Company 
against the Arendal Smelteverk (furnace) at Eydehavn in southern Norway in 
November 1943.  Production was reduced by twenty-five percent for two months at 
Fosdalen and at Arendal Smelteverk, which produced 4000 tons of ferro-silicum 
annually for Germany, production was stopped for six months.
 32
  These attacks also 
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had the full support of the Norwegian authorities, which through NIC (1) supplied the 
men, provided local intelligence, and co-operated in their planning.  Nevertheless, the 
outcome of many other operations was less satisfactory.  Teams sent into Norway 
across the North Sea were firstly subject to the vagaries of the extreme weather 
conditions often found this far north, and which made operating in this theatre even 
more problematic and dangerous.  Industrial targets were often in remote locations, 
especially in the north, which with the huge distances involved made access from the 
UK extremely difficult.  On these occasions both the fishing boats and air transport 
were not viable, and therefore SOE was often reliant on the availability of 
submarines.  After their arrival in occupied Norway they also had to avoid detection 
by the German and Norwegian security police and then overcome the extensive 
security measures that were put in place to protect these important industrial and 
military sites.  It is therefore not surprising that many operations were either 
abandoned or ended in tragedy. 
The team sent on Operation Marshfield in November 1942, an attack on the 
Rødsand iron ore mines south of Trondheim, disappeared without trace.
33
  A second 
attempt to carry out Operation Seagull in February 1943, a planned attack against the 
mines at Sulitjelma in northern Norway, which had the capacity to produce up to 
140,000 tons of pyrites per annum, ended in disaster when the submarine carrying the 
party vanished.  A final attempt against this site in the summer of 1944, Operation 
Docklow, was recalled at the last moment when it was discovered that transportation 
of materials to Germany had ceased.
34
  The Sulitjelma mines, although strategically 
important, proved too distant and inaccessible for SOE ever to carry out a successful 
operation against them.  Operation Midhurst, the plan to attack the frostfilet factories 
in Hammerfest and Melbu in northern Norway in early 1943 was also abandoned 
because of security fears in the area.
35
     
SOE operations were not, however, confined to attacks against the mining or 
transportation of specialist ores or metals.  There were other sites of strategic 
importance.  In early 1942, the Air Ministry approached SOE to assist in an operation 
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against the Focke-Wulf Kondor reconnaissance bombers that used Sola airfield 
outside Stavanger.  These bombers had proved a significant threat to British merchant 
shipping crossing the Atlantic and therefore SOE made strenuous efforts, in co-
operation with the Norwegian authorities, to sabotage the aircraft, but again the 
difficulties of inserting a team into the Stavanger area from outside proved 
insurmountable.  By the spring of 1942 a party of three men was standing by ready to 
go and one effort to deliver them was made in the second half of May, but due to 
complete cloud cover the attempt was cancelled and the aircraft returned to the UK.  
After this, owing to the longer daylight hours, the operation was postponed and it 
appears that it was never resurrected. 
36
 
Perhaps the best known coup de main operation that SOE undertook during 
the war is „Gunnerside‟, the attack against the concentration plant for heavy water at 
Vemork in February 1943.  The details of this operation have been recounted so often 
that they will not be repeated here.
37
  Nevertheless, there are some important aspects 
to this operation that have not been extensively highlighted before and which are 
particularly pertinent to this thesis.   
„Gunnerside‟ was one of the series of attacks planned or undertaken against 
heavy water production in Norway between 1941 and 1944.
38
  SOE was involved in 
all of these, although „Gunnerside‟ was significantly the first specifically joint 
SOE/FO operation.
39
  The interests and involvement of the Norwegian authorities 
were important factors in all these attacks, but in the case of „Gunnerside‟, they were 
crucial.  The Norsk Hydro factory at Rjukan manufactured 200,000 tons of fertiliser 
per annum using the hydrogen and oxygen produced at its electrolysis plant at 
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Vemork further up the Vestfjord valley.
40
  Both sites were therefore two parts of a 
major concern that employed a large section of the local population and made a 
significant contribution to the Norwegian economy.  Accordingly, it was always 
important for the Norwegian government to ensure that damage to these works and 
not just the local hydroelectric power station, was minimised.  Consequently, FO 
enthusiastically promoted „Gunnerside‟, not only because it was its suggestion, but 
also because it was a precision operation directed at the heavy water equipment and 
stocks and therefore would restrict both the economic and structural damage to the 
remainder of the plant.
41
  The intelligence supplied by Jomar Brun and Leif Tronstad 
also meant that a wooden mock-up of the high concentration plant could be built and 
used to prepare for the operation.  This was an important contributory factor in 
ensuring that the attack was exact and ultimately successfully executed.
42
  Therefore, 
although „Gunnerside‟ was typical of SOE‟s coup de main operations in Norway in 
that it set out to deny Germany what was believed to be a critical war material, it was 
also a product of Norwegian concerns and the desire for a more measured and precise 
approach that would result in less long-term damage to the country‟s immediate and 
possibly post-war industrial and commercial interests. 
On the night of 27/28 February 1943, the „Gunnerside‟ team along with the 
„Swallow‟ party, which had been in the area since the failed „Freshman‟ operation, 
successfully destroyed the bulk of the heavy water high concentration plant at 
Vemork.
43
  This led to the loss of 400 kilograms of production, and 500 kilograms of 
heavy water in situ.
44
  It did not, however, lead to the eighteen-month interruption in 
production that was SOE‟s objective45 and sensational and exaggerated claims that it 
halted Hitler‟s „advance‟ toward an atomic bomb are difficult to substantiate.46  In 
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June 1943, the plant produced the highest monthly quantity heavy water of the war 
and transportation to Germany was quickly recommenced, which was why it was 
decided to bomb the site. The Germans re-established production by moving 
concentration cells intended for another new plant at Såheim, a few kilometres away, 
to Vemork, and by bringing back 100 Kgs of 97.5% partially diluted heavy water 
from Germany.
47
  The operation, therefore, again indicates that the effect of coup de 
main attacks in Norway, although brilliantly executed, was largely only disruptive and 
temporary, and therefore sites, such as Orkla and Vemork, had to be regularly 
revisited.     
„Gunnerside‟, and other operations against economic and military targets in 
Norway, however, did have another perhaps more valuable strategic outcome.  They 
created local security scares that forced the German authorities to position significant 
troop numbers in remote areas.  In March 1943, Lt. Col. Wilson expressed the view 
that recent operations such as „Gunnerside‟ had kept „the German occupying forces on 
the move and on tenterhooks‟.48  And after the operation 2800 enemy soldiers were 
employed to search for the sabotage party on Hardangervidda, the mountain plateau 
in southern Norway.  Around 5000 men were also stationed in German military 
barracks in the area around Orkdal close to the Orkla pyrite mine.  These attacks, 
therefore, taken in totality made a significant contribution to SOE‟s objective of 
ensuring that „as far as possible‟ it did everything within its power to increase 
„Germany‟s security commitments‟ in Norway.49  
Although the origins of coup de main attacks were strategic, not only their 
form but also the nature of their implementation was influenced by Norwegian 
concerns.  Despite being SOE/FO collaborations local Milorg groups had no direct 
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involvement in carrying out these operations.
50
  The aim was to give the appearance 
that they were purely British and thereby avoid possible reprisals against the local 
population and resistance groups.  During the first SOE coup de main attack in 
Norway in May 1942 - Operation Redshank - the party took a parachute badge with 
them, which it was planned would be left behind to indicate that the British had 
carried out the attack.  The „Gunnerside‟ team wore British uniforms and even 
brought uniforms with them for the „Swallow‟ party.51  By making these operations 
appear British, SOE coup de main operations did not on the whole result in 
widespread reprisals against the local population, so politically they did not present 
SOE with any significant problems.  After „Redshank‟, the Germans took six 
hostages, who were held responsible for any further actions.  But despite the later 
attacks it does not appear that any major retribution was inflicted on the area.  After 
„Gunnerside‟ the Germans eventually arrested around 250 Norwegians, burnt down 
mountain huts, and forced members of the local resistance to go under cover or flee, 
but there were no extensive loss of life.  The exception was Operation Kestrel, which 
along with „Musketoon‟, and the killing of two German soldiers by members of 
SOE‟s „Heron‟ team, led to the series of arrests in the counties of Trøndelag, 
Nordland, and Troms and the eventual execution of thirty-four Norwegians.  In this 
case, however, it was the unique occurrence of all three operations happening within a 
few weeks of each other and in close proximity, which gave the Germans an excuse to 
institute a wave of terror in the region.  Furthermore, although these activities 
undoubtedly made conditions extremely difficult for local resistance groups, which 
were often broken up or forced to go into hiding, they had all been approved by the 
Norwegian military authorities through the ANCC and were undertaken by men from 
a unit of the Royal Norwegian army.  They were therefore joint operations and they 
did not result in any major difficulties for SOE.  According to Lt. Colonel Wilson, 
Oscar Torp, the Norwegian Minister of Defence consistently withstood every attempt 
to make reprisals „a political instead of a military question‟.52 
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As the strategic priority in northwest Europe during 1943 was to help prepare 
the way for an invasion in 1944, it became increasingly important to maintain the 
pressure on Germany, deny it important resources and to ensure its forces remained 
stretched across the European mainland and Scandinavia.  SOE was, therefore, 
instructed to prioritise and prepare attacks not only against „industrial targets‟ but also 
coastal shipping and German communications.
53
  In the Oslo area this led, through 
operations „Chaffinch‟, „Mardonius‟, „Bundle‟, and „Goldfinch‟, to a number of 
attacks against enemy vessels.  Notwithstanding this in the two years between the 
spring of 1943 and the spring of 1945 only six ships were significantly damaged by 
sabotage, and therefore it appears that SOE‟s efforts had only a very limited impact.54  
Moreover, the reservations within SOE regarding attacks against the Norwegian rail 
network because of the „political issues‟ involved, and the instructions from the COS 
that such operations should be avoided until the „moment to strike‟ came, had an 
important impact on the nature and timing of this category of operation.  In October 
1943, COSSAC instructed SOE to plan for the „possible future interruption of railway 
communications‟, although no overt action was permitted without authority.55  
Consequently, the three teams, „Grebe‟, „Lapwing‟, and „Fieldfare‟, and the leader of 
a fourth operation, „Woodpecker‟, which between the autumn of 1943 and the spring 
of 1944 were parachuted into Norway with variable success, were only instructed to 
reconnoitre the railways with a view to future action.  They would only disrupt enemy 
troop movements in the case of either an Allied invasion or a German withdrawal 
from Norway.
56
  These teams therefore had a long wait often in difficult conditions, as 
it was not until the end of 1944, when it was agreed that the transfer of German 
divisions from Norway could be a potential threat to the Allied advance into 
Germany, that they were called into action.        
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Despite the increased importance placed on sabotage during 1943, it was also 
still only NIC (1) teams that undertook coup de main operations in Norway on behalf 
of SOE and Norwegian authorities.  Nevertheless, there were the first signs of a 
change in the nature of these operations: a change that became widespread during 
1944.  The increased emphasis placed on attacks against targets of value to Germany 
led to the instruction from SOE for its „organisations‟ in the „more populated‟ areas of 
Norway to engage in „open‟ sabotage,57 and this ultimately had a significant impact at 
a local operational level.  NIC (1) teams began to stay in the country, especially 
around Oslo and Bergen, for longer periods, sometimes several months, and often 
undertook a number of tasks, including weapons instruction and sabotage.
58
  They 
also began to make use of local recruits, sometimes from Milorg, to directly assist 
them in carrying out an operation.  „Mardonius‟, the operation to sink enemy shipping 
in Oslo harbour during the spring of 1943 stayed in Norway for several weeks.  There 
was particularly stringent security around the Oslo port area and therefore it took a 
great deal of preparation before any attacks could be undertaken.  The team of two, 
Max Manus and Gregers Gram, was also instructed to train local volunteers and 
eventually received considerable help from employees at the workshops where enemy 
ships were repaired.  Sigurd Jacobsen, who had „quite a high position‟ within Milorg, 
provided considerable assistance by placing limpet mines on three vessels, although 
none of these exploded.
59
  SOE‟s final operation against the heavy water produced at 
Vemork was carried out in early 1944.
60
  On 20 February, a team of Norwegian 
saboteurs including Knut Haukelid, who had arrived in Norway as part of the 
„Gunnerside‟ team, sank the train ferry that linked the railheads at either end of Lake 
Tinnsjø, east of Rjukan.  On board the ferry were most of the remaining stocks of 
diluted heavy water, which the Germans were transporting back home after deciding 
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the previous December to end production.  Militarily it was largely a successful 
operation, although fourteen civilians lost their lives.
61
  The objective was once again 
to interdict the supply of a major war material to Germany and despite a clear risk to 
the local population the operation was approved by the Norwegian Minister of 
Defence, seemingly with little hesitation.
62
  It was, however, particularly significant 
because it was organised and undertaken by a SOE operative who had been in the 
country for a long period, in direct collaboration with Knut Lier Hansen from Milorg 
and Rolf Sørli, the leader of „B-org‟ (the industrial resistance organisation) in Rjukan.  
It was, therefore, a joint operation involving SOE and local resistance members and 
indicative of how sabotage would be carried out in Norway during the final months of 
the occupation.
63
   
Whilst Milorg‟s official policy continued as before: to keep their organisation 
intact and not to become active prior to the liberation, especially if operations could 
be carried out by groups sent in from outside in British uniform,
 64
 widespread 
collaboration between Milorg and SOE on sabotage operations was still several 
months away. Therefore, despite the increased emphasis placed on attacks against 
strategic targets at this time, until conditions within Norway altered significantly, 
sabotage remained primarily a SOE and FO responsibility.  There were signs, 
however, that the political context within Norway was beginning to change.  For 
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example there was a growing willingness and eagerness within the ranks of Milorg to 
become active, and this along with other events, would have a significant impact upon 
the nature of sabotage operations in Norway during the final months of the 
occupation.  
 
 
II 
SOE long-term local operations in Norway: the creation of a Clandestine Army 
under British control 
Whilst SOE pursued its objective of attacking economic and military targets it 
also implemented its long-term aim of organising and preparing a clandestine 
guerrilla army in Norway.  Therefore, between autumn 1940 and late spring 1944 at 
least sixty SOE operations were sent into Norway by sea, air, or across the Swedish 
border, with the aim of organising local groups into fighting units that through cutting 
lines of communication and carrying out acts of sabotage behind enemy lines, could 
support operations by regular forces.    This section will not be a narrative of all these 
operations.
65
  Long-term activities will be examined in broad terms to show how they 
evolved in response to strategic developments and political factors, not only relations 
between SOE and the Norwegian authorities but also conditions within occupied 
Norway.  
After Section D‟s first operation in Norway in June 1940 and through 
Malcolm Munthe in Stockholm contact was continued and developed during the 
summer and autumn of 1940 with resistance groups in western Norway, Trondheim 
and around Oslo.
66
  SOE‟s early policy was also to recruit Norwegians in Britain, who 
would then be made ready to return home in order to organise local „cells‟ that would 
together form a general movement leading to a rebellion against the German 
occupation.
 67
   SOE‟s first operation from the newly established Shetlands Base in 
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November 1940 was an attempt to build on previous contact with groups in the 
Bergen area and to begin the groundwork for the development of a resistance network 
in southern Norway.  Unfortunately the Abwehr, the German military intelligence 
organisation, had infiltrated the boat crew and all three SOE agents were arrested soon 
after landing in Norway and later executed.  This was a very early example and a 
warning of how dangerous enemy agents would be to SOE activities in Norway.
68
  
After the policy of rebellion had been replaced by plans to organise an armed 
and trained secret guerrilla army based in the key strategic areas of Norway,
69
 two 
new important operations were put together.  „Claribel‟ was a scheme to use 
resistance organisations across northwest Europe, including Norway, to attack lines of 
communications or cause general disruption behind enemy lines and thereby spoil any 
attempt by Germany to invade Britain. The scheme for Norway was called „Claribel 
A‟.  It was believed that conditions in the country, the emergence of resistance groups 
under SOE control, made it an ideal location to undertake guerrilla operations against 
enemy shipping and aircraft if the need ever arose.  Fortunately the plan never had to 
be used and in March 1942 was abandoned.
 70
   From the spring of 1941, SOE also 
began to implement Operation Cockfight, its generic plan for developing a 
decentralised clandestine army in Norway consisting of armed and trained local 
resistance groups all under its control.
71
  It initially consisted of three strands.  Firstly, 
the attempts made during 1941 to bring back members of resistance groups, including 
Milorg, to Britain for training before sending them back to Norway to continue the 
preparation of their own organisations.  This had some success but was restricted by 
the availability of transport, the handful of fishing boats at the Shetlands Base, and the 
difficult conditions that these boats had to operate under.  Nevertheless, the contact 
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that was established with Milorg‟s leadership and with the Sørlie group in Trondheim 
meant that eventually a handful of men were brought back to the UK.  By the autumn 
of 1941, however, by which time the Milorg leadership had not only been hit by a 
series of arrests but had turned to its government in London for authority, this aspect 
of „Cockfight‟ was no longer viable.72   The second part of the plan was to set up a 
series of arms dumps in key locations across Norway, but by the end of 1941 only one 
had been established at Hammersett, southwest of Trondheim, and some arms and 
equipment delivered with the „Archer‟ team to Selvær off the coast of Nordland.73  
Lastly, SOE set out to send its own teams, made up of recruits trained in Britain, to 
the key strategic areas of Norway to make contact with and prepare local resistance 
groups, or to establish new organisations.  The objective was that they would all be 
armed, organised, and trained in guerrilla warfare, and through W/T put in direct 
contact with and therefore placed under the supervision of SOE Headquarters.
74
  In 
the first half of 1941, however, only one operation, „Cheese‟, was sent to southern 
Norway for the purpose of working with and developing local resistance groups.
75
  As 
with coup de main operations a shortage of trained recruits, insufficient 
transportation, and terrible weather conditions, particularly during the autumn of 1941 
slowed the implementation of „Cockfight‟.76   
During the 1941-1942 season, however, by which time SOE had a significant 
pool of prepared volunteers to call on, a total of fifteen operations were eventually 
sent to the pivotal areas of Norway from Mosjøen in the north, along the west coast 
from Trondheim to Stavanger, on the east and west side of Oslo fjord, and in the 
valleys running north and west from the Oslo region.  The bulk were, therefore, 
located in southern Norway where it was initially believed „offensive operations‟ 
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might occur.
77
  Beginning with Operation Letterbox in September 1941, and finishing 
with Operation Raven the following April, these consisted of teams usually made up 
of an organiser, W/T operator and possibly an arms instructor.  In addition over eighty 
tons of arms and equipment were delivered to a range of locations along the coastline 
and inland in order that the preparation of local groups could begin.
78
  
By the summer of 1942, however, due to an array of difficulties, Operation 
Cockfight had achieved relatively little.  The shortage of available transport continued 
especially airdrops.
79
  The restrictions associated with working in the hostile 
environment found this far north were a continual problem and a significant limiting 
factor on SOE activities.  Operations were regularly held up by the severe conditions 
found in the North Sea and there were frequent problems with radio equipment.
80
  The 
nature of the occupation and the conditions within Norway were also a major barrier 
to progress.  In the small isolated communities that are characteristic of Norway, the 
arrival of strangers was quickly noted and regularly brought to the attention of the 
local German security police or Norwegian informers.  By the summer SOE had 
recognised that there was „still a tendency to overrate the loyalty of relatives and 
former friends‟, and „to underrate the enemy‟s contre-espionage [sic] service‟.  Five 
of the thirteen arms dumps that were eventually established during the 1941/42 season 
had been captured,
81
 and during 1942, six of the fifteen long-term operations that had 
been sent to Norway were broken up by the German security and Norwegian Nazi 
police organisations through the use of local agents and informers.
82
  This had severe 
and tragic consequences for the civilian population as well as important repercussions 
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for SOE.  Both the tragedy at Televåg near Bergen and the arrests and executions 
undertaken after the break up of Operation Heron in the autumn of 1942,
 
which have 
previously been blamed on the activities of SOE and SIS, were at least partially the 
result of the work of Norwegian agents.
83
  Altogether this meant that the effort to 
organise a secret army proved to be extremely problematic, especially whilst SOE and 
its agents faced a severe and ongoing threat.  Instead of building for the future, the 
organisation was continually on the defensive, as is exemplified by the following 
examples.   
After the capture of the „Crow‟ W/T operator Ernst Jacobsen in July 1942, he 
agreed to work for the Germans and transmit messages back to Britain under Gestapo 
supervision.  Fortunately, due to intelligence from a source in Stockholm, SOE was 
quickly informed about Jacobsen and therefore aware that the messages he sent during 
the summer of 1942 were under outside control.
84
  In May 1942, however, Tor 
Gulbrandsen, the organiser for Operation Anchor, a plan to organise guerrilla groups 
along the west side of Oslo fjord, was arrested by the Gestapo.  After agreeing to 
work for the Germans he was in September 1942 allowed to escape and he eventually 
returned to Britain via Sweden, from where he was instructed to supply information 
on SOE and its agents using either letters sent to cover addresses in Oslo or through a 
locally obtained radio set.  The initial interrogations of Gulbrandsen by SOE and MI5 
failed to pick up that he was effectively an enemy spy, and it was only in late January 
1943, owing to information supplied by Ernst Jacobsen, that SOE learnt that the 
Germans had recruited Gulbrandsen.  A plan was then put together to use him to send 
misinformation back to Norway, so as to deceive the Germans as to SOE‟s intentions, 
but it seems that Operation Omelette, as this was called, was never carried out.
85
  
Nevertheless, both operations illustrate how effectively and quickly the German 
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authorities infiltrated SOE operations, broke them up and attempted to use them for 
their own purpose.   
By the summer of 1942, therefore, there was little semblance of a clandestine 
army in Norway.  Despite the early emphasis that Britain had placed on the 
contribution of secret armies across occupied Europe, conditions within these 
countries were a significant limiting factor on the implementation of this policy.  In 
the highly unlikely event of a landing by a British Expeditionary force in Norway in 
1942, it seems improbable that it would have had any support from guerrilla groups 
operating behind enemy lines.  Therefore strategic ambition was alone not enough. 
Organising local resistance groups into a viable military force was dependent on local 
conditions, not least the occupying regime in Norway and its security network, which 
was quick to take the offensive against SOE in order to nullify any attempt it made to 
operate within the country.  
From early 1942 the development of a secret army in Norway was also a joint 
effort by SOE and FO using the forum of the ANCC, and involving Milorg.  The 
relationship between these parties also had an important impact on operations at a 
local level.  Owing to its distrust and dislike of Milorg‟s centralised structure, SOE 
sponsored organisations and local Milorg groups were largely developed separately 
up until the autumn of 1942.  This was the result of the decision to create two 
„distinct‟ organisations across the regions of in Norway; a policy that ultimately held 
back attempts to organise a clandestine army.  SOE teams arrived from Britain 
unannounced and attempted to work independently in areas where local Milorg 
groups retained links with SL, which created a series of difficulties.
86
  SOE, 
eventually supported by FO, was not, however, instigating a deliberate policy of 
complete non co-operation with Milorg as an organisation.  It was attempting to 
operate in a manner that ensured that its teams did not become entangled with the 
leadership in Oslo.
87
  The instructions issued to SOE teams were that the groups that 
they worked with should be „isolated‟ as „far as possible‟ from other groups within 
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their area in an „urgent need for security‟ and to avoid the break-up of local 
organisations that had previously occurred because of a „common link to the central 
organisation‟.88  It was, however, an approach that within the conditions of occupied 
Norway proved to be unrealistic and contact with Oslo was unavoidable.  Tor 
Stenersen, the organiser for Operation Crow, was asked to make his radio available 
for SL so that it could communicate direct with the Norwegian authorities in London.  
He met Einar Skinnerland, the „Grouse‟ organiser, who was also in touch with the 
leadership in Oslo, as were several of the other NIC (1) teams that had arrived in 
Norway during the spring.  In June 1942, Lt. Col. Wilson expressed his frustration 
that SOE teams had become „mixed up with Oslo HQ‟, something that SOE „wanted 
to avoid‟. 89  Relations were particularly difficult in the area around Kristiansand and 
Flekkefjord on the southern tip of Norway, where the NIC (1) team and the Milorg 
district organisation co-existed in a state of hostility from summer 1942.  It appears 
that the local resistance had built up an impression, possibly from SOE, that there 
would be an Allied invasion in 1942.  This, it has been claimed, led them to organise 
too fast, resulting in lax security and ultimately penetration by local police forces.
 
 
Although, SOE accepted that it might have created the expectation of a landing in 
Norway,
 90
 the real significance of this local difficulty was that it represented the 
inevitable problems and dangers that resulted from a political decision that allowed 
two underground organisations with different views over their role, to operate often in 
close proximity.  Regular intervention from SL, which was attempting to both assert 
its authority across southern Norway and obtain access to the W/T contact that SOE 
groups had with the UK, also exacerbated the situation.  All of this severely disrupted 
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the progress of several SOE operations and had serious repercussions for Milorg.
91
  
Therefore, despite the strategic and military emphasis placed on secret armies, 
political decisions made in London that failed to understand or take account of local 
conditions ultimately led to serious difficulties. 
The development of relations and contact between SOE/FO in London and SL 
in Oslo had an impact on the development of long-term plans and operations in 
Norway in one other important way.  Milorg was directly under the authority of its 
government in London, but if it was to have day to day involvement in decisions 
regarding the organisation and use of a clandestine army in Norway it had to have a 
direct W/T link with Britain.  Moreover, if Milorg was to be brought under effective 
control by FO, communication also had to be improved with its leadership in Oslo.  
Einar Skinnerland, organiser for the „Grouse‟ party had originally been sent to Britain 
in March 1942 by Milorg to obtain consent for a direct radio link with the UK.
92
  In 
early 1942, FO had also expressed a desire to have a W/T operator sent to Oslo, and 
consequently in May an agreement was finally reached with Rolf Palmstrøm, 
Milorg‟s signals-chief.  This led in September 1942 to Operation Plover, Per 
Solnordal, who was sent to Norway to establish the first W/T link between SL and FO 
and SOE in London.  Solnordal was, however, owing to the activities of a Norwegian 
agent employed by the Abwehr, arrested at the end of 1942.  It was only after the 
arrival of Operation Thrush, Norman Gabrielsen and Operation Curlew, Knut 
Haugland and Gunnar Sønsteby, in the autumn of 1943, that communication between 
London and Oslo was finally placed on a sound and reliable long-term footing.
93
  
In the meantime, in response to changes within Milorg in the summer of 1942, 
it was decided where possible to base the future development of a clandestine army in 
Norway on an amalgam of SOE and Milorg groups.
94
  In recognition of this the name 
„Cockfight‟, which symbolised SOE‟s vision of a guerrilla army under its direct 
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control, was dropped and replaced by the broad term „secret army‟ to cover the 
underground organisation that would be formed in Norway by SOE and FO jointly.
95
  
From the autumn of 1942 until the late spring of 1944, close to forty NIC (1) teams or 
individuals were sent into Norway in order to continue the process of organising and 
preparing this army.  Conditions within Norway, the infiltration of informers and the 
work of the local police organisations meant, however, that during 1943 many of 
these activities, such as the „Lark‟ operations in Trondheim, the „Falcon‟ operations in 
Nordland, and the „Sandpiper‟ operation in the south, were often no more than 
attempts to re-build local networks in areas where previous resistance groups had 
been broken up.
96
  It was also felt that it was „difficult to organise for “The Day” in 
secrecy without even a vague idea of the interval of time that may elapse‟.97  This 
uncertainty over Norway‟s future owing to its peripheral position meant that SOE 
accepted that not only could no indication be given by its teams that an invasion was 
pending, but also that although the organisation of a secret army during 1943 should 
continue, it would not have the same degree of urgency.
98
  In the meantime the 
military priority was coup de main operations.  Moreover, with operational priorities 
elsewhere material for Norway continued to be extremely limited and therefore this 
embryonic clandestine army remained largely unarmed and unprepared.  During 1943, 
only 192 containers with arms and equipment were dropped into Norway compared 
with 5,299 containers delivered to France during the same period.
99
  Nevertheless, 
despite nervousness over its centralisation, SOE teams began to work with the Milorg 
leadership and its local organisations, especially in eastern Norway where it was 
strongest.  Operations such as „Chaffinch‟, Puffin‟, and „Goldfinch‟ all worked 
closely with SL during 1943.
100
  In the other districts of Norway, however, around 
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Stavanger for example with Operation Osprey, and north of Trondheim with 
Operation Martin, where it was often weak or non-existent, NIC (1) teams either took 
much longer to strike up a working relationship with Milorg or continued with 
attempts to organise their own local groups.
101
 
 By June 1943, however, the possible impact on Norway of Allied plans for 
northwest Europe began to reshape the preparation of a secret army.  The possibility 
of a German withdrawal from the country and the implementation of a scorched-earth 
policy meant that SOE and FO agreed that long-term operations in Norway should 
incorporate both „defensive and preservative‟ measures.102  Therefore, from the end of 
1943 and through 1944, NIC (1) teams were also instructed to prepare protective 
measures against important local industries and communications networks should 
German forces adopt such a policy.  It appears that the first NIC (1) team that went 
into Norway with orders to undertake such measures was „Sandpiper‟ on 10 
December 1943, followed in January 1944 by „Antrum Green‟ and in February by the 
„Merlin‟ team that was sent to the Bergen area.103  These were small beginnings, but 
during the second half of 1944, in co-operation with Milorg, they would become part 
of a massive and widespread increase in protective activities across the country. 
By early 1944, therefore operations to organise a secret army in Norway had 
been adapted in response to the possible consequences of the country‟s peripheral and 
subordinate position in relation to the wider strategic context in Europe.  Political 
changes, the improvement in relations with Milorg, also meant that the basis of this 
clandestine army had begun to change.  At the same time, however, conditions within 
Norway, the nature of the occupying regime and its attempts to break up any form of 
resistance, meant that SOE was forced to adopt measures to ensure that a secret army 
was protected, especially as it became increasingly likely that it would be required to 
make a significant contribution to the country‟s liberation. 
 
 
                                                          
101
 For example see details of Operations Martin and Osprey in, Appendix F, „SOE Long-Term 
Operations in Norway 1940-1945‟, pp. 341-343.  NHM: Operation Instructions for Martin, 20 March 
1943, in SOE archive, boks 43, mappe 40/1/6.  Details on Operation Osprey, in SOE archive, boks 27, 
mappe, 19/1/3, 19/4/1, and 19/2/2.        
102
 PRO: paper entitled, „SOE Outline Plan for Joint Activities in Norway 1943/44‟, attached to a 
memo from SN (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson) to AD/E (Brigadier E.E. Mockler-Ferryman), ref. SN/1202, 26 
June 1943 in HS2/218. 
103
 NHM: Operation Instructions for Sandpiper, 2 December 1943, in SOE archive, boks, 24, mappe 
18/1/5. Operation Instructions for Merlin, 8 February 1944, boks 29, mappe 20.2/1/2.   
 248 
III 
Rat Work in Norway: Internal Preservation 
During the first half of 1942, several of SOE‟s operations in Norway were broken up 
through the efforts of informers or police agents with major consequences for the 
local population and Milorg groups.  This threat had to be curtailed; otherwise any 
effort to organise and prepare a secret army would ultimately fail.  Consequently, 
from the summer of 1942 several SOE teams were instructed to assassinate or prepare 
the way for the execution of informers and German and Norwegian Nazi police 
officials.
104
  These began as defensive measure and a response to conditions in 
Norway.  But during the final two years of the occupation, in order to ensure that 
resistance groups would be in a position to make a direct military contribute to the 
liberation, these became offensive operations and part of a co-ordinated „campaign‟ 
that was instigated across Europe.  Owing to its position on the strategic and 
geographical margins the contribution of a secret army to Norway‟s liberation was, 
however, particularly significant, and therefore as the final stages of the occupation 
approached its preservation became increasingly important.  Assassinations were, 
therefore, not just a response to the brutality of the regime in occupied Norway, but 
also a reflection of the military importance placed on the role of indigenous forces in 
a country that stood outside the main theatre of Allied operations in Europe.     
 Liquidations during the occupation, the authorised killing of Norwegian 
citizens are naturally a very sensitive moral, legal, and constitutional issue.  
Nevertheless, they have only received significant academic attention in Norway in 
recent years.
105
  This thesis will, however, concentrate on the link between 
assassinations and the particular strategic and political conditions that ultimately 
meant that although relatively small in number, these operations were in Norway an 
important collaborative military effort involving SOE, Norwegian government, its 
military authorities, and Milorg.   
 The threat to SOE/FO and Milorg activities in Norway came from the German 
and Norwegian Nazi police and military organisations that were set up in the country 
from the summer of 1940.  In 1939 the criminal police (Kripo), the Geheime 
Staatspolizei (Gestapo), which together made up the German security police and the 
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Sicherheitsdienst, the Nazi intelligence organisation (SD) were merged into one office 
in Germany under the leadership of Reinhard Heydrich, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei 
und des SD (Sipo u. SD).  Moves to transfer this structure to Norway began almost 
immediately after its occupation.  In June 1940 all the German police in the country 
were placed under the authority of Frederick Wilhelm Rediess, whilst Sipo u. SD 
(henceforth Sipo), housed at Victoria Terrase in Oslo, was under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Heinrich Fehlis.  Sipo was made up of six departments, including Abteilung IV, the 
Gestapo, which led the offensive against the resistance organisations and SOE in 
Norway.  It was also divided into several sections; the most significant of which was 
Referat IVN.  This was responsible for the department‟s intelligence network in 
Norway, which consisted of employed Norwegian agents, usually those that had Nazi 
sympathies such as members of NS, or criminals who saw this as an easy way to get 
hold of money, cigarettes, or alcohol.
106
  Over four thousand Norwegians were 
eventually sentenced for being denouncers or spies, and at the liberation the Gestapo 
had 312 registered Norwegian agents each with their own cover name.  Amongst 
these numbers were notorious individuals such as Marino Nilsen, Finn Kaas, Astrid 
Dollis, Ivar Grande, and most famously Henry Rinnan, who created a huge network of 
informers in Trøndelag and western Norway that was a constant threat to both SOE 
and Milorg.
107
  It was not, however, just the Gestapo that posed a danger to SOE and 
resistance groups.  There was also the Abwehr, Germany‟s military intelligence 
organisation, which up until the summer of 1944 also had a permanent establishment 
in Norway.  It was responsible for operational intelligence against enemy forces, 
sabotage behind enemy lines, the prevention of enemy espionage and the protection of 
German military forces.
108
 
Prior to 25 September 1940, however, whilst negotiations continued between 
the German Reichskommisar and the Presidential Board of the Norwegian Storting 
over future constitutional government in Norway, the German police were 
„deliberately and openly‟, held back.  The change in the political climate after 25 
September, however, the ending of negotiations and the move to Nazify the country 
and all its institutions, combined with increasing resistance to this move, meant that 
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from this point the German security police were given a free rein. 
109
   In July 1941 
the Norwegian Statspoliti (Stapo), state police was also established.  All of its 
employees, with the exception of four, consisted of NS members,
110
 and under the 
leadership of General Karl A. Marthinsen, it worked closely with Sipo in order to 
protect the occupying regime in Norway.  The invasion of the Soviet Union and 
Allied raids against Norway during 1941 also made the German and Norwegian 
police and security forces increasingly sensitive to any form of resistance.  The 
Germans were not prepared to tolerate unrest in the occupied countries, including 
Norway, particularly as their military situation worsened.  Perhaps the best illustration 
of this is the „Commando Order‟ signed by Hitler on 18 October 1942, which stated 
that any commandos, agents, or saboteurs that were captured should be handed over 
to the Sipo and shot.
111
  A combination of political and military factors therefore 
resulted in a police and security network in Norway that would make future 
clandestine operations extremely precarious.  The imprisonment of 40,000 
Norwegians and the execution of 369 during the occupation are an indication of the 
lengths that the German and NS authorities were prepared to go to stifle any 
opposition.
112
  
With the exception of Malcolm Munthe‟s last minute and improvised attempt 
to organise the assassination of Heinrich Himmler in Oslo in early 1941,
113
 SOE 
interest in liquidations does not appear to have re-emerged again until the spring of 
1942, by which time Operation Cockfight was fully underway.  In May a local 
resistance group established by SOE in southern Norway through its agent Odd 
Starheim („Cheese‟) was badly hit by the Gestapo.114  Accordingly, it was decided 
that „instructions‟ should be issued „to the effect that Norwegian informants and 
traitors may be put out of the way by our bands‟.  At the same time the Norwegian 
Commander-in-Chief, major general Hansteen requested that this directive be sent to 
the „secret army‟ (Milorg).115   Therefore, by the summer of 1942, both SOE and FO 
had decided that they must actively protect the Home Front from the threat posed by 
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„denouncers and traitors‟.116  This suggests that assassinations did not start out as 
predetermined offensive against the German security police but a defensive response 
to the difficult conditions in Norway.  Moreover, as both SOE and FO shared and 
were committed to the same long-term objective of creating and preserving a 
clandestine army in Norway, collaboration on this issue, although potentially 
controversial and risky, was never as problematic as other matters such as sabotage.  
 Whether „instructions‟ were ever sent in the spring of 1942 is unclear but 
probably in response to these local difficulties, SOE decided to take appropriate 
action.  Operation Swan, a team of two, was sent to the area around Kristiansand in 
southern Norway in August primarily to establish a W/T link and to provide arms 
instruction for guerrilla groups in the area.  It was, however, also required to train 
small teams in the „best means of disposing of dangerous denouncers by 
assassination‟, although no acts would be undertaken until approval had been obtained 
from Allied HQ in London.
117
  This operation plagued by local difficulties achieved 
very little, and soon afterwards and rather ironically the activities of the Gestapo 
broke up clandestine activity in the area and resulted in the arrest and brutal execution 
of several leading local figures from Milorg.
118
  Nevertheless, between the summers 
of 1942 and 1943 a further five of the eighteen SOE operations that were sent to 
Norway to help organise guerrilla units were also instructed to train local groups to 
carry out assasinations or were given authority to undertake such acts themselves.
119
  
This was the beginning of a joint effort led by SOE and FO together, and eventually 
including Milorg, and illustrates how seriously all parties took the threat from 
informers and the nazi police organisations.     
The first of these operations in October 1942, „Bittern‟, proved to be 
contentious.  The party, supplemented by thirty grams of cocaine, included the ex-
criminal Johannes Andersen better known as Gulosten (yellow cheese), who had 
assassinated an Abwehr agent before fleeing to Britain.   Moreover, due to confusion 
over its role, the behaviour of members of the party and because the Home Front was 
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not informed of the operation beforehand, it turned out to be a fiasco.
120 
 This caused 
difficulty for the Norwegian government both internally and in its relations with the 
civilian resistance leadership, and for these reasons it has received considerable 
attention from previous historians.
121
  „Bittern‟ was, however, primarily a Norwegian 
operation and the use of such potentially controversial means indicates that not only 
SOE but also FO were prepared to make every military effort to ensure that the 
development of a secret army in Norway could continue.
122
 
 The difficulties with „Bittern‟ also did not deter SOE and FO in their future 
efforts to deal with „denouncers‟ or undermine future collaboration with SL.  In the 
Gudbrandsdal and Østerdal, the two valleys running northwest from Oslo, the 
„Gannet‟ team continued to carry out its instructions to make ready „Saccharine 
Squads‟, small teams especially trained in silent killing.123  The „Chaffinch‟ team, 
which parachuted into southern Norway in early January 1943, was also ordered to 
prepare a local team of three men to use the „special devices‟ intended for use on 
Quislings.  Furthermore, the view within Milorg, which had taken up the issue of 
informers as early as the summer of 1941,124 was according to Tor Stenersen, the 
leader of „Chaffinch‟, that „something effective should be done‟ although „preferably 
by men from the UK‟.  Consequently, SL was anxious to deal with denouncers, 
although they wanted them to be taken silently and their bodies to disappear without 
trace, as this would reduce the risk of reprisals.  And it was eventually willing to 
contribute to these operations.  The result was the so-called „X-Groups‟, teams of six 
men trained especially for the purpose of disposing of informers.  They were 
organised by SL, instructed by the „Chaffinch‟ team, and before they were used the 
necessary permission had to be obtained from the UK, but through Milorg.
125
  Initially 
this joint effort appears to have had little impact, but it shows that the commitment to 
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prepare and undertake assassinations was by 1943 based on a shared view both in 
London and Oslo that the threat posed by informers and the Nazi police forces had to 
be counteracted.
126
    
Liquidations were therefore initially a defensive response by SOE, FO, and 
Milorg to the difficult conditions they faced in occupied Norway.  They were also on 
the whole part of a co-ordinated and planned military effort and therefore were not 
random, uncontrolled, and indiscriminate acts of revenge, which perhaps explains 
why there were relatively few in comparison to other occupied countries.
127
  As the 
final stages of the war in Europe approached, however, assassinations became an 
offensive weapon that was used to help ensure the integrity of resistance organisations 
in the important period in the run up to liberation.  In June 1943, SOE‟s Norwegian 
Section announced it would take part in a „general plan of campaign‟, a series of co-
ordinated operations against Gestapo officers and informers.  The initial failure of 
„local means‟, however, meant that for Norway „specially trained agents‟ would be 
„sent in from the UK to carry out the actual work of execution‟.128   The result was 
Operation Rat Week, which was launched in November and marked the 
commencement of a synchronised offensive against informers across parts of 
occupied Europe.  At least three NIC (1) teams, „Goldfinch‟ in Oslo, „Goshawke‟ in 
the Gudbrandsdal, and „Redwing‟ in Bergen, were assigned to take part in this joint 
action.  They were instructed to wait for a message, „Dei som skulle vekia – mot de 
som skulle siga‟ (those that shall give way – against those that shall win), which 
would signal that „Ratweek‟ should begin.  It was eventually broadcast over the BBC 
on 6 December 1943 at 18.00 hrs.  Although owing to local concerns „Goshawke‟ and 
„Redwing‟ did not take part in this „campaign‟, on 8 December „Goldfinch‟ undertook 
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the first assassination by a SOE group in Norway.  It was the first of four executions 
carried out by this team in the Oslo area over the next four months.
129
   
Although „Rat Week‟ was a SOE offensive, Milorg was, nevertheless, still 
involved and therefore assassinations remained a joint effort.  The „Goldfinch‟ party 
was instructed to „proceed to contact SL in Oslo to arrange for Rat Week‟, and it was 
Milorg that would provide the names of those to be liquidated.  The training of the 
„X-Groups‟ in collaboration with Milorg was also not abandoned, and during the 
autumn of 1943 three „killing-squads‟ and four „shadow-squads‟ were prepared.  
These eventually attempted to liquidate six named informers, although without 
success.
130
  At the conference held in Stockholm in March 1944 between members of 
FO and Milorg, it was also agreed that „certain military actions against the occupying 
power and its tools‟, a euphemism for attacks against the Gestapo, should be 
instituted.
131
  As a result a request was sent to London asking for support, which in 
April resulted in the arrival of Operation Buzzard in Norway to „provide help‟ in 
„executing denouncers‟.132         
It became increasingly important to defend the resistance in Norway in the run 
up to the liberation.  In September 1944, SHAEF accepted that Milorg had to be 
safeguarded so that it could act as a protective force during the early stages of the 
country‟s liberation, and therefore it was agreed that action against Gestapo agents 
should continue.
133
  By December the execution of collaborators was top of a list of 
targets given to Gunnar Sønsteby, leader of the NIC (1) teams and link with Milorg in 
the Oslo area.
134
  Consequently, the number of assassinations of informers and senior 
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Nazi police officials, carried out by both SOE and Milorg groups, grew during 1944 
and 1945.  The „Buzzard‟ team supported by members from other SOE groups 
working in the Oslo area undertook several executions during this period.
135
  In 
Trondheim, SOE made several attempts during 1943 and 1944 to liquidate Henry 
Rinnan, whose network of informers had done so much damage to resistance groups 
in the area,
136
 although without success.
137
  In Bergen, SOE‟s „Razorbill‟ team linked 
up with a local Communist group that in November 1944 assassinated two local 
police officials.
138
  In Ålesund on the west coast, a local Milorg group assassinated 
Ivar Grande, Henry Rinnan‟s second-in command, after orders had been received 
from London via a W/T link provided by SOE‟s „Antrum‟ operation.139  From the 
beginning of 1944 and up until the German capitulation in May 1945, SOE undertook 
or were in some way involved in at least eighteen assassinations in Norway, whilst 
Milorg carried out even more.
140
  There was therefore a co-ordinated, determined and 
joint effort to protect Norwegian resistance as the liberation approached.  This is 
perhaps best exemplified by the assassination of major general Karl Marthinsen, head 
of the Norwegian Stapo, in February 1945.  He had been listed as a legitimate target 
in London, the „Buzzard‟ team carried out the action, and although the attack resulted 
in the execution of twenty-eight people, it received the unequivocal support of the 
Norwegian government.
141
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Operations that included instructions to undertake assassinations or train local 
groups in assassination were part of an effort to protect the long-term military project 
of organising a secret army, although they were initially a response to conditions 
within the country and therefore defensive.  As the final stages of the war approached, 
however, wider strategic considerations came into play and they therefore took on a 
more offensive nature in Norway to ensure that the preparation of the resistance for its 
role in the liberation could continue unchecked.  Unlike sabotage, which remained a 
difficult issue through to 1944, assassinations also had the support of the Norwegian 
military authorities and Milorg and were therefore controlled, planned, and considered 
a legitimate military tool to be used in defence of Norwegian interests, in this case the 
preservation of the Home Forces.   
 
 
Conclusion 
SOE operations were the result of a range of factors.  The immediate objective of 
attacking economic and military targets and the longer-term aim of organising a secret 
army had strategic origins.  The requirement to work with the Norwegian military 
authorities and Milorg, however, meant that some aspects of policy had to be tailored 
in order to meet their concerns.  The outcome of these operations was also influenced 
by a further, additional component: the conditions within occupied Norway, both 
physical and political.  Many teams never reached their target, and many objectives 
had to be attacked several times in order to have any significant long-term impact.  
Even Operation Gunnerside, so often held up as SOE‟s greatest success, had only a 
small effect on the production of heavy water. The impact of the work of the German 
and Norwegian Nazi police organisations in occupied Norway with their extensive 
use of informers, meant that SOE operations were constantly infiltrated and broken 
up.  Consequently, resistance groups had to be regularly rebuilt and direct action 
taken against denouncers through assassination.   
Local operational difficulties, political factors, the nature of its occupation, 
and lastly and most significantly Norway‟s contribution within the wider strategic 
context all combined to shape SOE operations.  By the end of 1943, however, it was 
the impending Allied invasion of northwest Europe and its potential impact on 
Norway that increasingly began to impose its influence on all SOE activity in this 
theatre.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
SOE AND THE LIBERATION OF NORWAY 1944-1945: OPERATIONS IN 
THE SHADOW OF OVERLORD 
 
  
Introduction 
The nature and scale of SOE’s operations in Norway changed significantly in the 
months leading up to the German capitulation in May 1945.  This was firstly the result 
of a very different strategic background, which from the spring of 1944 was 
dominated by Allied operations in northwest Europe.  By the summer Norway was 
firmly entrenched in the shadow of events on the mainland of Europe, which meant it 
remained sidelined and isolated.  Consequently, uncertainty continued over its 
eventual liberation, especially whilst over 300,000 German military and civilian 
personnel remained in the country.  Alongside this, with the end of the war in Europe 
in sight, post-war considerations also became significant.  Norway’s future economic 
prosperity and the transition to lawful, constitutional government therefore became 
additional factors that had an important impact on the make-up of special operations 
in the country during the final year of its occupation. 
  SOE sabotage operations had been an element of a British attritional strategy 
that set out to help undermine the enemy’s fighting strength and prepare the way for 
major land operations on the Continent that would complete the defeat of Germany.  
Therefore, once Operation Overlord commenced it would have been natural for this 
type of operation in Norway to become redundant.  This was not the case.  As the first 
part of this chapter will show, from the summer of 1944 the contribution of sabotage 
changed and instead of preparing the way for Overlord it became directly supportive 
to Allied operations on the Continent.  Anything considered of immediate importance 
in sustaining German resistance or a potential threat to the Allied campaign became a 
target, including the units of the 20
th
 Mountain army that began to withdraw from 
Norway in the autumn of 1944. 
  Nevertheless, as the second section of this chapter will show, within the 
different context of the final months of the occupation, long-term activity, 
preparations for the liberation, became the priority.  From September 1944, SHAEF 
decided that precedence should be given to arming, equipping, preparing, and 
preserving resistance groups as a local force for protection and law and order during 
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the potentially uncertain period after a collapse of German authority either centrally or 
in Norway, and before the arrival of regular troops from the Continent.  Consequently, 
through SFHQ, in collaboration with FO and Milorg, a major effort was made to 
prepare the resistance, put in place a huge array of operations designed to protect 
industrial and economic sites from destruction, and help facilitate a peaceful transfer 
of power back to the Norwegian authorities.  It was therefore only in the final stages 
of the war in Europe, and as a consequence of a combination of Norway’s position in 
relation to the culmination of Allied strategy and post-war considerations, that the 
preparation of a secret army in Norway really gathered pace.  
  Notwithstanding the importance of the strategic background, political factors 
also had a particular significance during the final months of the occupation.  Relations 
between SOE and the Norwegian authorities had by this stage become extremely 
close and the leadership of Milorg looked to FO for direction.  The visits of Jens Chr. 
Hauge to London also reflected its adherence to co-operation with SOE and through it 
the Allied High Command.   All parties were committed to the shared aim of assisting 
Norway’s liberation and therefore SOE operations in 1944 and 1945 were built on a 
solid collaborative basis.  Furthermore, events within Norway, the emergence and 
growing authority of Hjemmefrontens ledelse, the Home Front leadership, 
preparations for the approaching liberation, German backdoor efforts to conscript 
young Norwegians, and the actions of Communist groups, all contributed to a 
decision to allow the direct involvement of Milorg units in sabotage.  This resulted in 
a major intensification in attacks against economic and military targets during the 
final months of the occupation.  Nevertheless, the outcome of all these activities, 
especially preparations for the liberation, continued to be plagued by local and 
logistical difficulties and therefore despite a huge increase in the flow of resources to 
this theatre from the autumn of 1944, a fully armed, trained, and prepared secret army 
was never created in Norway.  The country’s marginal position ultimately meant that 
the whole process was left too late. 
  Nonetheless, in May 1945 Germany capitulated and over the following 
months there was a gradual return to legitimate government in Norway.  The final 
section of this chapter will show that despite the difficulties, SOE alongside FO 
helped Milorg to play a significant although largely symbolic role in ensuring that this 
was a peaceful and largely uneventful process.    
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I 
SOE Sabotage Operations in Norway 1944-1945: A Tactical and Collaborative 
Offensive 
After the successful launch of Overlord, sabotage in Norway changed from being 
strategic coup de main strikes against economic and military sites, to tactical 
operations in support of the Allied campaign on the Continent.  This meant that 
attacks against targets, such as the Orkla pyrite mines near Trondheim, were 
eventually replaced by actions against objectives such as fuel, armaments, and the 
German divisions that began to retreat through Norway, all of which were considered 
of ‘immediate’ and ‘present value to the enemy’.1  The amount of sabotage also 
increased significantly due to the decision by the resistance leadership in Norway to 
allow units of Milorg to participate in operations against targets of military 
importance.  Attacks undertaken by teams sent in from Britain were replaced by 
attacks carried out by local teams, either NIC (1) or Milorg units alone or in 
collaboration.  This is what SOE had intended from the beginning: sabotage carried 
out by locally led and organised groups controlled from the UK.  It only happened, 
however, when conditions within Norway permitted.         
 During the first half of 1944, in the run up to Overlord, SOE sabotage activity 
in Norway was sparse.  At least four coup de main operations using teams from 
Britain were planned, but only one, ‘Feather II’ against the locomotives at the Orkla 
pyrite mines, was eventually undertaken.  By the end of September 1944, when 
operations ‘Dodworth’ and ‘Docklow’ against the Orkla and Sulitjelma mines 
respectively were terminated, SOE attacks prepared and instigated from outside 
Norway were brought to an end.
2
  The view within the Allied High Command was 
that a ‘premature sabotage campaign in Norway’ was ‘more likely to hinder than help 
their general D-Day plans’.3  Consequently, SOE’s support for ‘Fortitude North’ was 
restricted to minor activities such as maintaining the frequency of journeys to the 
Norwegian coast and increasing W/T traffic, and because of a fear of reprisals and 
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potential damage to Milorg it was decided not to escalate sabotage.
4
  It therefore 
appears that there was a growing realisation that the resistance in Norway would 
probably be required to make an important contribution to the liberation and therefore 
had to be kept intact and not prematurely sacrificed in a sabotage campaign that might 
achieve very little.  There was an appreciation that conditions in Norway, especially 
the ‘extent of enemy control’, meant that a major increase in activity could be 
extremely hazardous.
5
       
 From May 1944, however, as part of the Home Front struggle against plans to 
conscript young Norwegians for military service on the eastern front, Milorg units 
carried out attacks against the registration offices of the Arbeidstjeneste (Labour 
Services) around Oslo.
6
  Therefore, events within Norway and the resultant stepping 
up of resistance to the actions of the occupying regime were the trigger that ultimately 
led to an increase in sabotage.  This was at a time when the resistance leadership 
believed that the Norwegian people wished ‘to play a part in the fight against the 
enemy’, and would ‘endure the sacrifices entailed by military actions on the part of 
the Home organisations’.7   This was significant, not just because it marked the end of 
a policy of largely non-violent resistance in Norway, but also because it marked the 
beginning of widespread collaboration between SL and SOE groups on sabotage 
operations, especially around Oslo.  Gunnar Sønsteby had been SOE’s pre-eminent 
agent in the capital since the spring of 1942.  He had also developed links with SL and 
built up a network of contacts, including the many NIC (1) teams that were by that 
time working in the locality.
8
  In mid May 1944, Jens Chr. Hauge asked for 
Sønsteby’s assistance in the fight against conscription,9 which led to direct SOE 
involvement in the attacks against the Labour Services.  It was this that also gave rise 
to the formation of what was referred to as the ‘Oslo Detachment’; a group made up 
                                                          
4
 PRO: extracts from Plan ‘Fortitude’, (SHAEF [44] 13), 23 February 1944, and ‘Plan Fortitude’, ref. 
MUS/709/2/411, 1 April 1944, including ‘SOE/SO Directive to Scandinavian Region’, in HS2/1.   
5
 PRO: letter from D/S (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson) to 8627 (Nielsen) ref. N.16, 23 January 1944, in HS2/128. 
6
 On the night of 4-5 May 1944, Milorg teams attacked the offices of the Labour Services in Oslo, 
Skien, Ulefoss, Hønefoss and Sarpsborg, and abortive attacks took place at Holmestrand and 
Stavanger.  See: PRO: paper entitled, ‘A.T. Mobilisation in Norway’, attached to minutes of the 30th 
meeting of the ANCC, 8 June 1944, in HS2/138.  Moland, Kampen mot mobiliserings-trusselen i 
Norge 1943-1944, pp. 21-22.  
7
 PRO: ‘Report from a Conference in Stockholm in March 1944’, (translation), 14 April 1944, in 
HS2/233. 
8
 NHM: ‘Interrogation of Capt. Gunnar Sønsteby’, 2 July 1945, in SOE archive, boks 16, mappe 
13/3/6. G. Sønsteby, (i samarbeid med J. B. Gundersen), Bak rapportene, (Oslo: Aventura Forlag, 
1985), pp. 140-208.   
9
 G. Sønsteby, Bak rapportene, p. 152. 
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from SOE agents operating in the area.
10
  This unit became officially attached to SL 
with Sønsteby as its sabotage leader
11
 and over the following months it carried out at 
least thirty-five successful attacks against major industrial and military targets around 
Oslo,
12
 sometimes assisted by members of Milorg.  From this point, therefore, 
sabotage in Norway, particularly in the south, was a joint effort involving NIC (1) 
teams and Milorg units.
13
   
 The direct involvement of the Home Forces meant that during the final year of 
Norway’s occupation, even though SHAEF gave it a lower priority than preparations 
for the liberation,
14
 sabotage increased significantly.  The number of attacks carried 
out against economic and military targets in Norway by NIC 1 teams and Milorg units 
between the early summer of 1944 and May 1945 was considerably greater than the 
total number of coup de main operations carried out during the previous four years.  
One official Norwegian report cites at least seventy cases of sabotage against 
industrial plant in Norway during 1944 alone,
15
 whilst another report, the result of an 
insurance investigation of war damage between July 1944 and spring 1945 that 
excludes railways and actions by the ‘Oslo Detachment’, lists at least 140 cases of 
possible sabotage.
16
  Another estimate based on the traces that can be found in 
original documents, and which includes railway and shipping sabotage alongside 
                                                          
10
 Before May 1944, although the various NIC (1) teams around Oslo knew of each other’s presence, 
there was no special contact or co-operation.  From 18 and 19 May and during the summer, members 
from these teams worked together under Sønsteby, carrying out sabotage actions aimed at scuppering 
efforts to mobilise young Norwegians. The ‘Oslo Detachment’ eventually included members of the 
‘Curlew’, ‘Company’, ‘Puffin’, Buzzard’, Bundle’, ‘Goldfinch’ and ‘Turkey’ teams.  See: NHM: report 
from 24 (Sønsteby), typed on 20 September 1944, in FO IV archive, boks 13, mappe 9-C-2.  SOE 
archive, boks 16, mappe 13/3/6, the ‘Oslo Group’.  Moland, Kampen mot mobiliserings-trusselen i 
Norge 1943-1944, p. 21. 
11
 PRO: memo from SU, (Bjarne Øen) to DS, (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson), headed ‘Directive to no 24’, 6 
December 1944, in HS2/204. 
12
 Lt. Colonel J.S. Wilson was in Norway in June and July 1945, met members of the Oslo Detachment 
and visited many of the sites that they had attacked.  PRO; ‘Diary of Scandinavian Tour’ by J.S. 
Wilson OBE, in HS9/1605/3.   
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 NHM: SOE archive, boks 11, Wilson’s mappe 10/8/1, Appendix J, ‘Local Acts of Sabotage’.  Berg 
& Lindhjem, Militær motstand i Rogaland og Vestfold, pp. 90-95.  T. A. Barstad, Sabotasjen i Oslo 
området, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1975), pp. 40-42.  
14
 PRO: ‘Directive on the Employment and Development of Resistance in Norway’, ref. 
Mus/2210/1899, 3 September 1944, in HS2/234.  
15
 The Communists group working around Oslo caused some of the damage listed.  NHM: paper 
entitled, ‘Damage done by sabotage to industrial plants in 1944’ from the Norwegian Economic 
Intelligence Office, ref. Jnr. U.D. 10567/45, 16 April 1945, in FO IV archive, boks 14, mappe 9-C-3, 
‘Sabotasje Oversikt’.  
16
 NHM: document entitled ‘Undersøkelse vedr. Sabotasjeskader’, 20 July 1945, in FO IV archive, 
boks 14, mappe 9-C-3.   
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attacks against economic and military targets, puts the total at between 350 and 400 
acts of sabotage during the final months of the occupation.
17
  
  From the spring of 1941, SOE had hoped to develop a sabotage organisation 
within Norway, but the objection of the Norwegian authorities based partly on 
Milorg’s fears that local involvement in such activities would threaten its long-term 
existence precluded this.  It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that in the summer 1944, 
when Milorg was for the first time prepared to become directly involved in military 
operations, SHAEF was reluctant to allow the resistance in Norway to be active.
18
  It 
was, however, in response to events in Norway that the policy of the resistance 
leadership changed, not wider strategic or military requirements.  This meant that 
from the summer of 1944, despite SHAEF’s hesitation, Milorg groups carried out a 
series of operations against targets across southern Norway where many important 
industrial sites and military stores were concentrated.  In Milorg’s District 13, in and 
around Oslo, a separate action group called Aks 13000 was set up under the District 
Leader.  It had a military structure, with a staff, a ‘Head of Actions’, and sabotage 
teams that were responsible for reconnaissance of the objective through to the actual 
operation.  During the final eight months of the occupation between 300 and 400 men 
from D13 were involved in operations against industrial and military sites around the 
capital.
19
     
  There was not just an increase in the amount of sabotage in Norway from the 
spring of 1944; the nature of the targets also changed.  From early July after the 
successful completion of Operation Neptune, the assault phase of ‘Overlord’, NIC (1) 
personnel, assisted by Milorg and with permission from London, attacked chemical 
factories in Oslo that produced sulphuric acid, a key component in the production of 
both explosives and more significantly U-boat batteries. 
20
  Also in July, SFHQ 
decided that ‘petrol and oil’ were ‘targets of greatest importance and should be 
attacked whenever possible’.21  Consequently, over the following months at least 
twenty-eight operations were undertaken against oil and petrol stores and several 
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 Moland, Sabotasje i Norge under 2. verdenskrig, p. 28. 
18
 PRO: ‘Directive on the Employment and Development of Resistance in Norway’, ref. 
Mus/2210/1899, 3 September 1944, in HS2/234. 
19
Barstad, Sabotasjen i Oslo området, pp. 38-45. 
20
 NHM: ‘Report from 24 (Gunnar Sønsteby), 20 September 1944, in FO IV archive, boks 13, mappe 
9-C-2.  Report on the ‘Operation against the Verpen Svovelsyrefabrikk’, 16 August 1944, in SOE 
archive, boks 19, mappe 14.1/5/1. 
21
 NHM: telegram to ‘Firecrest’, ref. srl c4232, no. 20, 26 July 1944, in SOE archive, boks 20, mappe 
14.2/2/3.   
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hundred thousand litres were destroyed through actions by Milorg groups and NIC (1) 
teams either alone or in collaboration.
22
  Operations against U-boat fuel and the power 
supply to the shipyards in Bergen, including yet again the Laksevaag floating dock, 
were yet another part of the Allied effort to end the potential threat posed by the U-
boats stationed in Norway.
23
  Further important targets attacked by NIC (1) teams, 
particularly the ‘Oslo Detachment’ under Sønsteby and local Milorg groups, included 
aircraft parts, arms and ammunition production, mechanical workshops, the remaining 
stocks of ball-bearings in Norway,
24
 and finally shipping.  SHAEF continued to place 
a high priority on attacks against enemy vessels and Operation Bundle, local Milorg 
units, and Communist groups taken together had some success, eventually sinking or 
badly damaging at least twelve ships in the Oslo harbour area as well as undertaking 
attacks in Bergen, Horten, Porsgrunn and Moss harbours during the final months of 
the occupation.
25
  The intention behind all these actions was to give direct and 
immediate support to the Allied campaigns against Germany.  It is, however, very 
difficult to assess their overall military contribution within the broader context.  They 
undoubtedly led to a significant amount of destruction of vital materials, as 
exemplified by oil and petrol, at a time when Germany could least afford it, and at 
little cost to the Allies.  They were also symbolically significant, as this was the first 
time that SOE and Milorg had worked together on operations that made an immediate 
and direct military contribution to the war in Europe.  It has also been claimed that 
they were a further complicating factor for the German occupation of Norway, and 
had a positive impact on the morale of both the civilian population and Milorg.
26
   
 It was important, however, that as the objective of these sabotage operations 
was to support the Allied offensive across Europe, they were co-ordinated and 
directed against appropriate military targets by SFHQ and FO IV in close liaison with 
SHAEF.   The improvement in W/T contact with Milorg from the autumn of 1943, 
which was extended during the spring of 1944 when several new clandestine radio 
stations began operating in the Oslo area, was crucial to this.
27
  Milorg also 
                                                          
22
 NHM: SOE archive, boks 11, Wilson’s mappe 10/8/1, Appendix J, ‘Oil and Petrol Sabotage’.   
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27
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contributed to this joint effort by separating out those industries that were of 
immediate importance to the German war effort and suitable for sabotage from those 
that were less significant but important to post-war Norway and therefore should 
remain untouched.  This information was passed to London via Stockholm and 
resulted in a paper that was sent back to the Norwegian capital in June, and which 
became the basis for industrial sabotage over the coming months.  Targets were, 
however, only attacked after they had been released or authority had been obtained 
through FO in London, either directly by the Milorg districts or more often by its 
leadership.
28
  Even if an objective of high priority was selected, if an operation could 
lead to reprisals against Milorg or the local population, prior approval had to be 
sought from London.
29
  The excellent working relationship between SOE, FO and 
Milorg was therefore a crucial factor in ensuring that sabotage in Norway was used as 
an extensive and effective tactical weapon in the final offensive against Germany, 
without resulting in political difficulties with the Norwegian government and 
unnecessary damage to the country’s post-war economy.  
 Finally, there was one other category of sabotage that became widespread 
during the final months of Norway’s occupation.  This was railway sabotage.  As 
shown, during 1943 and early 1944 SOE sent four operations to Norway in readiness 
to sabotage the main railway routes in the event of a German withdrawal or to support 
a possible Allied invasion.
30
  In the run-up to Overlord, however, and during the 
summer and early autumn of 1944 these teams remained idle as SHAEF continued to 
fear that unrestricted attacks against the railway network would threaten the long-term 
integrity of Milorg and could lead to widespread famine amongst the civilian 
population.  After the success of the preliminary stage of Overlord, it also preferred to 
allow German forces to leave Norway.
31
   Nevertheless, SOE believed that it could 
and would eventually be called on to make a contribution to slowing down German 
withdrawals by attacking the railway network in Norway.  Therefore, it continued 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘Corncrake’ in contact with the UK and from this point communication continued unhindered.  For 
example by March 1945, SL had three W/T stations working for them in the Oslo area: ‘Chiffchaff’, 
‘Crossbill Red’, and ‘Coppersmith Blue’. See: NHM: ‘Report on the Wireless Service Between SL and 
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Haugland in SOE archive, boks 22, mappe 15/3/1. 
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 Barstad, Sabotasjen i Oslo området, pp. 97-101. 
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  NHM: telegram to ‘Firecrest’, ref. srl c4232, no. 20, 26 July 1944 in SOE archive, boks 20, mappe 
14.2/2/3.  Telegram to Chiffchaff, nr B 1412, 28 July 1944, in boks 15, mappe13/2/9.   
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 See chapter seven, p. 235.  
31
 See Chapter two pp. 80-81. 
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with its preparations and in September and October 1944, operations ‘Woodlark’ and 
the main ‘Woodpecker’ party were also sent to the country to prepare attacks against 
the railways both north and south of Trondheim.  By late October 1944, when a 
‘limited’ number of attacks against the railways was permitted,32 there were therefore 
five NIC (1) teams resident in Norway or just across the border in Sweden in various 
states of readiness.  It was, however, only from early December 1944 and owing to 
concerns over the arrival of units of the 20
th
 Mountain army on the Continent that 
these teams were given permission to undertake unlimited action and a widespread 
offensive began.
33
  From this point until April 1945 a sabotage campaign that 
included NIC (1) teams, Milorg units, a team from the Norwegian Parachute 
Company (Operation Waxwing), an OSS team (Operation Rype), and plans to use the 
Special Air Services (SAS), was launched against the Norwegian rail network in an 
attempt to delay and disrupt the withdrawal of German forces from Norway.
34
 
 This offensive resulted in probably close to one hundred actions against the 
railway routes that were used to transport German troops southwards.
35
  These 
included the destruction of small sections of rail line, the demolition of bridges, and 
larger scale attacks such as Operation ‘Betongblanding’ (Concrete Mixer) on 14 
March 1945, which was the largest co-ordinated sabotage action in Norway and 
involved 1000 men from Milorg attacking the railway lines on both sides of Oslo 
fjord.
36
  Despite some initial reluctance within SHAEF to use Milorg, this was 
therefore a major collaborative tactical effort.
 37
    
 Notwithstanding the scale of railway sabotage in Norway during 1945, there 
is, however, doubt over its effectiveness.  In July 1945, in response to a request from 
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the COS, G-3 Division of SHAEF produced a ‘Report on the Value of SOE 
Operations in the Supreme Commander’s Sphere’.  This rather self-congratulatory 
paper made the claim that the impact of railway sabotage in Norway was ‘striking’ 
and led to a reduction in the rate of withdrawal from Norway from ‘four divisions to 
less than one division per month’.  It is a claim that was repeated after the war in 
British publications but has justifiably been treated with some scepticism in more 
recent Norwegian histories.
38
  From the summer of 1942 until April 1944 there was 
relatively little change in the number of enemy forces in Norway, which despite the 
rotation of troops in and out of the country remained fairly static at around eleven to 
thirteen divisions.
39
  The Germans, however, withdrew at least nine complete 
divisions from Norway between July 1944 and May 1945, including the major part of 
those units chosen to return to the Continent as part of Operation Nordlicht, the retreat 
from Finland, as well as other manpower, such as 11,000 men from the Luftwaffe.
40
  
There was, therefore, an uninterrupted flow of enemy forces out of the country after 
the launch of Overlord, which actually accelerated despite the instigation of extensive 
railway sabotage.  The destruction of rail line and the demolition of bridges in the area 
north of Trondheim had little impact on the movement of German forces as new 
routes were found, motorised transportation used, or temporary bridges quickly 
erected.  Even most of the damage caused by Operation Betongblanding in March was 
repaired within a few hours.
41
  This sabotage was nevertheless an additional major 
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security and logistical problem for the occupying regime in Norway during the final 
months of the war.  At the time it was estimated that at least 2000 German troops 
were used as ‘line guards’ in an attempt to protect the rail network.42  German 
withdrawals did begin to slow down in the spring of 1945, but other factors such as 
the mining of Norwegian waters, lack of shipping and coal, and Allied air superiority, 
were probably the major causes behind this.
43
   
 Although railway sabotage did not have the impact that SOE claimed, it 
nevertheless does illustrate how Norway’s relationship to the wider strategic 
background was crucial in determining the nature of special operations in the country 
during the final months of the war in Europe.  Strategic factors were, however, alone 
not enough to lead to the major increase in sabotage that occurred at this time.  
Changes in the nature of the occupation and preparations for the liberation led to an 
important modification in policy by the Home Front that allowed Milorg units to 
become actively involved in sabotage, assisting SOE teams and carrying out their own 
actions.  It was, therefore, a mix of strategic and political influences specific to the 
final stages of the war in Europe and the occupation of Norway that led to not only a 
change in the make-up but also an intensification of SOE sabotage from the summer 
of 1944.    
      
 
II 
SOE and the Liberation: the Preparation of a Protective Force 
From the summer of 1944 SFHQ, in collaboration with FO and under the authority of 
SHAEF, also began a major effort to prepare both Milorg and SOE sponsored groups 
to act as a protective force that could be utilised within Norway during the early 
stages of its liberation.  Preparations were predominately built on an expectation that 
the most likely scenario was that the German forces would eventually capitulate, 
despite some fears that there might be an enemy withdrawal or even a last stand in the 
country.  Consequently, after four frustrating years, and within the particular strategic 
conditions of 1944, SOE’s plans to prepare a secret army in Norway came to fruition. 
This underground army would not, however, be used as a guerrilla force to support an 
opposed landing by Allied troops, as originally intended, but to assist in the peaceful 
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transition to lawful government in Norway.  Therefore, its role was ultimately purely 
political. 
The major effort that was put in to creating a viable clandestine military force 
in Norway during 1944 and 1945 also remained a joint endeavour based on a shared 
belief that it would be required to make a significant contribution to the liberation.  
Scotco espoused the contribution of resistance forces, particularly in light of the 
shortage of regular troops for operations in Norway, and therefore liased closely with 
SFHQ.   SOE’s Norwegian Section and FO IV jointly oversaw and helped to prepare 
this underground army.  By this stage Milorg had over 30,000 men under its control, a 
military staff structure spread across the regions of Norway, an internal 
communications network, and a leadership that looked to London and ultimately the 
Allied High Command for direction and authority.
44
  
This background led to a huge array of operations in Norway during 1944 and 
1945 that were designed to ensure that a clandestine army was in a position to make 
an effective contribution to the liberation of the country from German occupation. 
There was an acceleration and increase in the supply of arms, equipment, and training.  
Teams of officers were sent in from Britain in an effort to improve local leadership 
and measures were taken to ensure that resistance groups remained intact and 
undiminished.  Milorg in collaboration with SFHQ and FO initiated a huge array of 
counter-scorch measures.  Arrangements were put in place to ensure close liaison 
between SFHQ/FO, Scotco, Milorg, and the Norwegian Police Battalions in Sweden, 
along with measures to facilitate the rapid deployment of forward parties to the key 
areas of Norway immediately after a German surrender.  The objectives were to 
ensure protection of key industrial sites and communications, maintain law and order, 
and prepare the way for the arrival of the main contingent of Allied forces that would 
ultimately enforce the armistice conditions.  In addition, in response to the retreat of 
German forces into northern Norway in October 1944 and the implementation of a 
brutal scorched-earth policy, SFHQ responded to requests for help from the 
Norwegian government and agreed to prepare local resistance groups in this remote 
region, although with little success.     
From the autumn of 1944, the supply of materials to Norway increased 
significantly and nearly three-quarters of all arms and equipment delivered by air was 
                                                          
44
 See chapter three, pp. 138-141.  
 269 
dropped during the final nine months of the occupation.
45
  Between September 1944 
and May 1945, the RAF and USAAF undertook a notable but costly effort to 
distribute these supplies and twenty three British and six American planes were lost 
on dropping operations over Norway.
46
  This alone indicates that there was a 
determination within SHAEF to ensure that the Home Forces in Norway were 
adequately prepared.  At the same time, however, the number of recruits in Milorg 
also increased, especially during the final months of the occupation when it grew from 
a little over 30,000 to around 40,000,
47
 and therefore, by May 1945, despite Allied 
efforts, it was still not fully armed.  In Milorg’s District 21, in the county of Møre and 
Romsdal on the west coast south of Trondheim, of the 1500 men mobilised in May 
1945 only between seven and eight hundred had weapons.  In District 17, in the 
county of Telemark west of Oslo, only 1764 men out of a total of 3151 mobilised in 
May 1945 were armed, despite receiving fourteen successful drops during the final 
months of the occupation.  The leadership of District 25, close to Lillehammer north 
of Oslo, also complained after the war of a general shortage of arms and equipment.
48
  
During 1944 and 1945, there was also an increase in the number of NIC (1) teams that 
went into Norway to help prepare local resistance groups, mostly from Milorg.  
Nevertheless, the proportion of those that eventually received instruction was patchy.  
In eastern Norway, where Milorg was at its strongest, only seventy-five percent 
received military training despite the arrival of fifty instructors from Britain.  And in 
the area around Trondheim only fifty percent of Milorg recruits were trained. 
In late April and early May 1945, however, there were several clashes between 
German patrols and armed groups from two of the reception camps, ‘Bjørn West’ near 
Bergen and ‘Elg’ northwest of Oslo, which had been set up in the mountains to 
receive and train members of the Home Forces in preparation for the liberation.  
Unlike the local groups the Germans suffered heavy casualties during these 
encounters,
49
 which appears to indicate that the training and preparation of the 
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resistance was having some effect and that in small and isolated confrontations with 
occupying troops they were capable of acting as an effective military force.  
Nevertheless, whilst visiting Norway at the end of the occupation, Lt. Colonel Wilson 
wrote in his diary that it was fortunate for ‘Bjørn West’ that ‘the end came so soon 
after the action’. 50 In other words he felt it was unlikely that the resistance could have 
withstood the full force of German power for very long if it had ever been brought to 
bear against them.  Although a late but significant effort was made by the Allies to 
prepare a secret army in Norway, at the time of the German surrender the ‘40,000 
Milorg personnel’ were certainly not fully equipped and trained.  The difficulties of 
transporting materials to Norway in the winter months and of operating in an 
occupied country meant that the whole process could not be completed within the 
short time frame that was available.  It is, therefore, difficult to see how this 
clandestine army, without prompt support from regular forces, could have ever 
defended the country from a determined German effort to instigate a wide-spread 
scorched-earth campaign, let alone a last stand, if either had ever been carried out.
51
  
Nevertheless, with resources deployed elsewhere, the Allies realised that they 
had to rely heavily on the contribution of the Home Forces in the early stages of the 
liberation.  A further indication of this was the huge effort that was put in to ensuring 
that this underground army would be able to communicate both internally and 
externally so that its contribution could be effectively co-ordinated and closely 
managed.  As with any army, command and control is essential and this requires not 
only having the necessary equipment but also a sufficient quantity in the right place at 
the right time.  By 8 May there were sixty-nine clandestine wireless stations operating 
in the country, compared with only two in 1941, and during 1945 over 4000 messages 
were sent from Norway, over fifty percent of the total sent during the war.  From early 
1944 attempts were also made to set up an internal radio network so that local Milorg 
organisations could communicate within their area, across districts, and with SL in 
Oslo.  By May 1945, through using radio sets assembled in Norway under the code-
name ‘Olga’ as well as equipment brought into the country, twelve districts were able 
to intercommunicate.  In addition about 100 SCR/ 195 ‘walkie-talkie’ sets were also 
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sent to the country to aid communication in ‘battlefield conditions’. 52  The effort to 
ensure effective communication during the liberation was therefore much more 
successful. 
An army, secret or otherwise, also has to have a competent leadership.  By the 
early summer of 1944 both SFHQ and FO had recognised that there was a shortage of 
trained officers within Norway, something that was confirmed by Milorg soon 
afterwards.
53
  It was therefore decided to send in specialist teams to link up with and 
where possible reinforce the Milorg district leadership.  This eventually happened in 
two ways.  Firstly, through Operation Farnborough, which set out to send specialist 
teams largely made up of recruits from Den norske krigs-skolen, the Norwegian War 
School in London, to eastern Norway, especially in and around Oslo where Milorg 
was at its strongest.  The objective was to increase ‘the preparedness of the district’ 
through supplying teams of officers and NCOs.  And between the end of December 
1944 and mid February 1945, nine out of a total of ten such operations were sent to 
Norway.
54
  Secondly, in the outlying Milorg districts, NIC (1) teams were 
progressively authorised when possible to link up with and provide support for the 
local resistance leadership.  For example, in early November 1944 Operation Auk 
arrived in the Haugesund area between Bergen and Stavanger.  The leader of the team 
was instructed to take over responsibility for SOE groups already there, re-organise 
the district, and become military adviser to the Milorg District Leader.  In mid 
February 1945, Operation Diver was sent to the Milorg District 21, around Ålesund 
on the West Coast, also to act as military adviser to the District Leader.
55
  During the 
final months of the occupation, therefore, Milorg became the unequivocal basis for a 
clandestine army in southern Norway, and a major effort was put in to ensuring it was 
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an effectively led military force.  Nevertheless, there were areas where the 
organisation remained weak and ineffectual, such as around Sogne north of Bergen, 
where SOE and FO retained responsibility for organising local groups.  By this stage, 
however, SOE, owing to a number of ‘favourable’ reports from the field, appears to 
have lost any reservations it had about the reliability of Milorg.
56
  
 Preparing, arming and equipping a clandestine army in Norway in readiness 
for the liberation was on its own not enough.   This underground force had to be kept 
intact and its numbers preserved and if possible increased if it was ever to make a 
viable military contribution.  Conditions within Norway during the final twelve 
months of the occupation made this increasingly difficult.  As shown the threat to 
Milorg from the German and Norwegian security police using informers and 
provocateurs continued and even intensified as the liberation approached and 
therefore the number of liquidations undertaken by SOE and Milorg groups 
increased.
57
  A further hazard to this clandestine army was also the attempt, using the 
cover of the Labour Services, to conscript young Norwegians for German military 
service, thereby denying the resistance both new and current recruits and thus 
weakening its ranks.  In response to this both SL and FO in collaboration with SFHQ 
decided to set up reception camps or cells in the woods and mountains where young 
men could hide and receive training and weapons instruction. 
Although the series of cells that Milorg set up in the woods across eastern 
Norway during the summer of 1944 were a refuge for significant number, almost 
3000 around Oslo, they nonetheless proved difficult to maintain.  Owing to a lack of 
provisions many of the men, over 1500, were forced to flee to Sweden, whilst others 
found local jobs or returned home.  Some cells, however, particularly those close to 
and even across the Swedish border, were kept going through the winter of 1944-
1945.  Supplies of clothes and food, along with a few weapons, were brought over 
from Sweden during the autumn of 1944 by so-called ‘Planet Groups’ established by 
the Norwegian authorities in Stockholm.  Arms and equipment were also dropped by 
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air and NIC (1) officers carried out instruction, but the total effort in men and 
materials was relatively small.
58
  
From as early as March 1943, SOE had also contemplated setting up a small 
number of secret bases in Norway.
59
  And during the winter of 1943-1944, FO also 
began to consider the idea of establishing a series of camps in the mountains where 
young men could be trained.  Consequently, in May 1944 instructions were given to 
plan several large ‘bases’ or ‘reception centres’ in isolated locations where Milorg 
recruits could not only escape the threat of mobilisation but also be formed into armed 
and trained guerrilla units that could be used during the liberation if required.  The 
project was provisionally approved by SHAEF in July 1944
60
 and at the end of 
August preparations commenced for the first base called ‘Elg’ situated in the lower 
Valdres valley about 100 kilometres northwest of Oslo.
61
  The intention was to 
establish five camps across southern Norway but despite the efforts through OSS to 
obtain supplies of Arctic equipment from the USA, only three of these bases, ‘Bjørn 
West’ north of Bergen, ‘Varg’ east of Stavanger, and ‘Elg’, received enough material 
to be able to grow their numbers.  Nonetheless, even ‘Bjørn West’, the largest of these 
reception centres, was only able to send 250 fully armed men into Bergen on the 
evening of 9 May 1945 to help maintain order after the German surrender.
62
  Even 
with the huge increase in the supply of arms and equipment to Norway during the 
final months of the occupation, it was not enough to sustain even small groups in 
hiding in the harsh northern climate for any significant period. 
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The frenetic effort to prepare a clandestine army in Norway during the final 
six months of the country’s occupation had the full support and co-operation of the 
Norwegian government.  The manpower in Milorg symbolised its main military 
contribution to the liberation and therefore its preparation and utilisation was 
politically very important.  Conditions within occupied Norway, however, continued 
to limit what was achievable.  Nevertheless, the country’s marginal position, both 
strategically and geographically, meant that local manpower had to be utilised, 
particularly in an effort to protect the country from the potentially destructive impact 
of a German scorched-earth policy.  Moreover, as the final stages of the war in 
Europe approached post-war considerations, the safeguarding of the Norwegian 
economy and industrial infrastructure from long-term and costly damage became 
increasingly important.   
From December 1943 and during the following spring NIC (1) teams 
continued to go into occupied Norway with instructions to prepare local groups to 
protect key industrial sites.
63
  In the spring of 1944 the Norwegian military authorities 
and Milorg leadership also affirmed that ‘preventive’ measures needed to be prepared 
in advance,
64
 a view that was reinforced in July when intelligence was received from 
MI IV in Stockholm that indicated that the Germans might attempt to destroy 
industrial sites, communications, harbours, and ship-works at the end of their 
occupation.
 
Looking to the future, the Norwegian government clearly had a strong 
political motive to protect its country’s economic base and therefore became fully 
engaged in the planning, preparation, and implementation of counter-scorch 
operations.  Consequently, from the spring of 1944, Leif Tronstad and Peter Deinboll 
in FO IV, who both had valuable local experience, began preparations for the 
protection of Norwegian industries and communications.  And during his visit to 
London in July/August 1944, J. Chr. Hauge attended the meeting of the ANCC where 
all parties agreed to the importance of protective operations.
 65
  There was therefore 
pressure from SOE, FO, and Milorg to increase counter-scorch measures in Norway 
and from the beginning of September, after instruction from SFHQ, it became the 
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primary task for the Home Forces.  FO provided expertise, SOE and FO jointly 
supplied specialist teams, arms, equipment and training, whilst Milorg provided the 
bulk of the men that would undertake these preventive measures.  They were therefore 
collaborative operations and representative of the close co-operation between SOE, 
Norwegian authorities, and Milorg.
66
  Most importantly, this tri-partite relationship, 
backed by the authority of the Allied High Command, meant that the number and 
scale of these operations could increase dramatically over the following months.  
From September 1944, built on help provided by OSS office in Paris, and 
drawing on Allied and resistance experience of German demolitions in France, 
preparations began for a whole raft of counter-scorch operations in Norway.
67
  The 
first major collaborative effort of this kind was Operation Sunshine.  The party, under 
the command of Major Leif Tronstad, was parachuted into Norway in October 1944.  
Its objective was to protect the power stations in the counties of Telemark and 
Buskerud, as well as the Norsk Hydro industrial plants in Rjukan and Notodden.  
Divided into three sections, ‘Moonlight’, ‘Starlight’, and ‘Lamplight’, it included 
many of the men from operations ‘Grouse’ and ‘Gunnerside’ who would eventually 
work closely on the project with both the local Milorg organisation and SL in Oslo.  
This operation is important, not just because of its objective, but also because of what 
it symbolises.  The hydroelectric plants in Norway and the production of heavy water 
had been major strategic targets for SOE.  From the early autumn of 1944 the priority, 
because of their economic importance, was to ensure their protection.  Consequently, 
‘Sunshine’ was in many ways a watershed that marked the point at which post-war 
factors became the determining factor in shaping operations against major industrial 
targets in Norway.
68
  The aim was no longer to destroy these sites, but to stop them 
being destroyed.   
During October and November 1944, FO, Milorg, represented by Jens Chr. 
Hauge, SFHQ, Scotco and MEW also put together three major protective plans.  The 
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first of these was the ‘Foscott Plan’, which set out to protect the priority targets in 
Norway, the power supply and telecommunications network.  Altogether 118 sites, 
including thirty-four power stations and twenty-seven transformer stations, were 
identified.  In addition, local Milorg groups would protect sixty-one secondary targets 
that were identified as part of the ‘Carmarthen’ plan, whilst the ‘Bedriftsorganisasjon’ 
(B.org), the industrial organisation, a resistance group based on factory workers under 
the control of SL, would protect many smaller targets under the ‘Catterick’ plan.69  
To implement the ‘Foscott’ plan the ‘Farnborough’ teams provided expertise 
and worked with local Milorg organisations to protect key sites in eastern Norway.  In 
addition, as with Operation Sunshine, other sites across the country were allocated to 
teams either sent from Britain, such as ‘Clothall’ and ‘Crowfield’, or to NIC (1) teams 
that were already resident in Norway, such as ‘Arquebus’ or ‘Razorbill’.  Many of 
these teams also worked in collaboration with local Milorg groups.  Finally, there 
were operations such as ‘Barming’ that for various reasons never reached Norway and 
in these cases it was Milorg or other local groups that stepped in to help.  SOE and 
FO, in co-operation with Milorg, put together at least forty operations in the final nine 
months of the war that set out to help protect Norway’s power stations, industries, and 
telecommunications network.  It was a major collaborative effort and is a further 
illustration of the import role allocated to clandestine forces in Norway during the 
liberation.
70
  The improvised and sporadic nature of SOE’s earlier activity had been 
left far behind.  These operations were sophisticated, well planned and organised.  
There is one other protective plan that because of its scale and military 
importance to the liberation should also be mentioned.  This was ‘Polar Bear’, an 
operation that set out to safeguard the main Norwegian harbours from German 
demolition, something that had happened to the French ports and as a result slowed 
the Allied advance in the autumn of 1944.  It involved FO IV, SOE, and on this 
occasion it also included help from the Norwegian navy, which supplied the 
manpower, and the Royal Navy, which organised a trip to Dieppe so that the 
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Norwegian personnel could study the German destruction at first hand.  Between mid 
January and May 1945 a total of ten ‘Polar Bear’ teams were eventually sent to 
Norway to cover a total of fourteen Norwegian harbours from Narvik in the north to 
Fredrikstad in the east.
71
  
Despite the explicit priority given to protective operations, however, whilst 
uncertainty remained over the intention of the German forces in Norway, the idea of 
using local guerrilla forces in support of Allied military operations to re-occupy the 
country was not completely abandoned.  It seems that SOE still believed it needed to 
continue to prepare for all possibilities, no matter how unlikely.  Therefore, some of 
the NIC (1) teams that went into the country during the final months of the 
occupation, such as ‘Snowflake’, ‘Avocet’, and ‘Diver’, still received instructions to 
prepare local groups to undertake guerrilla operations in support of Allied forces, if 
this proved to be necessary.  For example, Operation Diver, which arrived in Norway 
as late as mid February 1945 to work in the Ålesund area, was instructed to plan 
actions to assist the ‘Allies in the event of an invasion’.72  Such instructions, however, 
were by this stage not widespread and seem to have been confined to teams operating 
in areas where Milorg was traditionally weaker, especially along the west coast.  
There also appears to be no evidence that they were directly linked to a last minute 
expectation or fear that the German forces in Norway might make a last-stand, and 
probably represented no more than a continuation of earlier work.   
During the final months of the occupation the bulk of SOE’s operations 
reflected the view that Allied military success in Europe would ultimately lead to a 
collapse or surrender of German authority in Norway.  It was, however, important for 
post-war political stability if the return to legitimate, civilian government could 
happen in a peaceful and orderly environment.  In September 1944, therefore, SFHQ 
had directed that the Home Forces should work closely with the civilian resistance in 
Norway to help establish and maintain law and order prior to the arrival of a relief 
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force,
73
 a point reinforced in the ‘September Directive’ that was issued to the Milorg 
district leadership soon afterwards.
74
  In step with this the Norwegian government in 
London accorded the Home Front Leadership an important executive role in the 
transitional period prior to the re-instatement of legal authority in Norway.
75
  
Ultimately it was the Home Forces in collaboration with newly appointed local 
government officials, local police, and the District Commanders (DKs), the 
Norwegian government representatives responsible for resistance forces once the 
liberation had commenced, that would help to ensure that this transition was 
controlled and uneventful.
76
  Alongside this the Norwegian Police Battalions in 
Sweden, made up from some of the thousands of Norwegian refugees that had fled the 
country since 1940, would be made ready by the Allied and Swedish authorities to act 
as an additional local force that could also be quickly deployed in Norway.  By May 
1945, a total of nearly 11,000 men in units of the Rikspoliti (State Police) and 
Reservepolitikorps (Police Reserve Corps) were awaiting a call to return to their 
homeland.
77
 
Recognition that local forces would have to be utilised as part of the military 
plans for the liberation is also borne out by the efforts that were made to institute 
close liaison between SFHQ and Scotco and to ensure that when the time came there 
would be close operational liaison between the Allied land forces in Norway, Milorg 
and the Police Battalions.  Contact between SOE’s Norwegian section and Scotco was 
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formalised in April 1944 when Lt. Colonel C. S. Hampton was appointed as liaison 
officer between the two.  A further step was taken when in the summer of 1944 
authority was given for the formation of a ‘Special Force Detachment’ (referred to as 
M.E. 12), under Hampton, to ensure direct and close collaboration between SFHQ and 
Scotco in the planning for the liberation.  This led to the formation of a HQ 
Detachment and five Special Force sections, one for each of the main regions of 
Norway, which were given the task of working with the Allied forces that would 
oversee and enforce the liberation.  Three Special Force sub-sections were also 
created to accompany the Police Battalions as they crossed from Sweden into Norway 
en route for Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo respectively.  The objective of special force 
units was once in Norway to provide liaison between the Allied forces and local 
Milorg groups, including SL in Oslo, the DKs once they arrived, and with the Police 
battalions as they moved into Norway.
78
  At the same time although Milorg would 
remain under the executive command of its own leaders and the relevant DK, local 
military commanders would be able to issue orders for their employment through the 
DK or a representative of SFHQ.
79
  
Further evidence of the military significance placed on Milorg and the Police 
Battalions are the proposals, which originated in early September 1944, to send Allied 
representatives of SHAEF, through SFHQ, to both Norway and Sweden.  There was a 
belief within Scotco that there was a need to ‘advise and assist the Home Front in 
organising all available forces’, to ‘co-ordinate action taken within Norway with that 
undertaken by Allied forces outside’, to ‘hinder German attempts at wrecking’, and to 
make ‘preparations for the speedy arrival of supplies’.80  This was given added 
impetus by fears within SOE’s Norwegian section that the impending armistice 
between Finland and the Soviet Union could result in an early German withdrawal, 
instigation of a national scorched-earth policy, or maybe even a capitulation, leading 
to conditions of unrest and disorganisation across Norway.  With no military action 
possible within this theatre at this time it was felt that a great degree of responsibility 
could therefore fall on the Home Front and SFHQ.  This led to the ‘Scale’ operations, 
                                                          
 
78
 NHM: SOE archive, boks 11, Wilson’s mappe 10/8/1, Appendix P, ‘Special Force Detachment, 
Force 134’.  
79
 PRO: ‘Operation Doomsday’ – Joint Plan by DCOS, Planning Staff, Commander-in-Chief Rosyth, 
Military Commander Joint Task Force, 13 Group RAF (Plans), April 1945, in WO106/4401.  
80
 PRO: ‘Proposals for a Military Mission’, by C.K. Squires (Scottish Command), 28 August 1944 in 
HS2/215. 
 280 
which were plans to send Allied representatives to Norway to liaise with local 
resistance leaders, provide SHAEF with intelligence, and if necessary, receive the 
surrender of local garrisons and gain German recognition of the role of the Home 
Front.
81
 
Initially several missions were planned in order to cover Milorg HQ in Oslo, 
the region around Trondheim, the county of Nordland centred on Mosjøen, the 
Stavanger/Kristiansand area, and Bergen, as well as one to work with SOE and OSS 
missions in Stockholm.  The leading operation, called ‘Octave’, set out to send an 
Allied team to link up and co-operate with SL to assist it to prepare the Home Forces 
in Norway, undertake counter scorch operations, hinder German withdrawals if 
required, and receive the capitulation of German forces if necessary.  Although 
‘Octave’ was kept alive at least until the end of 1944, only three operations were 
eventually sent into the field: ‘Quaver’ and ‘Semi-Quaver’ in Nordland, and ‘Minim’ 
to Stockholm.  The reason for the eventual abandonment of ‘Octave’ and the missions 
to Stavanger/Kristiansand and Bergen is unclear.  Contact between SFHQ and Milorg 
HQ in Oslo was during the autumn of 1944 very close, especially after J. Chr. 
Hauge’s visits to London and with the improved W/T links it was probably felt that 
the mission was no longer necessary.  The withdrawal of German forces from Finland 
also did not have the widespread impact that was feared.
82
 
The first ‘Scale’ operation to go ahead was ‘Quaver’, in October 1944.  It has 
attracted previous attention because it was the only SOE operation sent to Norway 
that primarily used British recruits,
83
 including a SOE staff officer, J. C. Adamson.  
Owing to the strategic geography of the area, which made it a potential transportation 
bottleneck, it was an important locus for gathering intelligence on and for the 
initiation of operations against the German forces moving southwards.  Previous 
attempts by NIC (1) teams to build up resistance groups further south – Operations 
Heron and Falcon - had been broken up by the work of the German security police 
and local informers and Milorg had also failed to build up a significant organisation in 
the area.  Consequently, operations ‘Quaver’ and ‘Semi-Quaver’ were a final, and 
                                                          
 
81
 PRO: paper entitled, ‘Scale Missions’, 15 September 1944, in HS2/215.  NHM: paper entitled, 
‘Outline of Projected Plans for Norway’, from D/S (Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson) to AD/E (Brigadier E.E. 
Mockler-Ferryman), ref. DS/SN/2987, 21 September 1944, in SOE archive, boks 5, mappe 10/3/2.  
82PRO: paper entitled ‘Norway: Provision of SOE/SO Missions’, 10 September 1944, in HS2/234.  
Paper entitled Scale Missions’, 15 September 1944, in HS2/215. 
83
 Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 659. 
 281 
after Adamson’s early capture, a failed Allied attempt to establish armed and trained 
resistance groups in this strategically important region.
84
  
The other ‘Scale’ operation that went ahead was ‘Minim’, the proposal to send 
a representative of SFHQ to Stockholm to act as a liaison officer between SHAEF and 
SOE office, OSS mission, and MI IV.  This was more successful.  The most important 
issue for ‘Minim’ - Major H. A. Nyberg from SOE’s Norwegian section - was 
Operation Beefeater, the training and preparation of the Norwegian Police Battalions. 
From December 1944, Nyberg, under the cover of ‘Honoury Assistant Military 
Attaché’ at the British Legation provided SFHQ and Scotco with regular and up to 
date information on ‘Beefeater’.85  ‘Minim’ is another indication of the value that 
SHAEF and Scotco placed on the Norwegian Police Battalions in Sweden as a force 
that could be quickly deployed in Norway in the days immediately after a German 
capitulation.  They were eventually incorporated into Operation Doomsday, the plan 
to establish forces in southern Norway as soon as the German commander had 
accepted the Allied terms of surrender.  Their military significance is also highlighted 
by Operation Antipodes, which was approved in February 1945.  This was a plan, put 
together in Stockholm by SOE, FO, and Milorg, to use teams from Britain, Sweden 
and within Norway to protect the bridges along the vital routes into the country.  The 
objective was to ensure that the advance of the Norwegian police units was not 
delayed.  It only proved possible in the short time-scale available to get eight of the 
original fourteen ‘Antipodes’ operations in place, although local Milorg groups in 
eastern Norway were also used to help secure the numerous bridges that straddle the 
River Glomma on the routes into Oslo.
86
  
Finally, there was one other major event that had an impact on the 
development of SOE operations in Norway during the final months of the occupation.  
This was the retreat of the German 20
th
 Mountain Army followed by the advance of 
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Soviet forces into northern Norway in autumn 1944, which led to the forced 
evacuation by the German authorities of a large part of the local Norwegian 
population from the northern counties of Finnmark and Nord-Troms and the 
instigation of a brutal scorched-earth policy.
87
  As a result the Norwegian government 
turned to its allies, including SOE, for assistance in its effort to make a contribution to 
what it saw as the liberation of a part of its country and to protect Norwegian interests 
and citizens in the region.   
This resulted in two failed attempts to instigate actions against German forces 
in the north of Norway through arming and preparing local resistance groups.  The 
first operation was called ‘Husky’, a plan to establish a SFHQ base in Finnmark using 
Norwegian and British personnel and where selected local recruits could be trained 
and equipped to carry out actions behind the German lines.  The second operation 
called ‘Scapula’ was an attempt, in response to appeals from SIS station ‘Gudrun’, to 
supply weapons to local groups, who would then lead efforts to resist the forced 
evacuation of the civilian population.  SOE strongly opposed both operations, 
primarily as it was felt they had no military value and that there better ways of using 
scarce resources, but eventually it bowed to political pressure from the Norwegian 
authorities and agreed to implement them.  The remoteness of the area, which made 
contact extremely difficult, the threat posed by small enemy vessels, and the rejection 
by SIS operator of the British and Norwegian proposals, meant, however, that both 
projects were eventually abandoned.
88
  Nevertheless, they illustrate that SOE, despite 
severe reservations, continued to believe that its commitment to collaboration with the 
Norwegian authorities was vital.        
The first two sections of this chapter have examined SOE’s operations in 
Norway during the final months prior to the country’s liberation.  In the early hours of 
7 May 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally.  The last section of this chapter 
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will therefore move on to examine SOE’s contribution, alongside FO and Milorg, to 
the early stages of Norway’s liberation and consider whether these efforts ultimately 
had any value. 
     
 
III 
The Collapse of German authority and the liberation of Norway May-June 1945: 
SOE long-term policy is finally implemented 
At 02.41 a.m. on 7 May 1945 Germany surrendered unconditionally on all fronts.  
This was confirmed in a BBC broadcast to Norway at 18.30 p.m. and during the same 
evening people began to appear on the streets of Oslo to celebrate the end of the war.  
On the afternoon of 8 May an Allied ‘Herald Party’, a forward party from Scotco, 
flew into Oslo with the capitulation dictate, which was presented to the German High 
Command at Lillehammer later that evening.  On 9 May General Böhme, in command 
of the German forces in Norway, confirmed that he would work loyally to ensure that 
its terms were carried out.
89
 
  When the German High Command accepted the Allied terms and conditions 
of surrender in Norway on 8 May 1945, uncertainty over the route to liberation was at 
an end.  Over the coming weeks and months there was an orderly and largely 
uneventful German capitulation.
90
  According to General Thorne, C-in-C Allied Land 
Forces Norway, the smoothness of the early stages of the liberation was the result of 
‘the good discipline of Milorg and of the German Command’.91  Whilst the view of 
Jens Chr. Hauge was that it was primarily because of the ‘brilliant German staff work’ 
and the ‘unbelievable discipline of the Germans’ rather than Allied efforts.92  On 8 
May, however, there was still the potential for chaos and disruption within the 
country, especially in the period before the arrival of an Allied force to oversee the 
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surrender.  Close to 400,000 Germans remained in the country, including many of the 
war weary divisions that had fought in Finland before retreating into Norway in the 
autumn of 1944.  It is within this context that the contribution of clandestine forces in 
Norway should be assessed.   
In this potentially unstable situation it was important that all the plans that 
SFHQ, FO IV, and Milorg had put together over the previous months to protect 
Norwegian industry and communications, ensure law and order, and to assist a prompt 
return to civil authority in Norway, were rapidly set in motion.  Alongside this the 
framework that had been created to ensure that once the Allied forces arrived in 
Norway they could effectively co-ordinate their work with the local resistance 
leadership across the country, had to be put in place. 
 In the days prior to 8 May everything was done to avoid any clashes between 
the Home Forces and German units that might threaten an orderly capitulation.  To 
assist this objective on 7 May the Home Front leadership, using contacts that had been 
developed earlier, began discussions with the German High Command in order to 
prevent any possible misunderstanding or disagreements.  From the autumn of 1944, 
SL was in touch with two officers, Frithjof Hammersen and Joachim Von Moltke in 
the Wehrmacht High Command.  When Hauge visited London in November 1944 he 
made SOE fully aware of this contact, which eventually provided the Allies with a 
great deal of important intelligence on the German authorities during the final months 
and weeks of the occupation.  For example, Hauge was told that ‘responsible German 
military circles in Norway’, proposed ‘to finish the occupation’ after ‘the collapse of 
Germany’, and that three weeks before the capitulation there was still 350,000 enemy 
soldiers and civilian personnel in the country.  On 7 May, it was Hammersen that 
became the official liaison officer between the Wehrmacht and Milorg.
93
 
On 8 May the general order for the mobilisation of the Home Forces across the 
country was issued and from this point it was no longer an underground army.  In line 
with the directives issued by SL in September and December 1944, key sites, such as 
harbours, communications, and important public buildings were quickly taken over by 
Milorg units in order to ensure the protection of the country’s industrial and 
communications infrastructure.  Of the estimated 40,000 members of the Home 
Forces in Norway, 19,000 were eventually mobilised for protection duties and 
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although preparations had been made to destroy some key sites, ‘not a single bridge’ 
was blown, or ‘a single quay or power station’ destroyed.94  In accordance with lists 
that had been drawn up earlier Milorg units arrested members of NS, Norwegians who 
had fought for the Wehrmacht and informers, as well as some members of the 
German security apparatus.
95
  All these tasks were undertaken by recruits from a 
clandestine army that had been given leadership, largely trained and at least in part 
lightly armed and equipped through the efforts of SOE in close collaboration with FO. 
 According to General Sir Andrew Thorne when the Allied troops arrived in 
Norway, ‘peace and order prevailed everywhere’, which meant that the whole of the 
forces under his command where ‘available for the control of the German forces’ and 
this allowed him to ‘impose disarmament terms’ from the very beginning without 
distraction.  Nevertheless, as Jens Chr. Hauge wrote later, it was the Germans that still 
‘held real power’, and it needed an Allied operation to liberate Norway.  In other 
words the Home Forces were only ever able to undertake a supportive role alongside 
regular forces.
96
  Many of the recruits were unarmed, some were untrained, and most 
only had light weapons: a ‘very special army’ according to Hauge.97  The view of 
General Thorne was that they were a match for any force that was not ‘well supplied 
with support weapons’, by which he presumably meant artillery, tanks, and aircraft, 
which the German units in Norway still had.
98
  Nevertheless, the Home Forces played 
an important symbolic role in the early hours and days after the German surrender in 
Europe.  Their presence on the streets and at key sites across Norway represented an 
immediate return of some form of legitimate national authority in the country in the 
period prior to the arrival of Allied forces. 
                                                          
 
94
 For example, in Bergen the Germans made preparations to blow up the quays by placing explosives 
in containers resembling gas cylinders 1.60 m long suspended in shafts in two rows 5 metres apart.  
Den norske regjerings virksomhet: fra 9 april til 22 juni 1945, bind IV, forsvarsdepartementet, p. 125. 
PRO: transcription of notes taken by SN (P) (Sir George Montagu-Pollock), during his visit to Norway 
in 1945 in HS2/213.  Paper entitled, ‘Norwegian Home Front’, written by General Andrew Thorne in 
October 1945 in WO106/1984.   
95
 Hauge, Frigjøringen, pp. 134-135.  
96
 PRO: paper entitled, ‘Norwegian Home Front’, by General Sir Andrew Thorne, October 1945, in 
WO106/1984. 
97
 Members of the Home Forces had white armbands with Norwegian colours whilst the police had 
black armbands with ‘Politi’ written in red.  See: Hauge, Frigjøringen, p. 135. 
98
 At the liberation the German forces in Norway possessed 131 tanks, and although considered 
obsolete they were still in good condition.  PRO: letter from General Sir Andrew Thorne, Commander 
Allied Land Forces to CIGS, (GOW 73), 15 July 1945, in WO106/1983.  Report on the visit to Allied 
Land Forces Norway by MO3 Colonel, 14-18 June 1945, in WO216/568.   
 286 
 From 9 May, through the implementation of operations ‘Doomsday’ and then 
‘Apostle’, Allied forces moved into Norway and by the middle of June totalled around 
30,000.
99
  Included in this were the Special Force Detachments that accompanied the 
Police Battalions from Sweden and Allied troops as they arrived in the country. These 
provided an important link between the local Milorg leadership and the DKs, the 
Allied ‘Zone Commanders’ that had military responsibility for the regions of Norway, 
and the HQ of ‘Force 134’.  They also worked closely with local Milorg units in 
helping to enforce law and order in the more remote areas, such as in the north and 
west.
100
 
 Under the terms of surrender the German forces were moved to reserves, 
disarmed, and ultimately returned to their homeland.  The arrival of King Haakon on 
7 June saw the end of the military phase of the liberation and the return of 
constitutional government in Norway.  On 9 June 15,000 men from Milorg filed past 
the King in Oslo, followed on 28 June by 205 men from the Linge Company and sixty 
men from the Shetlands Base in their last official duty.  On 15 July the Home Forces 
were disbanded followed by the Special Force Detachments.  During June and July 
the formation of eighteen Light Infantry Battalions had also begun and these would 
provide the core of a provisional Norwegian army that when the German forces were 
no longer considered a risk would take over from Allied forces in Norway.  SOE’s 
Norwegian section was closed on 7 September 1945 and the last British troops left 
Norway on 27 December 1945.
101
 
 
 
IV 
Conclusion 
 During 1944 and 1945, SOE operations in Norway in close collaboration with 
FO and Milorg, reached a scale and intensity that had not been seen over the previous 
four years.  The nature of these operations also changed with a move from coup de 
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main attacks against strategic targets to tactical sabotage, and a shift from preparing a 
guerrilla army in Norway to support an eventual Allied landing, to preparing an 
indigenous clandestine army that could act as a protective force within the country in 
the days after the expected German surrender or collapse and the arrival of significant 
Allied forces from the Continent. 
 Behind this change was the shift in the strategic background of Europe that 
occurred after 6 June 1944.  With the successful launch of Operation Overlord, SOE 
activity in Norway became directly subservient to Allied progress on the Continent, 
rather than helping to prepare the way for it.  The liberation was also dependent on the 
speed and ultimately the success of the Allied offensive.  Only after a German 
unconditional surrender would the military forces required be made available for 
Norway.  It was within this context that the Home Forces were seen as an important 
local resource that could be armed, trained, and prepared through SOE, and ultimately 
used in the potentially uncertain period within the country immediately after the 
expected German collapse. 
This does not mean that political and other issues did not also play a part.  The 
decision by the Home Front that allowed Milorg to collaborate in attacks against 
military targets from the spring of 1944 had a major impact on the scale of sabotage in 
the country.  The liberation of Norway was the primary objective of the Norwegian 
government in London, and as it believed that Milorg would be its main military 
contribution to this, it fully supported and contributed to SOE’s effort to prepare and 
organise a clandestine army.  The difficult post-war issues that plagued SOE activities 
in other theatres also did not hamper collaboration in Norway.  The constitutional 
authority of the government-in-exile was recognised both at home and abroad and 
agreement had been reached with the Home Front as to how the democratic process 
would be restored in Norway after the liberation.  Although conditions within the 
country, the nature of the occupation, still hampered the efforts of SOE, FO, and 
Milorg, co-operation and organisation had reached such a level that the major effort to 
prepare the Home Forces for the liberation was pushed forward with, notwithstanding 
many local difficulties.  Consequently, even though there was never a fully equipped 
or prepared secret army in Norway, local forces eventually made a valuable 
contribution to the liberation, although it was not the contribution that had originally 
been envisaged in the difficult months following the collapse of France in 1940.  The 
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strategic concept of using secret guerrilla army, which was a product of Britain’s 
militarily weak and isolated position in 1940, was fortunately no longer required.      
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       CONCLUSION 
 
 
SOE carried out an assortment of activities in Norway between the summer of 1940 
and the liberation in May 1945, ranging from sabotage and subversion to attempts to 
organise a clandestine guerrilla army.  The objective of this thesis has, however, not 
been to narrate these events as has often been the case with SOE histories, but to look 
behind them and analyse the influences and factors that shaped the overall plan of 
action for Norway as articulated by the series of policy documents produced by SOE 
and later SFHQ between 1940 and 1945.  Consequently, using archives in both 
Britain and Norway including recently released material and a combination of British 
and Norwegian secondary sources, this thesis has centred on SOE in Norway and its 
place within the wider strategic and political context.  It has also for the first time 
brought together the many diverse issues surrounding SOE interest in this theatre and 
where appropriate, based on a re-examination of old material or a consideration of the 
latest material, has produced some new and different interpretations.                   
 The initial proposition was that in the case of Norway it was strategic factors, 
SOE and particularly the country’s contribution within the wider strategic context in 
Europe that remained the fundamental influence behind the evolution of policy and 
therefore ultimately operations at a local level.  Political factors, represented by the 
interests of the Norwegian government in exile and the resistance organisations that 
emerged in response to Norway’s occupation, primarily Milorg, were also important, 
but although they moulded policy and tempered it in some ways, they did not dictate 
its essential structure.  This was the same for collaborative issues, defined as the 
relationship between SOE and the other agencies such as COHQ, PWE, the RN, RAF, 
and even SIS, all of which took an interest and were active in this theatre.   
 The subsequent examination of policy and the strategic, political, and 
collaborative issues that were behind it has shown, however, that SOE operations in 
Norway were ultimately the result of a coming together of all these influences.  
Furthermore, it was the combination of factors that was particular to Norway that 
gave rise to the nature of clandestine activities in this theatre.  The first and most 
significant of these was strategic, and political and collaborative forces never 
undermined its formative importance.  The combination of short and long-term aims, 
which remained at the heart of SOE’s plans for Norway from the autumn of 1940, 
originated within a British forward strategy that was formulated during the difficult 
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conditions of the summer of 1940.  Consequently, the broad mix of SOE operations 
was directly linked to the strategic beginnings of this organisation and the 
contribution that it was initially believed it could make to the defeat of Germany.  
More significantly, however, the military worth of the short and long-term strands of 
policy and their interrelationship between 1940 and 1945 was ultimately determined 
by Norway’s peripheral position and subservience to the main thrust of British and 
later Allied strategy and operations in Europe.  It was this particular condition that 
was the principal influence on SOE policy and activities in this theatre.     
 Nevertheless, SOE’s plans for Norway could not be divorced from political 
matters, the organisation’s relationship with the Norwegian government in exile and 
Milorg, as well as the nature of the occupation and its impact on the development of 
resistance in Norway.  The crucial point about these influences, however, was that 
they were on the whole beneficial.  This meant that SOE was able to implement its 
aims in Norway largely on its terms and without the disruption or complication that 
was often caused by the major political difficulties it experienced when operating 
within other occupied countries. Through and as a result of its strong relationship with 
the Norwegian authorities and ultimately Milorg, SOE ensured that its plans for 
Norway remained predominately intact, under the control of the Allied High 
Command, and therefore in step with wider strategic requirements.  The benefits of 
effective collaboration were also not confined to relations with the Norwegian 
government.  A significant proportion of SOE’s activity in Norway, such as the series 
of amphibious raids carried out in association with COHQ or the sea-borne operations 
that were co-ordinated under the authority of ACOS, were the result of its ability to 
successfully work with or alongside the other organisations that also took a military 
interest in this theatre.  Relations at a local operational level in Norway were 
predominately cordial and often close.  
 The strategic factors that were pertinent to Norway were all ultimately linked 
to its marginal position in relation to the rest of Europe.  Initially this meant that 
SOE’s early plans for the country originated within a policy that was not specifically 
designed for Norwegian conditions but for Continental conditions.  And were part of a 
forward strategy that meant that clandestine activity, particularly the organisation of 
secret armies had to be co-ordinated across the occupied countries.  Nonetheless, 
Norway was from a very early point also considered to be a theatre where sabotage 
and subversion could be quickly and effectively implemented.  It had a long and 
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accessible coastline and produced a number of what were considered important war 
materials.  This seemed to make it ideal for small offensive operations such as 
amphibious raids or coup de main attacks, which required relatively little resource in 
terms of men and materials.  As a result of the German occupation, which from the 
beginning had been resisted, it was also believed that there were the seeds of 
organised resistance that could be cultivated over the longer term into an underground 
army that would be able to support a possible future landing by regular forces in the 
south of the country.  Moreover, there was a significant body of experience of both 
applying economic pressure against Germany through Norway and of carrying out 
clandestine operations within the country, which was passed to SOE by many of the 
figures that helped to establish its Scandinavian section in the summer of 1940.  This 
gave added impetus to the development and implementation of its policy.  Therefore, 
the various actions carried out by SOE in Norway during 1940 and 1941 were not 
opportunistic or a case of the organisation ‘justifying its existence’,1 but were early, 
very small, but considered elements of a British long-term, forward strategy as it was 
applied to this theatre.   
Nevertheless, Norway’s position in relation to the rest of Europe, both 
geographically and strategically, soon led to contradictions within SOE policy. As the 
defeat of Germany was never going to be achieved through Norway, the description 
of the country as a strategic backwater is apt.
2
  It was, however, exactly this that 
ultimately defined its contribution to the war in Europe.  Despite early indications of 
an interest in a landing in the south of the country, from at least the spring of 1941 
there were also signs that Norway’s strategic and military value lay elsewhere.  From 
April, SOE was fully aware that its activities could help to lock-up German divisions 
in this so-called backwater and thereby make it a constant drain on enemy resources.  
Therefore, the large number of German troops that were retained in this theatre 
throughout most of the occupation was not simply the fortuitous or unintentional 
result of the actions of organisations such as SOE, but the consequence of a conscious 
effort.  This effort would, however, at the same time undermine SOE’s long-term 
plans for Norway as an increase in the number of German divisions in a country that 
was ideally suited for defensive operations made an Allied landing extremely 
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implausible, especially during 1941 and 1942 when militarily resources were scarce 
and there were other priorities, such as the defence of the UK and the protection of 
Britain’s position in North Africa.   Consequently, by August 1941 Norway was seen 
only as a theatre for possible subsidiary operations, and notwithstanding repeated calls 
for a Second Front and Churchill’s enthusiasm by the late autumn of 1941 the country 
was deemed suitable for just two relatively small combined operations against 
economic and military targets along the Norwegian seaboard.  From this point until 
May 1945, only minor sea-borne operations, coup de main attacks, and sabotage 
would be undertaken in the country.  By the end of 1941, therefore, even before the 
entry of the USA into the war, Norway was a secondary theatre of operations and 
thereby directly ancillary to British and Allied strategy as it was ultimately 
implemented in the Mediterranean and northwest Europe.   
It was Norway’s subordinate status that shaped the nature of the operations 
that were undertaken within its borders between 1940 and 1945.  It made it ideal for 
the extensive use of small raids and coup de main attacks against economic and 
military targets, which contributed to the undermining of German fighting strength.  
Not simply or primarily through disrupting supplies of important war materials, or 
through provoking a spirit of unease and apprehension amongst the occupying forces 
thereby adding to their security commitments, but also by helping to encourage 
enemy fears of an invasion.  All of this helped to mislead Germany as to Allied 
intentions and led it to make an unnecessarily high military investment in a country 
that was marginal to the outcome of the war in Europe.  Norway’s main strategic 
value therefore was as part of the process of weakening and stretching the enemy and 
thereby helping to prepare the ground for the implementation of a final Allied 
offensive in northwest Europe that would complete Germany’s defeat.  In that sense 
the country was from even as early as 1941 in the shadow of what would eventually 
be Operation Overlord.  Unfortunately, however, its marginal position also ensured 
that its liberation would have to await the successful completion of the war in Europe.       
This is perhaps at odds with the view that Norway’s strategic significance was 
represented by the threat posed by the presence from early 1942 of the bulk of the 
German surface fleet and a significant number of U-boats in the country, which along 
with the German Air Force posed a real threat to the Arctic convoys and a perceived 
threat to the Atlantic trade routes.  This undoubtedly placed an extra burden on the 
Home Fleet and created a great deal of concern within the Admiralty, as is illustrated 
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by the huge effort to sink the Tirpitz.  Nevertheless, it is important to point out that 
this had little impact on the progress of the Allied offensives across Europe, including 
the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy.  The threat to the Arctic convoys was 
largely confined to the period between the winter and autumn of 1942, after which it 
began to decline, and ultimately major German warships only sank forty-seven Allied 
ships - about the same number as were lost to mines during any three month period.  
By the end of May 1943, the Battle of the Atlantic had been won, and after the 
disabling of the Tirpitz and the sinking of the Scharnhorst at the end of the year, the 
balance within northern waters had turned clearly in the Allies favour.  It is also 
doubtful, as has been recently argued, that the Atlantic war was ever ‘within 
Germany’s power to win’ and that it had any ‘appreciable influence on the outcome of 
the war’.3  Consequently, the importance placed on the threat posed by the German 
fleet stationed in Norway although of significance to the British Admiralty was short-
lived and has probably been overplayed.  
Norway’s marginal position in relation to the development of Allied strategy 
and operations in western Europe had an important impact on SOE policy in two 
ways.  Firstly, it meant that from the end of 1941 and up to the summer of 1944, the 
immediate objective of attacking important war materials in Norway and thereby 
contributing to the strain on the enemy’s war effort, became the priority.  The 
importance of this element of policy reached its peak in 1943, as the pressure grew to 
intensify the burden on Germany and prepare the way for Overlord the following 
year.  Secondly, it meant that the preparation of a secret army was not only given a 
lower priority, but that it was hampered by a lack of resources and had to continue in 
conditions of uncertainty over when and how the country would be liberated.  From 
the summer of 1944, however, also as a result of Norway’s marginal position, the 
relationship between these two strands of policy changed.  With Allied manpower 
deployed elsewhere and therefore not immediately available to enforce the liberation, 
the preparation of a secret army became the priority.  Sabotage was considered to be 
of lesser importance, although it continued in support of and therefore directly linked 
to operations on the Continent. 
Despite the fundamental and principal significance of strategic factors, SOE’s 
policy for Norway was further shaped by political considerations.  The first of these 
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was the crucial relationship between SOE and the Norwegian authorities in London.  
Importantly, both for the development of SOE’s plans for this theatre and ultimately 
for its operations, the nature of this relationship eventually suited both parties.  
Through collaboration and an eventual partnership, SOE was able to accommodate 
Norwegian concerns and retain the use of Norwegian expertise and resources, which 
it was so dependent on, without having to significantly distort its aims.  This 
contradicts previous accounts of the contact between SOE and Norwegian authorities, 
which argue that it was founded on scepticism and distrust toward Norwegians, and 
built on British terms.  And it was only from early 1942, in response to the concerns 
of the Norwegian government that relations began to improve.
4
 
There were two factors that defined SOE’s attitude toward the Norwegian 
authorities.  The first was its complete dependence on Norwegian volunteers to 
undertake its activities in this theatre; something that from the beginning it believed 
should and could only be done through and in association with their political 
representatives based in London.  The Norwegian government in exile was the lawful 
representative of its nation’s interests, something that was quickly recognised in the 
summer of 1940, and to disregard its authority would have been very risky.  
Consequently, from early August, SOE made contact with the relevant figures within 
the government and military authorities in order to allow it to begin the process of 
recruitment.  Scepticism toward Norwegians, as with many other nationalities, was 
undoubtedly expressed, but pragmatism outweighed this.  Contact was not therefore 
developed just on a dogmatic ‘need to know’ basis, but also on a practical basis; with 
those individuals that would ensure SOE received the manpower and support it 
required to become operational in this theatre.  Restricting its contacts and the amount 
of information it passed on about its activities was also not unnatural for a new secret 
organisation and not uniquely applied to the Norwegian government.  Moreover, SOE 
was required through its Charter to ensure that clandestine and subversive activities 
across the whole of Europe were kept in step with strategical requirements, which 
meant that it had to remain in control.  And it was the need to strike a balance 
between retaining the use of Norwegian volunteers whilst safeguarding its dominant 
position that underlay its approach to and association with the government in exile 
throughout the war.  It was not a relationship founded on negative, ethnocentric 
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views.  From the beginning SOE believed it was working closely with the Norwegian 
authorities, and it is difficult to see what other approach it could have taken during 
1940 and 1941other than working through individual contacts.  At the time, however, 
it meant that SOE had a free reign in Norway and its plans for this theatre were not in 
the beginning re-shaped or undermined by Norwegian interests.  
It was the fear of losing influence and control, primarily over the use and 
development of Milorg but also over Norwegian manpower, that forced SOE to 
change tack and work with and through their military authorities in London in a more 
equitable and open way.  At the same time the Norwegian government initiated 
important reforms to its military command and staff structure in exile.  This led in 
early 1942 to the creation of Forsvarets Overkommando (FO), its Defence High 
Command, which enabled it to work in a far more co-ordinated and effective way 
with the British, develop clear policies in the sphere of clandestine operations, and 
ensured that it retrieved some control and influence over the use of its citizens on 
operations carried out on its soil.  There was a clear understanding within FO that 
SOE was answerable to the COS, that its allies had the leadership of the war and the 
means to conduct it, and therefore its objectives could only be achieved and interests 
served through co-operation.  From this point until the end of the war relations with 
SOE were built on a collaborative basis that ultimately served the purpose of all 
parties.  For SOE it meant that through NIC (1) it secured the use of a unit of the 
Royal Norwegian army to carry out special operations in Norway, under the military 
authority of the Norwegian High Command, but ultimately under the strategic 
direction of the COS.   Collaboration, however, also meant that restrictions on the 
distribution and sharing of information were no longer viable and that plans for this 
theatre had to be developed and implemented on a joint basis.  Consequently, SOE 
had to accept that to cement its relationship with the Norwegian authorities and to 
guarantee its control over special operations in Norway, it had to adapt aspects of its 
policy to meet Norwegian concerns.  This led to the abandonment or scaling back of 
some of SOE’s coup de main operations and the original aim of developing a sabotage 
organisation within Norway was reluctantly sidelined.  The longer-term aim of 
creating a clandestine army was, however, strengthened by collaboration as both 
parties shared the view that the resistance in Norway would ultimately play a 
significant role in the re-occupation of the country.  On the whole, SOE developed a 
very successful alliance with the Norwegian authorities, which meant that its 
 296 
objectives in this theatre were never severely damaged or complicated by political 
difficulties.  They were eventually enhanced by the positive nature of the relationship. 
The other factor that had a significant impact on the evolution of SOE’s plans 
for this theatre was the response within Norway to the nature and form of its 
occupation.  From the summer of 1940, this gradually resulted in organised and co-
ordinated resistance to the German authorities and NS, which crystallised around two 
movements, Sivorg and Milorg.  Both had a strong and influential central leadership 
based in Oslo that eventually worked closely with the government in London, with 
each other, and with the Norwegian people.  Milorg, which became a branch of the 
Norwegian armed services, quickly developed its own stance, based on local 
conditions and past experience, on what its military contribution should be both prior 
to and at the liberation. The resistance in occupied Norway therefore had an authority 
both at home and in London that SOE was eventually forced to recognise and accept, 
although it took some time. 
From the autumn of 1940, the relationship between SOE and Milorg was 
shaped by Britain’s determination to make sure that an underground army in Norway 
conformed to British views over its structure and its role, prior to and during the 
country’s liberation.  There was never an intention to avoid or ignore Milorg; the 
objective was to incorporate it and make use of the potential manpower resources that 
it could call on.  It was, however, this effort by SOE to take on the ownership of all 
armed resistance in Norway that was at the heart of the difficulties between the two 
organisations.  As Milorg’s early leadership was a product of local circumstances and 
recent experience its vision of a clandestine army did not readily conform to British 
ideas.  This led to ongoing difficulties and distrust.  Within this context, SOE’s 
attempts to impose itself on Milorg, and then to work around its leadership both 
failed.  It was only after events within Norway led to changes in Milorg’s leadership, 
structure and ultimately its policy, combined with a realisation that Norwegian 
conditions would not allow two clandestine organisations to operate alongside each 
other that SOE accepted that it would have to work with Milorg.  The issues 
surrounding sabotage and assassination perhaps best exemplify how crucial local 
factors were in shaping attitudes within Milorg and ultimately its relationship with 
SOE.  Both are violent acts that when carried out risked major reprisals from the 
occupying authorities against the local population and resistance groups.  Prior to 
1944, however, after which local circumstances made it both necessary and 
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acceptable, Milorg refused to support the use of indigenous groups or civilians to 
undertake sabotage.  The risk of carrying out such acts in the view of its leadership far 
outweighed the potential benefits.  The destruction of an important industrial site 
might have a strategic or military value, but did nothing within the setting of occupied 
Norway to help in the development of a clandestine army, which was Milorg’s single 
objective.  Paradoxically, however, it was fully prepared to collaborate in carrying out 
assassinations, which were also extremely hazardous and violent acts, and from the 
beginning of 1943 it was working closely with SOE in training execution teams.  In 
this case local factors, specifically the actions of informers and the Nazi police 
organisations, were a direct and serious threat to its objective of organising an 
underground army, and therefore something had to be done, whatever the danger.   
It was during 1943, as communication and contact improved and after Milorg 
had fully accepted its subservience to FO and that decisions over its deployment 
would be made in London not Oslo, that relations with SOE improved.  By the 
summer of 1944, these three parties had formed a close partnership under the 
authority of the Allied High Command.  Nevertheless, it had taken a long time to get 
to this position and the process had been very problematic, although this was not 
especially significant whilst there was no possibility of an Allied landing in Norway.  
It once more came back to the country’s position on the periphery of Europe, which 
meant that relations with Milorg only became particularly important during the final 
months of the occupation, when the preparation of clandestine forces in this theatre 
became a priority.  It had, however, been left too late, and at the time of the German 
capitulation, despite a huge last minute effort, there was still not a fully armed or 
trained secret army in Norway.          
The importance of collaboration on SOE policy and operations in Norway was 
also reflected in its readiness to work with the other British and American military 
organisations that took an interest in this theatre.  From the autumn of 1940, SOE 
recognised that it would be required to assist with operations such as raids and air 
attacks, and that through working with COHQ or the Air Ministry it would be part of 
a wider strategic effort.  It was, however, not only SOE that was aware of the 
potential benefits of co-operation.  Even the ‘professional military’ had an 
appreciation of the value of SOE’s more unconventional methods.  The RN was fully 
prepared to make use of the organisation’s skills in order to develop and employ 
various submersible vessels in its attempt to sink the Tirpitz.  Through ACOS it 
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worked alongside SOE on a series of sea-borne operations against enemy shipping in 
Norwegian waters.  Bomber Command was also prepared, when resources allowed, to 
attack targets that SOE had flagged up as unsuitable for sabotage.  Behind this 
willingness to co-operate was the belief that Norway was a theatre where significant 
economic and military pressure could be applied against Germany, especially along 
the Norwegian seaboard and against some important industrial targets within the 
country.  There was also an understanding within the regular services that this 
country, its terrain, long coastline, and the location of many of its important targets 
often made it particularly suited for more unorthodox methods.  Ultimately, SOE’s 
success in working with and alongside the regular armed services and other new 
military organisations was again advantageous to its plans for this theatre.  It enabled 
it to extend and intensify its activities, especially at times when it neither had the 
resources or ability to undertake such actions alone.  Moreover, notwithstanding the 
criticisms of each other and an element of rivalry, there was a realisation amongst the 
many organisations operating in this theatre that collaboration was more effective 
than conflict.     
The culmination of SOE’s policy was its operations, and it is these that 
exemplify how the strategic, political, and collaborative factors eventually came 
together and affected its actions a local level.  Furthermore, it is also important to 
reach a conclusion as to whether or not its actions had any militarily value or 
significance, especially as this is an issue that has so preoccupied previous historians.
5
  
SOE was predominately involved in two types of activity in Norway.  Firstly, 
there was sabotage, coup de main operations, and amphibious raids.  Up to the 
summer of 1944 these were strategic operations that were a small part of the overall 
effort to wear down Germany, but once Overlord had been successfully launched they 
became tactical operations in direct support of the Allied offensive across Europe.  
From the spring of 1942, NIC (1) teams, made up of Norwegian volunteers often 
transported in Norwegian fishing boats, carried out attacks instigated by SOE, but 
planned and prepared in co-operation with the Norwegian authorities.  Therefore, 
even though Milorg had no involvement in these operations, there was a direct and 
crucial Norwegian contribution.  Many attacks were also undertaken in co-operation 
with or had an important input from the armed services or other military organisations 
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such as COHQ.  All SOE operations against economic and military targets in Norway 
were therefore joint operations, and the participation of other agencies was crucial to 
both their implementation and eventual shape.  The attacks against the production of 
heavy water in Norway, operations ‘Freshman’ and ‘Gunnerside’, exemplify this. 
‘Freshman’, in the autumn of 1942, was a collaborative project that involved 
SOE, COHQ, the RAF, the 1
st
 Airborne Division, and the Norwegian authorities, and 
which following SOE’s recommendation targeted the hydroelectric plant at Vemork.  
As an air attack had been ruled out, owing to Norwegian concerns, it was believed 
that an operation to disable such a large site required a team of at least thirty, and 
therefore it was placed under the remit of COHQ.  ‘Gunnerside’ the follow up attack 
in February 1943 was predominately Norwegian.  It was a Norwegian idea that was 
actively promoted because it was a precision operation that would avoid widespread 
damage to the Norsk Hydro plant and power station and reduce the possibility of 
reprisals against the local population.  It was based on Norwegian intelligence, and 
used a NIC (1) team, many of whom were locals.  SOE instigated and authorised the 
operation, provided training and arranged transportation to the target.  It was 
brilliantly executed, but it did not achieve its objective of a lengthy interruption in 
production of heavy water. 
Ultimately, coup de main operations and raids against strategic targets in 
Norway had a limited long-term economic effect.  Delays and disruption were often 
caused, but unless a target was regularly revisited, such as the Orkla pyrite mines, the 
influence was temporary and overall production levels were not seriously diminished.  
Everything was, however, done to make these operations appear British and on the 
whole they did not result in widespread reprisals against the local population, and 
therefore in that sense they were relatively successful.  They were also significant in 
other ways.  They required little resource: just small teams of Norwegian volunteers, 
with a relatively small amount of equipment, and for the most part using only a 
handful of fishing vessels.  Notwithstanding this they often created security scares out 
of all proportion to their size.  Along with amphibious raids, the movements of the 
British Home Fleet in this theatre, and strategic deception, these attacks helped to feed 
Hitler’s fear that Britain retained an interest in Norway and an ability and intention to 
return to the country at some future point.  They did, therefore, have a strategic and 
military value. 
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From the summer of 1944, the nature of sabotage in Norway not only 
changed, but with the support of Milorg and the Norwegian authorities it also 
intensified and became widespread across the south of the country.  This 
intensification did not mean, however, that all objectives were achieved.  Whilst a 
considerable amount of material that was directly and immediately important to the 
German war effort was destroyed, as with oil and petrol, the effort to stem the flow of 
German divisions out of Norway through railway sabotage had little impact.  The 
results were therefore patchy.  Nevertheless, the involvement of Milorg was 
symbolically important, as this was its first direct and major contribution to the Allied 
war effort and a reflection of the growing confidence and maturity of the resistance 
movements in Norway.  It also illustrates how far Milorg’s policy on the use of 
clandestine forces in Norway had moved from the original aim that it should never be 
more than a mobilisation force employed and armed only after the arrival of Allied 
forces in the country.  It was an evolution that continued even after the war when 
plans were put together by the Norwegian authorities to organise ‘stay-behind’ units 
that would mobilise and go into action in the event of a Soviet occupation.
6
     
The other category of SOE activity consisted of operations that set out to 
organise and prepare a secret army.  Although these also had strategic origins, they 
were particularly affected by Norway’s position as a secondary theatre of war.  With 
little prospect of a landing in the country, the training and equipping of clandestine 
forces was until the autumn of 1944, plagued by a lack of resources.  The lower 
priority accorded to these operations and the uncertainty surrounding the future role of 
a clandestine army also complicated matters.  Teams sent into Norway eventually had 
to prepare local groups for a series of possible scenarios, not just an Allied landing.  
The failure to work with Milorg in the early years also slowed the whole process and 
made it more problematic.  And the attempts to keep resistance groups in situ over a 
long time period also proved extremely difficult in the face of the efforts of 
Norwegian informers and the German security police, who caused considerable harm 
to not only SOE, but also Milorg and the local population.  All this meant that prior to 
1944, SOE was largely on the defensive and made only sporadic and limited progress 
toward organising an armed and prepared clandestine army.  
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The outcome of SOE activities was also governed by another set of factors.  
Sabotage, subversion and the organising of resistant groups were all beset by the 
many local difficulties of working in occupied Norway.  Factors, such as the extremes 
of climate, topography, hours of daylight, and surviving in an occupied country with 
small isolated communities where the arrival of a stranger was immediately noticed, 
made success very elusive.  The decision and determination to carry out an operation 
was therefore alone no guarantee of success.  Nevertheless, SOE in co-operation with 
its partners carried out a range of operations that although not always successful 
contributed to making Norway an increasing and unwelcome burden on the German 
war effort.  At the end of the war there was also an underground army in place that, 
although certainly not fully prepared or equipped, was able to make a significant 
contribution in ensuring that the liberation of Norway and the transition from 
occupation to lawful government ran particularly smoothly.  In many ways Norway 
was an ideal country where irregular and clandestine methods of warfare, whether 
raids, propaganda, coup de main attacks, or cultivating resistance, could make a very 
small but cost-effective strategic contribution to the Allied victory in Europe.                             
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APPENDIX A
1
 
 
  
LIST OF SOE STAFF CRYPTONYMS FOR SCANDINAVIA AND NORWAY 
To help ensure security SOE provided its staff and its Norwegian colleagues with a 
series of symbols to use in internal correspondence instead of their real names.  Below 
is a list of the symbols and the people they refer to that are regularly found in the SOE 
Norwegian files.   
 
Senior Staff: 
A/CD Air Commodore A.R. Boyle.  In March 1943 he replaced Mr J. 
Hanbury-Williams as assistant to CD, the Executive Director of SOE, 
with responsibility for intelligence, security and personnel.  He had 
moved from the Air Ministry in July 1941 to take over responsibility 
for intelligence in SOE with the symbol AD/B. 
 
A/DA Sir Charles Hambro used this symbol from 6 January to 17 November 
1941.  From 11 January he reported direct to CD, and from 23 March 
1941 became CD’s deputy on all matters concerning SO2. 
  
AD/E Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferryman used this symbol from April 1943.  
He was deputy to Major-General Colin McV. Gubbins and in May 
1943 he became Director of the ‘London Group’ with responsibility for 
northwest Europe, and a member of SOE Council. 
 
ADE/US Colonel J. Haskell, who was Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman’s equivalent 
within OSS London.  From November 1943 these men jointly ran 
SOE/SO HQ in London. 
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AD/M Lt. Colonel H. N. Saunders, who ran a special staff branch within 
SHAEF called G3 or ‘Musgrave’, which was the link between SFHQ 
and SCAEF.  
 
AD/N Rear Admiral A. H. Taylor and head of SOE’s Naval Directorate from 
its creation in April 1943. 
 
AD/S Lt. Colonel Harry Sporborg used this symbol as Regional Head for 
Western Europe from early 1941 until May 1942.  His responsibilities 
included Scandinavia and ‘F’ Section (France), but was expanded in 
spring 1941 to include Belgium and Holland.  From November 1941, 
Sporborg reported to Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins, who at the same 
time was made ‘Director of Operations’.  In May 1942, Sporborg was 
made Personal Private Secretary to CD, but remained available for 
consultation on matters concerning Scandinavia and was responsible 
for working with PWE on operational propaganda.  In September 
1943, Sporborg became V/CD, deputy to CD. 
 
CD Executive Director of SOE.  From August 1940 this was Sir Frank 
Nelson, who in May 1942 was replaced by Sir Charles Hambro.  
Hambro remained until September 1943 when Major-General Colin 
McV. Gubbins took over and continued as CD until the end of the war. 
 
D Major General Lawrence Grand.  The former head of Section D who 
was offered a post with SOE but at the end of September 1940 decided 
to resign. 
 
D/CD Charles Hambro who from November 1941 used this symbol as deputy 
to SOE’s Executive Director, a position he retained until he became 
CD in May 1942.  In July 1942, in response to the ‘Playfair’ report, an 
investigation into SOE’s administration, this position was split creating 
two deputies, D/CD (A) and D/CD (O).  In November 1943, however, 
in yet another re-organisation, Mr P. Murray was appointed to run 
SOE’s internal organisation and given the symbol D/CD.  
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D/CD (A) Mr J. Hanbury-Williams who was appointed in July 1942 as deputy to 
CD with responsibility for administrative services.  Air Commodore 
Boyle replaced him in March 1943. 
 
D/CD (O) Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins used this symbol from July 1942 when 
he was appointed second deputy to CD with responsibility for the 
Western and Central European regions.  All the relevant Country 
Sections and services ancillary to operations were therefore placed 
under Gubbins, who also became SOE’s military adviser to the COS. 
 
D/S Initially General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall who in December 1942 
was appointed head of a Scandinavian Region.  In March 1943 there 
was a temporary revision to the previous arrangement of separate 
Country Sections.  In the following September, however, a 
Scandinavian Region was brought back under Lt. Colonel J. S. Wilson 
who took on the symbol D/S for the rest of the war. 
 
DS/US Lt. Commander F. W. G. Unger-Vetlesen (USNR) who was Wilson’s 
equivalent at OSS office in London with responsibility for 
Scandinavia.  In June 1944 he became a member of the Anglo-
Norwegian Collaboration Committee (ANCC). 
 
DS.1 Major F. Cromwell who from May 1943 to June 1944 was OSS 
representative at SOE’s Norwegian Section.  He also joined the ANCC 
before being replaced by Lt. Commander Unger-Vetlesen. 
 
DS/Plans Major C. S. Hampton who was the first Commandant of STS 26, the 
Norwegian section’s Special Training School (STS) near Aviemore, 
from November 1941 to September 1943.  In April 1944 he was made 
responsible for liaison duties on operations and plans between SOE’s 
Norwegian Section and Scottish Command and given the symbol 
DS/Plans.  In October 1944 he took over command of the Special 
Force Detachment for Norway. 
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L Colonel A. M. Anstruther, SOE’s Planning Officer in 1941.  
 
M Brigadier Colin McV. Gubbins was given this symbol when he joined 
SOE in November 1940 and was made head of training and operations, 
with responsibility for raiding parties, and given control over the 
Polish and Czech Sections.  Under him Colonel J. S. Wilson was 
responsible for training and Colonel R. H. Barry for operations.  In 
November 1941 Gubbins was made ‘Director of Operations’ with 
responsibility for all operations directed from England, a position he 
retained until the SOE organisation was reformed in July 1942. 
 
M/CD Major-General Colin McV. Gubbins who from March to June 1943 
used this symbol as deputy to Charles Hambro. 
 
S Head of the Scandinavian Section.  From August 1940 until December 
1940 this was Charles Hambro.  Lt. Colonel H. N. Sporborg replaced 
Hambro and retained the position until October 1941 when George 
Wiskeman took over responsibility for the Region until January 1942 
when it was broken up into separate country sections. 
 
V/CD Major-General Colin McV. Gubbins became V/CD on 1 June 1943.  
He retained this position until September 1943 when he became CD.  
Lt. Col. H. N. Sporborg replaced him as V/CD. 
 
SOE Norwegian section staff: 
D/G Mouse Lt. J. L. James Chaworth-Musters who worked for Section D before 
joining SOE in summer 1940.  During that summer he was referred to 
as D/G Mouse in SOE correspondence, the ‘mouse’ reflecting his 
background as a zoologist.  Once the Scandinavian section was up and 
running he went under the symbol S.3. 
 
SN Lt. Colonel J. S. Wilson who from January 1942 used the symbol as 
head of the Norwegian Section.  He continued to use the symbol even 
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after he was made head of the Scandinavian Region in September 
1943. 
 
S.1 Commander Frank Stagg who in autumn 1940 was made principal 
adviser to Lt. Col. H. N. Sporborg.  At the beginning of 1941 he was 
given responsibility for Norway under Sporborg as head of the 
Scandinavian section.  When a separate Norwegian Section was 
created in January 1942 he remained as an adviser and a secretary on 
the ANCC until he left SOE in July 1942.    
 
S.2 Major R. C. Holme, who worked at the SOE Mission in Stockholm 
until he was arrested by the Swedish authorities.  He was eventually 
released and returned to Britain where by 1942 he was working in 
SOE’s Norwegian section with responsibility for translations and 
records.  He eventually moved to the intelligence section where he 
continued to be responsible for translations. 
 
S.3 Lt. J. L. Chaworth-Musters who during 1941was closely involved in 
the recruitment and training of Norwegian volunteers.  In January 1942 
his symbol changed to SN/I when he moved to the intelligence section. 
 
S.3.1 Martin Linge, who was a liaison officer with the British at Åndalsnes 
in April 1940 until he was injured and evacuated to Britain.  In August 
he again became a liaison officer, but this time between SOE and the 
Norwegian authorities with responsibility for recruiting Norwegians to 
serve on behalf of SOE.  Out of this came what is known as the ‘Linge 
Company’, officially called the Norwegian Independent Company No 
1, (NIC 1) the unit of the Norwegian armed forces that carried out 
operations in Norway on behalf of SOE and FO.  Linge was killed in 
December 1941 whilst taking part on Operation Archery.       
 
SA A. A. Flygt. 
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SN.A Major Malcolm Munthe, who had been SOE’s representative with 
responsibility for Norway at the British Legation in Stockholm 
between October 1940 and July 1941.  After arriving back in Britain he 
worked in SOE’s Norwegian section with responsibility for organising 
a secret army in Norway, eventually in association with Milorg, 
provision of W/T operators and briefing of agents.  He left the section 
in February 1943. 
 
SN. A.1 Captain P. F. S. Douglas, who was originally Munthe’s assistant.  He 
took over from Munthe and had a long career in the Norwegian section 
eventually in 1944 becoming SN/OPS with responsibility for coup de 
main operations and by the end of 1944 SN/O with joint responsibility 
for the various departments within the section. 
 
SN/I From January to May 1942 this was Lt. Chaworth-Musters, who then 
moved to STS 26 and took up the symbol SN/P, which he retained 
until he joined SIS in August 1943.  Between May 1942 and December 
1944, Captain H. A. Nyberg was SN/I with responsibility for collection 
and collation of intelligence, liaison with FO II, (the intelligence 
department of the Norwegian High Command), propaganda agents, 
and liaison with PWE and Bård Krogvig at the Norwegian Information 
Office.  In December he was sent to SOE Mission in Stockholm where 
under the cover of Assistant Military Attaché he was responsible for 
liasing on the training of the Norwegian Police forces.  Captain J. D. 
M. Carr took over responsibility for intelligence.  
 
SN/O Initially Captain J. C. Adamson, who in 1942 was given responsibility 
for coup de main operations and liaison with COHQ.  By spring 1944, 
he had taken over responsibility for planning and given the symbol 
SN/plans.  He retained this position until October 1944 when he was 
dropped into Norway as part of Operation Scale.  He was the only 
Norwegian section staff officer to be sent into Norway during its 
occupation.  He was arrested soon after landing and eventually sent to 
Germany, although he survived the war. 
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SNS Major F. W. Ram, who until July 1943 had administrative 
responsibility for the Shetlands and Burghead bases, the maintenance 
of the boats, ordering stores, false papers, and coastal intelligence.  He 
also had responsibility for seats on the Stockholm Air Service, liaison 
with ACOS, SIS, and the Norwegian intelligence office. 
 
SN. S1 Captain F. K. M. Carver, initially assistant to Major Ram, he remained 
in the department responsible for the Shetlands Base until the end of 
the war. 
 
SN. S2 Lieutenant K. H. Cochrane, originally responsible for stores and 
clothing at Chiltern Court he had by autumn 1944 become SN/Ops 
with responsibility for agents, air operations and radios. 
 
SN.T Captain P. W. Boughton-Leigh who joined SOE in the summer of 
1940 and remained until the end of the war in 1945.  During the five 
years he worked with training and personnel as liaison officer between 
NIC (1) and HQ. 
 
SN/Plans.1 Lt. Commander, Sir George Montagu-Pollock.  Pollock had originally 
worked at the press department of the British legation in Oslo.  He was 
interned after the occupation until November 1942 when he was 
released and returned to the UK.  In February 1943 he was placed in 
charge of the Norwegian section’s sea operations with the symbol 
SN/O.1.  This eventually included liaison with ACOS in preparation 
for the ‘Welman’ and ‘Vestige’ operations.  In March 1944, however, 
he joined SOE’s Norwegian section staff working on planning with the 
symbol SN/Plans.1.  By March 1945 he had responsibility for the all of 
departments within the section as well as coup de main operations and 
had the symbol SN (P).  On 6 June 1945 he left for Norway where he 
undertook a tour of the districts reporting on Milorg, its level of 
preparedness, and the impact of SOE’s coup de main operations.       
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SZ Lt. Colonel Sporborg who was responsible for Norway until December 
1940 when he took over responsibility for the Scandinavian Section. 
 
 SOE Mission at the British Legation in Stockholm 
Numbers were used as symbols for the staff, agents, members of Milorg, members of 
the Norwegian authorities, and contacts in Stockholm. 
 
4301 Malcolm Munthe. 
4305 Odd Starheim, leader of SOE’s Cheese operation. 
4308 Daniel Ring, former Milorg member who fled to England in April 
1940 and eventually worked as liaison officer between the SOE and 
Norwegian military authorities in Stockholm. 
4309 Pål Frisvold, Milorg pioneer and member of its central council who 
fled to Stockholm in the spring of 1941. 
4318 Major Helseth, Milorg pioneer who was arrested in the spring of 1941. 
4319 Korsvig Rasmussen, one of Odd Starheim’s contacts in Oslo in the 
spring of 1941. 
4340 Lt. H. Marks, originally of the Yorks and Lancs regiment, who fought 
in the Norwegian Campaign.  Initially reported missing he managed to 
get to Stockholm and in November 1940 was recruited by SOE.  He 
took over from Malcolm Munthe in July 1941 but after continued 
pressure from the Swedish government he returned to Britain in 
October.  In early 1942 he was put in charge of SOE’s naval base at 
Burghead in Scotland and given the reference SN/B.  He drowned in a 
sailing accident April 1943. 
4341 R. C. Holme  (see above). 
4344 Major Andrew Croft who had in late 1939 accompanied Malcolm 
Munthe to Sweden and then Norway to assist in the transportation of 
British arms and equipment to Finland.  He was in Bergen when 
German forces arrived in April 1940 but managed to flee back to 
Britain.  He eventually took over from Munthe as Assistant Military 
Attaché at the British Legation in Stockholm in 1941 and gave part of 
his time to continuing some of Munthe’s work.  From early 1942 he 
 310 
assisted W. H. Montagu-Pollock in co-ordinating SOE activity out of 
the Legation until he finally returned to Britain in November 1942. 
4345 Anne Waring, who worked in the Norwegian Section at the SOE 
Mission in Stockholm and became assistant to Edgar Nielsen, who 
took over responsibility for Norway in December 1941.  Mrs I. 
Bernardes replaced her in early 1943. 
4346 Edgar Nielsen.  He had worked in Norway on and off since 1916 for 
SIS and then the Foreign Office.  He was Vice Consul at Skien in 1940 
when Norway was invaded.  After two weeks he escaped to Sweden 
but was eventually appointed vice-consul at Petsamo in Finland.  By 
the summer of 1941 he was back working in the British Legation in 
Stockholm and from October 1941 gradually took over the work that 
Munthe and Marks had carried out in Norway.  In December 1941 he 
was given full responsibility for Norway, a post he held until the end of 
the war.  In July 1942 his symbol changed to 8627.           
4350 Mr W. H. Montagu-Pollock, ‘Counsellor’ at the British Legation in 
Stockholm.  In early 1942 he began to co-ordinate all SOE activity 
from the Legation with Andrew Croft assisting him.  In July 1942 Lt. 
Colonel George Larden (6201) took over his work. 
4401 Peter Tennant, who in 1940 was Press Attaché at the British Legation 
in Stockholm.  In the autumn of 1940 he was made responsible for 
SOE activity in Sweden, Denmark, and Germany along with 
propaganda activities.  His SOE duties were, however, eventually 
scaled back although he continued to have responsibility for SOE’s 
Swedish section in Stockholm until November 1942.  In January 1944 
he took on responsibility for liaison on matters regarding the training 
of the Norwegian Police Battalions in Sweden.     
 
In 1942 the symbols for SOE Mission at the British legation in Stockholm were 
changed and some new ones were added. 
 
6200 George Wiskeman. 
6201 Lt. Colonel George Larden (see above). 
6202 Mr W. H. Montagu-Pollock (see above). 
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6203 Peter Tennant (see above). 
6212 Commander John Martin, SIS station chief in Stockholm. 
6213 Mr Harry Södermann, head of the Swedish State Criminological 
Institute in Stockholm and friend of Peter Tennant.  In June 1942 he 
visited the Norwegian military authorities in London and became an 
important contact and link in the training and equipping of the 
Norwegian Police Troops - Operation Beefeater. 
6233  Symbol for the British Legation in Stockholm. 
7404 Mr R. B. Turnbull, previously 4351, who from March 1941 was 
responsible for SOE’s Danish section at the British Legation.  At the 
end of 1942 he took over responsibility for the co-ordination of SOE 
activities out of Stockholm. 
8638 Colonel Ole Berg, the former Milorg pioneer who fled to Sweden at 
the end of 1942.  He eventually became the Norwegian Military 
Attaché and Military Inspector in Stockholm. 
8628 Mrs I Bernardes (see above). 
8626 Sverre Ellingsen who in 1943 took over from Daniel Ring in 
Stockholm. 
8629 Major-General Wilhelm Hansteen, who became the Norwegian Chief 
of Defence in February 1942. 
8632  Axel Baumann, head of MI IV in Stockholm from January 1944. 
8639 Colonel Helseth (see above). 
8634 Norwegian Home Front Office in Stockholm. 
8627 the symbol used by Edgar Nielsen from July 1942 (see above). 
8633 Norwegian Legation in Stockholm. 
8686 Major H. Nyberg, who arrived in Stockholm in December 1944 (see 
above). 
8625 Lt. Colonel W. F. W. Ram who initially worked for SOE’s Norwegian 
section in London (see above).  In spring 1945 he was moved to 
Stockholm under the cover of Assistant Military Attaché to correlate 
the work of the Norwegian Section as a whole, including ‘Beefeater’. 
8647 Lt. Colonel Rørholt, who took over from Axel Baumann as head of MI 
IV in 1945. 
8637 Milorg. 
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No. 24 Code name for Gunnar Sønsteby, SOE’s foremost agent in the Oslo 
area from spring 1942. 
No. 12 Daniel Ring (see above). 
No. 38 Sverre Ellingsen (see above). 
 
The OSS Westfield Mission in Stockholm  
Apollo Colonel George S. Brewer, head of the Mission 
Vaudeville Hans Ericksen, responsible for the Norwegian section of the Mission 
 
The Shetlands Base  
SN/L Major L. H. Mitchell, who was commanding officer at the base until 
November 1942. 
SN/L.1 Lt. D. A. Howarth, who joined the base as second in command in 
spring 1941. 
SN/L.2 Lt. A. W. Sclater R.M., known under the pseudonym A. W. Rogers, 
who took over from Mitchell in 1942. 
SN/L.4 Lt. Leif Hauge, R.N.N., who from summer 1942, was in command of 
the Norwegian recruits at the base. Lt. H. Henriksen replaced him in 
the summer of 1944. 
SN/C.1 Leif A. Larsen, who because of his exploits became known as 
‘Shetlands Larsen’.  
 
Staff in the Norwegian High Command who worked closely with SOE 
SB Thore Boye, Bureau Chief in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and 
Norwegian secretarial representative on the ANCC. 
SM Lt. Commander L. M. Marstrander, an original Norwegian member of 
ANCC who from spring 1942 was central in formalising the 
relationship between the Norwegian recruits at the Shetlands Base and 
the Norwegian High Command.  He lost his life whilst taking part in 
Operation Carhampton in January 1943. 
SP Finn Nagell who arrived in Britain in November 1940.  In January 
1941 he set up and run the Forsvarsdepartement Etteretningskontor, 
the Norwegian Ministry of Defence Intelligence Office (FD/E), which 
amongst other things had responsibility for contact with the ‘English 
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Secret Services’.  In February 1942 the Norwegian Defence High 
Command was re-formed with an intelligence section, FO II.  
Nevertheless, FD/E remained in place and under Nagell it had 
responsibility for gathering intelligence from Norway.  In April 1942, 
it was also divided into five departments.  In July 1944, however, it 
was merged into FO II under Colonel Roscher Lund, although Major 
Finn Nagell continued as his second in command. 
SR Lieutenant Jan H. Reimers, a chemical engineer from Trondheim and 
pupil of Leif Tronstad he worked for FO II and collating much of the 
industrial intelligence that was so central to SOE coup de main 
operations in Norway.  He became the central figure behind the series 
of SOE/FO anti-sabotage operations that were put together in 1944-
1945. 
ST Professor Leif Tronstad was the central figure in the planning of the 
SOE operations against heavy water production in Norway.  He had 
helped to set up the plant in the 1930s along with Jomar Brun, but 
when Norway was occupied he became involved in the resistance 
making contact with both SOE and SIS.  He escaped to Britain in 
autumn 1941, and from 1942 he worked within the Norwegian High 
Command and became a member of the ANCC.  His industrial 
background was vital in helping SOE prepare many of its coup de main 
operations.  In October 1944 he was dropped into Norway on 
Operation Sunshine but in the following March was killed in action. 
SU Bjarne Øen, head of FO IV from December 1942.  He worked closely 
with Lt. Colonel J. S. Wilson until the end of the war. 
Sverre Haugen  This was SOE’s cover name for Jomar Brun, the Chief Engineer at 
Vemork.  Brun was the main source of intelligence for operations 
‘Freshman’ and ‘Gunnerside’ before he fled to Britain in November 
1942.  He was in contact with Tronstad from early 1940 and during 
1942 sent vital material back to London, such as drawings of the site 
and details on production.        
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FO IV staff 
SX Major Jens Henrik Nordlie, originally a leading figure in Milorg.  He 
eventually fled to Britain and in July 1944 was made responsible for 
the District Specialists in FO IV, which meant that he worked closely 
with SN/Ops in SOE’s Norwegian section. 
 
District Specialists 
SXE.1 Lt. Owre, responsible for eastern Norway. 
SXS.1 Lt. Ellingsen, responsible for southern Norway. 
SXN.1 Lt. Martens-Meyer, responsible for western Norway. 
SXT.1 Lt. Breida, responsible for the county of Trøndelag. 
SXN.1 Mr Jæger, responsible for northern Norway. 
SX.M Captain Kristensen , responsible for military matters. 
SX.O Mr. Mostfeldt, responsible for organisation. 
     
           
        
 315 
  
APPENDIX B 
 
 
A HISTORY OF SECTION D AND SOE’s SCANDINAVIAN AND 
NORWEGIAN SECTIONS IN LONDON AND STOCKHOLM
1
 
Section D: April 1938 – August 1940 
Scandinavian Section: formed September 1939. 
Head of Section: Captain Ingram Fraser (D/G) 
      Lt. Commander Gerry Holdsworth RNVR (DG-1) 
Norwegian section: formed late 1939 when Lt. James Chaworth-
Musters RNVR was recruited.  He became ‘Temporary British Vice 
Consul’ in Bergen between January and April 1940.  Arrived back in 
Scotland on May 12 and continued his work with Section D under the 
reference D/G Mouse.  At the end of 1939 Helmar Bonnevie was also 
recruited as Section D’s agent in Norway, but references to him 
disappear to end after the German invasion in April 1940.   
 
SOE’s Scandinavian and Norwegian sections: August 1940 – January 1942 
August 1940: Sir Charles Hambro was recruited to SOE from the 
MEW to head a new Scandinavian section, which included a 
Norwegian sub-section.   
Summer 1940: the Norwegian section of Section D, which consisted 
of Lt. J. L. Chaworth-Musters and P.W.T. Boughton-Leigh, was the 
original basis for SOE’s Norwegian sub-section.  Lt. Colonel H. N. 
Sporborg also joined SOE from MEW and took over responsibility for 
Norway with Lt. Commander Frank Stagg as his principle adviser.  
 
                                                          
1
 Compiled from the following sources: PRO: paper entitled ‘The Scandinavian Region – SOE’, 18 
September 1945 in HS2/12.  HS7/190, The Stockholm Mission.  HS8 files.  FO371/29697 & 
FO371/29408.  Documents and information from personal files of Captain H. J. Marks, E. M. Nielsen, 
G. O. Wiskeman, Lt. Col. J. S. Wilson, Lt. J. L. Chaworth-Musters RNVR, Lt. Commander F. N. Stagg 
RN, Major P. W. T. Boughton-Leigh, supplied by the SOE Adviser, Records and Historical 
Department, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London.  M. Munthe, How Sweet is War.  Sir Peter 
Tennant, ‘Norwegian resistance: the Swedish connection’, in Salmon, (ed.), Britain and Norway in the 
Second World War, pp. 176-186.  
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December 1940 – October 1941: Lt. Colonel H.N. Sporborg was 
made head of the Scandinavian section in December 1940 and 
eventually Regional Head for Western Europe, which included 
Scandinavia, France, Belgium, and Holland, whilst Hambro was 
promoted to Regional Head (A/DA) with responsibility for Europe, 
West and North Africa, and propaganda.  The Scandinavian section 
consisted of the sub-sections Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.  
Whilst Sporborg was de facto head of the Scandinavian Section it was, 
however, George Wiskeman (S.5) head of both the Swedish and 
Finnish sub-sections, who acted as ‘de jure head’. 
October 1941 – January 1942: George Wiskeman took over as head 
of the Scandinavian section from Lt. Colonel Sporborg, who remained 
Regional Head for Western Europe. 
January 1942 – December 1942: the Scandinavian section was for the 
first time broken up and divided into Country Sections with Lt. 
Colonel John Skinner Wilson as head of the Norwegian section.    
Wiskeman continued to handle political and PWE contacts and as head 
of the Swedish section was responsible for the Stockholm Mission.   
December 1942 – March 1943: General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall 
joined SOE on 19 October 1942 and in December was appointed head 
of a re-constituted Scandinavian region with responsibility for the 
different country sections until March 1943. 
March 1943 – September 1943: the Scandinavian region was again 
broken up into separate country sections and Lt. Colonel Wilson 
continued as head of the Norwegian section. 
September 1943 – May 1945: in September 1943 Wilson was 
appointed head of the Scandinavian region, a position he retained until 
the end of the war.  He also retained direct responsibility for the 
Norwegian section. 
 
                                THE STOCKHOLM MISSION 
Spring – Summer 1940: with help from Peter Tennant the press 
attaché and Colonel Sutton-Pratt, the Military Attaché, Section D had 
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used the British Legation in Stockholm as a local base prior to the 
formation of SOE.  
May 1940: Malcolm Munthe arrived in Stockholm.  He had entered 
Norway from Sweden prior to the German invasion on 9 April 1940 to 
act, on behalf of MI (R), as a liaison officer with the Norwegian army 
in southern Norway.  After several weeks he managed to flee across 
the border back into Sweden.  He made contact with the British 
Legation and after the arrival of a telegram from London was 
appointed Assistant Military Attaché with the rank of Major, reporting 
to Colonel Sutton-Pratt. 
October – November 1940: Sir Charles Hambro arrived from London 
and spent six weeks in Stockholm.  Hambro set up a SOE Mission at 
the British Legation and appointed Munthe as SOE representative for 
Norway.  His tasks were to recruit Norwegian volunteers, help people 
cross the border between Norway and Sweden, and to carry out special 
operations in occupied Norway. 
July 1941: after carrying out a series of operations on behalf of SOE in 
Norway, including an apparent attempt to assassinate Heinrich 
Himmler during a visit to Oslo in January 1941, the Swedish 
authorities expelled Munthe. 
Summer 1941: Munthe’s work at the Stockholm Mission was from the 
end of July taken over by Captain H. J. Marks.  Marks, a soldier in the 
Yorks and Lanes Regiment, had been involved in the fighting in 
Norway during the spring of 1940.  He escaped to Sweden and in 
November 1940 was recruited to work on behalf of SOE.  By early 
August 1941, however, the Swedish authorities had requested that 
Marks leave their country and through September the British Foreign 
Office also put pressure on SOE for Marks removal.  About this time 
Andrew Croft arrived in Stockholm and took over from Munthe as 
Assistant Military Attaché. 
Autumn 1941: Hugh Marks eventually left Sweden at the beginning of 
October.  In September 1941, Victor Mallet, the British Minister in 
Sweden, had suggested that Edgar Nielsen should take over from 
Marks and handle SOE’s work in Norway, but in a low-key and more 
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surreptitious manner.  In mid-October Nielsen was given responsibility 
for SOE activity in Norway, but he was to act merely as a ‘post-office’, 
a conduit for information, so that the Legation would not be 
compromised.  
December 1941: by this time, however, it appears that Edgar Nielsen, 
assisted by Anne Waring, had taken over full responsibility for SOE 
activity in Norway.  In early 1943, Mrs Bernardes replaced Anne 
Waring, but Nielsen retained his responsibility for SOE’s Norwegian 
section at the Stockholm Mission until the end of the war. 
June 1942: the Stockholm Mission played a significant role in helping 
to instigate and eventually oversee on behalf of the Allies, the training 
of the Norwegian police troops in Norway.  The friendship between 
Peter Tennant and Harry Södermann, head of the Swedish State 
Criminology Institute in Stockholm, led to a visit by Södermann to 
London in June 1942.  During this trip he met Oscar Torp the 
Norwegian Minister of Defence, and Terje Wold, the Minister of 
Justice, who asked him about training Norwegian policemen in 
Sweden to take over in Norway after the war.  On his return 
Sødermann played an important role, in close contact with Tennant, in 
furthering the idea of preparing Norwegian military units in Sweden, 
under the cover of police training, to assist in the country’s liberation.  
January 1944: Peter Tennant was instructed to supervise liaison 
regarding the military training of Norwegian volunteers in Sweden. 
December 1945: Major Henry Nyberg arrived in Stockholm to report 
on and watch over training of the Norwegian Police Troops under the 
cover of Assistant Military Attaché. 
Spring 1945: Lt. Colonel Ram arrived in Stockholm also under the 
cover of Assistant Military Attaché to ‘correlate’ the working of the 
Norwegian Section at the British Legation, including ‘Beefeater’. 
End of July 1945: SOE Mission at the British Legation in Stockholm 
was closed down.  
       
 
          
 319 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
     
A HISTORY OF THE SHETLANDS BASE: AUTUMN 1939 – JULY 19451 
Autumn 1939: Section D through Frank Carr, August Courthold and Gerald 
Holdsworth began to explore the possibility of using the Shetlands as a base 
from where equipment could be smuggled to Norway using fishing boats 
crewed by Norwegian fishermen.  Nothing came of this. 
April 1940: Section D re-considered employing Norwegian fishing vessels to 
establish a link with Norway, and from May and through the summer they 
were used to transport special operations teams, arms, and equipment to 
locations along the country’s western seaboard. 
August 1940: plans to create a permanent flotilla of Norwegian fishing 
vessels for use in operations to Norway began to evolve.  During the month 
the Admiralty in agreement with the Norwegian Department of Trade took 
control of at least a dozen boats, which were then placed in the ‘Small Vessels 
Pool’ commanded by Admiral Preston. 
September 1940: by early September an agreement had been reached with 
Admiral Preston that SIS and SOE could have the use of five or six of the 
twelve fishing vessels.  Up until the spring of 1943, it was the Small Vessels 
Pool that allocated vessels to NID (C), the naval liaison section of SIS, for use 
on SOE operations out of the Shetlands.     
October 1940: by this stage there were ongoing conversations between SO2, 
SIS, MI5 and the Admiralty concerning the establishment of a permanent 
naval base on the Shetlands from where these fishing boats could operate, 
agents and stores could be held prior to going to Norway, and where refugees 
could be received and interrogated.  Toward the end of October, Captain L. H. 
Mitchell, a SIS officer, was approached and asked to become the base 
commander.   
                                                          
1
 Compiled from the following sources: PRO: HS2, HS7, and HS8 files.  NHM: SOE archives.  Den 
Norske regjerings virksomhet: fra 9 April til 22 juni 1945, bind IV, forsvarsdepartementet.  Nøkleby, 
Pass godt på Tirpitz.  Brooks, ‘Britain and Norwegian resistance: clandestine sea transport’, in Salmon, 
Britain and Norway in the Second World War, pp. 161-166.  Howarth, The Shetland Bus.  Sælen, 
Shetlands Larsen.    
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November 1940: by mid November Mitchell had arrived in the Shetlands to 
set up and take command of the base.  The first operation to Norway departed 
on 10 November when three agents were transported to the Bergen area.  A 
second operation followed on 22 December. 
December 1940: by the end of the month the base was up and running, and 
Military Establishment no. 7 (ME 7) was the army unit made responsible for 
administering the site and victualling the boats.  Throughout the war the base 
remained under the command of a British officer, whilst SOE operations that 
used the fishing vessels were carried out under the authority of the head of its 
Norwegian section, who issued the operational and sailing orders.  There was, 
however, close liaison with ACOS, through the Naval Officer in Command 
(NOIC) at Lerwick.  After discussions between Sir Charles Hambro and the 
Admiralty in February 1943 the base was also excluded from the control of the 
Deputy Director, Operations Division (Irregular) [DDOD (I)] at the 
Admiralty, who had responsibility for clandestine operations in home waters 
from that spring.  Due to the large number of sea-borne operations to Norway 
from the Shetlands, the flotilla of fishing boats were, however, placed under 
the ‘general control’ of ACOS.        
Spring 1941: Lt. Commander D.R. Howarth RNVR joined the base as second 
in command.  Initially, operations were run from Lerwick with the agents 
accommodated at Flemington.  In the summer of 1941, however, the 
operational base moved to Lunna Voe, thirty miles north of Lerwick. 
July 1941: during the 1940/1941 season - (November-May) - it appears that 
only SOE used the fishing vessels at the base to send agents and stores to 
Norway.  In July 1941, SIS set up its own base at Peterhead in Scotland, from 
where it operated until November 1943.  This might have been the result of 
security concerns within SIS, although during the 1941/1942 it also sent eight 
operations to Norway using vessels from the Shetlands Base.     
 October 1941: by this stage, after the commencement of the second season of 
operations, the base still had only about six boats regularly available for use.  
In October, Captain (later Major) A.W. Sclater RM, better known under the 
pseudonym of A.W. Rogers, joined the base as adjutant.  Norwegian naval 
uniforms were also purchased during the autumn for the Norwegian crews.                     
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Early 1942: after Operation Anklet, the Lofoten raid in December 1941, the 
condition of the fishing boats at the Shetlands Base became a major issue.    
Charles Hambro eventually came to an agreement with ACOS that care and 
maintenance of the Shetlands flotilla was a naval responsibility and it was 
delegated to Lt. Commander Howarth RN, who employed Norwegian 
engineers and used local facilities.  From late 1941, SOE began to reconnoitre 
a site at Burghead in Scotland as the possible location for an additional naval 
base.  
March 1942: after the establishment of ANCC the Norwegian authorities in 
co-operation with SOE attempted to bring the Norwegian sailors at the base 
under Norwegian naval command.  Lt. Commander Marstrander, and Captain 
F. K. M. Carver, were sent to the Shetlands to report on conditions at the base.  
In mid March, Marstrander recommended that the crews should be 
incorporated in the Royal Norwegian Navy and become the Norwegian Naval 
Independent Unit (NNIU).  They would receive basic naval training and report 
to a Norwegian officer who would reside at the base and be responsible for 
their discipline.  Lt. Commander Kleppe was appointed as the Norwegian 
commanding officer in early April, but this proved to be a disaster as the 
crews refused to accept both his disciplined approach and the proposal to 
incorporate the men into the Norwegian navy. 
Summer 1942: eventually, after several weeks of discussions, an agreement 
was reached on the status of the Norwegian crews.  Together they would 
continue to constitute NNIU and remain under the command of a Norwegian 
naval officer, Lt. Leif Hauge, who replaced Kleppe, and with Sub Lt. 
Eidsheim as the second Norwegian officer at the base.  Ultimately the 
administration, discipline, and welfare of the unit was the responsibility of 
General Hansteen, the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, but at this stage the 
men were not incorporated in the Norwegian Navy.  The Norwegian officer 
was also responsible to the British officer in command of the base. 
September 1942: at the beginning of the 1942/1943 season the Norwegian 
flotilla at the Shetlands Base consisted of ten fishing boats and four Arctic 
whalers that had been brought over from Iceland.  The operational base also 
moved from Lunna Voe to Scalloway. 
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November 1942: Captain (later Major) A.W. Sclater took over command of 
the base from Mitchell, who returned to work for SIS.  A subsidiary SOE base 
at Burghead also became operational at this time under the command of 
Captain H. J. Marks.  Only five trips were, however, made from the base 
between November 1942 and January 1943, and of these only two were 
successful.  Nonetheless, from 1 September 1943 it functioned as a transit 
camp for personnel and supplies and for training purposes under STS 26.   
Winter 1942/43: during this season German defences became even more 
formidable and movements of the Norwegian fishing fleet were restricted.  
This made conditions along the Norwegian coast extremely dangerous and a 
total of six boats from the Shetlands Base, three of them the Arctic whalers, 
were lost as well as thirty-two men.   
Summer 1943: with the assistance of OSS, Sir Charles Hambro approached 
Admiral Stark, Head of the US Naval Mission in London, and as a result the 
United States Navy provided three 110 foot Submarine Chasers for SOE/SO 
and SIS operations out of the Shetlands Base. 
October 1943: on 26 October the Norwegian flag was raised on the three 
submarine chasers the ‘Vigra’, ‘Hitra’, and ‘Hessa’.  These boats replaced the 
fishing vessels and between November 1943 and May 1945, operating out of 
Lerwick, undertook 109 operations to Norway with no loss of life. 
Summer 1944: working on the submarine chasers meant that the Norwegian 
crews were on the same level as the men that operated the MTBs.  
Consequently, they were drafted into the Norwegian Navy and for the 
remainder of the war the NNIU was administered by Sjøforsvarets 
Overkommando, the Norwegian Naval High Command; as a result nine crew 
members resigned.  At the same time Lt. H. Henriksen replaced Lt. Hauge as 
the Norwegian commanding officer at the base. 
Summer 1945: the submarine chasers continued to operate up to and after the 
German surrender.  The base was eventually closed down in mid-September 
1945.  Altogether forty-four men and eight boats were lost during operations 
from the Shetlands Base.                        
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
SOE Coup de Main Operations in Norway: 1940-1944 
   (Planned, Attempted, and Completed)
1
 
Date Operation Objectives Details  
 
March 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1941 
 
 
 
 
March 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preparations 
commenced in 
April 1941.  
Last reference 
in the ANCC 
minutes at end 
of 1942  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
June 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
Arctic 
 
 
 
 
 
Gertrude 
 
 
 
 
 
Landlubber 
 
 
 
 
Barbara 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clairvoyant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Burnous 
 
 
 
 
 
The resurrection of an 
old MI (R) plan to 
sink a vessel 
alongside the quay at 
Narvik. 
 
A proposal to interdict 
the supply of sulphur 
from Norway to 
Germany.  
 
 
A proposal to interdict 
the supply of ferro-
chrome from Norway 
to Germany. 
 
A plan to use a team 
recruited in Sweden 
by Malcolm Munthe 
to sabotage the 
railways around 
Trondheim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initially: Tyssedal, 
Rjukan (including 
nitrate factories), 
Bjølvefoss, Høyanger, 
Saude and Stangfjord 
hydroelectric power 
stations, and the 
Tinnsjø ferries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Th first of many plans 
to attack the Orkla 
pyrite mines at 
Løkken near 
Trondheim.  
 
In December 1941, Churchill once again 
turned his attention to the export of Swedish 
iron-ore through Narvik.  Consequently, 
Operation Arctic was reconsidered although 
ultimately never undertaken. 
 
During spring 1941 both this and 
‘Landlubber’ led to Operation Maundy, the 
plan to use fishing vessels to lay mines in the 
Norwegian leads, (see Appendix E), and 
Operation Clairvoyant (see below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A team of eight men was recruited in Sweden 
and in early March 1941 picked up from the 
Norwegian coast by fishing vessel.  They 
were trained in the UK and returned to 
Norway.  Two groups of three eventually 
remained in Norway to carry out the 
sabotage; the other two men returned to the 
UK.  On the night of 17/18 April one group 
managed to attack the Trondheim-Storlien 
railway line and the carriage of one train was 
damaged as it went through a tunnel.  All six 
men fled to Sweden where eventually they 
were arrested. 
 
An ambitious plan to attack the major 
hydroelectric sites and ferries in southern 
Norway in order to disrupt the manufacture of 
specialist metals, predominately aluminium.  
Also included a plan to bomb Rjukan to stop 
the production of heavy water.  After it failed 
to obtain the required aircraft and because of 
objections from the Norwegian authorities, 
the plan was scaled down to a projected 
attack against Høyanger.  One sortie was 
made but failed due to bad weather, and then 
members of the party were badly injured in a 
car crash.  Nevertheless, it continued to be 
resurrected at least until the end of 1942. 
 
Stores and personnel were available in the 
area and intelligence collected but at the end 
of August 1941, the MEW told SOE that the 
plant needed to be put out of action for 
several months if an attack was to be 
                                                          
1
 Compiled from the following sources: PRO: HS2, HS7, HS8, DEFE2, PREM3, CAB files.  NHM: 
SOE archive.  Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene.  Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear 
Energy.  
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By Autumn 
1941, SOE  had 
already begun 
to consider an 
operation 
against this site 
 
 
 
January 1941 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 April 1942 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 1942 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 September 
1942 
 
 
 
 
 
8 November 
1942 
 
 
 
5 February 
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
6 February 
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alfriston 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Woodcock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redshank (P. 
Deinboll, P. Getz, 
T. Grong) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seagull I (Lt. 
Eskeland. 2. Lt. 
Skog, Sgt. 
Blindheim, J. 
Baalsrud, Sgt. 
Hanssen) 
 
 
 
 
Kestral (Lt. P. 
Getz, Sgt. T. 
Grong, Cpl. L. 
Brønn) 
 
 
 
Marshfield (Lt.  
F. Normann, Sgt. 
K. Hennum) 
 
 
Seagull II (Lt. P.  
Getz, Lt. T. Skog, 
Sgt H. Hanssen, 
Sgt T. Grong, Pte. 
S. Granlund, Gnr. 
E. Eriksen) 
 
Granard (Lt. P. 
Deinboll, 2.Lt. 
Bjørn Pedersen, 
O. Sættem) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knaben molybdenum 
mines near Fjotland, 
approximately sixty 
miles inland from the 
southern tip of 
Norway. 
 
 
 
Proposed attack 
against Sola Airfield 
outside Stavanger. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Baardshaug 
converter and 
transformer station 
which controlled 
power to the railway 
between the Orkla 
pyrite mine and the 
port of Thamshavn. 
 
The disruption of 
supplies of blister 
copper, pyrites and 
zinc concentrate 
produced at the 
Sulitjelma mines in 
northern Norway 
through attacking 
Fagerli power station. 
 
Fosdalen iron ore 
mines in north 
Trøndelag. 
 
  
 
 
Rødsand iron ore 
mines north of 
Åndalsnes. 
 
 
Sulitjelma mines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack and destroy the 
loading tower, and 
sink a laden pyrites 
cargo vessel at the 
outer end of 
Thamshavn pier in 
order to dislocate the 
transport of sulphur 
worthwhile.  This led SOE to concentrate on 
disrupting the transportation of pyrites from 
the mine to Germany.  
  
 Molybdenum was considered to be the most 
important war material that Germany 
obtained from Norway and therefore SOE, 
COHQ and RAF all showed interest in this 
site. It was eventually left to the RAF and 
USAAF, who launched attacks against the 
target in March and October 1943, and again 
in 1944.   
 
The Air Ministry requested SOE to consider 
an attack against the Focke Wolfe aircraft and 
other heavy bombers.  One unsuccessful 
sortie was made on the night of 3-4May after 
which the operation was postponed and it 
does not appear to have ever been 
resurrected.    
 
Successfully attacked on 4 May 1942.  The 
transformer station was totally destroyed, 
which reduced the transport capacity of the 
line by 50% for six months.  Nevertheless, 
production at the mine was still 468,640 tons 
in 1942, only slightly down on the previous 
year.  All escaped to Sweden.    
 
 
The original outline project was submitted for 
approval on 28 June.  Postponed in October 
1942 after Operation Musketoon led to an 
increase in security in the area and at the 
Sulitjelma plant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 This plant had received machinery from 
Germany and ‘full support for an increased 
rate of production’.  It was successfully 
attacked on 5 October and production was 
reduced by 25% for two months.  The party 
escaped to Sweden  
 
First attempted in October.  Eventually sailed 
on 8 November but the team disappeared 
after landing on the Møre coastline on 10 
November 1942.  
 
Resurrected in December 1942.  Party of six 
departed in the submarine Uredd on 5 
February 1943 from Lunna Voe.  The party 
never reached Norway.   After the war it was 
discovered that the vessel had sailed into a 
German minefield close to Bodø.  
 
Party sailed on 6 December 1942 and landed 
on the Norwegian coast two days later.  It 
was six weeks before a German vessel of 
sufficient size came alongside the pier.  On 
25 February limpet mines were placed on the 
S.S. Nordfart.  Two holes were blown in the 
ship, which was then run aground.  It only 
took a few months, however, before the ship 
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16 February 
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1943 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1943 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 March 1943 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 October 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gunnerside (J. 
Rønneberg, K. 
Haukelid, K. 
Idland, F. Kayser, 
H. Storhaug, B. 
Strømsheim) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Midhurst 
 
 
 
 
 
Chaffinch (T. 
Stenersen, O. 
Sandersen, M. 
Olsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
Mardonius (Max 
Manus, Gregers 
Gram)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bundle (M. 
Manus,, G. Gram, 
E. Juden, C. 
Viborg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pyrites from the Orkla 
mines. 
 
 
The storage and 
production plant for 
heavy water at 
Vemork so that 
present stocks and 
fluids in the course of 
production would be 
destroyed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposed attack 
against the frostfilet 
factories in 
Hammerfest and 
Melbø. 
 
One of the tasks of 
this three man party 
was to investigate the 
possibility of 
destroying enemy 
shipping in the Oslo 
and Drammen area. 
 
 
To attack merchant 
shipping in Oslo fjord 
by means of limpet 
mines placed by 
single operators 
working from canoes.  
Local volunteers were 
to be trained. 
 
To sink enemy 
shipping in Oslo 
Harbour and North 
Oslo fjord, with 
particular reference to 
enemy troop ships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
was again in service, and therefore the 
operation had little long-term impact. 
 
 
A first attempt to drop the team was made on 
23 January, but it was the night of 16-17 
February before it successfully landed in 
Norway.  On 23 February it joined up with 
the ‘Swallow’ group.  The attack was carried 
out on the night of 27-28 February.  The high 
concentration cells and 500 kilograms of 
heavy water were destroyed.   New high 
concentration equipment was, however, 
brought from the Norsk Hydro sites at 
Notodden and Såheim and 100 kg of heavy 
water brought back from Germany.  
Consequently, production recommenced only 
a few weeks later.  Five of the party crossed 
to Sweden, whilst Haukelid remained in 
Norway.    
 
The operation was abandoned in March 1943 
owing to a number of local operational 
difficulties.  Part of the operation was at one 
stage offered to OSS. 
 
 
The party took limpet mines with them to 
Norway and initially considered attacking 
shipping in Horten.  On 19 May, however, the 
group attached a limpet mine to the Sanev 
whilst in dock at Moss.  The boat sank the 
same day.  A later attempt to attack shipping 
in Oslo harbour was abandoned.  The party 
left Norway at the end of May. 
 
The party made a number of contacts, 
including Sigurd Jacobsen from Milorg, who 
on 27-28 April helped them place limpets on 
several ships.  The Ortelsburg was sunk, the 
Tugela and an Oil Lighter badly damaged, 
and a harbour beacon destroyed.  The team 
withdrew to Sweden on 4 May.   
 
 
Milorg’s leadership was eventually made 
aware of this operation and agreed to arrange 
a supply of shipping intelligence.  In early 
January Manus arrived in Stockholm to try 
and get authority to develop and use ‘baby’ 
torpedoes, but without success.  In February 
1944, ‘Bundle’ sank a German patrol vessel, 
but from this point on the team took on the 
additional responsibility of propaganda under 
the title ‘Derby’.   Manus and Gram also 
began to work with the other NIC (1) teams 
in the Oslo area, and became part of the ‘Oslo 
Detachment’ under Sønsteby.  Ship sabotage 
was not, however, abandoned and in June 
1944 six limpet mines were placed on the 
Monte Rosa but failed to cause major 
damage.  In August a German destroyer was 
attacked using a home-made torpedo and in 
January 1945 limpet mines were placed on 
the Donau and Rolandsech damaging both. 
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10 October 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 November 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 November 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1944 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 April 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
August 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
Feather I (P. 
Deinboll, O. 
Nilssen, A. 
Wisløff, L. Brønn, 
T. Bjørnaas, P. 
Skjærpe, A. 
Hægstad) 
 
 
 
 
 
Goldfinch (T. 
Stenersen, 
J.Allan, M. Olsen, 
O. Sandersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company (E. 
Tallaksen, B. 
Rasmussen, A. 
Trønnes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Swallow’ and 
Milorg: the train 
ferry ‘Hydro’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feather II (A. 
Hægstad, T. 
Bjørnaas, A. 
Wisløff) 
 
 
 
 
 
Albatross (L. 
Skjøld, P. 
Wegeland) 
 
 
 
Docklow (A. 
Hægstad, T. 
Bjørnaas, A. 
Wisløff) 
 
 
To stop production at 
the Orkla pyrite mines 
by destroying the lift 
machinery in the lift 
shaft.  If this proved 
to be too difficult they 
should attack the 
railway between 
Orkanger to 
Thamshavn.  
 
 
This was a 
continuation of the 
‘Chaffinch’ operation 
and one of its tasks 
was to attack shipping 
on the west side of 
Oslo fjord. 
 
 
 
To destroy the 
transformers at 
Arendal Smelteverk at 
Eydehavn near 
Arendal in southern 
Norway, which 
produced 4000 tons of 
ferro-silicon yearly, 
all of which went to 
Germany. 
 
A plan approved in 
February 1944, to 
stop the transportation 
of the remaining 
heavy water from 
Vemork to Germany 
by sinking the ferry 
carrying it across 
Lake Tinnsjø.  
 
 
 
 
To destroy the 
remaining electric 
locomotive on the 
Thamshavn railway. 
 
 
 
 
 
The aluminium plant 
at Saudasjøen was to 
be reconnoitred with a 
view to a possible 
future attack. 
 
To stop the export of 
pyrites and ores from 
the Sulitjelma mines 
by attacking the 
locomotives servicing 
the Sandnes to 
On 30 October a co-ordinated attack was 
carried out against the locomotives at 
Løkken, Thamshavn and Orkanger, which 
transported the materials from the mine to the 
point of shipment on the coast.  Five 
locomotives were destroyed or put out of 
action.  A further attack was carried out on 17 
November and a rail car blown up.  One of 
the team was killed, one captured, whilst the 
remaining men eventually escaped to 
Sweden. 
 
Two operations were planned.  In February 
1944 the ‘Goldfinch’ team waited at Skien in 
readiness to attack the ship that was to 
transport the residues of heavy water from 
Vemork to Germany.  It was never required.  
The second attack was to be against the M/S 
Lappland in Drammen at the beginning of 
May, but the ship sailed before the team was 
ready.  
 
The plant was attacked on 21 November and 
production was stopped for six months 
costing the Germans 2500 tons of ferro –
silicon. 
   
      
    
 
 
 
 
 On the night of 19 February an explosive 
charge was placed on the ferry ‘Hydro’ by 
Knut Haukelid, Knut Lier-Hansen from 
Milorg, and Rolf Sørlie from B-org.  The 
charge, 19 pounds of plastic explosive, went 
off the following morning as the ferry was 
crossing the lake, resulting in the loss of 500 
kilos of 100% heavy water and 14 Norwegian 
civilians.   Four drums did, however, survive, 
and this along with a small amount of heavy 
water from Såheim, was shipped to Germany 
during the spring.     
 
The team of three entered from Sweden on 21 
April.  On 9 May they blew up the 
locomotive and on 1 June the railway’s last 
railcar was also destroyed.  One of the 
locomotives had been sent to Oslo for repairs, 
but on 13 September this was attacked and 
damaged by the ‘Oslo Detachment’ under 
Gunnar Sønsteby.  
 
When production stopped at the plant due to 
lack of raw material, the plan was abandoned.     
  
 
 
 
The ‘Feather II’ team left Stockholm for the 
field on 15 August, but was quickly arrested 
by the Swedish authorities.  On 3 September 
they made a second attempt, but on 11 
September they were recalled after it became 
known that the transport of materials had 
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August/Septem
ber 1944 
(Stockholm – 
Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dodworth (E. 
Sundseth) 
 
 
 
 
Skjønslua railway or 
by attacking the tug 
boats moving between 
Skjønslua and 
Finneid. 
 
Another attack on the 
Orkla pyrite mines. 
ceased.  
 
 
 
 
 
On August 21, Sundseth was sent from 
Sweden to reconnoitre the area in readiness to 
receive a party that would be sent in from the 
UK.  He returned on 6 September.  On 
September 26 the Orkla attack was cancelled 
owing to the strong defences and a change in 
the general situation.       
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Sea-Borne Operations Instigated by or Involving SOE along the Norwegian 
Seaboard 1940-1945
1
 
Date Operation Objectives Details 
 
Autumn 1940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 March 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandible (formerly 
‘Castle’) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almoner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claymore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maundy I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To interrupt the 
supply of ilmenite 
from the A/S Titania 
mine at Sokndal by 
destroying the 
hydroelectric power 
station and loading 
appliances at the head 
of Jøssingfjord. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Norwegian 
herring  fleet in the 
North Sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The destruction of 
herring and cod oil 
plants on the Lofoten 
Islands, the arrest of 
local Quislings and 
enemy personnel, and 
the securing of 
volunteers for the 
Norwegian navy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enemy shipping in the 
Norwegian leads. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOE had shown interest in this site as 
early as August 1940.   From October, 
COHQ began to plan a raid against the 
target using a force that included three 
destroyers, 150 Special Service troops, 
and Norwegian interpreters supplied by 
SOE.  Ilmenite was considered to be a 
product of some importance, although it 
was pointed out that there were eleven 
months stocks in Germany.  The raid 
would also provide practical experience, 
annoy the Germans, and encourage 
Norwegians.   The operation was 
eventually cancelled on the instructions 
of Churchill. 
 
This was a plan to attack the Norwegian 
herring fleet working between 
Haugesund and Egersund.  SOE would 
provide Norwegian seamen who would 
operate as armed guards.  The COS 
approved it in principle, but by mid-
March it had been cancelled at the 
request of the Norwegian government.  
 
Planned, organised, and executed under 
the direction of COHQ in consultation 
with SOE.  The operation included five 
destroyers, 500 Commandoes from the 
Special Service Brigade, and through 
SOE, fifty-two Norwegian men and 
officers were supplied along with 
guides and naval pilots.   Altogether, 
eleven ships were sunk, factories and 
800,000 gallons of oil destroyed, 213 
enemy personnel captured, and 314 
Norwegian volunteers brought back to 
UK.  Important Enigma equipment was 
also captured.        
 
By early March 1940, SOE had a 
mining squad in training and on 29 
April 1940, the first Norwegian fishing 
boat left the Shetlands to lay mines in 
the inner leads.  Eventually eleven out 
of eighteen ‘R-Type’ mines provided by 
the Royal Navy were laid in Norwegian 
coastal waters. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Complied from the following sources: PRO: HS2, HS7, HS8, DEFE2, PREM3, ADM, and CAB files.  
NHM: SOE and FO IV archives.  
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April 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spring 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December  
1941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1941 
 
 
 
 
Hemisphere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wallah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maundy II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kitbag I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Archery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anklet 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack against a 
herring oil plant at 
Øksfjord in northern 
Norway. 
 
 
 
 
To establish a base in 
northern Norway 
from where 
operations could be 
launched with the aim 
of paralysing German 
sea-borne traffic 
along the Norwegian 
coast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To drop ‘R-mines’ in 
coastal waters north 
of Kristiansund. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
German controlled 
shipping, cold storage 
plants, fish canning 
factories, herring oil 
factory, oil tanks,  the 
capture of Quislings, 
and the recruiting of 
Norwegian volunteers 
at Florø. 
 
A raid on military and 
economic targets in 
the vicinity of Vågsøy 
with the objective of 
harassing the coastal 
defences of SW 
Norway and diverting 
enemy attention away 
from Operation 
Anklet. 
 
 
The object was to cut 
enemy 
communications with 
the north of Norway.   
This evolved into an 
 
The operation, conceived by 
Commander Frank Stagg of SOE, and 
consisting of ten Norwegian marines 
and one SOE agent, sailed on 8 April 
1941.  The plant was completely 
destroyed and the expedition returned to 
the UK on 15 April. 
 
By the end of July 1941 the Admiralty 
had approved ‘Wallah’.  The Norwegian 
Naval Staff and Nortraship, which 
provided a ship the SS-Anderson as a 
base for the operation, were both 
involved.  The Admiralty also provided 
two ‘Q’ ships, heavily armed merchant 
vessels, which would be used to 
intercept German shipping.  Local 
fishing boats would also be purchased 
and used to sail into harbours where 
explosives would be attached to enemy 
vessels.  The possibility of using ski-
troops to attack targets inland was also 
considered.  In October 1940 the 
operation was placed under ACOS, and 
in November under the C-in-C Home 
Fleet before it was eventually merged 
into ‘Anklet’.     
 
The fishing boat M/V Nordsjøen left the 
Shetlands on 19 October skippered by 
Leif Larsen and with nine men and 
forty-two ‘R-mines’ on board.  The 
mines were laid on 21 October but the 
boat encountered a major storm and had 
to be abandoned.  All the men 
eventually got back to Britain, including 
a group of seven led by Larsen in the 
fishing boat ‘Arthur’.  
 
The force included approximately 250 
men and officers from 6th Commando 
and thirty Norwegian men and officers 
provided by SOE under the leadership 
of Martin Linge.   It eventually got 
underway on 11 December , but was 
abandoned after reaching the 
Norwegian coast.  
 
 
Included almost 600 men and officers 
from No 3 and No 2 Commando plus 
six naval pilots and thirty-three 
Norwegian men and officers, including 
guides, provided by SOE and under the 
command of Martin Linge.  The force 
sailed on 26 December and arrived off 
the Norwegian coast the following day.  
The RAF supported the British naval 
forces and a number of economic 
targets were destroyed.   
 
Under the command of the 
Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, a 
large naval and military force, including 
300 men from No 12 Command, sailed 
on 22 December and arrived in the area 
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January 1942 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan/Feb 1942 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 
1942 
 
 
 
October 1942 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kitbag II 
 
 
 
 
 
Q-Ships Operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lark (Maundy) 
(O.K. Sættem, A. 
Christiansen) 
 
 
 Title (L. Larsen, P. 
Bjornøy, R. Strand, 
J. Kalve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carhampton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
operation whereby a 
temporary defensive 
base would be 
established on the 
Lofoten Islands from 
where light naval 
forces could operate 
against German sea 
communications.   
The Norwegian fish 
industry was also a 
target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To attack targets 
around Florø. 
 
 
 
 
The Q-ships intended 
for Operation Wallah 
were taken over by C-
in-C Home fleet to be 
used against enemy 
shipping. 
 
To lay mines in the 
inner leads around 
Trondheim. 
 
 
This was a joint 
FOS/SOE operation.  
The plan was that a 
fishing boat would 
tow two submersible 
‘Chariots’ and carry 
six Naval personnel 
into Trondheimfjord, 
where the attack 
against the Tirpitz 
would be launched. 
 
The objective was to 
board and capture a 
convoy of merchant 
ships off the southern 
coastline of Norway 
and bring them back 
to the UK.  The party 
was made up of 41 
men, 15 from NIC (1) 
and 26 from the RNN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on 26 December. The Norwegian navy 
provided two corvettes and over sixty 
naval ratings.  A SOE contingent of 
seventy-seven men and officers also 
sailed with the main force. They were 
instructed to seize five local fishing 
boats and attack navigation lights along 
the Norwegian coast, whilst W/T 
operators aided communication and 
supplied intelligence.  Three fishing 
boats also sailed from the Shetlands to 
attack navigation lights in the area, 
although only one completed its task.  
The expedition withdrew on 28 
December.  Some local targets were 
destroyed and 266 Norwegians brought 
back, but little else was achieved.   
 
The naval force, which sailed in early 
January, included five Norwegian naval 
pilots supplied through SOE.  A cargo 
ship and two trawlers were attacked 
before the force withdrew 
 
The operation sailed from the Shetlands 
on 29 January but returned to Scapa 
Flow on 5 February after being spotted 
by enemy aircraft.  SOE supplied 
intelligence, one officer, eight army and 
naval ranks, arms, and explosives.    
 
The plan was to send ‘R-mines’ with 
the Lark team to Norway and use 
rowing boats to lay the mines.  It was 
never carried out.   
 
The fishing boat ‘Arthur’ sailed on 26 
October and arrived off the Norwegian 
coast on 29 October.  The following 
day, in heavy seas, the two ‘Chariots’ 
were lost.  The fishing boat was scuttled 
and the crew and naval personnel 
attempted to escape to Sweden.  All 
except one got back safely. 
 
 
 
 
Attempts to sail were made in 
November but abandoned due to bad 
weather.  The operation was then 
delayed until Operation Cabaret had 
been completed.  It eventually left on 1 
January 1943 in the Norwegian whale-
catcher, the ‘Bodø’, which hit a mine on 
the way back and sank with the loss of 
thirty-three lives.  Two attempts to 
capture ships were made in January but 
both failed and the party was forced to 
flee to the mountains.  It was then 
decided that the group would assist 
Operation Yorker, a COHQ attack 
against the titanium mines in Sogndal, 
but this was cancelled due to bad 
weather.  Consequently, the party had to 
make their own way back.  Sixteen 
captured the coastal steamer, 
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September  
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September  
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 
1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vestige 1 
(Harald Svindseth, 
Ragnar Ulstein, Nils 
Fjeld) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vestige II (L. 
Olsen, 
 I Næss) 
 
 
 
 
 
Vestige III (S. 
Synnes, H. Hoel) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chariot operation 
(Karl Vilnes) 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbara I (Lt. C. 
Johnsen, Lt. B. 
Pedersen. Lt. B. 
Marris RNVR, Lt. J. 
Holmes, RN) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbara II 
The remaining 
Norwegians trained 
for Welman 
operations were: 
2./Lt. R. Larsen, 
Sgt. Ø. Hansen, Cpl. 
N. Olsen, Sgt. F. 
Kayser, Sgt. J. 
Akslen 
 
Barbara III 
(Trace) (Harald 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of the 
‘Vestige’ operations 
was to attack enemy 
shipping along the 
coast between Bergen 
and Ålesund.   
Kayaks would be used 
to get close to the 
vessel and limpet 
mines then attached to 
the ship’s hull.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim was to attack 
shipping in Askvoll 
harbour. 
 
 
 
 
The object of the 
‘Barbara’ operations 
was to sink enemy 
shipping in 
Norwegian coastal 
waters using 
‘Welmans’, the one-
man submersible 
craft. 
 
 
 
 The aim was to attack 
the anchorage at 
Askvoll. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim was to attack 
shipping in 
‘Tromøysund’, which was sunk in the 
North Sea, nineteen escaped to the UK 
in a fishing boat, two fled to Sweden, 
whilst four men remained in the 
country. 
 
Landed on 3 September by MTB and on 
the night of 23 September attacked the 
Hermut in Gulenfjord, north of Bergen.  
The ship was grounded.  The party was 
picked up by MTB on 16 November. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also landed on 3 September by MTB.  
Attempted an attack in Askvoll harbour 
but hampered by adverse weather.  
They moved to Ålesund and made 
contact with the ‘Antrum’ operation.  
Picked up 17 November by sub chaser 
as part of a SIS operation. 
 
Also landed by MTB on 3 September 
and on 6 October attacked the Jantje 
Fritzen in Ålesund using 6 limpets.  The 
ship was, however, kept afloat and 
towed to Bergen for repairs.  Picked up 
along with ‘Vestige II’. 
 
 
An observer, Vilnes, was landed on 
Atløy, north of Bergen, to report the 
movements of shipping in Askvoll 
harbour to a nearby MTB that was 
carrying ‘Chariots’.  Owing to the 
absence of shipping nothing happened.  
 
On 20 November 4 ‘Welmans’ and 2 
British and 2 Norwegian officers were 
transported to the west coast with the 
intention of sinking shipping or the 
floating dock in Bergen harbour.  The 
‘Welmans’ penetrated the inner harbour 
but the lead vessel was discovered and 
2nd Lieutenant Pedersen captured.  The 
other officers escaped after sinking their 
vessels and were eventually picked up 
on 5 February 1944. 
 
A SOE observer was landed on the 
island of Atløy, and a second attempt 
was made to land another two observers 
further south.  At the end of January 
1944, however, after the operation had 
failed to get underway, both sets of 
observers were picked up and the 
operation abandoned. 
 
 
 
An advanced party, ‘Trace’, was landed 
on 6 February 1944 and began sending 
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Feb/March 
1944 
 
 
March 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Svindseth, Ragnar 
Ulstein) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbara IV 
 
 
 
Vestige IV (K. 
Idsand, A. Åkre, K. 
Endresen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vestige XII (A. 
Torkildsen, A. 
Gade-Torp, F. 
Brandt) 
 
 
 
Vestige V (K. 
Vilnes, P. 
Ørstenvik) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vestige XIV (R. 
Larsen, Ø. Hansen, 
B. Petersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vestige VIII (H. 
Hoel, I. Næss) 
 
 
 
 
Maundy 
III/Dundee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gulenfjord. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim was to attack 
shipping in 
Syvdefjord. 
 
To attack shipping 
around Egersund 
using limpet mines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To attack shipping at 
Malm in North-
Trøndelag. 
 
 
 
 
To attack shipping 
loading pyrites at 
Sagvåg on the island 
of Stord. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To attack shipping in 
Frederickstad and 
other Østfold (eastern 
Norway) ports. 
 
 
 
 
 
An operation to attack 
shipping in 
Søderfjord. 
 
 
 
The party was 
instructed to lay 
mines north of Florø.  
Alternative targets 
were limpet attacks on 
shipping in 
Gulenfjord, the 
introduction of 
explosive charges into 
cases of salt herrings, 
or sabotage of the 
messages by W/T.  The ‘Welman’ party 
sailed on 13 February but was forced 
back by bad weather.  The operation 
was eventually abandoned although the 
‘Trace’ party continued to send 
messages until it was picked-up on 16 
March by sub-chaser. 
  
 
Th aim was to supply intelligence using 
the ‘Antrum Green’ station in Ålesund, 
but the operation never took place.  
 
The party initially failed to carry out 
any attacks, although later attempts 
were made against U-boats but with no 
success and a small vessel was sunk in 
Flekkefjord harbour.  The party, 
however, remained in the field for the 
rest of the war.  In early 1945, it was 
issued with new operation instructions 
and carried out acts of sabotage against 
German military camps in the area.   
 
On 16 March a sub-chaser landed the 
party equipped with folding boats rather 
than kayaks.  Conditions were so 
difficult that the party were eventually 
forced to flee to Sweden without 
carrying out any attacks.  
 
A sub-chaser dropped the party on 31 
March 1944.  Several attempts were 
made to attack shipping but weather 
difficulties again proved 
insurmountable and a sub-chaser 
recovered the party on 9 May.  There 
were plans to revive ‘Vestige V’ in 
August 1944 but due to objections from 
SIS these were abandoned. 
 
The party was dropped by air on 31 
March with folding boats and diving 
suits.  On the way to carrying out an 
attack the party was surprised and after 
an exchange of shots fled to Sweden.  
Although the party returned to the field 
at a later stage no attacks were 
undertaken.  
 
A sub-chaser landed the party at 
Skorpen on 12 April, but it failed to 
carry out any attacks due to the weather 
and short nights and was picked up on 1 
May. 
 
Despite four attempts, the first one on 
16 April, bad weather and poor 
conditions meant that the operation 
never took place. 
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September 
1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1944 
 
 
 
September 
1944 
 
 
 
 
September 
1944 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autumn 1944 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Salamander I (R. 
Ulstein) 
(The ‘Salamander’ 
operations would 
use the ‘Sleeping 
Beauty’ – motorised 
submersible canoe)   
 
Salamander II (F. 
Kayser, S. Synnes, 
A, Trønnes, K. 
Karlsen) 
 
Salamander III 
 
 
 
 
 
Salamander IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salamander V (T. 
Lien, A. Fløisand, 
L. Olsen, I. 
Tønseth) 
 
 
 
 
Cutlass (H. Ryen, 
Cpl. Ratvik, seaman 
Ingebritsen) 
 
 
automatic navigation 
lights in the fjord. 
 
To introduce a party 
of four men to attack 
shipping in the 
Nordgulen and Florø 
area using the 
‘Sleeping Beauty’.  
 
 
To attack depot ships, 
U-boats, and other 
vessels around Måløy 
using limpet mines. 
 
Target U-boat depot 
ships, U-boats, and 
other shipping in 
Søvdefjord using 
limpet mines. 
 
Target U-boat depot 
ships and U-boats at 
Hatvik using limpet 
mines. 
 
 
 
To attack workshop 
ships for U-boats, U-
boats and other 
shipping at 
Vingvågen near 
Trondheim. 
 
 
A plan to intercept a 
prison ship and 
release the thirty 
members of the 
resistance that were 
onboard.  They were 
from the Narvik area 
and were being 
transferred via 
Trondheim to a 
concentration camp. 
 
 
 
 
SIS objected to the operation because it 
believed it threatened its ‘Roska’ station 
near Florø. 
 
 
 
 
 
Landed by sub-chaser on 9 September 
but returned on 18 September with no 
success.  
 
 
SIS objected to the operation because of 
its station ‘Frey’ based at Guskøy south 
of Ålesund.  
 
 
 
SIS objected to this operation because 
of  its ‘Reva’ station near Bergen, but it 
was eventually cancelled because SOE 
agent in the area reported that the U-
boat depot ship and U-boats were no 
longer at Hatvik. 
 
Left by fishing boat with two ‘Sleeping 
Beauties’ on 13 September.  Returned 
on 30 September with no success. 
 
 
 
 
 
Four MTBs would intercept the ship 
south of Rørvik.  SOE agents would 
also go on board at Sandnesjøen to 
assist or to force the ship to sail for the 
UK if this failed.  The operation was 
never carried out. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
SOE Long Term and Miscellaneous Operations in Norway 1940-1945
1
 
 
DATE     OPERATION     OBJECTIVES              DETAILS 
 
10 Nov 1940 
(sea) 
 
 
 
23 Jan 1941 
(submarine) 
 
 
 
 
15 Sept. 1941 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
15 October 
 1941 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5/6 Dec. 
1941 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Dec. 1941 
(sea) 
  
 
Unnamed  
(M. Rasmussen, K.A. 
Lindberg, F. Pedersen 
Kviljo) 
 
Cheese I 
(O. Starheim) 
 
 
 
 
Letterbox 
(K.J. Aarsæther, A. 
Wisløff) 
 
 
 
 
Arquebus 
(S. Andersen, B. 
Haarvardsholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antrum 
(F. Aaraas, K.J. 
Aarsæther, K. 
Aarsæther) 
 
 
 
 
Archer 
(I. Fosseide, B. 
Mathiesen, Lynghaul, 
R. Aarkvisla) 
 
Contact resistance groups in 
Bergen and establish a W/T link 
with southern Norway. 
 
 
Contact resistance groups in 
southern Norway, collect 
intelligence, reconnoitre sabotage 
targets.  
 
 
To arrange weapons dumps, 
contact local resistance groups, 
and commence instruction in the 
mountains near Ålesund.  Wisløff 
would try and get work at 
Trondheim submarine base.  
 
To organise resistance groups in 
the Haugesund area, establish 
W/T contact, and investigate the 
possibility of importing 
explosives to attack the 
aluminium plant at Saudasjøen 
north of Stavanger. 
 
 
 
 
Set up W/T contact and develop 
groups in the Ålesund area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To organise a local intelligence 
service, reconnoitre possible 
sabotage targets, recruit and train 
local groups, establish radio 
contact.    
 
 
 
The Abwehr had infiltrated the crew of the 
fishing boat Urd II and all three SOE men 
were arrested after their arrival in Norway.  
They were executed in August 1941. 
 
Starheim made contact with local groups and 
through Lt. Pål Frisvold, the central 
leadership of Milorg.  He also sent back a 
significant volume of intelligence, before 
returning to Britain in July 1941. 
 
Both men returned early in November after 
making contact with groups around Ålesund. 
 
 
 
 
 
Haarvardsholm was lost whilst returning to 
the UK on the Blia in November, but 
Andersen remained in Norway for the rest of 
the war.   The radio was damaged and 
therefore contact was made in April 1942 
through SIS station, ‘Theta’.  A new radio 
was eventually sent from Stockholm in 
October 1942 and contact established.   
Relations with Milorg were problematic until 
1944 and the arrival of the ‘Albatross’ team.  
 
Aaras trained a local radio operator and 
returned to the UK in January 1942.  K. .J. 
Aarsaether also returned in January and was 
replaced by his brother Knut, who returned to 
the UK in March.  Radio contact with the 
area was problematic and by early 1943 had 
broken down. 
 
In the short-term this operation was linked to 
Operation Anklet, in the longer-term it was 
the first of a series of operations sent into 
Nordland to establish a guerrilla organisation.  
The group, however, never established radio 
contact and internal conflict between its 
members made it ineffective.     
  
                                                          
1
 This information is compiled from the following sources: PRO: HS2, HS7, and HS8 files. NHM: SOE 
and FO IV archives. Kjelstadli, Hjemmestyrkene.  Jensen, [et al], Kompani Linge, Birkenes, Milorg i 
D17: Nedre Telemark.   Berg & Lindhjem, Militær motstand i Rogaland og Vestfold, Welle-Strand, Vi 
vil verne vårt land,  Pedersen, Militær motstand i nord 1940-1945.   
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DATE OPERATION        OBJECTIVES                      DETAILS 
 
2 January 
1942 
(air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 February 
1942 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 February 
1942 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
8 February 
1942 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 February 
1942 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 March 1942 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 March 
 
Cheese II 
(O. Starheim, A. 
Fasting) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crow 
(E. N. Stenersen, the 
organiser, and E. K. 
Jacobsen the W/T 
operator, who followed 
on 27/3/42) 
 
 
 
 
Anvil 
(J. Gunleiksrud, the 
organiser, and W/T 
operator F. B. Johnsen, 
who followed on 12 
March) 
 
Lark 
(Odd Sørli, A. Pevik, 
followed by O.K. 
Sættem and A. 
Christiansen 
[instructors] on 8 April.  
E. Hansen [W/T], H. 
Nygaard [organiser] 
sailed on 18 April). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anchor 
(T. Gulbrandsen, and 
E. Hvaal, the W/T 
operator who followed 
17  April) 
 
 
 
 
 
Heron I  
(A. Knudsen, O. 
Baarnes, H. Bugge. H. 
K. Hansen, A. Larsen, 
W/T operator) 
 
  
 
Grouse 
 
To organise and instruct guerrilla 
bands in the Flekkefjord to 
Kristiansand area and receive 
arms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To establish W/T contact and 
organise guerrilla groups on the  
eastern side of Oslo fjord. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To establish W/T contact and 
organise guerrilla groups around 
Lillehammer. 
 
 
 
 
To establish radio contact, 
receive weapons, and train and 
build up guerrilla groups in the 
area around Trondheim.  
Possible sabotage targets, such 
as submarine supply ships, 
would also be reconnoitred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To establish W/T contact, 
instruct small groups in guerrilla 
warfare, and prepare to receive 
arms drops in the area around 
Drammen, west of Oslo. 
 
 
 
 
. 
Follow up to the ‘Archer’ party.  
The second of three parties that 
would organise and train a 
guerrilla force in the Vefsn 
district south of Mosjøen, 
receive arms dumps, and 
establish W/T contact. 
 
Skinnerland, who was originally 
 
Fasting carried out instruction whilst 
Starheim travelled to Oslo in January and 
met members of the central council of 
Milorg, including Rolf Palmstrøm the head 
of communications, who asked for a wireless 
operator and set.  It was agreed that Einar 
Skinnerland should travel to Britain to 
organise this, which he did along with the 
two SOE men on the ‘Galtesund’ in March.  
Three W/T sets were left behind for use by a 
local organisation under Gunvald Thomstad. 
    
 
Stenersen went in first and made contact 
with the local Milorg organisation and also 
with SL, which asked him to make his radio 
available.  He found a sight for the W/T 
operator and in May fled to Stockholm.  
Jacobsen came on air the same month, but in 
July was taken by the Gestapo, who 
attempted to work his set.  He escaped in 
December 1942. 
 
Gunleiksrud was arrested on arrival in 
February by the local Milorg organisation on 
suspicion of being a provocateur.  He also 
came into conflict with SL in Oslo.  He left 
for Sweden in July.  The W/T operator 
remained in Norway until the end of the war. 
 
   Sørli and Pevik made contact with groups 
in the Trondheim area.  They were followed 
by the instructors and then the W/T operator 
and organiser in April 1942.  Nygaard took 
over from Sørli.  Radio communication 
began in late May but contact was 
problematic during the summer.  The W/T 
operator, Hansen, who had gone to 
Stockholm, was forced to return to 
Trondheim in autumn 1942 to help improve 
matters. His set was D/F d and on 16 
December 1942 Nygaard and Hansen were 
arrested, although Nygaard escaped.  This 
temporarily ended radio contact with the 
Trondheim area. 
  
Gulbrandsen made contact with the 
leadership of Milorg in eastern Norway.  He 
began instruction but in May was captured 
by the Gestapo.  Hval was also captured 
soon after his arrival in Norway in April.  
Gulbrandsen escaped, with the help of the 
Gestapo in September and returned to 
Britain to  work for the Germans: see below, 
Operation Omelette. 
 
See below: Heron II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Skinnerland was dropped on the night of 28-
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1942 
(air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 April 1942 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 April 1942 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 April 1942 
(sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
28 April 1942 
(air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 April 1942 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
(E. Skinnerland, 
organiser) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mallard   
(E. Marthinsson & C. 
F. Aall) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heron II 
(B. Sjøberg, E. Rustan, 
L. Langaas, R.M. 
Olsen,  J. Kvarme, A. 
Gundersen)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Penguin  
(A. Værum organiser) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Cockerel  
(T. Hugo van der 
Hagen, E. Jensen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raven 
(W. Waage, 
L.Pettersen, C. 
Tønseth, G. Merkesdal, 
W/T operator)  
 
 
sent to Britain by R. Palmstrøm 
the head of signals in Milorg, 
was dropped in the county of 
Telemark to establish W/T 
contact and prepare the ground 
for the main ‘Grouse’ party, 
which was due to arrive at the 
end of April. The aim was to 
build an independent guerrilla 
organisation in the 
Telemark/Rjukan area. 
 
The objective was to establish 
W/T contact and a guerrilla 
organisation in the area just to 
the north of Bergen.  Great care 
would be used in approaching 
Milorg. 
 
 
 
 
 
Birger Sjøberg took over 
command of the 15-man party in 
the Vefsn district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sailed on the Olaf on 17 April 
with the ‘Anchor’ W/T operator 
E. Hvaal. Værum was instructed 
to work in the Haugesund to 
Egersund area, including 
Stavanger, organise local groups, 
and consider sabotage of certain 
targets, including Sola 
aerodrome. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
To carry out instruction and 
training in the Kristiansand area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To form guerrilla forces of 
approximately 300 men in the 
mountains around Voss and 
establish wireless contact with 
the UK.  Tasks on an Allied 
invasion would be to block the 
Oslo-Bergen railway and control 
29 March.  He was instructed to deliver arms 
to Milorg and advise them that the 
organisation in Telemark would operate 
independently.  Skinnerland made contact 
with SL during June 1942.  The second 
‘Grouse’ party, under Jens Poulsson was 
unable to leave Britain before the lighter 
nights began to take effect in May. 
  
 
 
 
The two men attempted to make contact with 
Milorg in Bergen, which eventually they 
managed to do.  On 30 May however, owing 
to information provided locally, the Gestapo 
captured the two SOE men and along with E. 
Hvaal they were shot.  The arrest of the 
‘Mallard’, ‘Penguin’, and ‘Anchor’ agents 
(see below) led to a series of arrests in the 
Bergen area and severely damaged local 
resistance groups. 
 
A considerable amount of weapons were 
imported into the area and the training of 
local groups began.  Early in September 
1942, however, owing to the work of a 
Norwegian agent, one of the ‘Archer’ group 
was arrested and led the Germans to a farm 
on Lake Majavatn where a SOE team was in 
hiding.  An exchange of shots followed, 
which resulted in the death of two Germans.  
This contributed to a decision to declare a 
state of emergency in the area, the execution 
of thirty-four Norwegians, and the break up 
of the Archer/Heron operation.  
 
Landed at Nesvik near Televåg on the island 
of Sotra outside Bergen on 21 April.  Both 
‘Penguin’ and ‘Anchor’ stayed with a 
contact man in Televåg.  On 26 April, six 
Germans and two Stapo men arrived at the 
agent’s hideout and a shootout followed in 
which two Germans were killed.  Værum 
was also killed whilst Hvaal was taken 
prisoner, tortured and later shot.  As a result 
of this incident all the houses in Televåg 
were burnt down, all men between 16 and 65 
sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 
Germany, whilst the rest of the inhabitants 
were banished and interned in Norway. 
 
In August 1941, Jensen left for Sweden 
followed by Hagen, who became part of 
Operation Carhampton in early 1943.  After 
this operation was abandoned he stayed 
behind in southern Norway to help F. Aaraas 
operate the ‘Carhampton’ W/T station.  
Aaraas was captured on 12 August 1943 but 
Hagen managed to escape.  
 
‘Raven’ soon came on air and transmitted 
until July, after which contact became 
problematic.  In October 1942, Waage 
arrived in Stockholm and was sent back to 
the UK.  Waage eventually returned in 
March 1943 as ‘Pheasant’.  In March 1943 
Pettersen also arrived in Stockholm and was 
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1-2 May 1942  
(Catalina) 
 
 
 July 1942 
 
 
 
 
July 1942 
(Catalina and 
fishing boat) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 1942 
(Submarine) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August  
1942 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
August 1942 
 
 
 
September 
1942 (via 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unnamed 
(S. Granlund, E. 
Østgaard) 
 
Ostrich 
(B. Pedersen, P. 
 Deinboll) 
 
 
Hawke/Kingfisher K. 
(Aarsæther H. 
Sverdrup) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Swan  
(G. Bråstad W/T 
operator, A. Fasting) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cygnet  
(P. Blystad) 
 
 
 
 
Peewit 
(O. J. Gulbrandsen, A. 
Øvre) 
 
Plover 
(P. Solnerdal) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the aerodrome at Bomoen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two men landed by Catalina to 
establish an arms dump north of 
Folda in northern Norway. 
 
This was a plan to send two men 
into Norway to contact 
Norwegian workers and train 
them in undetectable sabotage. 
 
Plan to organise a small 
resistance group on the Lofoten 
Islands in contact with the UK 
by W/T.  The group would  
receive arms and stores, which 
would then be distributed to 
parts of Norway in barrels of fish 
by fishing boat or by air. 
 
 
Establish W/T contact and 
provide arms instruction to 
guerrilla groups east of 
Kristiansand.  Fasting was also 
to train small groups in disposing 
of dangerous denouncers by 
assassination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was a trip that left the 
Shetlands in the ‘Sjø’ on 22 
August for a fortnight’s 
reconnaissance of the Bergen 
coastal district.       
 
Plan to send men to develop 
contacts in the Oslo shipyards. 
 
 
Early in 1942 the Norwegian 
High Command made a request 
for direct wireless 
communication with SL. In May 
an agreement was reached with 
the signals chief of Milorg to this 
effect.  ‘Plover’ was the result of 
this agreement.  He was also 
instructed to train a local person 
who could take over from him if 
necessary.   
 
 
 
 
sent to the UK.  Pettersen returned to 
Norway in September 1943 on Operation 
Redwing.  In April 1943 the last two 
members of ‘Raven’ attempted to return to 
the UK, but only Tønseth was successful. 
Organisation work continued in the area but 
there was no contact with the UK until 
September 1943.  In the spring of 1944 a 
new group called ‘Redstart’ arrived. 
 
 
 
 
 
It appears that the operation was never 
carried out because the two men were 
allocated to Operation Granard. 
 
 
Attempts were made to deliver Aarsæther to 
northern Norway firstly by Catalina and 
secondly by fishing boat but failed.  The first 
trip to land Sverdrup with stores sailed on 11 
December 1942 and eventually reached the 
Lofotens.  An attempt early in January 1943 
to establish Aarsæther as the W/T operator 
was a failure and he returned with Sverdrup.  
The plan was eventually abandoned. 
 
Landed by the submarine ‘Minerve’ on the 
night of 20-21 August off the coast of 
western Norway.  Established W/T contact 
from 24 September.  This operation was 
troubled by difficulties between Fasting and 
local groups, including Milorg.  Fasting, 
who had been part of Operation Cheese was 
unpopular with local SOE groups and his 
presence caused friction.  He left for 
Stockholm in November 1942 and Bråstad 
followed in February 1943.  The local 
Milorg organisation was hit badly by a series 
of arrests in December 1942. 
  
Operation lost at sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appears plan was never carried out.  
 
 
 
Plover went in through Stockholm and was 
installed in Oslo by early September.  With 
the help of Sønsteby he made contact with 
SL and came on air on 23 September.  
However, after problems with his call sign 
and with the help of Milorg, Plover got in 
touch with SIS station, ‘Beta’, and used its 
crystals and signals plan to communicate 
with the UK.  In mid November Solnerdal 
was instructed to train his successor Rolf 
Krohn, who began to transmit in December.  
On 19 December Solnerdal was ordered to 
Østfold and he sent his last message on 28 
December.  Krohn, however, signalled 
through another SIS station ‘Corona’ that 
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 September 
1942 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
October 1942 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 
 1942 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Nov 1942 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Penguin Primus (C. 
Langeland, G. 
Setesdal) 
 
 
Bittern (Jan Allen, 
Rubin Larsen, Erik 
Aasheim, Johannes 
Andersen (Gulosten) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grouse 
 (J. Poulsson (leader), 
K. Haugland, A. 
Kjelstrup, C. Helberg).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Swallow (J. Poulsson 
(leader) K. Haugland, 
A. Kjelstrup, C. 
Helberg, E. 
Skinnerland)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim was to re-establish W/T 
contact with the Stavanger area 
after the arrest of Arne Værum. 
 
 
Preparations began in June to 
train two Norwegians, including 
Johannes Andersen better known 
as Gulosten to undertake 
assassinations.  In March 
Andersen had killed Raymond 
Colberg, an Abwehr agent and 
his criminal background 
attracted him to SOE.  The party, 
dropped on the night of 3-4 
October was instructed to train 
resistance groups in 
assassination, assist in the 
carrying out of assassination, and 
help prisoners to escape.     
 
In early 1942, Poulsson had been 
selected as part of a plan to sink 
the Tinnsjø ferry, and later to 
place flares in the valley around 
Rjukan to help guide the 
bombers on Operation 
Clairvoyant.  In February 1942 
he presented a paper to Malcolm 
Munthe suggesting the 
establishment of guerrilla groups 
in Telemark.  This led to 
‘Grouse’.  The team was due to 
be dropped at the end of April, 
but this never occurred. In mid 
September it was decided the 
party could also act as advance 
party for the British Airborne 
troops on Operation Freshman as 
well as organising guerrilla 
groups in Øvre (Upper) 
Telemark. 
 
After the failure of ‘Freshman’, 
Operation Grouse was renamed 
‘Swallow’.  After Operation 
‘Gunnerside’, ‘Swallow’ was 
instructed to continue with its 
subsidiary task of organising 
local guerrilla groups, although 
members of the original party 
could decide whether they stayed 
in the country.  At this point 
‘Swallow’ was also divided into 
two parts.  The organisation of 
western Telemark would be 
under Knut Haukelid, from the 
Gunnerside’ team, and be called 
‘Bonzo’.  Eastern Telemark, 
under Einar Skinnerland would 
Solnordal had been caught on 6 January 
1943, and that he would flee to Sweden.  
Harald Kvande was recruited to set up a new 
station, ‘Plover Beta’, and he made contact 
on 26 May.  He eventually changed to the 
‘Plover Blue’ signal plan before being 
instructed to close down in September 1943.         
 
Between September 1942 and April 1943 
attempts were made through Stockholm to 
send an agent into the area to establish radio 
contact but ultimately with no success. 
 
The group had a list of informers with them 
but their operation, for security reasons, was 
not communicated to Milorg and owing to 
this, confusion over its role and because of 
the behaviour of its most notorious member, 
it ended without having carried out its 
primary task.  By the end of the year the 
whole team had fled to Stockholm.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The party was dropped on 18 October and 
its first telegram was sent on 9 November.  
Its instructions were that, after the 
completion of  ‘Freshman’, it should train 
local groups in guerrilla operations, and 
target ‘Hirdmen’ – the NS vigilante guard - 
and denouncers.  The group was, however, 
told to emphasise that its work did not 
signify that an invasion was imminent.  On 
23 November, after the failure of ‘Freshman’ 
and for security reasons, it was re-named 
‘Swallow’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After ‘Gunnerside’, Haukelid and Kjelstrup 
moved to the southwest part of Telemark, 
whilst Haugland worked on Skinnerland’s 
W/T skills.  Poulsson and Helberg both 
eventually crossed to Sweden, as did 
Kjelstrup in October 1943, and Haugland 
after helping Skinnerland, made contact with 
SL in Oslo and then fled to Sweden.  By the 
summer of 1943, however, Haukelid and 
Skinnerland had joined up.  ‘Swallow’ had 
two W/T sets and from the autumn of 1943 
these operated as ‘Swallow Blue’ under 
Skinnerland and ‘Swallow Green’ under 
Niels Krohg, a local man.   Haukelid and 
Skinnerland worked together close to Rjukan 
and it was through the ‘Swallow Blue’ 
station that intelligence on heavy water 
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November 
1942 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 
 1942 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 
1942 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1942 (Sea) 
 
 
December 
1942 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan 1943 
 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan 1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petrel (G. Fougner) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thrush (B. Fjelstad, 
N. Gabrielsen)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gannet (T.K. Hoff, O. 
Dobloug) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chough (Lt. 
Robberstad) 
 
 
Martin (G. Solberg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moorhen (A. Martens-
Meyer) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chaffinch  
(T. Stenersen, O. 
Sandersen, M. Olsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
continue under the name 
‘Swallow’.  Haugland would 
help ‘Swallow’ and through cut-
outs, ‘Bonzo’.  
 
 
 
Fougner was instructed to meet 
Home Front leaders and discuss 
the SOE/PWE and Norwegian 
proposals for operational 
propaganda. 
 
 
 
 Dropped on the night of 25-26 
November.  The objective was to 
establish a wireless base in the 
Bykle District in southern 
Norway as well as arrange for 
the receipt of stores and 
equipment for the ‘Cheese’ area.  
 
 
 
The objective was to provide 
arms instruction and guerrilla 
training as well as prepare three 
‘Saccharine’ squads –
(assassination teams). 
 
 
 
 
 
A plan to recruit men from the 
Bremnes area to work at the 
Shetlands Base. 
 
Solberg was instructed to go to 
the county of Troms in  northern 
Norway to establish contacts and 
set up a W/T base in preparation 
for Operation Martin, a plan to 
organise and assist local 
resistance groups in this area. 
 
The intention was to establish 
W/T contact with the local 
resistance organisation in 
Bergen, set up a radio link 
between the groups in the area, 
instruct a local W/T operator, 
examine the possibility of 
shipping sabotage, and possibly 
revive an export organisation. 
 
 
 
 
To work in the area to the west 
of Oslo, establish W/T contact, 
provide instruction and training, 
investigate the possibility of 
local groups undertaking 
shipping sabotage, and prepare a 
small local team to carry out 
assassinations. 
production was supplied and instructions 
given to attack its transportation to 
Germany.  In April 1944, ‘Swallow Blue’ 
became ‘Brown’.  Skinnerland eventually 
joined the ‘Sunshine’ operation whilst 
Haukelid worked with ‘Varg’ (see below). 
 
He left on 30 November and eventually 
arrived in Oslo where he met Bjørn Helland 
Hansen and Eugen Johannessen.  He then 
travelled to Stockholm.  He initially 
indicated that the proposals had been 
favourably received.  He returned to London 
on 10 February.   
 
Fjelstad was instructed to contact the Milorg 
District Leader (DL) and act as an arms 
instructor.  He was also to set up a place for 
the W/T station, which came on air on 7 
December, and reconnoitre landing places 
for the ‘Carhampton’ operation.  In 
December many local Milorg men were 
arrested and consequently in February 1943 
both men fled to Sweden. 
 
The team landed on 30 November and 
travelled through the Gudbrandsdal and then 
Østerdal areas training local instructors and 
forming a ‘Saccharine’ squad in both valleys 
to undertake assassinations.  In a period of 
five weeks, working with a locally appointed 
leadership, they trained sixty new instructors 
before departing for Sweden in February 
1943.   
 
Sailed on 12 December.  Robberstad was 
picked up a few days later having achieved 
relatively little. 
 
Solberg left Stockholm on 20 December 
with a courier whilst a W/T was sent 
separately to Trondheim.  Both men were, 
however, arrested at the Swedish border and 
Solberg was not released until 5 March.  He 
went to the UK to become the W/T operator 
for the main ‘Martin’ operation.  
 
Left on 6 January with Lt. Robberstad 
equipped with six radio transmitters.  Meyer 
made contact with local groups, but as the 
radios lacked transformers, the plan for a 
local network was shelved.  One transmitter 
fortunately did work and contact was made 
with the UK.  The local groups, especially 
after Televåg, feared reprisals and were not 
very accommodating.  Meyer did, however, 
set up a group in Bergen and left two radio 
sets before travelling back to the UK at the 
end of February.  Contact was never made.    
 
Landed on 23 January.  Contact was quickly 
made with SL.  Extensive training and 
instruction was carried out in the area.  In 
liaison with SL a group of 6 men, an ‘X 
Group’ was set up and trained in ‘silent’ 
killing.  Just before they left 3 more ‘X-
Groups’ were prepared.  The group also 
attempted and undertook ship sabotage in 
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Jan 1943 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
February 1943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1943 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1943 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1943 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1943 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lark (J. Pevik, N.U. 
Hansen) 
 
 
 
 
Omelette (T. 
Gulbrandsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antrum Red/Blue 
(K.J. Aarsæther) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lark Blue (O. Sørli, 
E.G. Onstad) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pheasant (W. Waage, 
J. Solberg Johansen, B. 
 Iversen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heron (Red) (O. 
Baarnes, A.E. Telnes, 
A. Gundersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was an operation to land 
arms and equipment in the 
Trondheim area in preparation 
for the resurrection of this 
operation. 
 
This was a plan to use 
Gulbrandsen as a double agent to 
deceive the Gestapo over SOE 
plans in Norway. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective was to send an 
agent back to the Ålesund area 
with two wireless sets, crystals 
and signals plans: ‘Red’ and 
‘Blue’.  One of the stations 
would be used to provide 
shipping intelligence. 
 
 
 
The objective was to re-establish 
contact with and continue 
organising groups in the 
Trondheim area as well as 
distribute arms dumps and 
prepare to receive Operation 
Source. 
 
 
 
 
To establish a W/T contact with 
the UK and organise groups in 
the Valdres and northern 
Hallingdal area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To re-establish W/T contact 
with the ‘Heron’ organisation 
and Lt. Sjøberg, deliver stores, 
inspect and provide information 
on local groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
Drammen and Moss respectively before 
leaving Norway at the end of May 1943.  
 
The party left on 3 January and returned on 
11 January having delivered approximately 
500 kilos of material to three sites around 
Trondheim. 
 
 
Gulbrandsen, the former ‘Anchor’ organiser, 
was captured in May 1942.  He was allowed 
to escape in September and eventually 
returned to England.  His story was initially 
accepted but after the ‘Crow’ W/T operator 
returned to the UK and told SOE that 
Gulbrandsen had been allowed to escape, the 
truth came out.  In early 1943 Gulbrandsen 
revealed how his escape was fixed.  Because 
of threats against his family he agreed to 
send intelligence on SOE back to the 
Gestapo in Norway either through W/T 
contact or letters to cover addresses in Oslo 
that would be delivered by new SOE agents.  
The operation was never undertaken and 
Gulbrandsen was sent to work at STS 26 for 
the rest of the war. 
 
K. J. Aarsæther sailed on 4 March.  ‘Antrum 
Red’ came on air on 19 March.  ‘Antrum 
Blue’ became an important contact and link 
for the ‘Vestige’ and ‘Barbara’ operations.  
He also contacted local organisations, 
trained a local telegraphist, and contacted a 
group in the Molde area.  Aarsæther 
eventually became sick and was returned to 
the UK in January 1944.  
 
Landed on 14 March with two wireless sets.  
A third set had been landed a few weeks 
earlier.  The Lark organisation was still 
intact.  Eventually two transmission sites 
were established in Trondheim and ‘Lark 
Blue’ came on air.  Gjems-Onstad trained a 
local operator to replace him in Trondheim 
and attempted to set up a station in 
Kristiansund, ‘Lark Brown’.  In October 
1943 both men left for Stockholm. 
 
The party was dropped on 12 March 1943.  
On 23 April the radio station came on air 
and continued to transmit until the end of the 
war.  Contact was made with SL and a 
number of groups organised in the area.  The 
first airdrop was not, however, received until 
April 1944 and therefore weapon training 
was delayed.  Operation Firecrest arrived in 
May 1944 to relieve the ‘Pheasant’ party. 
 
After the infiltration of the ‘Heron’ 
organisation the previous September, radio 
contact with the UK was broken.  The new 
team re-established contact on 7 April and 
Sjøberg was instructed to return to the UK.  
A Catalina aircraft picked him up at the 
beginning of May.  Radio contact continued 
but was broken between September and 
December 1943. 
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March 1943 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1943 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1943 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 1943 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1943 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
Martin (Red) (S. 
Eskeland, P.R. 
Blindheim, G. Solberg, 
J.S. Baalsrud) 
 
 
 
 
 
Puffin (W. Houlder, S. 
Blindheim) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stonechat (H. Lund) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thrush Red  
 (B. Fjelstad,  
N. Gabrielsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redwing (L. Pettersen, 
G. Wiig-Andersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goshawke (J. 
Gunleiksrud, O. 
Dobloug) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wagtail (J. Pevik, K. 
Brodtkorp Danielsen, 
O. Halvorsen, F. 
Bekke) 
 
 
 
 
The aim was to set up W/T 
contact between local groups in 
Troms and the UK, investigate 
and make contact with these 
groups, and finally organise 
them into small units that could 
attack targets in support of an 
Allied landing. 
 
To contact SL and train their 
groups in the Oslo area.  Also to 
advise local groups on 
insaississable sabotage in the 
Oslo shipyards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To work as W/T operator in the 
vicinity of Rena in Østerdal and 
hold himself at the disposal of 
the DL. 
 
 
 
 
Fjelstad was instructed to work 
as an instructor in the area to the 
east of Oslo whilst Gabrielsen 
would establish radio contact.  
They were also instructed to 
attempt to blow up the 
Prestebakke bridge in eastern 
Norway. 
 
 
The aim was to form a small 
group in the Voss-Bergen area 
that could work either as 
saboteurs or assist other teams 
from the UK, without 
endangering other groups in the 
area.  Assassinations would also 
be undertaken in November as 
part of ‘Ratweek’. 
 
To provide further instruction for 
groups in Gudbrandsdal and 
Østerdal, which it was believed 
had been taken over by Milorg, 
and obtain fresh information on 
these groups.  To arrange for 
assassinations during ‘Ratweek’ 
in November 1943. 
 
The original objective was to 
reconnoitre the railway in 
Namdalen north of Trondheim 
with a view to cutting off the 
town at some future date.  Before 
this was undertaken, however, 
both Pevik and Brodtkorp-
Danielsen were instructed along 
Left on 24 March 1943 and arrived off the 
Norwegian coast on 27 March.  A local 
tradesman, who the group had made contact 
with, contacted the authorities, which led to 
the arrival of the Gestapo.  The only member 
of the team to survive was Jan Baalsrud, 
who made a remarkable journey to Sweden, 
which he reached toward the end of May.  
 
Milorg were aware of the imminent arrival 
of this team before it landed on 17 April 
1943.  From early May until November it 
trained groups in the area around Oslo. Both 
men were captured in November 1943 but 
escaped to Sweden.  They returned in 
January 1944 and continued training until 
the summer, when both men travelled to 
Sweden.  They then returned to help 
organise Milorg sabotage teams and actions 
in the area, often in collaboration with other 
SOE teams.  Blindheim temporarily returned 
to Britain between January and April 1945. 
 
W/T contact was made in September but 
there were many technical problems and by 
October ‘Stonechat’ was back in Stockholm.  
The following spring an attempt was made 
to set up ‘Stonechat Green’, but he was 
captured and replaced by ‘Chicken’, who 
came on air in September 1944. 
 
Plans to blow up the bridge were soon 
dropped.  Fjelstad began training in the area.  
He then assisted SL by working as an 
instructor for the ‘X-Groups’.  Gabrielsen 
moved to Oslo to assist SL, training W/T 
operators and helping establish four new 
radio stations.  He remained connected to SL 
helping them establish an internal 
communications network. 
 
Dropped on 21 September, they made 
contact with local leaders and established a 
radio link with the UK.  They also met the 
Milorg District Leader for Bergen and 
established a relationship.  No assassinations 
were undertaken due to the fear of reprisals.  
In early 1944, Pettersen was moved to the 
‘Pheasant’ area but Andersen kept 
transmitting after receiving new crystals.  
  
Dropped on 21 September and carried out 
extensive training with local groups over the 
following weeks.  Although they prepared 
for ‘Ratweek’ no assassinations were 
undertaken.  In February 1944 they crossed 
the border into Sweden. 
 
 
 
The team was lead by Ole Halvorsen, a 
member of a Norwegian communist 
organisation.  An attempt against Rinnan 
was made on 7 October but failed.  The 
Gestapo then arrested another member of the 
group, Brekke, which lead to the arrest of 
Johnny Pevik, who had by then moved on to 
commence his work in Namdalen.  He was 
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October 1943 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1943 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November  
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 
1943 (Air and 
from 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grebe (T Hoff, J. 
Beck, H. Løkken, H. 
Storhaug, A. Øvergård, 
A. Graven) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lapwing (R. Arnesen, 
L. Fosseide, S. Haugen, 
Lt Kvaale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curlew (K. Haugland, 
G. Sønsteby) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goldfinch (T. 
Stenersen, J. Allan, M. 
Olsen, O. Sandersen)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sandpiper (J. Ropstad, 
A. Fosse, J. Eikanger, 
L. Tofte) 
 
 
 
 
 
with Ole Halvorsen and 
Frederick Brekke to attempt an 
assassination of the Norwegian 
informer Henry Rinnan. 
 
Instructed to establish 
independent of Milorg, a small 
force in the hills supplied direct 
from the UK.  They were also 
directed to reconnoitre the Røros 
and Dovre railways in order, 
should the occasion arise, to 
prevent enemy troops 
movements. 
 
The objective was to reconnoitre 
the Røros Railway, south of 
Trondheim, with a view to 
sabotage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To provide a wireless operator 
for Milorg, to advise Milorg on 
wireless matters, and to instruct 
and equip the five wireless 
stations in the Oslo area.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The party was instructed to 
resume training in the area to the 
west of Oslo, liquidate 
dangerous informers as part of  
‘Ratweek’, sabotage shipping on 
the west side of Oslo fjord, and 
reconnoitre Gardemoen airport.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The group was instructed to 
make contact with existing 
organisations in southern 
Norway, establish W/T 
communication, provide 
instruction, reconnoitre and plan 
an attack against the aerodrome 
at Kjevik, northeast of 
eventual executed in the cellars of the 
Mission Hotel in Trondheim.  
 
 
 
Dropped on 10 October, three of the party 
were killed on landing and therefore the 
remaining three were forced to flee to 
Sweden, where they remained until the 
following January.  
 
 
 
 
 
Dropped on 10 October.  The W/T set was 
damaged but after several trips to Sweden 
radio contact was established in June 1944.  
During August, October, and November 
1944 an additional five men strengthened the 
party.  It carried out its first action against 
the railway network on 10 December and 
again on 29 December 1944.  Three men 
from the party were later killed in a clash 
with German forces.  
 
Dropped on 17 November with the 
‘Goldfinch’ party and containers of weapons 
and equipment.  Haugland left for 
Kongsberg but was captured by the Gestapo 
although he escaped and eventually began 
his work in Oslo.  Sønsteby gathered the 
weapons and brought them to Oslo.  In 
March Haugland’s transmissions were 
detected but he escaped capture and in April 
both men left for Stockholm.  
 
Stenersen and Allan were dropped on 17 
November and met Olsen and Sandersen 
who had arrived from Sweden.  The team 
always worked closely with SL.  In 
December two of the group were surprised 
by the Germans and Stenersen was shot and 
captured, whilst Olsen escaped.  Olsen took 
over the party.  Meanwhile Sandersen 
established W/T contact whilst Allen began 
weapons training.  Olsen was joined by 
Edvard Tallaksen and Birger Rasmussen 
from the ‘Company’ team and began work.  
Reconnaissance of Gardemoen was 
undertaken and liquidations carried out.  By 
May 1944 the team had been involved in the 
assassination of at least 4 informers. The 
team was also made ready to attack the ship 
that would transport heavy water to 
Germany and prepared an attack against 
shipping in Drammen.  Members of the 
group also assisted in attacks against the 
Labour Service offices in Oslo. 
 
Dropped on 10 December the group quickly 
made radio contact and at the end of 
December met local Milorg leaders.  Over 
the coming months training was carried out, 
some weapons delivered and in September 
the group was reinforced by the arrival of 
two instructors from Sweden.  In October 
1944, the ‘Sanderling’ team arrived. 
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December 
1943 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January  
1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
January 1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
Osprey (A. Espedal, 
K. Hetland, J. 
Weltzien, K. Kiærland) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Falcon (B.E, Sjøberg,  
A.E. Larsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throstle (H. Hanson, 
A.Veda) 
 
 
 
Grebe Red (A. 
Overgård, H. Storhaug, 
A. Graven)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antrum Green (K. 
Aarsæther) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merlin, (H. Mowinkle-
Nilsen, L. Dallard – 
W/T operator) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Falcon (II), (H. 
Kristiansand, and prepare 
disruption or protection of 
communications if the Germans 
withdraw. 
 
Instructed to work in the 
Stavanger area, establish W/T 
contact, prepare local guerrilla 
groups, organise groups to 
sabotage or if necessary protect 
lines of communication, receive 
weapons, and prepare a plan to 
neutralise Sola aerodrome.  
 
 
 
 
 
To operate in the Mosjøen area 
re-organising local groups, 
receive arms and equipment, 
reconnoitre and plan the 
destruction or defence of lines of 
communication, maintain order 
after a German withdrawal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To work as weapons instructors 
for Milorg on the eastern side of 
Oslo under the command of the 
‘Thrush’ party. 
 
A re-establishment of the 
original ‘Grebe’ party, (see 
above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knut took over from his brother 
to continue W/T contact with the 
UK, provide intelligence, 
arrange sabotage of shipping and 
communications, form a group to 
carry out anti-sabotage and 
police the area in the event of a 
German withdrawal. 
 
To organise and instruct groups 
in the Bergen area, establish 
W/T contact with the UK, and 
prepare counter-scorch activities.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
 
 
Also dropped on 10 December the group 
began organisational work in the area but did 
not receive a delivery of  weapons until May 
1944.  Contact was quickly made with the 
Milorg District Leader, who from February 
was in contact with SL in Oslo.  From July 
1944, the group began to instruct local 
Milorg groups.  In autumn 1944 the area was 
hit by a series of arrests amongst SIS 
organisation and ‘Osprey’ went into hiding.  
At the end of the year the ‘Avocet’ team 
arrived. 
 
Landed on 18 January.  A further three 
parties were delivered to the area during 
March (see below) and after joining the 
‘Heron Red’ team this meant that there was a 
party of 16 working in the region.   From 
April, however, German security police 
began a series of raids in the region and in 
June operations ‘Bärenfang I to III’ 
commenced.  This resulted in the breaking 
up of ‘Falcon’, including the death of 
Sjøberg on 9 June, and by mid August SOE 
operations in the area were at an end. 
 
The team worked in D11, east of Oslo and in 
the summer of 1944 helped in the sabotage 
of petrol and oil stores in the area. 
 
 
Attempts to leave Sweden were initially 
hindered by the Swedish police and it was 
the end of February before the team crossed 
the border.  W/T contact was made and in 
mid-April ‘Goshawk’ joined them.  The 
group remained in situ for the rest of the year 
with some trips back and forth to Sweden.  
In December J. Gunleiksrud took over the 
leadership and the team began its 
involvement in railway sabotage.  
 
Remained in the area until September and 
organised guerrilla groups, weapons 
instruction, laid plans for demolishing 
ferries, and began a whispering campaign 
aimed at mobilising the Norwegian fishing 
fleet should an invasion occur. 
 
 
 
Three Milorg men returned to the UK on the 
boat.  The Merlin W/T operator moved 
around the area until September 1944 when 
due to German raids he went undercover.  
Instruction was initially undertaken in 
Bergen and from May in the surrounding 
districts.  In autumn 1944 the Merlin 
instructor moved back to Bergen where he 
remained until January 1945 when he joined 
the Bjørn West base.  
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(Sea) 
 
 
March 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
March 1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
April 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lynghaug, L. Largass, 
A. Z. Solbakken) 
 
Fieldfare (J. 
Rønneberg, B. 
Strømsheim, O, 
Aarsæther) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Falcon (III) (J. 
Kvarme, T. Valberg, E. 
Grannes) 
 
Lark/Durham (E. 
Gjems-Onstad, I. 
Gausland, H. Larsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Falcon Peregrine 
(H.K. Hansen, L. 
Sandin, E. Rustan, R. 
Rogne) 
 
Albatross, (L. Skjøld, 
P. Wegeland) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Buzzard (A. Aubert, 
H. Henriksen)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redstart (W. 
Johannesen, F. Kvist, I. 
Birkeland) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To reconnoitre the Åndalsnes-
Dombås railway, prepare 
weapons and explosives dumps 
near the railway, prepare 
counter-scorch plans for the 
railway. 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
To establish W/T contact, re-
organise Lark, and build up the 
propaganda organisation 
‘Durham’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
 
To re-organise local groups if 
necessary, instruct them in arms, 
explosives, and guerrilla tactics, 
and to prepare plans for the 
prevention of a German 
scorched-earth policy in the area 
north of Stavanger.  Also to 
reconnoitre the aluminium plant 
at Saudasjøen.   
 
 
To assist SL in executing 
denouncers in the Oslo area. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
To bring the organisation in the 
Voss area into a state of 
readiness through instruction in 
guerrilla tactics, and to prepare 
counter-scorch activities in case 
of a German withdrawal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dropped on the night of 7-8 March.  A bad 
landing so they lost much of their 
equipment.  Received further supplies in 
July but had to survive until the liberation on 
meagre rations.  Carried out their one and 
only action against the railway on 5 January 
1945.  In March 1945, Rønneberg travelled 
back to Britain but returned in May to help 
in the liberation of Ålesund 
 
 
 
 
 
Lt. Gausland went to Trondheim in January 
to rebuild contacts after a wave of arrests. 
Gjems-Onstad followed in March to take 
over the leadership and act as W/T operator.  
He built up local groups and returned to 
Stockholm in June.  He returned to 
Trondheim in August with a new W/T 
operator, E. Løkse, ‘Lark Yellow’.  Løkse 
was arrested and Gjems-Onstad again 
returned from Stockholm although his time 
was taken up with ‘Durham’ activities.  
Eventually F. Beichman joined him as W/T 
operator followed by T. Bjørnas and A. 
Wisloff.  In 1945 some railway sabotage was 
undertaken before Gjems-Onstad returned to 
Stockholm for the last time.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Landed in the area on 17 April.  Instruction 
continued through 1944 in co-operation with 
the local Milorg leadership in Haugesund.  
Weapons were delivered but in the autumn 
the Germans began a series of raids and the 
organisation was under severe pressure.  In 
November the area was reinforced by the 
arrival of the ‘Auk’ team.  Production at 
Saudasjøen had ceased due to a lack of raw 
materials.  
 
Remained in the Oslo area for the rest of the 
war and was responsible for a number of 
assassinations.  The most significant was the 
execution of Major-General Karl 
Marthinsen, the head of the Norwegian 
Stapo, in February 1945, which resulted in 
the execution of 28 Norwegians.   
 
Landed on 30 April with the ‘Firecrest’ 
team. Joined the Merlin W/T operator and 
began training in the area.  Made 
preparations to sabotage the Bergen railway 
to support an invasion, and protect Dale 
power station from German destruction.  In 
August they moved to the Hardanger area to 
continue training but in September during a 
German raid they lost their W/T set.       
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April 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
April/May 
1944 
 
 
 
 
May 1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
July 1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
August 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
August/Septe
mber 1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1944 (sea) 
 
 
Firecrest (E. Madsen, 
B. Holth-Larsen, E. 
Lorentzen, G. 
Sætersday) 
 
 
 
 
Woodpecker (O. 
Sættem) 
 
 
 
Goldcrest ( S. 
Sveinesen, R. Olsen) 
 
 
 
 
Robin, (A.H. Pevik, A. 
Torp) 
 
 
 
 
 
Crackle (F. Brandt, A. 
Torhildsen) 
 
Golden Eagle (M. 
Olsen, O. Sandersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
Sepals/Perianth (Lt, 
Håkon Kyllingmark-
Commanding Officer) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale Operations:  
Octave (Oslo), Minim, 
(Stockholm), Quaver 
and Semi-Quaver 
(Nordland & 
Trondheim), Semi-
Breve, Crotchet, and 
Sharp that together 
were to cover Bergen 
and the Stavanger area. 
 
Woodlark (H. 
Helgesen, O. Østgaard, 
O. Walderhaug) 
 
To relieve the ‘Pheasant’ team in 
the Hallingdal-Valdres area, re-
organise groups, carry out 
instruction in weapons, 
explosives and guerrilla tactics, 
and prepare counter-scorch 
activities. 
 
To reconnoitre the Dovre railway 
and other forms of 
communication with a view to 
sabotage. 
 
To reinforce the DL and to 
increase the preparedness 
of  District 14.1 around 
Drammen. 
 
 
Another attempt to liquidate 
informers particularly Henry 
Rinnan and Ivar Grande whose 
activities had caused so much 
damage in the county of 
Trøndelag. 
 
Instruction in dealing with 
landmines. 
 
To make preliminary 
preparations for what became the 
‘Elg’ base.  To establish W/T 
contact, make ready to receive 
supplies and escapees from 
German mobilisation orders.  
 
The plan was to set up 2 bases, 
‘Sepals’ and ‘Sepals I’, with 3 
operating units, ‘Perianth’, 
‘Perianth I & II’, on Swedish 
territory close to Narvik under 
the cover of being intelligence 
operations. They would supply 
intelligence on the area, establish 
a W/T link, and prepare attacks 
against targets although nothing 
would be undertaken without 
authority from London.  In 
November permission was given 
to undertake sabotage  
 
 
 
These Allied missions were to 
advise and assist the Home Front 
in organising all available forces, 
to co-ordinate action within 
Norway with that taken by 
Allied forces outside, to help 
hinder German counter-scorch 
plans, and assist in the arrival of 
military and civil supplies. 
 
 
To form a base from which the 
Nordland railway in Namdal 
north of Trondheim could be 
attacked.     
Landed 30 April and soon began to carry out 
weapons instructions.  In the autumn the 
men helped with the provision of supplies 
for the ‘Elg’ base.  From summer of 1944 
the team also began to undertake sabotage in 
the area, especially against oil and petrol 
supplies.  
 
This was the leader of the party who was 
dropped with the ‘Buzzard’ team on the 
night of 28-29 April near Larvik and 
remained in the area until October. 
  
It is unclear whether this team ever went into 
Norway.  The first radio message from 
‘Goldcrest’ was, however, sent at the end of 
May, but this could have been done by a 
local operator.  
 
Left Stockholm on 20 May and stayed in 
Norway for one month without producing 
any results.  Returned in early August and 
formed two groups to watch informers, but 
by mid October both men had been recalled. 
 
 
Two visits were paid to the field and four 
courses held. 
 
Radio contact was made and in the next 
three month 20 supply drops were received.  
The main team arrived on 27 November. 
 
 
 
 
By mid September 1944 both bases were 
manned and had W/T contact but for the rest 
of the year they only supplied intelligence.  
In mid-January preparations to set up a third 
base, ‘Sepals III’ began whilst the other two 
bases became ‘Sepals I & II’.  In March 
another base ‘Sepals Gorgon’ was also set 
up.  From mid January sabotage was 
undertaken, initially from 'Sepals I’ but 
primarily from ‘Sepals III’.  The bases were 
also a link, a source of supplies, and an 
organisational point for Milorg groups 
around Narvik and in the county of Troms.  
The bases finally played an important role in 
the liberation of the area in May 1945 and in 
the protection of local sites.  
 
Only Quaver/Semi-Quaver and Minim were 
eventually undertaken.  See below for 
details.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Landed on 12 September the three had by 
the end of September been joined by four 
additional men from Stockholm.  The party 
established a base just inside the Swedish 
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September 
1944 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1944 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1944 
(Sea) 
 
October 1944 
(Sea) 
 
October 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Razorbill (H. 
Rasmussen, L. 
Pettersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antrum Yellow/Grey 
(K. J. Aarsæther, K. 
Engelsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sanderling (K. 
Austad, T. Andersen, 
H. P. Armstrong, L. 
Eide) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Razorbill II (E. N. 
Kvale, J. Nesheim) 
 
Lark (Gjems-Onstad) 
 
 
Sunshine, Moonlight, 
Starlight, Lamplight 
( L. Tronstad, N. Lind, 
J. Poulsson, H. 
Nygaard, A. Kjelstrup, 
L. Brønn, E. Hagen, C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To instruct groups in Bergen, 
receive weapons, arrange for the 
transfer of men to the Bjørn 
West base, reconnoitre chosen 
targets to be protected, carry out 
attacks against enemy oil 
supplies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To organise and instruct groups 
in the Ålesund area, supply 
weapons and stores, prepare 
counter-scorch activities, and 
plan sabotage against German 
communications during an 
invasion or withdrawal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four were instructed to work 
in the counties of East and West 
Agder in southern Norway with 
the ‘Sandpiper’ team  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(See Above) 
 
 
(See Above) 
 
 
To protect the power stations in 
Telemark and Buskerud along 
with the Norsk Hydro industries 
in Rjukan and Notodden against 
any German attempt to initiate a 
scorched-earth policy.  These 
border but from an early stage it suffered 
from internal conflict and although a W/T 
operator arrived in November he was never 
able to make contact.  Supplies were short 
and there were several trips to Stockholm.  
On 13 January members of the party 
attacked the Jørstad Bridge resulting in the 
wrecking of a German troop train.  From this 
point, however, the party gradually broke up, 
had new leadership and increasingly played 
a subsidiary role in the area, although it 
marched into Steinkjær as a separate unit at 
the liberation.   
 
Arrived on 18 September.  Another two 
arrived on 1 October.  Training was carried 
out, weapons received, intelligence provided 
on the U-boat base.  The group worked with 
both Milorg and the communist organisation, 
Saborg.  It also provided names of informers 
for liquidation, and two local men were 
assassinated.  A steam ship and transformers 
at the ship works were also sabotaged.  At 
the beginning of May 1945 it was 
‘Razorbill’ that contacted the German 
Command in Bergen in order to help secure 
a peaceful liberation. 
 
Sailed on night of 22/23 September and 
replaced Knut Aarsæther who returned to the 
UK.  Work continued on building up the 
local organisation and they were reinforced 
in October by the arrival of two more men.  
Antrum was instructed to work closely with 
the local Milorg leadership, which would be 
linked with SL in Oslo.  At the end of 
October a message was sent via the 
‘Antrum’ radio that Ivar Grande, the 
informer, should be liquidated.  He was 
killed on 11 December.  
 
These four, including Percy Armstrong who 
had mixed British and Norwegian parentage, 
were dropped into southern Norway to 
reinforce the ‘Sandpiper’ team.  Austad and 
Eide worked in the area around Kristiansand.  
Preparations were made to receive operation 
‘Varg I’ but activities were badly hit by 
German raids and organisation was difficult.  
Supplies also remained short and it was 
March 1945 before airdrops eased the 
situation and some training could 
commence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was in many ways a reforming of the 
‘Gunnerside’ team.  The main party was 
dropped on 5 October.  W/T contact was 
made with the UK and the operation worked 
closely with the management of Norsk 
Hydro, the local Milorg organisation and 
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October 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
Helberg, G. Syverstad) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Woodpecker (K. 
Hellan, R. J. 
Johannesssen, Ø. 
Nilsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redstart (F. Olsvik) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Siskin (M. Olsen, R. 
Ulstein, H. Svindseth, 
N. Fjeld) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bjørn West (F. 
Kayser, S. Synnes) 
 
 
 
power stations provided 60% of 
the power in Østlandet, eastern 
Norway. Led by Leif Tronstad, 
who had been the central figure 
in the plans and preparations to 
disrupt heavy water production 
at Vemork.  The plan was 
divided into three sections: 
‘Moonlight’ with Rjukan at its 
core; ‘Starlight’ in Numedal, 
northeast of Rjukan; ‘Lamplight’ 
in the area around Notodden.  
Jens Poulsson led ‘Moonlight’ 
with Claus Helberg as W/T 
operator; Arne Kjelstrup led 
‘Starlight’, whilst ‘Lamplight’ 
was the responsibility of Herluf 
Nygaard.  Norman Lind, a 
British officer with Norwegian 
parents, acted as liaison officer.  
Einar Skinnerland became W/T 
operator at Tronstad’s HQ. 
 
This party had originally been 
called ‘Linnet’.  They were 
instructed to reconnoitre the 
Dovre railway south of 
Trondheim with a view to 
carrying out sabotage.    
 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To instruct groups in the Sogn 
area, especially at important 
power stations in readiness to 
undertake preventative action.  
Also to receive supplies and 
establish W/T contact with the 
UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The objective was to reconnoitre 
the area between Bergen and 
Sognefjord with a view to the 
possibility of establishing a 
guerrilla base and reception area. 
through them with SL in Oslo.  Training and 
a series of preparations were made to protect 
these sites over the coming months.  On 11 
March, Tronstad was tragically killed and 
Poulsson took over the leadership of the 
operation.  On 9 May 1945, ‘Sunshine’ was 
ordered to mobilise. The district was brought 
under its control and the designated targets 
protected.  Norwegian SS soldiers were 
imprisoned and Nazis arrested in 
collaboration with the local police.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dropped on 4 October and joined their 
leader O. Sættem.  In early March 1945, four 
additional men from Sweden reinforced the 
team.  On 9 December the party received 
orders to disrupt train traffic.  They attacked 
the Stølan tunnel between Opdal and 
Bjerkinn and stopped traffic for three days.  
The party had W/T difficulties for a while 
and was short of supplies until further drops 
were made.  
 
Olsvik was the new W/T operator.  The 
Merlin operator moved to Bergen to serve 
the ‘Redwing’ team.  At the beginning of 
December the ‘Redstart’ team were told to 
prepare railway sabotage but as the Germans 
did not withdraw from the area this was 
never carried out.  They continued with 
instruction until February when the priority 
became protection of key sites in the area, 
especially Bomoen aerodrome.  Despite 
airdrops the area lacked weapons and 
equipment and there were a series of raids 
that forced the team under cover.  They 
eventually joined the Bjørn East base, which 
took over responsibility for the Hardanger 
area. 
 
The team trained groups in the area and 
received supplies.  Between 10 April and 1 
May 1945, 35 tons of weapons and 
equipment were unloaded from sub-chasers 
and by mid April around 480 men were 
organised in the Inner Sogn area alone.  On 6 
May Captain Wendelbø Lysne arrived to 
take over all forces in the area.  From 8 May 
mobilisation began, and from 9 May 
members of NS and the Gestapo were 
disarmed and interned. 
 
Left the Shetlands on 15 October. This was 
the advance party, which would begin the 
preparatory work. 
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October 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 1944 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
October 1944 
(Sea) 
 
November 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 
1944 (Air) 
 
November 
1944 (Air) 
 
November 
1944 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
November 
1944 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quaver /Semi-Quaver  
(J. Adamson, M. 
Watson, P. Dahl, Sgt. 
Lindsay) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bjørn West II (R. 
Tvinnerheim, K. 
Karlsen, A. Trønes, M. 
Mathiesen) 
 
Antrum (H. Hoel, I. 
Næss) 
 
Varg I (H. Sandvik, T. 
Abrahamsen, S. 
Heidenreich, E. 
Johnsen, H. Bugge) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Varg (E. Vestre, T. 
Halvorsen) 
 
Woodlark (Y. Øgarrd) 
 
 
Auk (K. Vilnes, P. 
Ørstenvik, Capt. Sjø, 
Lt. Robberstad) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dipford-Frinton (P. 
Deinboll, A. Gjestland) 
 
 
 
 
Snowflake (P. Ratvik, 
H. Svindseth to join 
him from ‘Siskin’) 
 
 
 
 
 
To provide intelligence on 
enemy troop movements through 
the county of Nordland, assist 
local organisations, establish 
contact with Milorg, and 
consider possibilities of railway 
sabotage between Mo and 
Mosjøen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(See above) Also to establish 
radio contact, reconnoitre the 
billeting areas and dropping 
places, and to report to London. 
 
(See above) 
 
 
To make preparations for the 
safe reception, billeting, 
maintaining, training and 
employment of men in the hills 
of Setesdal, north of 
Kristiansand.  Once set up the 
base would receive local Milorg 
forces that would be trained in 
weapons and explosives use, 
sabotage and anti-sabotage.  
 
(See above). 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
To reinforce the ‘Arquebus’ and 
‘Albatross’ teams in the 
Haugesund area and reorganise 
the district.  A W/T link would 
be established.  The group’s 
leader was responsible for all 3 
teams and would be military 
adviser to the Milorg District 
Leader.  Local teams would 
organise preventative work and 
reconnoitre cutting points along 
local communications. 
 
To work with SL as technical 
advisers on railways, 
telecommunications, 
information, and propaganda. 
 
 
To organise and instruct local 
groups around Nordfjord, south 
of Ålesund in arms, explosives, 
guerrilla warfare, and counter-
scorch activities in order  to 
protect Svelgen Power and 
Transformer Station and Stryn 
 
Dropped on 16 October this was the only 
operation sent to Norway that was 
predominately made up of British recruits, 
including a SOE officer.  The strategically 
important area north of Trondheim had not 
had contact with the UK since the break-up 
of the ‘Falcon’ operation the previous 
August.  The operation was a disaster as 
soon after landing the party was surprised by 
a group of German soldiers.  This led to the 
capture of Adamson, his imprisonment in 
Norway and eventual transportation to 
Germany, although he survived the war.  The 
other three recruits eventually escaped to 
Sweden. 
 
This was the rest of the preparatory group, 
which on 7 November received its first 
weapons drop.  
 
 
(See above) 
 
 
The team was dropped on the night of 1-2 
November and met by J. Ropstad and 4 men 
from ‘Sandpiper’.  The leader was Harald 
Sandvik, and in addition to the original party 
four men from Milorg also joined the group.  
It was planned that the base would  have 5 
billeting areas. 
  
 
   
 
Dropped on 7 November to reinforce the 
area.  
 
 
 
 
After the arrival of ‘Auk’ in early November 
contact with Milorg widened.  The role 
assigned to local groups was a combination 
of counter-scorch activities and attempts to 
hinder German troop movements to the east 
should it be required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The plane disappeared over the North Sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
Landed on 27 November and made W/T 
contact on 2 December.  Had contact with a 
local SIS station, ‘Roska’, which during 
March 1945 sent messages on behalf of 
‘Snowflake’.  By the time of the German 
surrender ‘Snowflake’ had organised 400 
men although they lacked weapons.  On 13 
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November 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
November-
January 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November/ 
December 
1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December  
1944 
(Air/Stockhol
m) 
 
December 
1944, (Air to 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1944 (Sea) 
 
 
 
 
December 
1944 (Air)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elg I (P. Strande, P. 
Holst, A. Hagen, H. 
Christiansen)    
 
 
 
 
Scapula 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Husky (Major Andrew 
Croft and Lt J. 
Baalsrud – a total party 
of 5 Norwegians and 8 
British officers) 
 
 
 
 
Curlew (G. Sønsteby) 
 
 
 
 
Minim (Major H. A. 
Nyberg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cramlington (H. 
Ryen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bjørn East (O. 
Berentsen, J. Akslen, 
K. Nordgron, L. Olsen) 
 
 
 
Elg II (K. Poulssen, A. 
Thon) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Repeater Station. 
  
 
 
To continue the work of ‘Golden 
Eagle’ by preparing for the safe 
reception, billeting, maintaining, 
training and employment of 
1200 men between Valdres and 
Hallingdal. 
 
This was a plan to send a 
whaleboat with two instructors, a 
W/T operator, arms and 
equipment to the island of Senja 
in the north of Norway to assist 
resistance groups in their efforts 
to resist the German evacuation 
of the local population. 
 
To make contact with, supply 
and instruct detachments of 
Milorg behind the German lines 
in the north of Norway, with a 
view to operations against 
retreating enemy units.  
 
 
 
In November Sønsteby had been 
ordered to travel to London. 
 
 
 
To represent SFHQ at the SOE 
and OSS Missions in Stockholm 
on all matters for which SFHQ 
was responsible to SHAEF.  To 
assist in co-ordinating the 
activities of both Missions 
 
 
 
 
The intention was to have a party 
of 16 men working from a base 
on Swedish soil.  The ultimate 
objective was to cut the railway 
between Grong and Majavatn in 
the Nordland.  A base was to be 
set up in the neighbourhood of 
the target. 
 
As the area to be covered by 
Bjørn West base was so large it 
was decided to divide it into two.  
Bjørn East would be close to 
Vossevangen. 
 
(See above).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May it set up a HQ in Florø and was 
involved in the arrest of around 70 Nazis, 
informers, and Black Marketers. 
 
Dropped on 27 November the four officers 
went to their billeting areas whilst Strand 
contacted the local Milorg organisation. 
 
 
 
 
In November 1944, SIS station ‘Gudrun’ on 
the island of Senja’ (E. Johansen) 
telegraphed London asking for weapons to 
be supplied to local groups so that they could 
resist Germany’s forced evacuation of the 
population.  In the end Johansen rejected the 
proposal and it was cancelled. 
 
 
The eventual plan was that the Royal 
Norwegian Navy would transport a SOE 
team to the north of Norway, whilst four 
fishing vessels would sail independently to 
the region to be at SOE’s disposal.  The 
operation was cancelled at the end of 
January 1945 due to the lack of protection 
from the enemy’s small naval craft.  
 
In mid December he returned to Norway via 
Stockholm with his ‘Directive to nr 24’, 
which set out his tasks as sabotage chief for 
SL. 
 
Nyberg arrived in Stockholm on 16 
December with the title of Honoury 
Assistant Military Attaché.  Liased on the 
preparation of the Norwegian Police troops 
(Operation Beefeater) and sent regular 
reports on their progress, which also 
included intelligence on conditions in 
Norway.  After the liberation he 
accompanied the police troops into Norway.  
 
Dropped on 22 December.  This was the 
preliminary reconnaissance by the leader of 
the party before he went on to Stockholm to 
meet the rest of the party.  
 
 
 
 
 
This was a preliminary party of four under 
the leadership of Captain Berentsen.   
 
 
 
 
Dropped on 28 December.  From this point 
comprehensive instruction began and 
eventually many men returned to their 
hometowns to continue training.  From 
September 1944 to May 1945 the base 
received 75 airdrops with equipment for 
3000 men.  W/T contact was maintained 
with London and the transmitters in ‘Elg’ 
were in contact with six other radio stations.  
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December 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1944 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
December 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
December 
1944 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough I (J. M. 
Neerland) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough II (E. 
Eng, J. Herman Linge) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough III (E. 
Welle-Strand, K. E. 
Nordahl, O. Birknes, 
H. Engebretsen, A. 
Christiansen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough V ( K. 
Fossen, J. Opåsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough VI (H. 
Stridsklev, G. Bjaali, 
K. Fjell) 
 
Farnborough VII (J. 
Irminger, J. Stensnes) 
 
 
 
 
Avocet (T. Lien, A. 
Floisand, J. Thu, I. 
Tønseth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover the Milorg District 
D.11, this included part of Oslo 
and the area to the east of it.  The 
aim of the Farnborough 
operations was to reinforce the 
District Leadership and increase 
its preparedness, with special 
attention to preventative actions. 
  
To cover D.12, northeast of 
Oslo. Linge was also given the 
task of liquidating the 
Norwegian Nazi, Ole Utengen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover the Oslo area.  This 
was probably the best-organised 
Milorg District, which by July 
1944 had over 4000 men in its 
ranks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover District 14.3, the area 
around Gjøvik north of Oslo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
District 15, the west side of Oslo 
fjord. 
 
 
District 17, most of the county of 
Telemark in southern Norway. 
 
 
 
 
To reinforce ‘Osprey’ in the 
Stavanger area, organise 
sabotage cells along lines of 
communication, reconnoitre Sola 
aerodrome and dropping places, 
provide protection for vital 
plants. 
 
 
In April 1945 the enemy began to show an 
interest in the base and on 26 April there was 
a clash between 120 Germans and 85 local 
men.  Twenty-nine Germans were killed and 
thirty wounded, whilst ‘Elg’ lost six men and 
had two wounded. 
 
Dropped on 28 December, Neerland 
instructed the district’s most important 
recruits, so-called ‘Q-teams’ that had formed 
cells and were hiding in the woods.  He also 
examined and adjusted the protective plans 
that had been produced to cover this area.  
 
 
 
Dropped on the night 31 Dec-1 Jan.  Linge, 
son of Martin Linge, was captured and 
eventually transported to Germany.  
Meanwhile, Lt. Eng began instruction, 
organising drop zones, and selected those 
who would have responsibility for protecting 
key sites.  He eventually became chief of 
staff in D.12 working closely with the 
District Leader. 
 
Dropped on the night 31 Dec-1 Jan.  Contact 
was quickly made with the District Leader.  
The area had 8 ‘Foscott’ priority targets, 9 
‘Carmarthen’ targets and 24 smaller targets 
and therefore there was a significant amount 
of preparatory work to ensure that all these 
sites were protected.  Instruction was also 
undertaken in both tactics and the use of 
weapons and explosives.  To help training a 
camp was set up outside Oslo.  On 10 May 
all the primary and secondary targets in Oslo 
were successfully taken over by protection 
units from D.13. 
 
Dropped on 29 December.  Contact was 
quickly made with the District Leader, but 
Opåsen was killed in a shooting accident 
during a training exercise.  Nevertheless, 
over the following months preparations to 
protect local targets such as the Raufoss 
Ammunition Factory, continued along with 
the training of local recruits.  
 
Dropped on the night of 28/29 December.  
(There is little information on this 
operation).  
 
Dropped on 1 January.  Milorg men had 
formed cells in the hills and this was where 
early training began.  Detailed plans were 
also drawn up for the protection of key sites 
such as Hauen Transformer Station.          
 
It was dropped on 31 December and its radio 
station came on air on 9 January.  The party 
was instructed to work with Milorg, 
although contact should be infrequent.  A 
meeting with the DL for D19 was held but 
an instruction programme was delayed 
owing to a lack of weapons.  There was only 
one drop in January, none in February, and 
Stavanger had no weapons at all until a small 
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Nov/Dec 1944 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
January 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freethorpe (F. 
Baarnes, I. Rogne, A. 
Solbakken, A. E. 
Larsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough VIII (P. 
Emblemsvåg, E. 
Boyesen, J. Elvestad) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polar Bear VIII (F. A. 
Søreida) 
 
 
 
Polar Bear III (O. 
Drønen, J. Jensen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polar Bear IV (F. 
Åsmund Færøy) 
 
 
Polar Bear VI-W (S. 
Skelfjord) 
 
 
 
Polar Bear VI-Oslo 
(S. Egede-Nissen, J. 
Helen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To protect the repeater station at 
Mo i Rana, attack railway 
communications, and obtain 
intelligence on German troop 
movements using a group 
organised amongst the local 
railwaymen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To work in D.23, around 
Lillehammer and the 
Gudbrandsdal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To protect the ports of 
Haugesund and Odda. 
 
 
 
To cover the port of Bergen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover Stavanger. 
 
 
 
To cover Larvik, Sandefjord and 
Tønsberg on the west side of 
Oslo fjord. 
 
 
To cover Oslo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
amount was moved there at the end of 
March.  At the liberation 500 men were 
mobilised but only half had received 
weapons training.  Protection of local sites 
also proved difficult.  
 
In September 1944 Odin Normann, a trades 
union courier, offered to build up an 
organisation amongst the railwaymen in Mo 
i Rana.  ‘Quaver’ was originally to contact 
Normann but after this failed a group was 
organised in Stockholm under 2nd Lt. 
Baarnes that through Normann and a 
Swedish contact formed a base just inside 
the Swedish border from where it was 
instructed to carry out its tasks.  It would 
also have a W/T station ‘Fulmar’ to assist it.  
Eventually attacks were carried out against 
the railway a bridge north of Mo in February 
and the railway in April.  At the liberation 
‘Freethorpe’ proceeded to Mo i Rana and 
assisted the local Milorg forces. 
 
Crossed into Norway early in February and 
met the Milorg District Leader at Tretten.  
They were instructed to plan protection of 
important sites in the area and instruct local 
groups in weapons and guerrilla tactics.  
Operating in this area, however, proved 
difficult, especially as the Wehrmacht had its 
HQ at Lillehammer.  There were several 
confrontations with German patrols and in 
one of them Boyesen was killed.  
Nevertheless, in the early morning of 10 
May, Milorg successfully took control of the 
important sites in the area.  
 
Sailed on 12 January and with the help of 
‘Arquebus’ eventually arrived at Haugesund.  
He eventually undertook protective 
preparations at both ports  
 
Sailed on 16 January and eventually arrived 
at Bergen where they met the District Leader 
for D20.2.   It was discovered that the 
Germans had made preliminary preparations 
to demolish some quays.  Two hundred men 
from Milorg were made ready to assist and 
preparations were made to protect the port.  
At the liberation all the charges that the 
Germans had laid were disabled. 
 
Sailed on 16 January and landed on Bømlo 
north of Haugesund.  Færøy was, however, 
arrested as he tried to get to Stavanger  
 
 He arrived in the area from Stockholm in 
January and worked closely with Milorg. In 
early March he reported that he had 
completed his preparations. 
 
Arrived in the area on 19 January and at the 
end of the month made contacts with Milorg 
and harbour employees.  Groups were 
trained but there were few signs that the 
Germans were preparing to destroy the 
quays.  Nevertheless, training continued and 
on 8 May Milorg groups entered the harbour 
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January 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Razorbill (H.  
Rasmussen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polar Bear VI-E (I. 
Steensland) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coton (A. Hegstad, L. 
Sandin, L. Langaas, J. 
Gundersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corsham (K. 
Stoltenberg, G. Berg, 
O. Bergh) 
 
 
 
 
 
Polar Bear II (L. 
Hauge, T. Renaas) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover the harbours of 
Fredrikstad and Moss on the east 
side of Oslo harbour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was a plan, presented in 
early November 1944, to set up a 
base on Swedish territory from 
where the railway south of 
Mosjøen could be attacked.  The 
main target was the Trolldal 
viaduct. 
 
 
 
 
To protect Follafoss power 
station and Folden dam north of 
Trondheim 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover the port of Trondheim.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
area and took up their positions.  On 9 May, 
Milorg together with German guards began 
to patrol the harbour network. 
 
Rasmussen had returned to the UK to obtain 
equipment for Bjørn West.  Whilst in 
London it was agreed that targets in the 
Bergen area would be protected by B.org 
groups.  Eventually, however, it was Milorg 
that organised protection of primary 
‘Foscott’ targets in Bergen, whilst secondary 
targets were looked after by B.org.  
 
Arrived from Sweden on 23 January.  The 
Germans had made preparations to destroy 
the harbour at Fredrikstad.  Steensland was 
given a group of 120 men from Milorg.  
Contacts within the harbour were made, 
intelligence gathered and instruction 
commenced.  In Moss 100 men from Milorg 
were also trained in harbour protection.  
Early in February Steensland assisted by 
Milorg organised the capture of a total of 
eleven tugboats from Moss and Fredrikstad 
and they were sailed to Sweden. He returned 
to Norway in early March and continued 
preparation, although his men lacked 
weapons.  He then captured a cargo boat and 
small tanker and organised their 
disappearance to Sweden.  He returned to 
Fredrikstad on 2 May and after the 
liberation, claiming he was from the Allied 
Commission in Oslo, persuaded the Germans 
to remove all their guards from the harbour. 
 
Hegstad travelled to reconnoitre the area 
around Atosstugan in Sweden at the end of 
January 1945 and the other men followed 
during February.  By the middle of March 
there were a total of 14 living at the base, 
and on 21 April some of them cut the 
railway in two places north of Majavatn.  At 
the liberation the Coton party proceeded to 
Mosjøen and took over leadership of the 
resistance groups. 
 
Landed on 29 January and proceeded to the 
area of the targets.  They were instructed to 
work independently but this proved 
impossible.  Their radios were also damaged 
and eventually they decided to cross the 
border into Sweden, arriving in Stockholm 
on 6 March.  They did not return to the area. 
 
The party arrived in Trondheim on 7 
February.  It was  met by Gjems-Onstad who 
was co-ordinating the ‘Lark’ and ‘Durham’ 
operations.  The Germans had made some 
preparations to blow up the quays but it was 
initially difficult to obtain recruits from 
within the harbour area to help.  Eventually 
15 men from 'Lark’ and 50 men from 
‘Durham’ were transferred to ‘Polar Bear’ 
and training commenced.  Unfortunately, 
weapons drops did not materialise.  In April 
1945, ‘Polar Bear’ was placed under the 
District Leader for D.22, and on 9 May the 
team, consisting of 130, took over the 
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February 1945  
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
February 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Air- 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Air- 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
Antrum (K. 
Aarsæther) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diver (P. Skram, T. 
Jørgen)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crowfield (B. Hasle, 
B. Lier, A. Vibe) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough X (E. 
Næss, N. Uri) 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough IX (O. 
Berg) 
 
 
 
 
Sparrow (N. 
Gabrielsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
Sepals III (L. 
Schanche, B. Bjølseth, 
O. Mjeide) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dunkerton (E. 
Jacobsen, S. Hårstad, 
M. Uglem, A. Aksnes) 
 
 
 
 
To re-establish W/T contact with 
the UK, organise protection of 
certain ‘Foscott’ targets around 
Ålesund and provide arms 
instruction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To act as military adviser to the 
District Leader in Ålesund and in 
this role plan actions to protect 
local sites, assist the Allies in the 
event of an invasion, or hamper a 
German withdrawal. 
 
 
 
An operation to protect Moholt 
transformer station and 
Trondheim repeater station and 
to instruct and lead the local 
groups recruited for these tasks. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
To cover D.25, centred on 
Hamar in eastern Norway. 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover D.26, centred on 
Tynset and Alvdal in Hedemark 
in eastern Norway. 
 
 
 
To give Milorg W/T operators 
extra training and to assist them 
in ensuring a reliable 
communication service with the 
UK.  If required to assist W/T 
operators outside Oslo. 
 
To organise the despatch of 
operation ‘Crofton’, carry out 
certain sabotage activities, 
maintain contact with Milorg, 
provide instruction, and when 
possible supply them with 
weapons.  
 
To protect power stations at Nea, 
southeast of Trondheim.  
 
 
harbour in Trondheim.  Leif Hauge also took 
over the ports at Steinkjer and Namsos. 
 
In January both K. J. Aarsæther and the 
Milorg District Leader (DL) were brought 
back to the UK for conversations.  It was 
decided that Knut Aarsæther would work 
better with the DL and he was sent back to 
the Ålesund area on 13-14 February.   Radio 
contact was re-established on 17 February.  
Organisation within the area continued and 
by mid-April there were 1500 men prepared 
but without weapons, although in the final 
weeks of the occupation supplies did 
increase.   
 
Sailed with the DL on 13 February.  He had 
been given a new directive whilst in the UK.  
Contact would be established with SL in 
Oslo and the district, D.21, extended and 
divided into three sub-districts.  Milorg 
groups would also be built up and trained.  
Contact was made with Oslo and approval 
given.  
 
The operation commenced when Hasle and 
Lier were flown to Stockholm on 15 
February.  The group left for the border on 1 
March but for various reasons this first 
attempt was abandoned.  On 17 April, Hasle 
travelled via Oslo to Trondheim, arriving on 
26 April.  Vibe then left for Norway with 
another man and W/T contact was eventually 
established with Trondheim on 11 May.  The 
targets were occupied on 9 May. 
 
The party arrived in Stockholm on 12 
February and a few days later travelled to the 
district and met the DL.  He had already 
received instructions to organise the 
protection of selected ‘Foscott’ targets, 
which the expedition was instructed to assist.  
 
Arrived in Sweden on 19 January and 
reached the district on 14 February where he 
made himself available to the DL and 
assisted with preparations for the protection 
of ‘Foscott’ targets. 
 
Norman Gabrielsen had been working with 
SL since autumn 1943.  This was a 
continuation of his earlier work. 
 
 
 
 
Preparations began in January (See above).  
Several acts of sabotage were undertaken 
from this base. 
 
 
 
 
 
All the men were recruited in Sweden and 
trained there.  By 18 February they were in 
Norway, meeting and developing contacts in 
the area.  By mid March, however, due to 
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February 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Sea) 
 
February 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Air- 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
 
 
February 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
February 1945 
(Air) 
 
March 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chacewater (S. 
Armtsen, A. Larsen, K. 
Stordalen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redstart (I. Birkeland, 
C. Johnsen) 
 
 
 
Bjørn West (B. 
Eliassen) 
 
Turkey (A. Pevik, U. 
Axelsen) 
 
 
 
 
Polar Bear I (L. 
Larsen, B. Rist) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farnborough IV 
 
 
Griffon (A. Ratche, A. 
Engebretsen) 
 
 
 
 
Guillemot (B. 
Sevendal, K. Bredsen) 
 
Cramlington (Cpl. Y. 
Øgaard, 2. Lt. J. 
Kvarme, 2. Lt. H. 
Hansen), 
 
 
 
 
 
Clothall ( A. Johnsen, 
W. Hansen, J. Melsom, 
L. Aagard, B. Pettersen 
W/T operator from 
Sweden) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To organise protection of 
‘Foscott’ targets in D.16, in 
Telemark and Buskerud. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
To join the other SOE groups 
operating in the Oslo area and 
work with them under the 
authority of SL and the direct 
command of Gunnar Sønsteby. 
 
To cover the port of Narvik. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover D14.1, Buskerud and 
Telemark. 
 
To reinforce the ‘Grebe’ party 
and help undertake railway 
sabotage. 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
To act as a reception party for 
Operation Waxwing, (see 
below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To provide protection for  the 
power stations at Askim, 
southeast of Oslo, which 
supplied  power to the capital. 
 
 
 
 
German activity the group was back in 
Stockholm.  The whole group was back in 
Norway by the end of April 
 
Dropped on 21 February the group made 
contact with DL for D.16.  Targets around 
Kongsberg were agreed and training of local 
cells began.  German raids, however, soon 
followed and in clashes a number of enemy 
troops were killed, which led to further raids 
and the loss of equipment.  Nevertheless, by 
the time of the liberation ‘Chacewater ’ had 
300 men under them and together they took 
over their targets intact.  
 
In January Birkeland returned to the UK.  He 
returned to Norway on 21 February and the 
priority was to protect certain important sites 
in the area (See above).  
 
Further reinforcement. 
 
  
Dropped on 22 February and became part of 
the ‘Oslo Gang’ operating under Sønsteby. 
 
 
 
 
Arrived at the ‘Sepals II’ base on 22 
February and brought, with the help of 
Swedish soldiers, significant supplies.  
Contacts were made with Milorg in D.40 and 
with Kyllingmark, head of the ‘Sepals’ 
operation. Stores were moved closer to 
Narvik and training undertaken but activity 
by enemy troops meant that progress was 
slow.  
 
Was due to be landed on 23 February but the 
operation was replaced by ‘Chacewater’.  
 
Both ‘Griffon’ and Guillemot’ with two 
Norwegian army officers were dropped on 
24 February and assisted ‘Grebe’ in its area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the end o f January it was decided that H. 
Ryan (see above) and these three would act 
as a reception party for Operation Waxwing.  
There were problems with the Swedish 
authorities on the border and it was 
eventually the end of February before the 
party successfully crossed into Norway.  The 
‘Waxwing’ party was dropped on 24 March. 
 
Eventually dropped on 3 March and after a 
long march arrived in D.11.  They began to 
reconnoitre the targets, draw up plans, and 
organise local protection groups.  Employees 
from within the targets were also trained in 
protection skills.  By the end of April these 
groups were made up of 4-500 men.  From 7 
May ‘Clothall’ was mobilised and over the 
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March 1945  
(Stockholm) 
 
 
March 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
March 1945 
 
March 1945 
(Air & 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
March 1945 
(Air- 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1945 
(Air) 
 
March 1945 
 
 
 
Crofton (E. Juden, L. 
Schanke, O. Mjelde, B. 
Bjølset) 
 
Caldy I (2nd Lt. Songe-
Møller) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cormorant I ( B. 
Stenseth) 
 
 
Sepals Gorgon 
 
Orm (B. Hansen, B. 
Sætre) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rook (L. Petteresen, 
C. Tønseth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Puffin (S. Blindheim) 
 
 
Wren (K. J. Aarsæther, 
T. Baakind, A. Øvre, E. 
Sem-Jacobsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whinchat (R. Holter) 
 
 
Chaffinch (F. Solheim, 
 
 
 
To protect power, repeater, and 
telecommunications stations 
around Mo i Rana. 
 
The objective was to protect 
various power stations and 
repeater stations in D.18, in 
southern Norway.  The party was 
instructed to work for the 
District Leader and to have 
Milorg groups working for it. 
 
To reinforce the District 
Leadership and increase the 
preparedness of the D14..3. 
 
(See above). 
 
To establish a reception base 
centred on Trysil in eastern 
Norway. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was partly a plan, originally 
called Operation Tiger, to kidnap 
a German naval officer, Kapitan 
zur see, Hans Roesing, who it 
was believed was the authority 
behind U-boat operations out of 
Bergen.  The party was also 
instructed to organise sabotage 
and intelligence groups to 
undertake the work previously 
carried out by Saborg and BAR. 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 The original objective was to 
carry out sabotage against 
communication lines south of 
Steinkjer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To reinforce the DL and increase 
the preparedness of the District. 
 
To work in D.17, in Telemark, to 
following days occupied its targets. 
 
 
Left Stockholm in March to join up with the 
Sepals III’ base. 
 
 
This operation was instructed to take care of 
Høgefoss and Even Stadfoss power station, 
but little detail of this operation has 
survived. 
 
 
 
 
Dropped on the night of 3 March.  Stenseth 
carried out further training in the area. 
 
 
(See above). 
 
The first party was dropped on 3 March and 
included a W/T operator.  Radio contact was 
made with the UK and a group of four with 
the base leader, Captain Aasen, arrived from 
Sweden.  Supplies were initially limited and 
a strong German presence meant a lot of the 
work continued from across the Swedish 
border.  Nevertheless, co-operation with 
Milorg was good and supplies and further 
teams arrived from Stockholm.  At the 
German surrender the Orm leadership with 
75 men crossed the border.  On 9 May they 
accepted the surrender from the local 
German commandant. 
 
Arrived on 11 March but failed to locate its 
target.  The team worked closely with the 
Milorg DL and at the beginning of May 
made contact with the German commander 
in Bergen.  On 8 May the Gestapo left the 
town and on 9 May around 1100 local men 
were mobilised and occupied the important 
points in the locality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The plan was to drop the party but this did 
not happen and eventually it was sent to 
Stockholm.  Toward the end of April the 
group, strengthened by six men trained in 
Sweden, went into Norway.  By this stage it 
had been decided that its role should change 
to a series of protective tasks.  At the end of 
April it was decided that Lt. G. Klem should 
join the party and its name was changed to 
‘Wren Antipodes’ with the task of protecting 
Gudaa railway bridge.  Whether or not Klem 
entered Norway is unclear.  
 
Holter was to be dropped on the night of 22 
March. 
  
This was the last expedition to this district 
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(Air) 
 
 
March 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O. Aas) 
 
 
Waxwing (12 men 
from the Norwegian 
Parachute Company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rype (OSS operation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ibrox/Quail (SAS 
team)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medley (R. Larsen, K. 
Brodkorp-Danielsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antipodes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
carry out instruction for Milorg 
groups in the area. 
 
The objective was to help with 
attempts to delay German 
withdrawals from northern 
Norway by attacking the railway 
between Grong and Majavatn, 
north of Trondheim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The party under the command of 
Major William Colby was 
instructed to help delay German 
withdrawals by attacking the 
railway south of Grong in the 
county of Trøndelag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was a plan to drop a party 
of 11 SAS soldiers and two 
Norwegians to attack the 
Snåsamoen bridge in north 
Trøndelag.  ‘Quail’ was the 
reception party that would be 
sent from Stockholm. 
 
To protect Bårdshaug sub-station 
and Berkåk repeater station in 
southern Trøndelag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was a plan to keep open the 
major routes into Norway from 
Sweden by protecting the 
bridges over the River Glomma 
in eastern Norway.  Seven 
expeditions were set up in 
Stockholm and 6 UK officers 
were selected to assist Milorg 
and groups that were already in 
Norway. 
 
and training was undertaken over the 
following weeks. 
 
The original plan was to drop a group of 24, 
but on the night of 24-25 March a party of 
only 12 was dropped under the command of 
Major Ole Jacob Bangstad.  The 
‘Cramlington’ party received them.  On 15 
April they attacked the railway 50-km north 
of Grong and destroyed 400 metres of line.  
On 21 April the group raided Namskogen 
station destroying crossings and switches.  
On 23 April the group blew up 800 yards of 
rail north of Trongfors.  Bangstad returned to 
Stockholm at the end of April and the group 
moved to a base across the Swedish border.  
The group carried out work in the area after 
the German capitulation.     
 
Eight B-24 Liberators took off on 24 March 
carrying a total of 36 men.  Only one 
Norwegian and 16 Americans were, 
however, eventually dropped.  One plane 
dropped its group in Sweden and three 
planes returned to Scotland with their loads 
intact.   The team was met by a reception 
party and eventually ‘Rype’ consisted of 16 
Americans and 7 Norwegians.  They 
established a base at Gjevsjøen and prepared 
operations.  On 15 April the group blew up 
Tangen bridge, and on 25 April several 
sections of the railway in Lurudalen.  The 
party left Gjevsjøen on 11 May and 
proceeded to Steinkjer, where they remained 
for several days.     
 
Due to bad weather ‘Ibrox’ was cancelled at 
the beginning of April.  The reception party 
had left Stockholm on 26 March and arrived 
at their destination on 30 March.  They made 
radio contact but on 4 April they were forced 
back to Stockholm, where they arrived 3 
days later. 
 
This operation was initially given to the 
‘Dodsworth’ team.  This team of four was, 
however, never used and its job was 
eventually taken over by the team that was to 
act as the reception party for ‘Widgeon’, a 
group of three that would undertake railway 
sabotage between Støren and Opdal.  
‘Widgeon’ never arrived and therefore its 
reception party was renamed ‘Medley’ and 
took over the role originally allocated to 
‘Dodsworth’.  It carried out its tasks at the 
capitulation. 
 
Of the seven expeditions, all but two reached 
their destinations.  The ‘Wren’, ‘Clothall’, 
and ‘Sepals II’ operations were also given an 
‘Antipodes’ role and reinforced by additional 
officers.  At least three officers also arrived 
in D.11 to assist Milorg in preparing for 
bridge protection.  Milorg also made 
preparations in the border districts to protect 
key bridges. 
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April 1945 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1945 
(Stockholm) 
 
 
 
April 1945 
(Sea) 
 
April 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
April 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
April 1945 
(Air) 
 
April 1945 
(Air) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 1945 
(Sea) 
 
April/May 
1945 (Air) 
 
 
 
 
May 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 1945 
(Sea) 
Polar Bear IV (D. 
Ånestad, B. Nilsen) 
 
 
 
 
Landrail (Capt. R. 
Kvaal, I. Fosseide, R. 
Arnesen) 
 
 
Bjørn West (A. 
Mathiesen) 
 
Varg II (P. Vexels, O. 
Veraas, Capt. 
Christophersen) 
 
Dipper (O. 
Walderhaug, H. Roald, 
R. Gathaw) 
 
 
 
Chiffchaff I (E. 
Johnsen) 
 
Varg III (M. 
Sønneland, D.  
Sjørestad) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bjørn West VI (M. 
Eikanger) 
 
Caldy II & III (A. 
Fjeld, J. Stumpf) 
 
 
 
 
Ruff (H. Brandt)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stork (A. Rosenberg, 
J. Holvik, J. 
Heyerdahl-Larsen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Skua (J. Wright-Flood) 
 
To protect Stavanger  
. 
 
 
 
 
This group was instructed to take 
over command of the many 
military groups operating in 
Trøndelag. 
 
(See above). 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
This group was instructed to 
organise and train local Milorg 
groups and lead the protection of 
power stations in sub-district 
21..3. 
 
To carry out instruction in D.12. 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
(See above). 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective was to set up a 
W/T station on the coast around 
Sognefjord to improve 
communication with the 
reception committees that were 
organising the collection of 
supplies or pick-ups. 
 
To organise and instruct groups 
around Sognefjord in weapons 
and guerrilla warfare, link up 
with existing groups, receive 
weapons, and prepare protection 
of local power stations and 
telephone exchanges. 
 
 
 
To provide radio contact 
between the ‘Siskin’ group and 
After the failure of the first operation this 
team was dropped at Årdal in southern 
Norway on 25 April.  With the help of 
‘Osprey’ they eventually arrived in 
Stavanger. 
                    
Crossed the border from Sweden on 5 May 
and reached Trondheim on the afternoon of 8 
May.  
 
 
Further reinforcement. 
 
 
This party was dropped on 17 April and 
included the British liaison officer Captain 
Christophersen.   
 
Landed on the 21 April, but arrests in the 
area meant they returned and arrived back in 
the Shetlands two days later.  
 
 
 
Instruction was carried out until the end of 
the war. 
 
The camp was eventually divided into four 
billeting areas.  The first billeting area was 
eventually dropped because it had not 
received any supplies.  The second billeting 
area was placed under Knut Haukelid.  
‘Varg’ also became involved in counter-
scorch operations, focusing on the power 
stations in the Arendal area.  Significant 
weapons for up to 2000 men were dropped 
but there was still a lack of provisions and 
therefore the camp never really got going.  
 
Further reinforcement.  
 
 
The first operation was dropped on the night 
of 25-26 April and the second on 2-3 May, 
to protect Skerka and Nomeland power 
stations respectively. 
 
 
Landed on 4 May only a few days before the 
German capitulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Landed on 4 May.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Landed on 4 May. 
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May 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 1945 
(Air- 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 1945 
 
 
 
May 1945 
(Sea) 
 
 
 
Redpoll (G. Løken) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polar Bear V (G.  
Gundersen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polar Bear VII (H. 
Kristensen, I. 
Sklelbred) 
 
Redbreast (R.  
Mathiesen) 
 
 
 
 
Barming (G. Klem, P. 
Ihlen, J. Andreassen) 
 
Bracknell and 
Reproach  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
the UK. 
 
To establish a radio station on 
the coast in close to Bergen and 
in the vicinity of a suitable 
landing area in order to provide a 
speedy means of obtaining 
contact with reception 
committees. 
 
To cover the port of 
Kristiansand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cover the ports of Ålesund 
and Veblungnes. 
 
 
The objective was to send a W/T 
operator to maintain W/T 
communication between the 
Bremnes and Stord area and 
theUK  
 
To protect sites in Kristiansand. 
 
 
To protect various power 
stations sites on the Lofoten 
Islands. 
 
 
 
Landed on 4 May.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Gundersen was sent to Stockholm on 4 
April from where he travelled by boat to 
Høvåg outside Kristiansand, arriving just 
before the capitulation.  The Germans had 
made preparations to blow up the harbour 
but the local German commandant agreed 
that nothing would be carried out.  
Eventually, Gundersen with a group of 80 
men took over the port. 
 
This was cancelled.  
 
 
 
By the time Mathiesen was sent in the 
German forces in Norway had capitulated  
 
 
 
 
Never carried out.  Milorg protected the 
objectives. 
 
Never carried out.          
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